Constructing a Naturalistic Theory of Intentionality

Philosophia - A naturalistic theory of intentionality (in the sense of ‘aboutness’) is proposed that differs from previous evolutionary and tracking theories. Full-blown intentionality...     

Much Ado About Nothing: Toward a Structural Realist Theory of Intentionality

Building upon Brentano’s (in: McAlister LL (ed) Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” (or rather “intentional inexistence”) has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme (Crane in The objects of thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Aspects of psychologism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014). Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate version of relationalism. My relationalist theory of intentionality is inspired by what goes by the name of Noneliminativist Structural Realism (NSR) in the contemporary philosophy of science. NSR allows for a robust realist interpretation of the role of scientific models. The underlying insight of the paper is that it is best to be realist about the structure of the intentionality, which is the common element of the diverse theories of intentional objects. The Outcome is Structural Realist theory of Intentionality (SRI for short). I argue that SRI is not liable to the notorious objection of the impossibility of relata-less relations. I conclude that SRI fulfils the goal of robust psychological realism more economically and straightforwardly than Crane’s application of the notion of models.     

心理体验及其对象类型--试论迈农的意向性理论

意向性作为现代哲学的核心概念之一,在迈农这里有着与在胡塞尔那里同样重要的决定意义。迈农在布伦塔诺意向性理论的基础上,通过对心理体验及其各自所对应的对象类型的这一深入探讨,不仅将对象概念发展到了极致,而且为价值的存在争取了一个独立的领域,从而也使得价值的意向性构建成为可能。因此,迈农的意向性理论不仅是对象理论意义上的深化,更是价值维度上的深化。     

The Impact of Relationship Education on the Couple Relationship: A Grounded Theory of Intentionality and Awareness

Research on relationship education (RE) programs generally shows their effectiveness, but it is important to understand what the mechanisms of change are, how they occur within programs, and what participants experience. The purpose of this study was to explore couples' perceptions of the key components of their experience as participants of a Prep-based RE program. Research questions included: How do couples describe their experience of taking an 8-hour relationship education class? What elements had the biggest impact on their relationship? How has their relationship changed as a result of participation? Interview data from 39 married and cohabitating couples who participated in RE were analyzed using grounded theory methods. Six categories emerged from the analytic process, resulting in a model that provided explanatory detail of a typical RE program experience and its impact on the participants. These categories were: intentionality and awareness, context, relationship, workshop, impact (of RE), and couple interview. Couples described these categories as developing in a relatively chronological order, with Intentionality and Awareness being a central category that cut across the process and helped explain the impact of the program on the couple relationship. Implications for research, program development, and program facilitators providing RE are discussed.     

Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence.

     

Soap Opera Exposure and Enjoyment: A Longitudinal Test of Disposition Theory

Drama's appeal is driven in part by dispositions toward story characters and the deservingness of fortunes that befall them. This article reports the results of longitudinal research testing disposition theory's ability to predict viewer responses to daytime soap opera. A student sample completed a survey asking them to evaluate characters over 10 successive weeks. Measures of character morality and positive/negative outcomes for behaviors were used to predict the results of both viewer enjoyment and official Nielsen ratings in representative independent surveys covering the same 10 weeks. Consistent with disposition theory logic, an a priori specified interaction of character morality and behavioral outcome valence—the Disposition Vector Model—predicted higher Nielsen ratings and increased viewer enjoyment when benefaction/debasement befell characters morally deserving of these outcomes. Although well supported in short-term studies, to our knowledge this is the first study to support disposition theory over extended exposure to soap operas and predicting results in independent data sources.     

Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness?? intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of ??qualia?? or the ??what-it-is-like-ness?? of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective ??feels??, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows ??nature??, as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be ??representations?? of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically ??about?? anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects.