Mood effects on dominated choices: Positive mood induces departures from logical rules

In two studies, we investigated the role of mood states in dominated behavioral choices. Past research has shown that mood effects on judgment and decision‐making can be pervasive. Yet, the role of mood in dominated choices has so far been neglected. The present research represents a first empirical examination of mood effects on dominated choices. We measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) mood states in participants who made a series of choices in a gambling game. In this choice task without trade‐offs, participants were provided with information about the outcomes and probabilities associated with each choice option. The strategy to maximize the expected mean outcome implied the application of a straightforward and logical rule: Always choose the dominant option with the highest expected value. It has been argued in the literature that mood should have little or no impact when preferences are clear or strong. Still, we expected that mood states would affect even these dominated choices, building on previous work that showed that positive mood states enhance flexibility, creativity, and explorative behavior. The results showed that decisions made in a happier mood were less often in accordance with the logical rule than decisions made in a sadder mood. To conclude, happier mood states are associated to a lesser extent with decisions in accordance with a rule‐based strategy that maximizes expected mean outcomes in dominated choices. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making

Previous research has considered the question of how anticipated regret affects risky decision making. Several studies have shown that anticipated regret forces participants towards the safe option, showing risk-aversion. We argue that these results are due to the previous confounding of the riskiness of the options with the feedback received. Our design unconfounds these factors, and we predict that participants will always tend to makeregret-minimizingchoices (rather than risk-minimizing choices). We present three experiments using a “choices between equally valued alternatives” paradigm. In these experiments we manipulate whether the risky or safe gamble is the regret-minimizing choice by manipulating which gamble(s) will be resolved. As predicted, participants tend to choose the regret-minimizing gamble in both gains and losses and in both relatively high risk and relatively low risk pairs of gambles. We consider the implications of these results for the role of regret in choice behavior.     

The dynamics of choice in a changing world: Effects of full and partial feedback

We explored the dynamics of choice behavior while the values of the options changed, unannounced, several times. In particular, choice dynamics were compared when the outcome values of all available options were known (full feedback) and when the outcome value of only the chosen option was known (partial feedback). The frequency of change, the values of the options, and the difference between them were also manipulated. In an experiment with N = 427, we found that the patterns of choices were different for the two levels of feedback. Whereas behavior in the full-feedback condition showed a tendency to switch choices following a missed opportunity—replicating previous findings—the behavior in the partial-feedback condition was different. It was sensitive to the outcome value of the chosen option in comparison to some memory of the last-experienced outcome value of the unchosen option. However, the comparison of these two values influenced choice behavior only when the outcome of the currently chosen option was satisfactory and the last outcome of the unchosen one was not. As expected, the other manipulated variables (change frequency, the options’ values, and the difference between them) had no effect on the dynamics of behavior.     

Failing to commit: Maximizers avoid commitment in a way that contributes to reduced satisfaction

Past research suggests that individuals who approach decisions with the goal of maximizing, or selecting the best possible option, show less satisfaction with their choices than those with the goal of satisficing, or selecting the first “good enough” option. The present investigation examines whether this difference in choice satisfaction stems from a difference in willingness to commit to one’s choices. We argue that maximizers are reticent to commit to their choices and that this reticence robs them of the dissonance reduction processes that leave people satisfied. In Study 1, maximizers reported a stronger preference than satisficers for retaining the possibility to revise choices, both when reporting preferences in their own life and when choosing between options in a hypothetical situation. In Study 2, satisficers showed evidence of classic dissonance reduction after making a choice - they offered higher ratings of a chosen poster and lower ratings of the rejected alternatives, relative to baseline. However, maximizers were less likely to change their impressions of the posters after their choice, leaving them less satisfied with their selected poster. These results provide valuable insight into post-decision processes that decrease maximizers’ satisfaction with their decisions.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.     

Differential construal and the false consensus effect

People's own beliefs, values, and habits tend to bias their perceptions of how widely they are shared. The present research examined whether this "false consensus effect" is partly due to people's failure to recognize that their choices are not solely a function of the "objective" response alternatives, but of their subjective construal of those alternatives. Study 1 provided initial support for the importance of differential construal in people's consensus estimates by showing that larger false consensus effects tend to be obtained on items that permit the most latitude for subjective construal. Study 2 replicated this effect experimentally by asking Ss either a general or specific version of the same question. Larger false consensus effects were obtained on the general version that offered more latitude for construal. Studies 3 & 4 provided further support by showing that (a) Ss who made different choices tended to interpret the response alternatives in ways that reflected the choices they made and (b) subjects who were led to construe the alternatives in the same way tended to make the same choices.     

