Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation?

Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a target system. The source of this payoff is the existence of a causal interaction with the target system. A computer experiment, which does not go beyond the simulation system itself, lacks any such interaction. So computer experiments cannot confer any additional confidence in the fit (or lack thereof) between the simulation model and the target system.     

Moving the debate forward in small steps: A reply to Morrison

Morrison (1996) criticised the authors' 1995 evaluation on three main grounds: that it was too narrow, that it was circular, and that the model evaluated was contradictory. It is argued that the narrow focus was deliberate, that the methodology was standard and logical, and that the framework evaluated was coherent. Although the authors agree with Morrison in some respects, e.g. on the value of variety of methodology, there seems to be a basic difference in view on scientific method. The authors see research as (mainly) small steps which are erratic but generally cumulative; Morrison appears to favour grand-scale, multi-purpose research.     

剌佛与马礼逊在华传教事业之关系研究

剌佛是英国东印度公司驻广州商馆主席,马礼逊则是公认的基督教新教在中国传播的"开山始祖"。剌佛给予马礼逊在华事业多方帮助。可以说,马礼逊在华事业的开拓,与剌佛对其的鼎力相助是分不开的。但学界研究迄今尚付阙如。本文拟详加探究,祈望能补此方面研究之罅漏。     

Data analysis as insight: Reply to Morrison and Weaver

I begin by underscoring a fundamental point of agreement between Morrison and Weaver and me: that data analysis should entail designing whatever set of techniques optimizes insight into whatever question the experiment was designed to address, rather than implementing some rote set of preordained rules and regulations. Against this shared philosophical backdrop, I then (1) reiterate problems with hypothesis testing, and (2) address some of the quite pertinent issues that Morrison and Weaver raise with respect to computation of confidence intervals.     

Sexual Orientation Bias Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women: Modern Homonegative Attitudes and Their Association With Discriminatory Behavioral Intentions1

Two studies examined modern homonegative attitudes among nonstudents. In Study 1, participants completed the Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS; Morrison & Morrison, 2002 ) and other measures. Results indicated that MHS scores correlated positively with neoracism, neosexism, and the Protestant work ethic, and negatively with humanitarianism–egalitarianism. Gender differences were found and, irrespective of participant sex, greater modern homonegativity was directed toward gay, rather than lesbian targets. Study 2 extended research in the realm of modern homonegativity by investigating the linkage between modern homonegative attitudes and behavioral intentions in a sample of 196 community participants. As expected, modern homonegativity predicted discriminatory behavioral intentions toward a gay, but not a straight mayoralty candidate. Applications of these findings and future research directions are discussed.     

Influence of metacognitive variables and thought suppression on number of thoughts, discomfort they produce and number and quality of auditory illusions

Based on the model proposed by Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier (1995) on auditory hallucinations, this study explores the relationships between certain metacognitive variables and number of thoughts, the discomfort they produce, number of auditory illusions and the quality with which they are perceived in a sample from a non-clinical population. After group administration of the Metacognitions Questionnaire, 61 participants were randomly assigned to a suppression group (n = 31) or a focalization group (n = 30) in relation to thoughts with different degrees of self-discrepancy. Forty-eight hours after the set task, a non-vocal auditory stimulus was presented, and subjects were required to say whether they heard any words and, if so, how clearly. The results show how the metacognitive factors studied are useful for predicting our findings only for the suppression group and not for that of focalization. These data are discussed in the light of Morrison et al.'s model of auditory hallucinations.     

Does hunger influence judgments of female physical attractiveness?

To account for male preferences for female body weight following a consistent socio‐economic pattern, Nelson and Morrison (2005) proposed a social‐cognitive model based on the individual experience of resource scarcity. We replicated their studies showing that calorific dissatisfaction can influence preference for female body weight using a different dependent variable, namely photographic stimuli of women with known body weight and shape. Using this revised methodology, we found that operationalized intra‐individual resource scarcity affects preferences for body weight: 30 hungry male participants preferred figures with a higher body weight and rated as more attractive heavier figures than 31 satiated male participants. Hungrier men were also less likely to be influenced by cues for body shape, supporting extant cross‐cultural studies on female physical attractiveness. These findings corroborate those of Nelson and Morrison (2005) and are discussed in terms of how cultural contexts shape individual psychological experience as predicted by the theory of mutual constitution.     

