Judging risk behaviour and risk preference: The role of the evaluative connotation of risk terms

Two experiments investigate the impact of the evaluative connotation of risk terms on the judgment of risk behaviour and on risk preference. In the first experiment we focus on (1) the evaluation congruence of the risk terms with a general risk norm and (2) with subjects' individual risk preference, and its effects on the extremity of judgments of risk behaviour. In the second experiment we address (3) the effects of evaluative connotation of risk terms on risk preference. In the first experiment subjects were presented with four decision problems, each with a risky and a cautious decision option, and were required to judge options. Results showed that the judged discrepancy between the risky and cautious option was larger on scales which were evaluatively congruent with the general risk norm for that specific decision problem or with subjects' individual preference. More specificly, in decision problems for which there was considerable consensus about the risk-norm judgments were more extreme on scales which were congruent with the risk norm, in those problems lacking a clear-cut risk-norm judgments were more extreme on scales congruent with subjects' individual risk preference. In the second experiment we studied the reverse relation between the evaluative connotation of risk terms and risk preference. This experiment demonstrates that using evaluatively biased risk terms can affect risk preference. Using terms which imply a positive evaluation of risk-taking and a negative evaluation of risk avoidance led to increased risk preference, and vice versa. Results are discussed in the context of accentuation theory.     

Evaluative priming in a semantic flanker task: ERP evidence for a mutual facilitation explanation

In semantic flanker tasks, target categorization response times are affected by the semantic compatibility of the flanker and target. With positive and negative category exemplars, we investigated the influence of evaluative congruency (whether flanker and target share evaluative valence) on the flanker effect, using behavioral and electrophysiological measures. We hypothesized a moderation of the flanker effect by evaluative congruency on the basis of the assumption that evaluatively congruent concepts mutually facilitate each other’s activation (see Schmitz & Wentura in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 38:984–1000, 2012). Applying an onset delay of 50 ms for the flanker, we aimed to decrease the facilitative effect of an evaluatively congruent flanker on target encoding and, at the same time, increase the facilitative effect of an evaluatively congruent target on flanker encoding. As a consequence of increased flanker activation in the case of evaluative congruency, we expected a semantically incompatible flanker to interfere with the target categorization to a larger extent (as compared with an evaluatively incongruent pairing). Confirming our hypotheses, the flanker effect significantly depended on evaluative congruency, in both mean response times and N2 mean amplitudes. Thus, the present study provided behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for the mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts. Implications for the representation of evaluative connotations of semantic concepts are discussed.     

Electrophysiological responses to evaluative priming: the LPP is sensitive to incongruity

Previous studies examining event-related potentials and evaluative priming have been mixed; some find evidence that evaluative priming influences the N400, whereas others find evidence that it affects the late positive potential (LPP). Three experiments were conducted using either affective pictures (Experiments 1 and 2) or words (Experiment 3) in a sequential evaluative priming paradigm. In line with previous behavioral findings, participants responded slower to targets that were evaluatively incongruent with the preceding prime (e.g., negative preceded by positive) compared to evaluatively congruent targets (e.g., negative preceded by negative). In all three studies, the LPP was larger to evaluatively incongruent targets compared to evaluatively congruent ones, and there was no evidence that evaluative incongruity influenced the N400 component. Thus, the present results provide additional support for the notion that evaluative priming influences the LPP and not the N400. We discuss possible reasons for the inconsistent findings in prior research and the theoretical implications of the findings for both evaluative and semantic priming.     

After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli

Findings from three experiments suggest that participants’ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. Participants’ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that one’s automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.     

Evaluative priming of naming and semantic categorization responses revisited: a mutual facilitation explanation

The evaluative priming effect (i.e., faster target responses following evaluatively congruent compared with evaluatively incongruent primes) in nonevaluative priming tasks (such as naming or semantic categorization tasks) is considered important for the question of how evaluative connotations are represented in memory. However, the empirical evidence is rather ambiguous: Positive effects as well as null results and negatively signed effects have been found. We tested the assumption that different processes are responsible for these results. In particular, we argue that positive effects are due to target-encoding facilitation (caused by a congruent prime), while negative effects are due to prime-activation maintenance (caused by a congruent target) and subsequent response conflict. In 4 experiments, we used a negative prime-target stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) to minimize target-encoding facilitation and maximize prime maintenance. In a naming task (Experiment 1), we found a negatively signed evaluative priming effect if prime and target competed for naming responses. In a semantic categorization task (i.e., person vs. animal; Experiments 2 and 3), response conflicts between prime and target were significantly larger in case of evaluative congruence compared with incongruence. These results corroborate the theory that a prime has more potential to interfere with the target response if its activation is maintained by an evaluatively congruent target. Experiment 4a/b indicated valence specificity of the effect. Implications for the memory representation of valence are discussed.     

