Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform? A transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention

For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based on our experiential affective pre-discursive world-life. In this respect, here are some of the leading questions of my investigation: What are the differences and the proximities between these methods and attentional activity? Why is the latter not put to the fore as a method? To what extent is this secondary part played by attention linked to the constitution of phenomenology as opposed to psychology (for which attention is a central theme), and what does it mean for the impossibility of phenomenology to freeing itself completely from psychology?     

Are girls with problems of attention underrecognized?

There is a generally held belief that disorders of attention (e.g., ADHD) are to be found primarily among boys, not girls. We question the evidence relating to sex differences in the prevalence of attentional disorders and suggest possible reasons why reported sex differences appear limited to teacher ratings. An examination of the admittedly scarce literature on correlates of ADHD behaviors suggests no strong evidence for sex differences in the pattern of developmental, attentional and background correlates. We recommend the use of sex-specific norms and diagnostic criteria to identify girls with problems of attention and our plea is for more research to examine the nature of attention deficits in girls.     

Does the corollary discharge of attention exist?

We discuss experimental support for the existence of a corollary discharge signal of attention movement control and its formulation in terms of the corollary discharge of attention model of attention movement (CODAM). The data is from fMRI, MEG and EEG activity observed about 200 ms after stimulus onset in various attention paradigms and in which the activity is mainly sited in parietal and extra-striate visual areas. Moreover the data arises from neural activity observed before report of a subject's experience occurs. The overall experimental support for the existence of a copy of the attention movement control signal generates, it is suggested, a viable route to explore the relation between this signal and human consciousness, as concluded in the paper.     

Does contextual cuing guide the deployment of attention?

Contextual cuing experiments show that when displays are repeated, reaction times to find a target decrease over time even when observers are not aware of the repetition. It has been thought that the context of the display guides attention to the target. The authors tested this hypothesis by comparing the effects of guidance in a standard search task with the effects of contextual cuing. First, in standard search, an improvement in guidance causes search slopes (derived from Reaction Time x Set Size functions) to decrease. In contrast, the authors found that search slopes in contextual cuing did not become more efficient over time (Experiment 1). Second, when guidance was optimal (e.g., in easy feature search), they still found a small but reliable contextual cuing effect (Experiments 2a and 2b), suggesting that other factors, such as response selection, contribute to the effect. Experiment 3 supported this hypothesis by showing that the contextual cuing effect disappeared when the authors added interference to the response selection process. Overall, the data suggest that the relationship between guidance and contextual cuing is weak and that response selection can account for part of the effect.     

What kind of attention modulates the Stroop effect?

An intersection of three literatures (skilled word recognition, spatial attention, and the Stroop effect) is addressed in a series of four experiments. The results, in conjunction with other observations, are taken to suggest that (1) thedefault value for spatial attention in visual word recognition is distributed across the word, (2) precuing a single letter position serves to narrow the focus of spatial attention, and (3) this reduces or prevents activation in the word recognition system. Consequently, the Stroop effect is reduced in magnitude or eliminated, depending on details of the context. Contrary to the widespread view that it reflects automatic processing, the Stroop effect is better conceptualized as reflecting the action of default settings in the word recognition and attentional systems. Some relations between consciousness, context, and control are noted.     

Action or attention in social inhibition of return?

Psychological Research - When two individuals alternate reaching responses to targets located in a visual display, reaction times are longer when responses are directed to where the co-actor just...     

Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention

In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is to intend it as it would appear if we were to have an exhaustively synthetic explication of it. This perceptual apperceptive surplus is, on the other hand, distinguished from the surplus that categorial form represents over the perceptual sense data. In this paper I show how the apperceptive surplus can also be understood as a synthetic link to past experience that is passively operative in any present perception. The synthetic link to both past and possible experience is a link to non-actual perceptions. Links to non-actual experience are despite their non-actuality nevertheless genuinely intentional in that they enter into the sense of any actively constituted object understood as a unity of sense. Key to this interpretation is an explanation of how Husserl appropriated the key concepts of attention and apperception from psychologists of his day, such as Stumpf and Wundt.     

Feature absence–presence and two theories of lapses of sustained attention

We conducted two experiments using search asymmetry to test two theories of sustained attention lapses currently debated in the literature: the mindlessness theory and the resource theory. In the first experiment, participants performed a feature present and a feature absent sustained attention to response task (SART). The mindlessness theory predicts more commission errors in a feature present SART than a feature absent SART, while resource theory predicts the reverse, i.e. more commission errors in a feature absent SART than feature present SART. The latter occurred. In the second study, participants performed a naturalistic scene vigilance task with targets more analogous to a feature present search or more analogous to a feature absent search. The vigilance decrement occurred, with an increase in reaction time to targets over the course of the vigil. The decrement was more pronounced with the targets more analogous to a feature absent search. Overall, the results of both studies support a resource theory of sustained attention lapses, not the mindlessness theory.     