Video reviews

Breaking the Silence . Joyce Morrison and David Will
Challenging Myths. Joyce Morrison, Jacquie Roberts and David Will
Goodbye Baby Jane . Family observation training videotape produced by Rudi Dallos and Harry Proctor
Systemic Family Therapy . Philippa Seligman and Elsa Jones     

Metacognitions in patients with hallucinations and obsessive-compulsive disorder: the superstition factor

On the basis of the analogy between intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations established by Morrison et al. [(1995). Intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations: a cognitive approach. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 265-280], the present work compares the metacognitive beliefs and processes of five groups of patients (current hallucinators, never-hallucinated people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, recovered hallucinators, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, and a clinical control group) and a non-clinical group. The results show that of the five metacognitive factors considered in this study, two were found to be different in the current hallucinators group in comparison to any other group in the design. Likewise, it is found that the metacognitive beliefs of the current hallucinators coincide with those of the OCD patients in various factors, particularly that relating to superstition, and this is interpreted as lending support to the model of Morrison et al. (1995). Furthermore, the results are discussed in the light of existing research on Thought-Action Fusion, stressing the role that may be played by superstitious beliefs and magical thinking in auditory hallucinations and OCD.     

Book Review: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy

Based on the model proposed by Morrison, Haddock &; Tarrier (1995) on auditory hallucinations, this study explores the relationships between certain metacognitive variables and number of thoughts, the discomfort they produce, number of auditory illusions and the quality with which they are perceived in a sample from a non-clinical population. After group administration of the Metacognitions Questionnaire, 61 participants were randomly assigned to a suppression group (n?=?31) or a focalization group (n?=?30) in relation to thoughts with different degrees of self-discrepancy. Forty-eight hours after the set task, a non-vocal auditory stimulus was presented, and subjects were required to say whether they heard any words and, if so, how clearly. The results show how the metacognitive factors studied are useful for predicting our findings only for the suppression group and not for that of focalization. These data are discussed in the light of Morrison et al.'s model of auditory hallucinations.     

A computational account of children's analogical reasoning: balancing inhibitory control in working memory and relational representation

Theories accounting for the development of analogical reasoning tend to emphasize either the centrality of relational knowledge accretion or changes in information processing capability. Simulations in LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003), a neurally inspired computer model of analogical reasoning, allow us to explore how these factors may collaboratively contribute to the development of analogy in young children. Simulations explain systematic variations in United States and Hong Kong children's performance on analogies between familiar scenes (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006; Richland, Chang, Morrison & Au, 2010). Specifically, changes in inhibition levels in the model's working-memory system explain the developmental progression in US children's ability to handle increases in relational complexity and distraction from object similarity during analogical reasoning. In contrast, changes in how relations are represented in the model best capture cross-cultural differences in performance between children of the same ages (3-4 years) in the United States and Hong Kong. We use these results and simulations to argue that the development of analogical reasoning in children may best be conceptualized as an equilibrium between knowledge accretion and the maturation of information processing capability.     

Objective age-of-acquisition (AoA) norms for a set of 230 object names in French: Relationships with psycholinguistic variables,the English data from Morrison et al. (1997), and naming latencies

Picture naming speed is strongly influenced by the age of acquisition (AoA) of words. Most studies of AoA have relied on adults' AoA ratings. However, objective AoA has been found to be a stronger determinant of picture naming latencies. Whereas objective AoA norms for words have been collected for some language communities, no objective AoA measures for words were previously available in French. The study provides objective AoA norms for a set of 230 object names following the procedures used by Morrison, Chappell, and Ellis (1997) to collect objective AoA measures in English. The relationships between objective AoA measures, rated AoA, other variables used in psycholinguistic experiments (name agreement, image agreement, conceptual familiarity, etc.), the English data collected by Morrison et al., and naming latencies are analysed and discussed. In addition, reanalyses of data on picture naming latencies (Bonin, Chalard, Méot, & Fayol, 2002) with the use of objective AoA norms are provided. Stepwise multiple analyses show that objective AoA is a stronger determinant of (spoken and written) naming latencies than rated AoA, whereas objective word frequency is not a reliable independent determinant and does not interact reliably with AoA in any of the analyses.     

阅读过程眼动控制理论模型:E-Z Reader

简要介绍了一个新近出现的阅读过程中的眼动控制理论模型——E-Z Reader模型,并对该模型的特点进行了深入讨论。文中还涉及了其它几个相关的理论模型．如Morrison(1984)模型和Mr．Chips：理想观察者模型等。最后就E-Z Reader在中文阅读过程认知研究领域中的应用前景进行了讨论。     

Objective-AoA norms for 175 names in Spanish: relationships with other psycholinguistic variables,estimated AoA,and data from other languages

There is a large body of evidence suggesting that words learnt early in life are recognised and produced faster than words learnt later in life, even when other variables are controlled. This is known as the Age of Acquisition (AoA) effect. However, there is an aspect of AoA that requires research of a greater depth, namely the method of obtaining the AoA measures. In the majority of studies, adult participants were asked to estimate the age at which they learnt a given word. Morrison, Chappell, and Ellis (1997) proposed a new method for obtaining objective-AoA data. They asked children to name some objects, and the age at which a given word appeared with 75% or more frequency was considered the AoA of that word. Although this method is more valid than adult ratings, it has only rarely been used. The main aim of this work is to provide objective-AoA norms in Spanish for a set of 175 object names following the procedures used by Morrison et al. The relationships among objective-AoA, estimated-AoA, and other psycholinguistic variables (name-agreement, familiarity, visual complexity, word length, etc.) obtained from a previous study are also analysed. Finally, the similarity of objective- and estimated-AoA measures was examined using data from several languages. A cluster analysis and a multidimensional-scaling analysis revealed that the estimated-AoA measures in a language correlated more with the estimated-AoA measures of the other languages than with the objective measures in the same language. The results suggest that it would be desirable to always use objective-AoA norms because they are less skewed by familiarity.     