Visual and verbal coding in the interhemispheric transfer of information

A manual response was used to record a decision of ‘same’ or ‘differ’ on two visual signals which were presented simultaneously, either both to the same hemisphere or each to different hemispheres. The signals were drawn from the set of letters A, B, a, b. Eight subjects were required to match on the basis of the names of the letters (irrespective of whether they were capitals or lower case) and eight subjects were required to match on the basis of the visual identity of the signals.Reaction times were measured for ‘same’ and ‘differ’ decisions.This experiment extends a previous study by the same authors (Davis and Schmit 1971). The previous finding, that when two signals are presented each to different hemispheres, reaction times are shorter than when both are presented to the same hemisphere, was confirmed for both visual and name matching. New evidence is provided on the role of each hemisphere in the analysis and comparison of signals, on either a visual or a verbal basis, for ‘same’ and ‘differ’ decisions. A model to explain the results in terms of the different functions of the two hemispheres is proposed.     

Attitudinal effects of the use of evaluatively biased language

In an experiment to study the effects on attitudes of requiring subjects to use evaluatively biased language, 84 schoolchildren aged 13–14 years completed a questionnaire to measure their attitudes on the issue of adult authority over teenagers, before and after writing an essay on this issue in which they were either required to incorporate words from a list all of which implied a positive evaluation of a pro-authority position or a negative evaluation of an anti-authority position (pro-bias condition), or required to incorporate words where the implied evaluations were reversed (anti-bias condition), or were given no words to incorporate (control condition). Relative to controls, pro-bias subjects showed as a shift towards a more pro position and anti-bias subjects became more anti irrespective of their initial attitudes (pro-bias versus anti-bias comparison, p<.01). However, when tested 6 days later most of this effect had disappeared, particularly in the case of subjects whose initial attitudes were least pro. At this final session, subjects also rated attitude statements on the issue in terms of scales constructed from the pro-bias and anti-bias word lists. In accordance with previous research, the more pro subjects' attitudes, the more they showed greater polarization of judgement on the pro-bias than the anti-bias scales (p<.000l). It is concluded that a person's attitude may be related to the kind of evaluative language he will apply to an issue, and that when a person is induced to use language implying a particular evaluation of an issue, he may change his attitude, at least in the short term, so as to be more congruent with the language he has used.     

IF ATTITUDES AFFECT HOW STIMULI ARE PROCESSED, SHOULD THEY NOT AFFECT THE EVENT-RELATED BRAIN POTENTIAL?

Abstract— In Experiment 1, subjects completed an attitude survey to identify items toward which they held positive and negative attitudes. Subsequently, subjects were instructed to count the number of positive (or negative) stimuli in a series. Each series contained six attitude stimuli from a given semantic category (e.g., fruits), and the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative stimuli, as indexed by subjects' idiosyncratic attitudes, were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. In Experiment 2, subjects were exposed to personality traits that were positive or negative in series of six. Again, the structure of the series was varied so that positive and negative traits were evaluatively consistent or inconsistent within the series. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that although the event-related brain potential did not differ as a function of stimulus valence per se, evaluatively inconsistent, in contrast to consistent, stimuli evoked a larger amplitude late P300-like positive component that was maximal over the centroparietal region.     