‘This Is the Person You Selected’: Eyewitnesses' Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions

The aim of the current research was to identify conditions under which choice blindness in facial recognition decisions occurs. In five experiments, participants watched four mock‐crime videos and made choices that were either evaluative (Experiment 1) or absolute in nature (Experiments 2a–c and 3). When participants were subsequently asked to motivate their choice, they were sometimes presented with choices they had not made. For evaluative decisions, concurrent (27%) and retrospective blindness rates (21%) were relatively low compared with previous studies. For absolute decisions, choice‐blindness rates varied, depending on when exposure to the manipulated outcome took place (immediate: concurrent 32–35%, retrospective 0–6% [Experiments 2a–c]; 48 hours' delay: concurrent 68%, retrospective 39% [Experiment 3]). We argue that blindness for facial recognition decisions is more likely for evaluative decisions and for longer intervals between decision and manipulation and also for conditions of increased task complexity, which we interpret in terms of ambiguity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The decision to check in multialternative choices and limited sensitivity to default

Given the rapid proliferation of smartphone applications and data aggregation websites, in many situations people can use decision aids to guide their choices. For example, they may consider whether to use a navigation device to check the fastest route or whether to use a price comparison website to find the cheapest deal. In what circumstances will subjects use a costly comparison decision aid (which I refer to as “checking”) to choose for them? In six studies, I investigate the impact of the number of available alternatives and checking's attractiveness on the decision to check. While at first increasing the attractiveness of checking led to higher checking rates, a further increase in the number of available alternatives (and thus checking's attractiveness) did not increase the checking rate. Surprisingly, even when checking had a 40% higher expected value compared with not checking, the observed checking rate was below 45%, contrary to risk and ambiguity aversion predictions. Furthermore, labeling the checking alternative as the default had no impact on its choice rate. I find large individual differences in decisions to check. Surprisingly, subjects' initial decisions had high predictive power over their subsequent checking rates, even after 100 trials with full feedback. I propose two simple learning models that capture well the aggregated results.     

Choice and self-expression: a cultural analysis of variety-seeking

Three studies examined whether the tendency to seek variety in choices depends in part on cultural assumptions of choice and uniqueness. Study 1 showed that people from different cultures where different assumptions of choice and uniqueness dominate show different levels of variety in their choice rule use. Study 2 primed participants with magazine ads highlighting different representations of uniqueness dominant in individualist versus collectivist cultures to show the influence of cultural meanings of uniqueness on the variety-seeking tendency. Study 3 manipulated the motivation to display variety to demonstrate that variety-seeking in the United States partly hinges on cultural meanings of choice as self-expression. Variety-seeking in choice rule use was eliminated when participants had the chance to self-express through choice listing. The research illustrates the role of cultural assumptions in the variety-seeking tendency.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

自恋人格调节信任博弈的结果评价

自恋人格个体表现出亲社会行为的减少和对他人的反馈敏感。信任是人类社会互动行为的基础,自恋人格特质可能影响他们的信任决策。为了探究自恋水平如何影响信任博弈中结果评价的大脑活动,本研究采用事件相关电位技术记录了38名被试完成单次信任博弈时的脑电波。行为结果发现相对高自恋者的信任选择率显著低于相对低自恋者的信任选择率。脑电结果表明,相对高自恋者信任损失反馈减互惠获利反馈所得的FRN差异波(d FRN)显著地大于相对低自恋者,并且相对高自恋者结果评价诱发的P300波幅显著地大于相对低自恋者。本研究提供了自恋人格个体信任博弈中结果评价的初步神经电生理学证据。     

Reducing information avoidance through affirmation

Although screening for medical problems can have health benefits, the potentially threatening nature of the results can lead people to avoid screening. In three studies, we examined whether affirming people's self-worth reduces their avoidance of medical-screening feedback. Participants completed an online risk calculator for a fictitious medical condition and then were offered a choice to receive or not receive their risk feedback. Our results showed that affirmation decreased participants' avoidance of risk feedback (Study 1) and eliminated the increased avoidance typically observed when risk feedback might obligate people to engage in undesired behavior (Study 2) and when feedback is about risk for an untreatable disease (Study 3). These findings suggest that affirmation may be an effective strategy for increasing rates of medical screening.     

