Choice of definite versus indefinite article as a function of sentence voice and reversibility

Subjects were given reversible and nonreversible active and passive sentences, and selected either definite or indefinite articles for the nominals in each sentence. Experiment I used sentences with the first nominal marked for definiteness, and subjects selected the article for the second nominal. Experiment II had subjects select articles for both nominals. It was found in both experiments that sentence voice affected the marking of the second nominal in reversible sentences, but that sentence voice had no effect in nonreversible sentences. Instead, the marking of the second nominal in nonreversible sentences was affected by the article assigned to the first nominal, but there was no similar effect within reversible sentences. These results are related to suggestions of differential depth of processing for reversible and nonreversible sentences, to the stronger topic-comment distinction within passives than within actives, and to the function of articles in explicating case relations.     

Children's use ofGet passives

Children's use ofget in passivelike constructions was examined in this study. Fifty-eight children at three age levels were tested twice on imitation, comprehension, and production tasks. For the imitation and comprehension tasks, passive sentences withget were modeled in one instance and withbe in the other instance. On both tasks, children performed significantly better on theget items than on thebe items. For the production tasks, active sentences were used as the experimental stimuli. Among 928 production responses possible, children produced 423get passives and 6be passives. The frequency ofget passives increased with increasing age. Qualitative analyses were performed to determine agerelated changes in the pattern of linguistic strategies chosen. These data were consistent with predictions derived from a model of lexical directionality: Children used moreget thanbe passives and more truncated than full passives.     

Definiteness and voice in the interpretation of active and passive sentences

In Experiment I, subjects were given active and passive sentences where the definiteness of nominals is varied and about which uncertainty was expressed, e.g. “I thought that the policeman had been injured by a gangster, but I was mistaken, in fact.”. Their task was to decide what was the target of the mistake by completing freely the sentence in such a way that the account would be corrected. When the nominals are differentially determined (a-the, the-a), the pattern of responses indicates that, for both active and passive, subjects were more likely to conclude that it was the non-definitely marked nominal that had been involved in the mistake rather than the definitely marked one. When both nominals are similarly determined (a-a, the-the), subjects were more likely to indicate the event itself as having been involved in the mistake. This supports the hypothesis that subjects are able to utilize definiteness to determine the relation between presupposed and assertional information. In Experiment II, subjects were given paired active and passive sentences with differentially determined nominals and were required to choose between the two syntactic forms of each pair the one they would prefer to use. The pattern of responses clearly shows that subjects were more likely to choose the voice allowing the hypothesized preferential order “Definitely marked grammatical subject-non-definitely marked grammatical object”. Passive transformational rule is thus interpreted as a particular case of a more general rule specifying the ways in which what is made known (comment) is nested on to what is already assumed to be the case (topic).     

Perspective-taking and comprehension of passive sentences by Japanese-speaking children

This study demonstrates that children's difficulties in the interpretation of passives are attributed to their perspective-taking ability. Thirty-six Japanese preschool children participated in act-out sentence comprehension tasks. They were asked to manipulate two toy animals to demonstrate the meaning of two types of stimulus sentences: Type I had the child's toy, whose reference involved the child's actual name (e.g., Jun-kun no neko Jun's cat) encoded as grammatical subject, while Type II had the child's toy encoded as non-subject. Since passive structures take the perspective of the patient-denoting subject NP, it is assumed that only Type I passives have the perspective that matches that of the child.The results show that children's performance on passives was significantly better in Type I than in Type II sentences. But this difference was not observed for active sentences. For those who showed (nearly) perfect performance on active sentences, only Type I passives were equally well understood. These results strongly suggest that perspective-taking difficulties mask children's true competence on passives and that even 6-year-olds may not yet have attained the full perspective-taking ability required for comprehension of passive sentences.     

The copredication argument

The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true?     

The role of surface order and surface deletion in sentence perception

The perceptual complexity of intransitive adverbials, truncated passives and full passives was investigated in two experiments using rapid visual processing tasks. Both forms of passive were found to be more complex than the intransitive adverbials, presumably because of the lack of correspondence of surface and base orders. However, deletion of the logical subject in truncated passives did not increase their complexity relative to full passives.     

