Revelation without presentation: Counterfeit study list yields robust revelation effect

This study explores the revelation effect, a recognition memory phenomenon that occurs when test items (or related items) are specially processed before recognition judgment. These revealed items, whether targets or lures, receive a positive response bias. Although the effect occurs across various conditions, it has not been shown to occur when participants make judgments unrelated to episodic memory. We investigated whether the effect would occur when a recognition decision was nominally one of episodic memory, but when a complete episodic event had not occurred. Specifically, participants listened to noise that allegedly masked a list of words (in fact, no words existed). A revelation effect occurred with this pseudo-subliminal procedure, suggesting that the revelation effect need not rely on stimuli recalled through episodic memory but only a specific event to recall. The effect did not occur when participants simply guessed whether words were on an unheard list or made semantic judgments.     

Text cohesion and metacomprehension: Immediate and delayed judgments

In three experiments, we examined comprehension judgments made after a piece of text had been read. We propose that such metacognitive judgments are based on the content of working memory at the exact moment of assessment. Generally speaking, this working metacognition hypothesis is in agreement with Koriat's cue utilization approach, which implies that different elements of information will be available (and used) depending on the moment at which a judgment is made. More specifically, our hypothesis focuses on the management of working memory during reading as a cause for cue (un)availability. In support of these views, the results of Experiment 1 showed that a cohesion manipulation affecting the comprehension of specific paragraphs influences judgments only on these paragraphs, and not on judgments on the whole text. In Experiment 2, we showed that an interfering task that takes place just before this paragraph judgment is made wipes out this cohesion effect. Experiment 3 showed, on the other hand, that the whole-text judgment may, nevertheless, be affected by text cohesion, provided that the readers keep an access to the text when the judgment is made. These results support the idea that working memory management makes different cues available for metacognitive ratings at different delays.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Carryover effects of analytic thought on preference quality

The current study used a novel within-subjects design to test for the effects of analytic thought (reasons analysis) on the quality of the resulting judgments, as well as on subsequent, unanalyzed judgments of the same stimuli. Participants rated eight Olympic dives at two points in time, 30 min apart, under both reasoning and control instructions, which were then correlated with the scores the dives received from the Olympic judges. Results revealed asymmetric effects of reasoning and non-reasoning strategies: reasoning impaired judgments even when the judgments had been previously made under control conditions, and participants’ two sets of ratings were more strongly correlated with each other when made under control conditions than when either set had been reasoned. Analyses of decision times and reason–judgment correlations suggest that the effects of analytic thought in this domain are partially due to a general shift in decision strategy, and not exclusively to biases in the content of generated reasons.     

Key distance effects on perceived harmonic structure in music

Two experiments provide convergent evidence for the hypothesis that listeners interpret chords in terms of their harmonic functions in a system of interrelated keys. The perceived associations between chords undergo significant changes depending on the broader tonal framework in which they are embedded. Three independent context effects are identified, and their magnitude is found to be a systematic function of the distance between the context key and the key lot keys) of which the chords are members. In the first experiment, listeners rate how musically related one chord is to a second chord; the chords are those that function within two maximally distant major keys (C major and F# major). All possible chord pairs from this set are presented in each of three context keys: G major which is close to C major and distant from F# major), A major (which is moderately distant from both C major and F# major), and B major (which is close to F# major and distant from C major). The second experiment measures recognition memory for the same chords embedded in tonal sequences in C, G, A, or B major keys, or random sequences. In the two experiments, the distance between the context key and the key of the chords on the circle-of-fifths affects: (1) the probability that a repeated chord is correctly recognized, (2) the strength of association between chords from the same key measured in terms of both confusion errors and direct relatedness judgments, and (3) asymmetries in confusion errors and relatedness judgments when the chords are in different keys. Perceived harmonic relations are thus found to be strongly context dependent, but the context effects are lawful functions of interkey distance. We conclude that listeners possess a highly articulated system of knowledge about the harmonic functions of chords in musical keys and an appreciation of musical structure at the level of abstract tonal centers.     

Boundary distortions for neutral and emotional pictures

In two experiments, we examined Safer, Christianson, Autry, and Osterlund's (1998) claim that when emotional material is remembered, tunnel memory (i.e., the tendency to remember less of a scene than was actually shown) occurs. In Experiment 1, 81 undergraduate students drew photographs from memory after having briefly seen either four neutral or four emotional photographs. Both neutral and emotional drawings revealed boundary extension (i.e., the tendency to remember more of a scene than was actually shown). Experiment 2 relied on the camera distance paradigm (Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992). In a recognition test, 60 undergraduate students judged the camera distance of previously seen neutral or emotional photographs. The majority of them demonstrated accurate judgments and neither extended nor restricted picture boundaries. Those participants who made an error more often displayed a boundary extension than a tunnel memory error. Taken together, our results suggest that boundary extension for neutral and emotional photographs is a more robust phenomenon than its counterpart, tunnel memory.     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects’ judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2–5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2–5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

Reconstruction of things past: Why do some memories feel so close and others so far away?

