Multisensory temporal order judgments: when two locations are better than one

In Experiment 1, participants were presented with pairs of stimuli (one visual and the other tactile) from the left and/or right of fixation at varying stimulus onset asynchronies and were required to make unspeeded temporal order judgments (TOJs) regarding which modality was presented first. When the participants adopted an uncrossed-hands posture, just noticeable differences (JNDs) were lower (i.e., multisensory TOJs were more precise) when stimuli were presented from different positions, rather than from the same position. This spatial redundancy benefit was reduced when the participants adopted a crossed-hands posture, suggesting a failure to remap visuotactile space appropriately. In Experiment 2, JNDs were also lower when pairs of auditory and visual stimuli were presented from different positions, rather than from the same position. Taken together, these results demonstrate that people can use redundant spatial cues to facilitate their performance on multisensory TOJ tasks and suggest that previous studies may have systematically overestimated the precision with which people can make such judgments. These results highlight the intimate link between spatial and temporal factors in determining our perception of the multimodal objects and events in the world around us.     

The role of a change heuristic in judgments of sound duration

The present study investigated whether the quality of a frequency change within a sound (i.e., smooth vs. abrupt) would influence perception of its duration. In three experiments, participants were presented with two consecutive sounds on each of a series of trials, and their task was to judge whether the second sound was longer or shorter in duration than the first. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to judge sounds consisting of a smooth and continuous change in frequency as longer in duration than sounds that maintained a constant frequency. In Experiment 2, the same bias was observed for sounds incorporating an abrupt change in frequency, but only when the frequency change was relatively small. The results of Experiment 3 suggested that the application of a change heuristic when generating duration judgments depends on the perception of change as originating from a single, integrated perceptual object.     

The proximity heuristic in judgments of accident probabilities

In daily life, probabilities are often assessed informally through the perceived distance to a target event. Accident probabilities are believed to be high when a disastrous outcome appears to be close. This proximity heuristic can lead to exaggerated p(death) estimates in risky situations (Experiment 2), and sometimes higher probabilities for death after near‐accidents than after actual accidents (Experiment 3 and 4). Near‐accidents are also believed to be equally good, or better, predictors of future disasters than actual accidents, despite being less serious and more frequent (Experiment 5). The proximity heuristic influences the way people talk about their own and other people's chances (Experiment 1), and how they prepare to avoid (or, if necessary, to produce) a disastrous outcome (Experiment 6).     

Vowel and consonant judgments are not independent when cued by the same information

Despite many attempts to define the major unit of speech perception, none has been generally accepted. In a unique study, Mermelstein (1978) claimed that consonants and vowels are the appropriate units because a single piece of information (duration, in this case) can be used for one distinction without affecting the other. In a replication, this apparent independence was found, instead, to reflect a lack of statistical power: The vowel and consonant judgments did interact. In another experiment, interdependence of two phonetic judgments was found in responses based on the fricative noise and the vocalic formants of a fricative-vowel syllable. These results show that each judgment made on speech signals must take into account other judgments that compete for information in the same signal. An account is proposed that takes segments as the primary units, with syllables imposing constraints on the shape they may take.     

The proportion heuristic: problem set size as a basis for performance judgments

How do people evaluate their degree of mastery over a task? A series of four studies demonstrated that a potentially irrelevant cue can have a strong influence on such evaluations. In these studies, the total amount of work given to participants (the problem set size) influenced both (a) the amount of work participants completed before feeling that they had performed well and were adequately prepared for a related future task, and (b) participants' assessments of their performance and their feelings of preparedness for a related future task. These effects occurred even when a randomization procedure was used to emphasize the arbitrary nature of the problem set size. The effects vanished, however, when participants were given extra time to evaluate their progress after completing each problem. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The affect heuristic in early judgments of product innovations

According to the affect heuristic, people often rely upon their overall affective impression of a target to form judgments of risk. However, innovation research has largely characterized risk perception as a function of what the consumer knows rather than how they feel. In three studies, this research investigates the use of the affect heuristic in consumer judgments of product innovations. The findings indicate that judgments of risks and benefits associated with product innovations are inversely related and affectively congruent with evaluations of those innovations. Additionally, more affectively extreme evaluations are associated with increasingly disparate judgments of risk and benefit. This research contributes to our theoretical understanding of both consumers' evaluations of product innovations and the affect heuristic. Implications and suggestions for future research are also discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The memorizing effort heuristic in judgments of learning: A developmental perspective