意义理论

Research into logical syntax provides us the knowledge of the structure of sentences, while logical semantics provides a window into uncovering the truth of sentences. Therefore, it is natural to make sentences and truth the central concern when one deals with the theory of meaning logically. Although their theories of meaning differ greatly, both Michael Dummett’s theory and Donald Davidson’s theory are concerned with sentences and truth and developed in terms of truth. Logical theories and methods first introduced by G. Frege underwent great developments during the past century and have played an important role in expanding these two scholars’ theories of meaning. Translated by Ma Minghui from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (7): 53–61     

Syntax in pictures

It was hypothesised that pictures drawn to represent active and passive sentences would reflect this syntactic difference. Specifically, it was predicted that the reversal of the order in which the logical subject (LS) and the logical object (LO) occur in the change from active to passive form of sentence will affect the order in which they occur in their pictorial representations. A significant directional preference was found for placing the LO to the left of the LS in the pictorial representations of passive but not active sentences. This was discussed in terms of the marked status of the passive in relation to the active. In the case of sentences differing only in lexical marking there was no asymmetric directionality effect corresponding to that found for actives and passives. A significant tendency to match the surface order of the sentences in the pictures was found for both lexically marked and unmarked sentences. The possibility that other spatial or physical dimensions might be used to express syntactic and semantic factors in the pictorial representation of sentences is considered.     

Sentence processing deficits in two Cantonese aphasic patients

This paper reports the performances of two Cantonese aphasics on tasks examining their sentence processing deficits. The data on sentence comprehension show that thematically noncanonical sentences, full passives, and subject-gap sentences present greater difficulty to these patients than canonical sentences, truncated passives, and object-gap sentences, respectively. These patterns are consistent with previous observations on Chinese aphasics and are expected given the structural differences between Chinese and English. In a Cantonese grammaticality judgment test, a set of structures are identified that can elicit clear judgments from normal subjects and aphasics, contrary to the claim that grammaticality judgments in Chinese are probabilistic and fragile. Most interestingly, the patients' overall performance patterns reveal a double dissociation between sentence comprehension and judgment of sentence well-formedness, suggesting that the two tasks are supported by independent processing mechanisms.     

Mereology in Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic

How does Aristotle think about sentences like ‘Every x is y’ in the Prior Analytics? A recently popular answer conceives of these sentences as expressing a mereological relationship between x and y: the sentence is true just in case x is, in some sense, a part of y. I argue that the motivations for this interpretation have so far not been compelling. I provide a new justification for the mereological interpretation. First, I prove a very general algebraic soundness and completeness result that unifies the most important soundness and completeness results to date. Then I argue that this result vindicates the mereological interpretation. In contrast to previous interpretations, this argument shows how Aristotle's conception of predication in mereological terms can do important logical work.     

Testing a predicational model of cognition: Cueing predicate meanings in sentences and word triplets

Predication is a logical process in which meaning is extended from a broader context to a narrower, targeted referent independently of syntax and the passage of time. Since predicates lend meaning to their targets in cognitive processing, it follows that when unrecalled sentences are cued with their predicate-word meanings there should be greater retrieval than when these unrecalled sentences are cued with subject words. Three experiments (combinedN=164) tested this hypothesis and found data in its support (p — levels ranging from .05 to .001). A fourth experiment (N=48) removed syntax from consideration by employing triplets in which one word out of three sharing a common topic was the broadest in meaning, and hence was the expected predicate for cueing triplets when they were not initially recalled. As predicted, it was found that when the expected predicate of unrecalled triplets was used as a cue there were twice as many retrievals occurring as when the less broadly meaningful words were used as cues (p<.001). The findings are discussed in terms of logical learning theory's claim that ongoing cognition involves the continual taking of a position within a sea of opposite possibilities.     

Syntactic Representations Are Both Abstract and Semantically Constrained: Evidence From Children’s and Adults’ Comprehension and Production/Priming of the English Passive

All accounts of language acquisition agree that, by around age 4, children’s knowledge of grammatical constructions is abstract, rather than tied solely to individual lexical items. The aim of the present research was to investigate, focusing on the passive, whether children’s and adults’ performance is additionally semantically constrained, varying according to the distance between the semantics of the verb and those of the construction. In a forced-choice pointing study (Experiment 1), both 4- to 6-year olds (N = 60) and adults (N = 60) showed support for the prediction of this semantic construction prototype account of an interaction such that the observed disadvantage for passives as compared to actives (i.e., fewer correct points/longer reaction time) was greater for experiencer-theme verbs than for agent-patient and theme-experiencer verbs (e.g., Bob was seen/hit/frightened by Wendy). Similarly, in a production/priming study (Experiment 2), both 4- to 6-year olds (N = 60) and adults (N = 60) produced fewer passives for experiencer-theme verbs than for agent-patient/theme-experiencer verbs. We conclude that these findings are difficult to explain under accounts based on the notion of A(rgument) movement or of a monostratal, semantics-free, level of syntax, and instead necessitate some form of semantic construction prototype account.     