The vast majority of work in construal level theory focuses prospectively on the future. Through a series of studies controlling for knowledge about an event, we look retrospectively at the past and demonstrate that construal mindsets can materially influence how a past event is reconstructed in memory. Specifically, an event recalled in a more concrete mindset feels subjectively closer than when recalled in an abstract mindset (Studies 1-3). We present evidence suggesting this is because a concrete mindset actually makes people feel as though they know more, even if they were initially exposed to the same set of information—perceived information accessibility mediates the effect of construal level on temporal distance (Study 2). The effect of construal level on memory reconstruction extends to judgments of blame, where judgments of greater temporal distance drive a greater propensity to blame parties for negative events and temporal distance mediates these judgments (Study 3). Together, these studies are the first to demonstrate that the mindset employed when recalling an event shapes its remembrance.     

Revelation effects in remembering,forecasting, and perspective taking

The revelation effect is a robust phenomenon in episodic memory whereby stimuli that immediately follow a simple cognitive task are more likely to garner positive responses on a variety of memory tests, including autobiographical memory judgments. Six experiments investigated the revelation effect for judgments of past and future events as well as judgments made from others’ perspectives. The purpose of this work was to determine whether these subjectively distinct judgments are subject to the same decision-making biases, as might be expected if they are governed by similar processes (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner 2007). College-aged participants were asked to rate a variety of life events according to whether the events had occurred during their childhoods or would occur during the next 10 years. Events that followed an anagram task were judged as more likely to have happened in the past and more likely to occur in the future. We also showed a revelation effect when participants were asked to adopt the perspective of others when making judgments about past and future events. When the task was reworded to be non-episodic (participants judged how common the events were during childhood and adulthood), no revelation effect was found for either past or future time frames, which suggests common boundary conditions for both types of judgments. The results are consistent with studies showing strong parallels between remembering and other forms of self-projection but not with semantic memory judgments.     

Using the past to predict the future

This research addressed three issues. First, we examined whether retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) and judgments of learning (JOLs) assess memory differently. Second, we examined the relative accuracy of JOLs and RCJs at predicting future recall performance. Third, we examined whether making JOLs improves subsequent recall better than making RCJs or making no metacognitive judgment. Results suggest that RCJs and JOLs are both based on retrievability, but that participants use their memory differently when making JOLs. RCJs were more accurate than JOLs at predicting future recall for some subsets of items, but the reverse was true for other subsets of items. Finally, eventual recall performance was facilitated when participants made JOLs but not when they made RCJs, suggesting that the JOL task helps to improve people's learning of the items.     

Accounting for occurrences: a new view of the use of contingency information in causal judgment

When people make causal judgments from contingency information, a principal aim is to account for occurrences of the outcome. When 2 causes are under consideration, the capacity of either to account for occurrences is judged from how likely the cause is to be present when the outcome occurs and from the rate at which the outcome occurs when that cause alone is present, which gives an estimate of the strength of the cause. These propositions are formalized in a weighted averaging model, which successfully predicted several judgmental phenomena not predicted by other models of causal judgment. These include a tendency for judgment of one cause (A) to be reduced as the number of occurrences of when only the other one (B) increases and a tendency for A to receive higher judgments than B if A is better able to account for occurrences than B is even if B has a higher contingency with the outcome than A does. Overshadowing, a tendency for judgments of B to be depressed if A has a higher contingency, is weak or absent when B is better able to account for occurrences than A. Results of several experiments support these and related predictions derived from the accounting for occurrences hypothesis.     

Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to implicit interference effects at retrieval

We conducted three experiments to determine whether metamemory predictions at encoding, immediate judgments of learning (IJOLs) are sensitive to implicit interference effects that will occur at retrieval. Implicit interference was manipulated by varying the association set size of the cue (Experiments 1 and 2) or the target (Experiment 3). The typical finding is that memory is worse for large-set-size cues and targets, but only when the target is studied alone and later prompted with a related cue (extralist). When the pairs are studied together (intralist), recall is the same regardless of set size; set size effects are eliminated. Metamemory predictions at retrieval, such as delayed JOLs (DJOLs) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments accurately reflect implicit interference effects (e.g., Eakin & Hertzog, 2006. In all three experiments, we found that DJOLs and FOKs accurately predicted set size effects on retrieval but that IJOLs did not. The findings provide further evidence that metamemory predictions are inferred from information other than direct access to the state of the memory trace, as well as indicate that inferences are based on different sources depending on when in the memory process predictions are made.     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

Effects of alcohol intoxication on metamemory and on retrieval from long-term memory

In a balanced-placebo design, people expected either an alcohol drink or placebo drink and consumed either alcohol (1 ml/kg) or placebo. Shortly thereafter, each person attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions (e.g., "What is the capital of Chile?"), made confidence judgments about the accuracy of recall, made feeling-of-knowing judgments on all nonrecalled items, and received a recognition test. Unanticipated outcomes included: Alcohol intoxication significantly hindered recall from long-term memory, contrary to previous conclusions that alcohol does not affect retrieval; people's expectancy of alcohol had no significant effect on memory or metamemory performance, contrary to its established effects on other kinds of performance; and alcohol intoxication produced no significant overconfidence in judgments about recall or in feeling-of-knowing judgments, contrary to the overconfidence produced in other kinds of judgments such as an intoxicated person's assessment of his driving ability. This last outcome implies that alcohol intoxication does not produce a general lowering of the threshold for confidence but rather has effects that are situation specific.     