Recent work on adult metacognition indicates that although metacognitive monitoring often guides control operations, sometimes it follows control operations and is based on the feedback from them. Consistent with this view, in self-paced learning, judgments of learning (JOLs) made at the end of each study trial decreased with the amount of time spent studying the item, suggesting that JOLs are based on the memorizing effort heuristic that easily learned items are more likely to be remembered. Study 1 extended investigation to primary school children. Whereas for third to sixth graders (9- to 12-year-olds) JOLs decreased with increasing study time (ST), no such relationship was found for first and second graders (7- and 8-year-olds). For both age groups, however, recall decreased with ST, supporting the validity of the memorizing effort heuristic. Self-reports (Study 2) disclosed the belief that recall should tend to increase with ST. The results bring to the fore the importance of mnemonic cues that shape metacognitive feelings even among primary school children. These cues lie in the very feedback that learners gain on-line from task performance rather than in metacognitive knowledge, and their use may also contribute to increased monitoring accuracy with age.     

Impression formation of tests: retrospective judgments of performance are higher when easier questions come first

Four experiments are reported on the importance of retrospective judgments of performance (postdictions) on tests. Participants answered general knowledge questions and estimated how many questions they answered correctly. They gave higher postdictions when easy questions preceded difficult questions. This was true when time to answer each question was equalized and constrained, when participants were instructed not to write answers, and when questions were presented in a multiple-choice format. Results are consistent with the notion that first impressions predominate in overall perception of test difficulty.     

Intersensory conflict between vision and touch: the response modality dominates when precise, attention-riveting judgments are required

In four experiments, reducing lenses were used to minify vision and generate intersensory size conflicts between vision and touch. Subjects made size judgments, using either visual matching or haptic matching. In visual matching, the subjects chose from a set of visible squares that progressively increased in size. In haptic matching, the subjects selected matches from an array of tangible wooden squares. In Experiment 1, it was found that neither sense dominated when subjects exposed to an intersensory discrepancy made their size estimates by using either visual matching or haptic matching. Size judgments were nearly indentical for conflict subjects making visual or haptic matches. Thus, matching modality did not matter in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, it was found that subjects were influenced by the sight of their hands, which led to increases in the magnitude of their size judgments. Sight of the hands produced more accurate judgments, with subjects being better able to compensate for the illusory effects of the reducing lens. In two additional experiments, it was found that when more precise judgments were required and subjects had to generate their own size estimates, the response modality dominated. Thus, vision dominated in Experiment 3, where size judgments derived from viewing a metric ruler, whereas touch dominated in Experiment 4, where subjects made size estimates with a pincers posture of their hands. It is suggested that matching procedures are inadequate for assessing intersensory dominance relations. These results qualify the position (Hershberger & Misceo, 1996) that the modality of size estimates influences the resolution of intersensory conflicts. Only when required to self-generate more precise judgments did subjects rely on one sense, either vision or touch. Thus, task and attentional requirements influence dominance relations, and vision does not invariably prevail over touch.     

State anxiety impairs attentional control when other sources of control are minimal

Research suggests anxiety impairs attentional control; however, this effect has been unreliable. We argue that anxiety’s impairment of attentional control is subtle, and can be obscured by other non-emotional sources of control. We demonstrate this by examining conflict adaptation, an enhancement in attentional control following a trial with high conflict between distracter and target stimuli. Participants completed a Stroop task featuring incongruent (e.g. RED in green font; high-conflict) and control (e.g. +++ in green font; low-conflict) trials. More state-anxious participants showed greater Stroop interference following control trials, but interference was uniformly low following incongruent trials. This suggests state anxiety can impair attention, but other sources of top-down control – such as conflict adaptation – can easily overcome this impairment. This is consistent with recent theories of anxious cognition and shows that anxiety researchers must attend to the dynamics and sources of attentional control.     

Memory accessibility and probability judgments: an experimental evaluation of the availability heuristic.

Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) availability heuristic hypothesis, the current study found a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the perceived future probability of similar events. Furthermore, when the relative accessibility of memories of positive and negative events was experimentally manipulated using the Velten mood-induction procedure, the perceived future probabilities of similar events also changed in a manner consistent with the availability heuristic account. Reductions in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations were, as predicted, related to increases in perceived probability, and vice versa. Partial correlations indicated that this association between the observed patterns of changes in recall latencies and probability judgments could not be accounted for by the existence of independent associations between each of these effects and the magnitude of mood change.     

