Emotion judgments do not differ as a function of perceived nationality

This article reports three studies concerning the relationship between emotion judgments and perceived nationality of the expressors being judged. Study 1 demonstrated that observers do not reliably make implicit assumptions about the nationalities of the expressors in judgment tasks. Study 2 examined judgments of Americans and Japanese observers who were told that Caucasian and Asian expressors were Americans and Japanese, respectively, and who made fixed‐choice judgments and intensity ratings. Study 3 examined judgments of Americans given similar instructions and who used a multiscalar rating task. Neither Studies 2 nor 3 provided evidence that nationality information affected judgments. These findings have implications not only for basic emotion theory, but also for international and intercultural communication training.     

Rich contexts do not always enrich the accuracy of personality judgments

We test the common assumption that information ‘rich’ contexts lead to more accurate personality judgments than information ‘lean’ contexts. Pairs of unacquainted students rendered judgments of one another's personalities after interacting in one of three, increasingly rich, contexts: Internet ‘chat’, telephone, or face-to-face. Accuracy was assessed by correlating participants' judgments with a measure of targets' personalities that averaged self and informant ratings. As predicted, the visible traits of extraversion and conscientiousness were judged more accurately than the less visible traits of neuroticism and openness. However, judgment accuracy also depended on context. Judgments of extraversion and neuroticism improved as context richness increased (i.e., from Internet ‘chat’ to face-to-face), whereas judgments of conscientiousness and openness improved as context richness decreased (i.e., from face-to-face to Internet ‘chat’). Our findings suggest that context richness shapes not only the availability of personality cues but also the relevance of cues in any given context.     

Hemisphere-specific effects in word recognition do not require hemisphere-specific modes of access

Consistent with converging experimental evidence, we assume that foveal information is initially split across the two cerebral hemispheres. We have previously presented the SERIOL model of letter-position coding, which specifies how the resulting two halves of a letter string are integrated into an abstract representation of letter order. This representation is based on ordered pairs of two letters (bigrams); such a representation is created for input occurring at any location in the visual field. Various studies have shown hemisphere-specific effects in lexical access by using unilateral presentation of stimuli. While the hemisphere-independent means of lexical access in the SERIOL model (via bigrams) may seem inconsistent with these findings, we propose that such effects arise from the hemisphere-specific transformations necessary to create the bigram representation. We provide a theoretical account of the finding that high N (lexical neighborhood size) evokes facilitation in the RH, but not the LH (Lavidor & Ellis, 2002a, 2002b); an experiment discussed elsewhere (Whitney & Lavidor, 2003) has verified key predictions of this account. We also discuss the differing effects of word length across visual fields.     

Forgotten but not gone: Context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered—for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Forgotten but not gone: context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered--for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Automatic effects of instructions do not require the intention to execute these instructions

Prior research established that newly instructed stimulus-response mappings, which have never been executed overtly before, can lead to automatic response-congruency effects. Such instruction-based congruency effects have been taken as evidence for the hypothesis that the intention to execute stimulus-response mappings results into functional associations that serve future execution. The present study challenges this hypothesis by demonstrating in a series of four experiments that maintaining instructed stimulus-response mappings for future recognition, rather than for future execution, can also lead to an instruction-based congruency effect. These findings indicate that the instruction-based congruency effect emerges even when it is very unlikely that participants form the intention to execute instructions. Alternative interpretations of the instruction-based congruency effect are discussed.     

Phonemic awareness and spelling: children's judgments do not always agree with adults

The ability to make explicit judgments about speech sounds is important in learning to read and write an alphabetic system. However, even when children can make consistent judgments about sounds their judgments do not always agree with those of adults. In this study, some children from groups of kindergartners (mean age 5 years, 10 months) and first graders (mean age 6, 7) stated that /tr/ (as in "truck") did not begin with the sound /t/. This judgment was reflected in these children's spellings: They tended to spell /t/ before /r/ with CH, reflecting its affrication. Parallel results were found for /dr/. Further, some children judged that /c/ (as in "chill") and /j/ (as in "Jill") began with /t/ and /d/, respectively. They used the letters T and D to spell these sounds. Thus, children's attention to a phonetic level may result in judgments of speech sounds and spellings that are different from those of adults.     

Sources of confidence judgments in implicit cognition

Subjective reports of confidence are frequently used as a measure of awareness in a variety of fields, including artificial grammar learning. However, little is known about what information is used to make confidence judgments and whether there are any possible sources of information used to discriminate between items that are unrelated to confidence. The data reported here replicate an earlier experiment by Vokey and Brooks (1992) and show that grammaticality decisions are based on both the grammatical status of items and their similarity to study exemplars. The key finding is that confidence ratings made on a continuous scale (50%—100%) are closely related to grammaticality but are unrelated to all of the measures of similarity that were tested. By contrast, confidence ratings made on a binary scale (high vs. low) are related to both grammaticality and similarity. The data confirm an earlier finding (Tunney & Shanks, 2003) that binary confidence ratings are more sensitive to low levels of awareness than continuous ratings are and suggest that participants are conscious of all the information acquired in artificial grammar learning.     