The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments

The signal detection model forknow andremember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity,A′, are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.     

Schematic knowledge changes what judgments of learning predict in a source memory task

Source monitoring can be influenced by information that is external to the study context, such as beliefs and general knowledge (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). We investigated the extent to which metamnemonic judgments predict memory for items and sources when schematic information about the sources is or is not provided at encoding. Participants made judgments of learning (JOLs) to statements presented by two speakers and were informed of the occupation of each speaker either before or after the encoding session. Replicating earlier work, prior knowledge decreased participants’ tendency to erroneously attribute statements to schematically consistent but episodically incorrect speakers. The origin of this effect can be understood by examining the relationship between JOLs and performance: JOLs were equally predictive of item and source memory in the absence of prior knowledge, but were exclusively predictive of source memory when participants knew of the relationship between speakers and statements during study. Background knowledge determines the information that people solicit in service of metamnemonic judgments, suggesting that these judgments reflect control processes during encoding that reduce schematic errors.     

The effects of binocular and motion-generated information on the perception of depth and height

The perception of distance and size in the presence of optical gradient information was investigated under four viewing conditions—binocular view with and without head motion, and monocular view with and without head motion. Subjects (60 adults) matched distance intervals (from 15 to 127 cm) and heights of a target triangle (from 5 to 15 cm) by adjusting the length of a metal tape. Both linear and power functions were fitted to each individual’s distance judgments, and the competing perceptual models were compared. For both models, it was found that binocular information was sufficient to specify relative, but not absolute, distance, that monocular information was sufficient to specify an orderly relation between target distance and judgment but not absolute distance, that average error was less in the binocular conditions, and that perceived distance was not affected in either condition by the addition of head motion. The analysis of size judgments revealed that monocular and binocular judgments did not differ, that matches made with and without head motion did not differ, and that, in all conditions, matches exceeded target heights by an average 30% to 40%. Judged size was also analyzed as a function of target distance. In all conditions but monocular view with head motion, the effect of distance was to increase size judgments. The distance judgments support the hypothesis (Purdy, 1958) that the binocular stimulus carries information that the monocular stimulus does not; they fail to support the hypothesis (Gibson, 1966) that observer motion adds information to the static stimulus. The size judgments support neither hypothesis but suggest an independence of perceived size from perceived distance.     

The role of source memory in older adults' recollective experience

Younger adults' "remember" judgments are accompanied by better memory for the source of an item than "know" judgments. Furthermore, remember judgments are not merely associated with better memory for individual source features but also with bound memory for multiple source features. However, older adults, independent of their subjective memory experience, are generally less likely to "bind" source features to an item and to each other in memory (i.e., the associative deficit). In two experiments, we tested whether memory for perceptual source features, independently or bound, is also the basis for older adults' remember responses or if their associative deficit leads them to base their responses on other types of information. The results suggest that retrieval of perceptual source features, individually or bound, forms the basis for younger but not for older adults' remember judgments even when the overall level of memory for perceptual sources is closely equated (Experiment 1) and when attention is explicitly directed to the source information at encoding (Experiment 2).     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

Very short term recognition memory for odors

An investigation of very short term olfactory recognition memory was made with odors of low familiarity to subjects. The experimental procedure was that currently used to make qualitative similarity judgments on odors delivered in paired succession. Subjects made similarity judgments in a yes/no recognition paradigm on odors that were either identical or different. The dependence of recognition performance upon the degree of qualitative similarity was assessed by using two sets of dissimilar odor pairs: slightly dissimilar pairs (S1) and very dissimilar pairs (S2). Performance in terms of correct judgments (hits, correct rejections) was rather good for identical pairs in both sets and was nearly perfect for very dissimilar pairs with a delay of 2–300 sec, suggesting no effect of time or similarity on performance. However, for slightly dissimilar pairs, false alarms increased in number, thereby indicating a dependence of the recognition score on the qualitative distance between odors. In addition, false alarms tended to increase with the lengthening of the retention interval. It was suggested that the subjects based their responses on their capability to detect differences between odors rather than recognizing their similarities. Correct identifications were thus preserved at the cost of increasing false alarms when the discrimination task was made more difficult by closer similarity between odors (S1) or by the fading of memory traces with time. Studying the congruence between the similarity judgments and the kind of evocations associated with paired odors gives some support to the view that recognition performances had some cognitive/semantic basis.