Accessibility of affective versus cognitive components of attitudes

Four studies investigated differences in accessibility of affective and cognitive components of attitudes. Accessibility was measured by response times on bipolar semantic differential evaluative adjectives (e.g. ‘positive–negative’) in response to how one felt and thought, respectively, about an attitude object. The evaluative items were accompanied by affective and cognitive context items, which were not analysed, but were meant to promote the retrieval of affective and cognitive evaluations respectively. Responses to affective evaluations were given faster than responses to cognitive evaluations, suggesting that affect-based evaluations are more accessible in memory than cognition-based evaluations. The results were obtained in two attitude domains, i.e. brand names and countries. The results support the validity of a two-component affect–cognition model of attitude. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement

Faultless disagreement and faultless retraction have been taken to motivate relativism for predicates of personal taste, like ‘tasty’. Less attention has been devoted to the question of what aspect of their meaning underlies this relativist behavior. This paper illustrates these same phenomena with a new category of expressions: appearance predicates, like ‘tastes vegan’ and ‘looks blue’. Appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste both fall into the broader category of experiential predicates. Approaching predicates of personal taste from this angle suggests that their relativist behavior is due to their experience-sensitivity, rather than their evaluative meaning. Furthermore, appearance predicates hold interest beyond what they can teach us about predicates of personal taste. Examination of a variety of uses of appearance predicates reveals that they give rise to relativist behavior for a variety of reasons—including some that apply also to other types of expressions, such as epistemic modals and comparative terms. This paper thus serves both to probe the source of relativist behavior in discourse about personal taste, as well as to map out this kind of behavior in the rich and under-explored discourse about appearances.

     

Awareness of the influence as a determinant of assimilation versus contrast

In the present study, subjects had to generate an evaluative judgment about a target person on the basis of his behaviour that had both positive and negative implications. In a previous phase of the study that was ostensibly unrelated to the judgment task, the relevant trait categories were primed. Subsequently, half of the subjects were reminded of the priming episode. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Lombardi, Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Newman and Uleman, 1990) that used memory of the priming events as a correlational measure, a contrast effect was found under the ‘reminding’ condition and assimilation resulted when subjects were not reminded of the priming episode. This pattern of results is interpreted as the consequence of corrective influences.     

Social Concepts and Judgments: A Semantic Differential Analysis of the Concepts Feminist, Man, and Woman

Male and female participants  ( N = 274)  made judgments about the social concepts of feminist , man , and woman on 63 semantic differential items. Factor analysis identified three basic dimensions termed evaluative, potency, and activity as well as two secondary factors called expressiveness and sexuality. Results for the evaluative dimension showed that the concept feminist was rated negatively with male participants rating feminist more negatively than female participants. In terms of potency, feminist was judged higher than man whereas the concept woman was rated low on this dimension. Participants also judged the concept feminist as low in expressiveness and rated woman as the most expressive. Feminist received low ratings on the erotic-sexual dimension (sexuality) by female participants and negative sexuality ratings by men. These results are discussed in terms of social role theory, gender stereotypes, and the changes in women's roles and behavior.     

The social context of stereotyping and differentiation

Two related field studies investigated social stereotyping and differentiation between student groups in higher education. In the first, subjects from Exeter and Manchester Universities rated students at both institutions on a number of evaluatively positive attributes. They also judged the degree status and prospective employment opportunities of the groups, in a context which rendered these important. Although subjects displayed strategies of positive differentiation, this was restricted to certain ‘consensual’ dimensions, reflecting perceived stereotypic differences between the groups. Discrepancies in the pattern of differentiation between the groups, and with finding of comparable studies, are discussed. This paradigm was then extended to the case where Manchester University subjects rated three groups, including the ingroup (Oxford or Exeter University vs. Manchester University vs. Manchester Polytechnic students). From social identity theory it was predicted that comparisons with a higher status outgroup which also excelled on contextually important dimensions (Oxford/Exeter), would increase positive differentiation of the ingroup from a second, lower status outgroup (Manchester Polytechnic students). This was confirmed, although there was weaker evidence for devaluation of the second outgroup in absolute terms. In both studies the relation of group status and dimensional importance of the material factor of career prospects helped to explain the strategies of differentiation adopted.     

Self-structure and emotional experience

Two studies examine individual differences in affective reactivity by linking emotional experience to cognitive self-structure. Consistent with the view that individuals with an evaluative compartmentalised self-structure are emotionally reactive, we find that evaluative compartmentalisation is associated with the experience of, and desire for, high-arousal positive (HAP) affect, whereas evaluative integration is associated with the experience of low-arousal positive (LAP) and low-arousal negative affect and the desire for LAP affect. Although compartmentalised individuals are less granular in their tendency to report experiencing both HAP and LAP, they are strongly differentiated in their perceptions of high-arousal states as positive and low-arousal states as negative. Thus, compartmentalised individuals' reactivity may be explained by their preference for HAP states and the ‘breadth’ of their emotionality (e.g., the tendency to experience sadness and nervousness at the same time).     