The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: why the adjustments are insufficient

One way to make judgments under uncertainty is to anchor on information that comes to mind and adjust until a plausible estimate is reached. This anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is assumed to underlie many intuitive judgments, and insufficient adjustment is commonly invoked to explain judgmental biases. However, despite extensive research on anchoring effects, evidence for adjustment-based anchoring biases has only recently been provided, and the causes of insufficient adjustment remain unclear. This research was designed to identify the origins of insufficient adjustment. The results of two sets of experiments indicate that adjustments from self-generated anchor values tend to be insufficient because they terminate once a plausible value is reached (Studies 1a and 1b) unless one is able and willing to search for a more accurate estimate (Studies 2a-2c).     

Art and authenticity: the importance of originals in judgments of value

Why are original artworks valued more than identical duplicates? The present studies explore 2 mechanisms underlying the special value of original artwork: the assessment of the art object as a unique creative act (performance) and the degree of physical contact with the original artist (contagion). Across 5 experiments, participants were exposed to hypothetical scenarios in which an original object was duplicated. The type of object varied across experiments (e.g., a painting vs. a piece of furniture) as did the circumstances surrounding the creation of the original object and the duplicate. Overall, the results support assessments of performance and contagion as key factors underlying the value of original artwork, and they are consistent with the conclusion that the discrepancy in value between original artworks and perfect duplicates derives from people's lay theories about the domain of art, rather than from associations with particular kinds of art or certain cases of forgery.     

Asymmetry in judgments of personality: others are less differentiated than the self

Previous evidence suggests that judges rely more heavily on implicit personality theories when they rate relatively unfamiliar others. One further implication of this evidence is that correlations among traits should be stronger in other ratings than in self-ratings, particularly when (a) judges lack trait relevant information and/or (b) motivational accuracy is low. We tested these predictions by comparing self- versus other ratings on the Big Five in two studies. Study 1 used previously published data to demonstrate clear self/peer differences in the average relations between Big Five dimensions (excluding Extraversion). Study 2 was based on self- versus other ratings in 12 samples. Overall, the intercorrelations among Big Five traits (excluding Extraversion) tended to be significantly stronger in peer ratings than in self-ratings. The most consistent effect involved the relation between Neuroticism and Agreeableness (overall r=-.43 and -.29 in the peer ratings and self-ratings, respectively). In addition, as expected, the degree of relation among traits varied depending upon the type of target being rated (i.e., spouse vs. dating partner vs. friend vs. stranger). Implications of these findings are discussed.     

The ease-of-processing heuristic and the stability bias: dissociating memory, memory beliefs, and memory judgments

Judgments about memory are essential in promoting knowledge; they help identify trustworthy memories and predict what information will be retained in the future. In the three experiments reported here, we investigated the mechanisms underlying predictions about memory. In Experiments 1 and 2, single words were presented once or multiple times, in large or small type. There was a double dissociation between actual memory and predicted memory: Type size affected predicted but not actual memory, and future study opportunities affected actual memory but scarcely affected predicted memory. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that beliefs and judgments are largely independent, and neither consistently resembles actual memory. Participants' underestimation of future learning-a stability bias-stemmed from an overreliance on their current memory state in making predictions about future memory states. The overreliance on type size highlights the fundamental importance of the ease-of-processing heuristic: Information that is easy to process is judged to have been learned well.     

People use the memory for past-test heuristic as an explicit cue for judgments of learning

When people estimate their memory for to-be-learned material over multiple study–test trials, they tend to base their judgments of learning (JOLs) on their test performance for those materials on the previous trial. Their use of this information—known as the memory for past-test (MPT) heuristic—is believed to be responsible for improvements in the relative accuracy (resolution) of people’s JOLs across learning trials. Although participants seem to use past-test information as a major basis for their JOLs, little is known about how learners translate this information into a judgment of learning. Toward this end, in two experiments, we examined whether participants factored past-test performance into their JOLs in either an explicit, theory-based way or an implicit way. To do so, we had one group of participants (learners) study paired associates, make JOLs, and take a test on two study–test trials. Other participants (observers) viewed learners’ protocols and made JOLs for the learners. Presumably, observers could only use theory-based information to make JOLs for the learners, which allowed us to estimate the contribution of explicit and implicit information to learners’ JOLs. Our analyses suggest that all participants factored simple past-test performance into their JOLs in an explicit, theory-based way but that this information made limited contributions to improvements in relative accuracy across trials. In contrast, learners also used other privileged, implicit information about their learning to inform their judgments (that observers had no access to) that allowed them to achieve further improvements in relative accuracy across trials.