REASONS AND REASON REVISITED: ANOTHER REPLY TO MORRISON

In a previous article, Katherine Morrison (1999) argued that in my book Back to Reality: A Critique of Postmodern Theory in Psychotherapy (Held, 1995) I failed to accept the "strictly epistemological" aim of the narrative therapy movement. In the present article she reiterates the same objections, and adds the new criticism that I perceive epistemological oscillations in the writings of narrative therapists where there are none. In my present response I summarize my prior response to Morrison's (1999) critique (Held, 1999a), and I then respond to her new objections by showing how the conflation between epistemology and ontology that she attributes to me reflects her own confusion rather than mine.     

Evolutionary Theology and God–Memes: Explaining Everything or Nothing

It is not uncommon for Darwinists and memeticists to speculate not only that god–memes (cultural units for belief in a god) evolved as maladaptive traits but also that these memes do not correspond to anything real. However, a counter–Darwinian argument exists that some god–memes evolved as adaptive traits and did so with a metaphysical correspondence to reality. Memeticists cannot disallow these positive claims, because the rules they would use to disallow them would also disallow their negative claims. One must either accept that positive Darwinian theological claims can fall within the bounds of science (and therefore be judged on their explanatory merits alone) or must disallow both sets of arguments, including any claims that god–memes fail to correspond to reality. Given that many Darwinists do not appear to accept a modest version of science that avoids negative metaphysical claims, precedence exists in memetic and Darwinian discourse for making positive metaphysical claims as well.     

The Hubris Hypothesis: You Can Self-Enhance, But You'd Better Not Show It

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims ("I am better than others"; Experiments 1-7), noncomparative positive claims ("I am good"; Experiments 1-2, 4), self-equality claims ("I am as good as others"; Experiments 3-4, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better than I used to be"; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims ("S/he is better than others"; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1-7) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 4-7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4-6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims.     

Claims of Near-Death Experiences, Gestalt Resistance Processes, and Measures of Optimal Functioning

The present study investigated the relationship between claims of near-death experiences (NDEs) and measures of self-actualization, Gestalt resistance processes, transfluence, mystical experiences, and claims of peak life experiences in a sample of 155 individuals. As hypothesized, I found significant positive correlations between the claims of NDEs and transfluence and mystical experiences. I found no significant correlations between claims of NDEs and the seven Gestalt resistances, suggesting that NDErs are neither more nor less resistant than nonNDErs. I also found no significant relationship between claims of NDEs and self-actualization or claims of peak life experiences.     

God Diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder

This article endorses the contention that God suffers from a mental disorder, but challenges J. Henry Jurgens’ diagnosis of bipolar disorder as reported in The Onion (“God diagnosed with bipolar disorder”, 2001) and proposes narcissistic personality disorder instead. It uses the diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder from The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC, 1994) and various biblical citations in support of this diagnosis. It rejects the idea that a major personality change is reflected in the New Testament and claims that God did not experience a major transformation of his narcissistic personality structure as described by Heinz Kohut (Forms and transformations of narcissism, in A. P. Morrison, Ed., Essential papers on narcissism, pp. 61–87, New York University Press, New York, 1966/1986). However, it concludes that God’s creativity accounts for the stability of his narcissistic personality structure and helps to explain his lack of empathy toward human beings.

How Could There Be True Causal Claims Without There Being Special Causal Facts in the World?

Some philosophers of physics recently expressed their skepticism about causation (Norton 2003b, 2007). However, this is not new. The view that causation does not refer to any ontological category perhaps can be attributed to Hume, Kant and Russell. On the other hand, some philosophers (Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe) view causation as a physical process and some others (Cartwright) view causation as making claims about capacities possessed by objects. The issue about the ontological status of causal claims involves issues concerning the ontological status of capacity, modality and dispositional claims. In this paper, my goal is to show that without engaging metaphysical debates about the ontological status of causal claims, it can be shown that we can objectively assign truth values to these statements. I argue that for causal claims to be objective we don't need to postulate the existence of special facts (specific to causal claims) in addition to ordinary physical facts described by physical theories. This, I think, is enough to justify the usefulness of this concept in certain branches (may be all) of science. Once this is achieved, there is no need to engage in unnecessary metaphysical debates. So, even if advanced physical theories don't mention this notion, causal reasoning can still be important in understanding the world not in the sense that science discovers special ontological category called causation but in the sense that we come to know certain facts about the world.