Contingent attentional capture or delayed allocation of attention?

Under certain circumstances, external stimuli will elicit an involuntary shift of spatial attention, referred to as attentional capture. According to the contingent involuntary orienting account (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992), capture is conditioned by top-down factors that set attention to respond involuntarily to stimulus properties relevant to one's behavioral goals. Evidence for this comes from spatial cuing studies showing that a spatial cuing effect is observed only when cues have goal-relevant properties. Here, we examine alternative, decision-level explanations of the spatial cuing effect that attribute evidence of capture to postpresentation delays in the voluntary allocation of attention, rather than to on-line involuntary shifts in direct response to the cue. In three spatial cuing experiments, delayed-allocation accounts were tested by examining whether items at the cued location were preferentially processed. The experiments provide evidence that costs and benefits in spatial cuing experiments do reflect the on-line capture of attention. The implications of these results for models of attentional control are discussed.     

Modulations of the processing of line discontinuities under selective attention conditions?

We examined whether the processing of discontinuities involved in figure-ground segmentation, like line ends, can be modulated under selective attention conditions. Subjects decided whether a gap in collinear or parallel lines was located to the right or left. Two stimuli were displayed in immediate succession. When the gaps were on the same side, reaction times (RTs) for the second stimulus increased when collinear lines followed parallel lines, or the reverse, but only when the two stimuli shared the same orientation and location. The effect did not depend on the global form of the stimuli or on the relative orientation of the gaps. A frame drawn around collinear elements affected the results, suggesting a crucial role of the "amodal" orthogonal lines produced when line ends are aligned. Including several gaps in the first stimulus also eliminated RT variations. By contrast, RT variations remained stable across several experimental blocks and were significant for interstimulus intervals from 50 to 600 msec between the two stimuli. These results are interpreted in terms of a modulation of the processing of line ends or the production of amodal lines, arising when attention is selectively drawn to a gap.     

From stimulus-driven to appraisal-driven attention: Towards differential effects of goal relevance and goal relatedness on attention?

The Component Process Model posits that attention is appraisal-driven rather than stimulus-driven and that the appraisal of relevance is of critical importance in such a mechanism. This means that any stimulus can attract attention or not depending on how relevant it is appraised. This hypothesis was tested in an implicit border similarity judgement task, in which thirsty participants were presented with bottles and vases that were respectively very relevant and weakly relevant to their goal to quench their thirst. These stimuli were also presented to quenched participants for whom none of the stimuli was relevant. The findings support the idea that our attention is more likely to be appraisal-driven than stimulus-driven, since bottles produced an attentional interference in thirsty participants only. It was also observed that, even if vases were judged weakly relevant by thirsty participants, they produced an attentional interference compared to empty stimuli, which was not the case in the quenched participants group. The concept of goal relatedness was proposed as an explanation for this result, and methodological implications were also discussed.     

Neuronal representations of cognitive state: reward or attention?

The effects of spatial or featural attention on the activity of neurons have been studied in many experiments that have used a variety of neurophysiological approaches. Other experiments have examined how expectations about reward are represented in neuronal activity in various brain regions. Although attention and reward are distinct concepts, I argue here that many neurophysiological experiments on attention and reward do not permit a clean dissociation between the two. This problem arises in part because reward contingencies are the only parameter manipulated in any of these experiments. I describe how attention and reward expectations have been confounded, giving rise to uncertainty about how signals related to attention and reward are distributed in the brain.     

Why does the gaze of others direct visual attention?

Viewing another person directing his or her gaze can produce automatic shifts of covert visual attention in the same direction. This holds true even when the task‐relevant target is much more likely to occur at the uncued location. These findings, along with other evidence, have been taken to suggest that gaze represents a “special” stimulus—the foundation of a social cognition system that can make inferences about the mental states of other people. However, gaze‐driven cueing effects could simply be due to spatial compatibility between cue and target. We compared the attentional effects of gaze shifts to a face with the tongue extended laterally to the left or right. When tongue direction was a nonpredictive cue, we found cueing effects from tongues that were indistinguishable from those produced by gaze. However, in contrast to previous findings with gaze, tongue cues did not overcome a validity manipulation in which targets were four times more likely to appear at the uncued location. We conclude that simple attentional cueing effects from gaze may be better explained by spatial compatibility, and that more complex, unique features of cueing from gaze may be better indices into perceptual systems specialized for social cognition.     

