Empathy present and future

The empathy concept has central significance for social and personality psychology and in many other domains, including neuroscience, clinical/abnormal psychology, and the health professions. However, the current diversity in conceptual and operational definitions, and the promiscuous use of the term “empathy,” threaten the ability of researchers to advance the field. The present article provides a quantitative review and conceptual analysis of empathy definitions and usages by examining 393 studies published between 2001 and 2013, and 96 studies published in 2017. We document the prevalence and diversity of definitions, as well as inconsistencies between conceptual definitions and measurements employed. We discuss ways to refine the conceptualization and operationalization of the empathy construct, including for many purposes, bypassing the term empathy in favor of lower-level construct labels that more precisely describe what is actually being measured. In many cases we see no added theoretical or empirical value in applying the term empathy.     

Psychoanalytic observation

The recent focus on empathy as the essential activity in psychoanalytic data gathering has underemphasized the complexity of psychoanalytic observation and has failed to identify what truly makes it unique among modes of psychological investigation. It is a process that includes introspection and empathy. However, it also includes the analyst's observation of the patient's behavior, and particularly verbal behavior, in a way that is not necessarily empathic. The psychoanalytic use of introspection and behavioral observation together, as they are modified by the analysand's free association and the analyst's evenly hovering attention, provides a unique method of data gathering. The transient, mutually related regressions of analyst and analysand which partly constitute the analyzing instrument modify the field of observation available to both, providing better access to derivatives of the analysand's unconscious mental functioning. This more complex concept of psychoanalytic observation, as opposed to that in which empathy is predominant, has important implications for psychoanalytic training, clinical work, and theory.     

Psychiatry,Cultural Competency,and the Care of Ultra-Orthodox Jews: Achieving Secular and Theocentric Convergence Through Introspection

Several socio-cultural factors complicate mental health care in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish population. These include societal stigma, fear of the influence of secular ideas, the need for rabbinic approval of the method and provider, and the notion that excessive concern with the self is counter-productive to religious growth. Little is known about how the religious beliefs of this population might be employed in therapeutic contexts. One potential point of convergence is the Jewish philosophical tradition of introspection as a means toward personal, interpersonal, and spiritual growth. We reviewed Jewish religious-philosophical writings on introspection from antiquity (the Babylonian Talmud) to the Middle Ages (Duties of the Heart), the eighteenth century (Path of the Just), the early Hasidic movement (the Tanya), and modernity (Alei Shur, Halakhic Man). Analysis of these texts indicates that: (1) introspection can be a religiously acceptable reaction to existential distress; (2) introspection might promote alignment of religious beliefs with emotions, intellect and behavior; (3) some religious philosophers were concerned about the demotivating effects of excessive introspection and self-critique on religious devotion and emotional well-being; (4) certain religious forms of introspection are remarkably analogous to modern methods of psychiatry and psychology, particularly psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy. We conclude that homology between religious philosophy of emotion and secular methods of psychiatry and psychotherapy may inform the choice and method of mental health care, foster the therapist-patient relationship, and thereby enable therapeutic convergence.     

'Introspectionism' and the mythical origins of scientific psychology

According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology's history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of "behaviour," that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird.     

Psychoanalysis and self psychology: a metapsychological essay with a clinical illustration

This paper is an attempt to evaluate critically some theoretical and clinical consequences of the psychoanalytic psychology of the self in its broad, supraordinate position. From this either-or position, advocated by Kohut and his followers, self psychology corrodes some of the most central explanatory concepts of psychoanalysis--conflict, transference, and resistance. In an extensive case illustration, I have tried to show the conceptual and technical impoverishment of the self-psychological views with respect to the concepts of organization in conflict, in defense, and in development, and with respect to the role of aggression and to the concepts of transference and resistance. These consequences of the supraordinate self-psychological viewpoint are related to its overt attack on metapsychology, which is linked to an epistemological fallacy as a consequence of the exclusive use of empathy and introspection with grave consequences for our explanatory power, i.e., a fundamental confusion between the realms of content and of function. This also implies an obstacle in the systematic study of self-deception and a threat to psychoanalysis defined as the study of human behavior considered from the viewpoint of conflict. Finally, an attempt is made to integrate the views of Kohut with those of Winnicott and of classical metapsychology.     

‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology

According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of “behaviour,” that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird.     

Attitudes toward empathy in domestic dogs and cats

This exploratory study included 524 undergraduate students (360 women, M age = 21.1 yr., SD = 6.1; and 164 men, M age = 20.0 yr., SD = 3.6) enrolled in introductory psychology sections who completed the Empathy in Pet Dogs and Cats Scale to assess their attitudes regarding how much domestic dogs and cats show vicarious experiencing of the thoughts, feelings, or attitudes of their owners. A principal components analysis followed by varimax rotation extracted five factors accounting for 60.85% of the total variance as follows: (1) Pets' empathy for owner, (2) Cats' empathy for owner, (3) Dogs' empathy for owner, (4) Souls in humans and pets, (5) Owners' empathy for pets. Women gave significantly higher ratings than men regarding dogs' and cats' knowing when their owners are happy, sad, or angry. Women also gave significantly higher ratings than men regarding dogs' and cats' feeling love and compassion for their owners. Specific instances of empathy in pets underscore the need for contemporary research to be inclusive of operational definitions of measures of empathy.     