Language,cognition, and second language grammaticality judgments

In first language research, there appear to be two predominant positions relating metalinguistic awareness to language development. One suggests that since metalinguistic awareness is related to primary language acquisition (comprehension and production), general cognitive processes perform a limited role in metalinguistic awareness. The other suggests that since metalinguistic awareness is more closely related to secondary language acquisition (reading and writing), a greater role is assumed by general cognitive processes. There have been some indirect attempts to study the role of language and cognition with respect to second language grammaticality judgments. There is growing evidence that metalinguistic awareness is a reliable indicator of developing second language competence. Furthermore, it has been shown that language aptitude is significantly related to metalinguistic awareness. The present study was designed to investigate the statistical relationship between second language grammaticality judgments and selected cognitive and linguistic variables. The variables studied were second language proficiency, second language classroom achievement, first language reading competence, language aptitude, nonverbal intelligence, field dependence-independence, and a written grammaticality judgment test tapping the ability to recognize, and correct, deviance. Subjects were college students in advanced English-as-a-second-language classes. Multivariate statistical techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of linguistic and cognitive variables to the individual variation demonstrated by the learners in their ability to detect deviance in English. The results showed that second language proficiency, second language achievement in the classroom, and language aptitude were significant predictors of the subjects' ability to make grammaticality judgments. First language reading competence was significantly related to subjects' ability to correct deviance. These observations are discussed in the light of: (1) the relationship among cognition, language, and metalinguistic awareness, and (2) the role of metalinguistic awareness in second language acquisition and second language learning.     

Grouping does not require attention

Many theories of visual perception stipulate that Gestalt grouping occurs preattentively. Subjects' failure to report perceiving even salient grouping patterns under conditions of inattention challenges this assumption (see, e.g., Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992), but Moore and Egeth (1997) showed that although subjects are indeed unable to identify grouping patterns outside the focus of attention, effects of these patterns on visual perception can be observed when they are assessed using implicit, rather than explicit, measures. However, this finding, which is the only one to date demonstrating grouping effects without attention, is open to an alternative account. In the present study, we eliminated this confound and replicated Moore and Egeth's findings, using the Müller-Lyer illusion (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we found converging evidence for these findings with a variant of the flanker task (Experiment 3), when the amount of available attentional resources was varied (Experiments 4 and 5). The results reinforce the idea that, although grouping outside the focus of attention cannot be the object of overt report, grouping processes can occur without attention.     

Older adults encode--but do not always use--perceptual details: intentional versus unintentional effects of detail on memory judgments

Investigations of memory deficits in older individuals have concentrated on their increased likelihood of forgetting events or details of events that were actually encountered (errors of omission). However, mounting evidence demonstrates that normal cognitive aging also is associated with an increased propensity for errors of commission-shown in false alarms or false recognition. The present study examined the origins of this age difference. Older and younger adults each performed three types of memory tasks in which details of encountered items might influence performance. Although older adults showed greater false recognition of related lures on a standard (identical) old/new episodic recognition task, older and younger adults showed parallel effects of detail on repetition priming and meaning-based episodic recognition (decreased priming and decreased meaning-based recognition for different relative to same exemplars). The results suggest that the older adults encoded details but used them less effectively than the younger adults in the recognition context requiring their deliberate, controlled use.     

The word-superiority effect does not require a T-scope

Six experiments examined the possibility of obtaining a word-superiority effect (WSE) without the use of brief stimulus exposures or a poststimulus mask. In each experiment, subjects were presented a stimulus string and two alternative strings that differed by a single letter (Reicher, 1969). The alternatives and stimulus remained in view until subjects responded, and subjects were under no pressure to respond quickly. In Experiments 1–3, the stimuli were presented in very small type so that they were difficult to see. Subjects were significantly more accurate with words than with nonwords, letters embedded among digits, or letters embedded among number signs (#s). In Experiments 4 and 5, the stimuli were embedded in a simultaneously present pattern mask. Subjects were significantly more accurate with words than with single letters by themselves. In the final experiment, the stimuli were presented in a mask with specific spatial frequency characteristics, and performance was significantly better with words than with nonwords. The WSE is a more general phenomenon than previously supposed; it is not limited to a tachistoscopic exposure.     

Individual differences in higher-level cognitive abilities do not predict overconfidence in complex task performance

Even when people perform tasks poorly, they often report unrealistically positive estimates of their own abilities in these situations. To better understand the origins of such overconfidence, we investigated whether it could be predicted by individual differences in working memory, attentional control, and self-reported trait impulsivity. Overconfidence was estimated by contrasting objective and subjective measures of situation awareness (the ability to perceive and understand task-relevant information in the environment), acquired during a challenging air traffic control simulation. We found no significant relationships between overconfidence and either working memory or attentional control. However, increased impulsivity significantly predicted greater overconfidence. In addition, overall levels of overconfidence were lower in our complex task than in previous studies that used less-complex lab-based tasks. Our results suggest that overconfidence may not be linked to high-level cognitive abilities, but that dynamic tasks with frequent opportunities for performance feedback may reduce misconceptions about personal performance.     

What preschool children do and do not do with ungrammatical word orders

Akhtar [J. Child Lang. 26 (1999) 339.] found that when 4-year-old English-speaking children hear novel verbs in transitive utterances with ungrammatical word orders (e.g., Elmo the tree meeked), they correct them to canonical SVO order almost all of the time. However, when 3-year-olds and older 2-year-olds hear these same utterances, they waver between correcting and using the ungrammatical ordering. In the current study, we adapted this task for children at 2;4, using an intransitive construction. The major finding was that children corrected the noncanonical word order less than half as often as Akhtar's 2-year-old subjects who were approximately 4 months older. At the same time, however, children showed in several ways that they had some implicit understanding of canonical SV order; for example, they used the novel verb which they heard used in grammatical word order more often than the novel verb which they heard in ungrammatical word order, and they consistently used pronouns and the progressive –s auxiliary in appropriate ways. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body of theory and research suggesting that the ontogenetic emergence of linguistic categories and schemas is a gradual process, as is the emergence of categories in other domains of cognitive development.