Children's reasoning about evaluative feedback

Children's reasoning about the willingness of peers to convey accurate positive and negative performance feedback to others was investigated among a total of 179 6‐ to 11‐year‐olds from the USA and China. In Study 1, which was conducted in the USA only, participants responded that peers would be more likely to provide positive feedback than negative feedback, and this tendency was strongest among the younger children. In Study 2, the expectation that peers would preferentially disclose positive feedback was replicated among children from the USA, and was also seen among younger but not older children from China. Participants in all groups took the relationship between communication partners into account when predicting whether peers would express evaluative feedback. Results of open‐ended responses suggested cross‐cultural differences, including a greater emphasis by Chinese children on the implications of evaluative feedback for future performance, and reference by some older Chinese children to the possibility that positive feedback might make the recipient ‘too proud’.     

Interrelationships Among Name Desirability, Name Uniqueness, Emotion Characteristics Connoted by Names, and Temperament

The subjects in Study 1 (the target group) provided their names and data on their own temperaments. The subjects in Study 2 rated the target group's names on uniqueness and desirability. The subjects in Study 3 rated the temperament qualities connoted by the names given by the target group. The name uniqueness and desirability scales had high reliabilities and correlated -0.44, showing that more unique names were less desirable. The qualities of pleasantness and dominance, which were connoted by a person's name, were judged very reliably. Names that connoted psychological health versus maladjustment (pleasant/ unpleasant temperament) were indeed associated with pleasant/unpleasant temperament attributes. The pleasantness and dominance connoted by names enhanced the desirability of those names, whereas greater unpleasantness and submissiveness were connoted by more unique names.     

Interrelationships Among Name Desirability, Name Uniqueness, Emotion Characteristics Connoted by Names, and Temperament

The subjects in Study 1 (the target group) provided their names and data on their own temperaments. The subjects in Study 2 rated the target group's names on uniqueness and desirability. The subjects in Study 3 rated the temperament qualities connoted by the names given by the target group. The name uniqueness and desirability scales had high reliabilities and correlated -0.44, showing that more unique names were less desirable. The qualities of pleasantness and dominance, which were connoted by a person's name, were judged very reliably. Names that connoted psychological health versus maladjustment (pleasant/ unpleasant temperament) were indeed associated with pleasant/unpleasant temperament attributes. The pleasantness and dominance connoted by names enhanced the desirability of those names, whereas greater unpleasantness and submissiveness were connoted by more unique names.     

Judgments of average lightness and darkness: A further consideration of inverse attributes

Twenty subjects judged the average lightness and darkness of paired Munsell gray papers according to magnitude estimation and category rating instructions. The data from category rating were approximately consistent with an averaging model but those from magnitude estimation were not. An analysis in terms of a two-stage model suggested that category ratings and magnitude estimates of each attribute were produced on the basis of the same composition rule, but implicated different output transformations. In judging darkness, subjects appeared to have reversed the scales employed in judging lightness, by a linear transformation in the case of category rating and by a reciprocal transformation in the case of magnitude estimation. However, differences between the input parameters obtained from judgments of lightness and darkness suggested that the scales of these attributes constructed from judgments of average magnitude may be biased.     

Towards a unitary account of access dysphasia: A single case study

Abstract

We report the case of a patient, H.E.C., with a profound verbal comprehension impairment. His comprehension impairment involved both common names (animal and inanimate items) and proper names. Within the proper name category, his comprehension of country and famous peoples' names was better than his comprehension of common forenames. By using matching to sample techniques, H.E.C.'s impairment was found to be affected by presentation rate and by semantic relatedness, but not by word frequency. An analysis of his responses showed marked inconsistency and serial position effects (i.e. a decrement of performance on subsequent presentations of the same items). H.E.C.'s comprehension deficit was interpreted in terms of an “access” impairment within the word-meaning system. A unitary account of this impairment in terms of a deficit that delays the return, following activation, of the set of representations underlying a word, to a “ready state” is proposed.