The role of closure in defining the “objects” of object-based attention

Many recent studies have concluded that the underlying units of visual attention are often discrete objects whose boundaries constrain the allocation of attention. However, relatively few studies have explored the particular stimulus cues that determine what counts as an “object” of attention. We explore this issue in the context of the two-rectangles stimuli previously used by many investigators. We first show, using both spatial-cuing and divided-attention paradigms, that same-object advantages occur even when the ends of the two rectangles are not drawn. This is consistent with previous reports that have emphasized the importance of individual contours in guiding attention, and our study shows that such effects can occur in displays that also contain grouping cues. In our divided-attention experiment, however, this contour-driven same-object advantage was significantly weaker than that obtained with the standard stimulus, with the added cue of closure—demonstrating that contour-based processes are not the whole story. These results confirm and extend the observation that same-object advantages can be observed even without full-fledged objects. At the same time, however, these studies show that boundary closure—one of the most important cues to objecthood per se—can directly influence attention. We conclude that object-based attention is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon; object-based effects can be independently strengthened or weakened by multiple cues to objecthood.     

The role of attention in automatization: Does attention operate at encoding, or retrieval, or both?

In this research, we investigated whether attention operates in the encoding of automatized information, the retrieval of automatized information, or in both cases. Subjects searched two-word displays for members of a target category in focused-attention or divided-attention conditions that were crossed with block (training vs. transfer). To see whether subjects encoded all available items or only attended items, we compared performance for subjects in different training conditions but in the same transfer condition. Subjects encoded attended items. To see whether subjects retrieved all the items they had in memory, or only items associated with that to which they were attending at retrieval, we compared performance for subjects in the same training conditions but in different transfer conditions. Subjects retrieved attended items. Attention was found to operate at both encoding and retrieval. These findings support the instance theory of automaticity, which predicts the role of attention at encoding and retrieval     

Is “Inhibition of Return” due to the inhibition of the return of attention?

Inhibition of Return (IOR) is usually explained in terms of orienting–reorienting of attention, emphasizing an underlying mechanism that inhibits the return of attention to previously selected locations. Recent data challenge this explanation to the extent that the IOR effect is observed at the location where attention is oriented to, where no reorienting of attention is needed. To date, these studies have involved endogenous attentional selection of attention and thus indicate a dissociation between the voluntary attention of spatial attention and the IOR effect. The present work demonstrates a dissociation between the involuntary orienting of spatial attention and the IOR effect. We combined nonpredictive peripheral cues with nonpredictive central orienting cues (either arrows or gaze). The IOR effect was observed to operate independent of involuntary spatial orienting. These data speak against the “reorienting hypothesis” of IOR. We suggest an alternative explanation whereby the IOR effect reflects a cost in detecting a new event (the target) at the location where another event (a cue) was coded before.     

Failures of cognitive control or attention? The case of stop-signal deficits in schizophrenia

We used Bayesian cognitive modelling to identify the underlying causes of apparent inhibitory deficits in the stop-signal paradigm. The analysis was applied to stop-signal data reported by Badcock et al. (Psychological Medicine 32: 87-297, 2002) and Hughes et al. (Biological Psychology 89: 220-231, 2012), where schizophrenia patients and control participants made rapid choice responses, but on some trials were signalled to stop their ongoing response. Previous research has assumed an inhibitory deficit in schizophrenia, because estimates of the mean time taken to react to the stop signal are longer in patients than controls. We showed that these longer estimates are partly due to failing to react to the stop signal (“trigger failures”) and partly due to a slower initiation of inhibition, implicating a failure of attention rather than a deficit in the inhibitory process itself. Correlations between the probability of trigger failures and event-related potentials reported by Hughes et al. are interpreted as supporting the attentional account of inhibitory deficits. Our results, and those of Matzke et al. (2016), who report that controls also display a substantial although lower trigger-failure rate, indicate that attentional factors need to be taken into account when interpreting results from the stop-signal paradigm.     

Cueing the location of a distractor: an inhibitory mechanism of spatial attention?

Presenting an irrelevant distractor increases reaction times to a target. The current study shows that cueing the location of an upcoming 'distractor' can help to reduce the effects the distractor has on target processing. It is hypothesized that this reduction is due to the active inhibition of the cued location. In two experiments in which the location of the distractor was cued in advance, a reduced effect of the distractor on target-processing was observed. Analyses indicated that this effect was most likely caused by inhibition of the distractor location. The present findings suggest that inhibition plays an important role in visual-spatial selection processes and that this inhibitory mechanism can be controlled in a top-down fashion.