Anticipated Emotions as Guides to Choice

When making decisions, people often anticipate the emotions they might experience as a result of the outcomes of their choices. In the process, they simulate what life would be like with one outcome or another. We examine the anticipated and actual pleasure of outcomes and their relation to choices people make in laboratory studies and real-world studies. We offer a theory of anticipated pleasure that explains why the same outcome can lead to a wide range of emotional experiences. Finally, we show how anticipated pleasure relates to risky choice within the framework of subjective expected pleasure theory.     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

Different Attentional Patterns for Regret and Disappointment: An Eye‐tracking Study

The unfavorable comparison between the obtained and expected outcomes of our choices may elicit disappointment. When the comparison is made with the outcome of alternative actions, emotions like regret can serve as a learning signal. Previous work showed that both anticipated disappointment and regret influence decisions. In addition, experienced regret is associated with higher emotional responses than disappointment. Yet it is not clear whether this amplification is due to additive effects of disappointment and regret when the outcomes of alternative actions are available, or whether it reflects the learning feature of regret signals. In this perspective, we used eye‐tracking to measure the visual pattern of information acquisition in a probabilistic lottery task. In the partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen lottery was revealed, while in the complete feedback condition, participants could compare their outcome with that of the non‐chosen lottery, giving them the opportunity to experience regret. During the decision phase, visual patterns of information acquisition were consistent with the assessment of anticipated regret, in addition to a clear assessment of lotteries' expected values. During the feedback phase, subjective ratings and eye‐tracking results confirmed that participants compared their outcome with the outcome of the non‐chosen lottery in the complete feedback condition, particularly after a loss, and ignored the non‐realized outcome of the chosen option. Moreover, participants who made more visual saccades consistent with counterfactual comparisons during the feedback period anticipated regret more in their decisions. These results are consistent with the proposed adaptive function of regret. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Inferences from decision difficulty

We propose that people infer the relative attractiveness of the choice alternatives from decision difficulty. A difficult decision signifies that the alternatives are close to each other in attractiveness, and an easy decision signifies that the alternatives are remote from each other in attractiveness. In Study 1, observers used reported decision difficulty to infer preferences of the decision maker. Studies 2-4 showed that inferences about the source of one’s own decision difficulty may affect a decision maker’s preferences. Study 4 integrates the notion of inferences from decision difficulty with dissonance theory, showing that in repeatable decisions difficulty reduces post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by our model, whereas with one-time decisions, difficulty enhances post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by dissonance theory.     

Burger or yogurt? Indulgent consumption in impression management contexts

We conducted three studies to investigate indulgent choice in settings with and without impression management by public–private manipulation with evaluation. Study 1 showed that the participants were less indulgent under public scrutiny due to the employment of impression management. Study 2 focused on the impression management context to test the moderate effect of self‐consciousness in two impression managed contexts. Study 3 focused on context without impression management to test the moderate effects of self‐awareness on choices. We found that depending on differences in primed personality, individuals tended to make choices other than those they favoured privately when anticipating that others might form impressions of them based on the decisions made. The findings of all three studies support our basic prediction that people are less indulgent under impression management and suggest that people tend to manage their impression by eating healthier (less indulgently) in public.     

重复信任博弈的决策过程与结果评价

“信任他人或者不信任他人?”是社会互动中经常面临一种行为决择, 直接影响着个体的社会生活。作为一种重要的社会信号机制, 信任是建立良好社会关系的基石, 它能够降低社会交易成本, 易化合作行为。为了探究个体在信任互动情境下大脑活动变化的时间动态特征, 采用事件相关电位技术记录了20名健康被试(充当信任者)完成重复性信任博弈任务(repeated Trust Game, rTG)时的脑电成分。行为结果发现个体选择信任的比例显著高于几率水平。电生理学结果表明, 决策阶段中不信任选择比信任选择诱发了更正的P2成分(150~250 ms), 差异波溯源分析定位于额中回(middle frontal gyrus, BA 46)和额下回(inferior frontal gyrus, BA 46)。反馈阶段中损失反馈比获益反馈诱发了更负的FRN成分(200~300 ms), 而获益反馈比损失反馈诱发了更短的P300潜伏期。本研究为理解人类信任博弈过程的动态加工时程提供了初步的神经电生理学证据。