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1.
David Jehle 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):565-578
This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal
interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and
orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired
causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way
the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central challenge of explaining how souls and bodies are uniquely paired, allowing
for them to enter into specific causal relationships, forming a singular soul–body unit.
“Thanks to Neal Judisch, Dean Zimmerman, Max Goss, Robert O’Connor, John Heil, Sloan Lee, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Carl Ginet,
and Deborah Smith for helpful comments. Thanks also to the audience at the Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting 2004
for helpful comments and suggestions.” 相似文献
2.
Jeff A. Snapper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):45-56
In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction”
section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not
succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s
argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist
theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully
rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both
kinds of arguments for its inconsistency. 相似文献
3.
Daniel Peterson 《Synthese》2011,181(3):367-374
In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping
beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences
even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping
beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical
and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments
support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books,
I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency
in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences. 相似文献
4.
Jonathan Tallant 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(1):133-140
In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments
due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips.
I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed. 相似文献
5.
Joseph A. Baltimore 《Synthese》2010,175(2):151-168
Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental
causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”:
If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition
to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In their
“Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don’ts,” Larry Shapiro and Elliott Sober employ a novel empirical approach to challenge
the piggyback principle. Their empirical approach pulls from the experiments of August Weismann regarding the inheritance
of acquired characteristics. Through an examination of Weismann’s experiments, Shapiro and Sober extract lessons in reasoning
about the epiphenomenalism of a property. And according to these empirically drawn lessons, the piggyback principle is a don’t.
My primary aim in this paper is to defend the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach. 相似文献
6.
Neil Campbell 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):137-145
Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection
claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson
by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense
might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case
the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains. 相似文献
7.
Christopher Gregory Weaver 《Synthese》2012,184(3):299-317
I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused,
are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander
Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies
inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the
argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian”
argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility
claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections
from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics. 相似文献
8.
Stephan Leuenberger 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(3):327-354
In “Ramseyan Humility,” David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments
invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on
the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter
how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since
they rely on a highly implausible assumption about the expressive power of our language. 相似文献
9.
Zanja Yudell 《Synthese》2010,175(2):241-253
Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition
of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR
that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by
Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of
buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored
solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties
may be indispensable to SR. 相似文献
10.
Jack Vromen 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(3):365-383
Abell, Felin and Foss argue that “macro-explanations” in strategic management, explanations in which organizational routines
figure prominently and in which both the explanandum and explanans are at the macro-level, are necessarily incomplete. They take a diagram (which has the form of a trapezoid) from Coleman,
Foundations of Social Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)/London, (1990) to task to show that causal chains connecting two macro-phenomena always involve “macro-to-micro” and “micro-to-macro” links,
links that macro-explanations allegedly fail to recognize. Their plea for micro-foundations in strategic management is meant
to shed light on these “missing links”. The paper argues that while there are good reasons for providing micro-foundations,
Abell, Felin and Foss’s causal incompleteness argument is not one of them. Their argument does not sufficiently distinguish
between causal and constitutive relations. Once these relations are carefully distinguished, it follows that Coleman’s diagram
has to be squared. This in turn allows us to see that macro-explanations need not be incomplete. 相似文献
11.
Ken Levy 《Synthese》2007,158(1):139-151
Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games.
Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door
that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for
these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what justifies
the switching strategy is its leading me to win a greater percentage of the time. In fact, what justifies the switching strategy
is not any statistical result over the long run but rather the “causal structure” intrinsic to each individual game itself.
Finally, I argue that an argument by Hilary Putnam will not help to save Baumann’s second conclusion above.
See Moser and Mulder (1994, pp. 115–116, 118). 相似文献
12.
Anders John 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):137-143
In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have
tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively,
Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which
an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend
a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural
philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments. 相似文献
13.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):115-121
Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to
do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to
kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both
Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be
understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such
a challenge unscathed. 相似文献
14.
Summary This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. 相似文献
15.
Max Kistler 《Synthese》2006,151(3):347-354
I analyse Rueger’s application of Kim’s model of functional reduction to the relation between the thermal conductivities of metal bars at macroscopic and atomic scales. 1) I show that it is a misunderstanding to accuse the functional reduction model of not accounting for the fact that there are causal powers at the micro-level which have no equivalent at the macro-level. The model not only allows but requires that the causal powers by virtue of which a functional predicate is defined, are only a subset of the causal powers of the properties filling the functional specification. 2) The fact that the micro-equation does not converge to the macro-equation in general but only under the constraint of a “solvability condition” does not show that reduction is impossible, as Rueger claims, but only that reduction requires inter-level constraints. 3) Rueger tries to analyse inter-level reduction with the conceptual means of intra-level reduction. This threatens the coherence of his analysis, given that it makes no sense to ascribe macroproperties such as thermal conductivity to entities at the atomic level. Ignoring the distinction between theses two senses of “reduction” is especially confusing because they have opposite directions: in intra-level reduction, the more detailed account reduces to the less detailed one, whereas in inter-level reduction, the less detailed theory is reduced to the more detailed one. 4) Finally I criticize Rueger’s way of using Wimsatt’s criteria for emergence in terms of non-aggregativity, to construct a concept of synchronic emergence. It is wrong to require, over and above non-aggregativity, irreducibility as a criterion for emergence. 相似文献
16.
Xiaoqiang Han 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):157-167
Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed
to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam
employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the
existence of myself, but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting
nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved
tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted
notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the
proofs of the existence of the empirical I, but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. 相似文献
17.
This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks’ paper “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following”. Hindriks claims to find
room for what he calls a modest solution to the Kripkensteinian problem of rule-following, different from both straight and sceptical solutions. Hindriks
criticises Philip Pettit’s “ethocentric” solution and goes on to provide his own, “modest” one. My paper is in two parts.
In the first part, I argue that there is no room for a “modest” solution to sceptical problems: depending on how one reads
Kripke, Hindriks’ “modest” solution is always going to turn out either straight or sceptical. In the second part, I defend
the ethocentric solution against Hindriks’ arguments. In particular, I argue that the topic-neutral specifications of favourable
conditions which Pettit uses are superior to Hindriks’ topic-specific ones.
*I want to thank Frank Hindriks for comments on an earlier version, but I take full responsibility for any remaining errors
or misunderstandings. This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project 202513). 相似文献
18.
Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders
of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot
causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum
and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t
be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing
out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum
and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails. 相似文献
19.
Longuenesse B 《Psychological research》2012,76(2):220-228
Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively
discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will
in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the
will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to
our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few
questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest
answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1. 相似文献
20.
Simon Dierig 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(1):73-92
The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is
Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means
of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative,
to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate
the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style
argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists
or its third premise is mistaken because having the “twater thought” instead of the “water thought” is not relevant. Finally,
it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist
can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge
and the nature of slow switching. 相似文献