It's Time We Brought Introspection Out of the Closet

ABSTRACT— I identify the main reasons why introspection unofficially has been banned from the field for some 100 years, though it has been partly smuggled back in through the use of "verbal (self-) reports." I then show why introspection is indispensable to psychology. I argue that this ban has retarded the progress of psychology by taking attention away from the problem of the accuracy of self-reports, limiting our understanding of concepts like emotion, discouraging psychologists from using introspection themselves, and ignoring the study of how to develop introspective skill. I conclude by suggesting some approaches to validating introspective reports.     

The role of primary prevention in mental health services: A review and critique

Community psychology in the West has had a growing impact on mental health service provision. One facet of this development has been the advocacy of an increased focus on the primary prevention of mental illness. This paper reviews both theoretical and practical work in this area in order to assess the current role and relevance of primary preventive interventions. There is a discussion of primary prevention's historical and theoretical contexts, of its conceptualisations and definitions, of criticisms of its relevance and efficacy, and of examples of its practice. It is argued that primary prevention is inappropriately marginalised in current service provision and that there is a need to engage in the long-term planning and evaluation of primary preventive interventions in order to facilitate their fuller incorporation into national and local policies on mental health.     

Varieties of Empathy and Moral Agency

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency.     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion

The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy.     

内省的心理学新探─—自我观察与心理调适

本文对内省作为一种心理学的基本方法作了历史回顾。作者还把内省看作人的某种个性倾向或心理特征尝试进行实证研究。调查结果表明,内省在被试看来,是自我概念形成与发展所必不可少的。结果还使作者确信,对内省联系个体心理与行为的调适作实证研究,不仅可行,而且有益。     

Feeling our way into empathy: Carl rogers,Heinz Kohut,and Jesus

Throughout their academic careers Carl Rogers and Heinz Kohut developed two contrasting definitions of empathy that influenced the ways in which both men sought to help their clients cope with emotional suffering. These two different understandings of empathy are contrasted to each other and finally compared with the understanding of empathy demonstrated in the teachings and actions of Jesus. It is hoped that through studying these ancient religious narratives we might be able to recover a deeper meaning of empathy.     

What is it Like to be Someone Else? Simulation and Empathy

This paper explores two models of empathy. One model places theory centre stage; the other emphasises our capacity to re-enact fragments of another's mental life. I argue that considerations of parsimony strongly support the latter, simulative approach. My results have consequences for the current debate between the theory-theory and simulation theory. That debate is standardly conceived as a debate about mental state attribution rather than about empathy. However, on the simulation model, empathy and mental state attribution involve a common mechanism. Thus the strength of the simulative approach to empathy lends considerable credence to the simulation account of mental state attribution. Considerations of empathy are thus surprisingly important in the philosophy of mind..     

天人合一心理研究范式发微

从学科本体对心理学做重新审视。在方法论上,把意识和物质等同犯了“范畴错误”; 在科学性上,心理学不该用证实主义而应用证伪主义的标准,且心理学难以成为自然科学意义的科学却有望成为胡塞尔“严格意义的科学”; 在认识论上,主客二分研究范式具有“‘主-客-间'双重障碍”。天人合一范式可解决双重障碍,并以直观内省体察普遍性定理。故汲取中国哲学中的观物取象法、虚壹而静原则、中国式内省并结合西方现象学提出天人合一研究范式的初步构想。     

Finding Empathy: How Neuroscientific Measures,Evidence and Conceptualizations Interact

ABSTRACT

Questions about how empathy should be conceptualized have long been a preoccupation of the field of empathy research. There are numerous definitions of empathy that have been proposed and that often overlap with other concepts such as sympathy and compassion. This makes communication between research groups or across disciplines difficult. Many researchers seem to see the diversity of definitions as a problem rather than a form of benign pluralism. Within this debate about conceptualization, researchers sometimes suggest that more neuroscientific evidence will make the problem go away – that uncovering the processes underlying empathy will thereby also sort out conceptual difficulties. In this paper, I challenge this assumption by examining how neuroscientists studying empathy use concepts in practice – both in the development of their measures and in the interpretation of their data. I argue that this neuroscientific literature demonstrates that continuity and stability comes from the use of certain established measures, while progress comes from expansion upon those measures and the flexibility of stated concepts. We do not ‘find’ empathy through increased neuroscientific evidence but we do get closer to understanding empathic processes, flexibly understood.     

共情的相关理论评述及动态模型探新

共情是发生在人际互动过程中的一种心理现象,恰当地共情不仅可以提高亲社会行为的发生几率,还可以有效抑制攻击行为。以往研究者大多从静态的角度对共情的定义、结构和机制等进行探讨,然而,共情作为一种心理过程,以动态的观点阐述其内部机制对于探讨共情的本质是十分必要的。本文首先回顾了以往研究者的共情定义,并在此基础上对共情进行了界定;之后在对共情相关的理论或模型评述的基础上提出了共情的动态模型,并结合以往的研究对动态模型进行了分析比较,最后是总结和对未来研究的展望。