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.     

Syntactic loss versus processing deficit: an assessment of two theories of agrammatism and syntactic comprehension deficits

This research evaluated Grodzinsky's (1984, 1986a) syntactic loss and Kolk and van Grunsven's (1985) working memory impairment explanations of syntactic comprehension deficits in agrammatic aphasics. Four aphasic patients were evaluated who showed different patterns of impairment on morphological and structural aspects of production. The comprehension tasks compared performance on full and truncated passive sentences. The syntactic loss hypothesis predicted worse performance on truncated than full passives, while the working memory deficit hypothesis predicted the reverse. Neither hypothesis was supported, as the patients performed at a similar level on both types of passives. In addition, there was little relation between the patients' production indices and their comprehension level. The results argue against any global theory of agrammatism that attempts to attribute all agrammatic speech and co-occurring syntactic comprehension deficits to the same source.     

Children's acceptance of underinformative sentences: The case of some as a determiner

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some, if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all/some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some/all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier.     

Action sentences

I would like to thank Eddy Zemach, Jonathan Stavi, Julius Moravcsik and Dov Gabbay for some very good discussions on the logical form of action sentences. Also, I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis for some very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

A CRITIQUE OF FREGE ON COMMON NOUNS

Frege analyzed the grammatical subject‐term ‘S’ in quantified subject‐predicate sentences, ‘q S are P’, as being logically predicative. This is in contrast to Aristotelian Logic, according to which it is a logical subject‐term, like the proper name ‘a’ in ‘a is P’– albeit a plural one, designating many particulars. I show that Frege’s arguments for his analysis are unsound, and explain how he was misled to his position by the mathematical concept of function. If common nouns in this grammatical subject position are indeed logical subject‐terms, this should require a thorough reevaluation of the adequacy of Frege’s predicate calculus as a tool for the analysis of the logic and semantics of natural language.     

Be is a raising verb: Psycholinguistic evidence

Psycholinguistic evidence is reported supporting the proposal from theoretical linguistics that the D-structure representation of English copular sentences likeJohn is a fool, The man is happy, etc., is [S [NP e] [vp BE [sc NP XP]]], containing a small clause (SC), rather than [s NP [vp BE XP]], in other words, thatbe is a raising verb. Response times to lexical targets following unaccusative, passive, intransitive, and transitive sentences were compared with response times to lexical targets following corresponding copular sentences. A raising analysis of copular sentences specifies a post-verbal NP-trace of the (raised) NP subject at S-structure. This trace should facilitate the response time to a post-sentence presentation of the head noun of the subject NP, causing copular sentence response times to pattern with the response times for corresponding unaccusatives and passives, which also contain such traces. A traditional nonraising analysis specifies no trace at S-structure. Response times to copular sentences should then pattern with corresponding intransitives and transitives, which also do not contain traces. The observed response-time patterns confirmed the raising analysis.This study was conducted at the National Technical Institute for the Deaf at Rochester Institute of Technology, in the course of an agreement with the U.S. Department of Education.     

The Medieval Octagon of Opposition for Sentences with Quantified Predicates

The traditional Square of Opposition consists of four sentence types. Two are universal and two particular; two are affirmative and two negative. Examples, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ designate the subject and the predicate, are: ‘every S is P’, ‘no S is P’, ‘some S is P’ and ‘some S is not P’. Taking the usual sentences of the square of opposition, quantifying over their predicates exhibits non-standard sentence forms. These sentences may be combined into non-standard Squares of Opposition (an Octagon in this case), and they reveal a new relationship not found in the usual Square. Medieval logicians termed ‘disparatae’ pairs of sentences like ‘every S is some P’ and ‘some S is every P’, which are neither subaltern nor contrary, neither contradictory nor subcontrary. Walter Redmond has designed a special language L to express the logical form of these sentences in a precise way. I will use this language to show how Squares of Opposition, standard and non-standard, form a complex network of relations which bring to light the subtleties contained in this traditional doctrine.