Judgments for inaccessible targets: Comparing recognition without identification and the feeling of knowing

Both the recognition-without-identification (RWI) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) paradigms attempt to tap participants?? sense about a target that is inaccessible. In the case of RWI, participants judge the likelihood that the inaccessible target was studied. In the case of FOKs, participants judge the likelihood that the inaccessible target will be recognized at a later point in time. The present study compared the two using a hybrid paradigm. The patterns of responding differed depending on whether the judgment was of the RWI type or the FOK type. For the former, ratings were significantly higher for studied than for unstudied inaccessible targets (the typical RWI effect). For the latter, ratings were significantly lower for studied than for unstudied inaccessible targets (a reversal of the usual RWI effect). Similarity of the targets and distractors diminished the usual RWI effect, but not its reversal in the FOK situation, suggesting that the bases of the two effects differ. A potential explanation is that when participants judge whether an inaccessible target was presented earlier, they are oriented toward relying on cue familiarity, which should be greater for cues of studied targets, whereas when they judge whether they will recognize an inaccessible target later on, they are oriented toward relying on the accessibility of information, which is greater in the unstudied condition, due to the lack of priming of the targets.     

When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement

Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among the members of the consensus community. I address the question of under what conditions it is likely that a consensus is in fact knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is likely to be knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus, and I identify three conditions—social calibration, apparent consilience of evidence, and social diversity, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

Differentiating explanations of attitude-consistent behavior: the role of perspectives and mode of perspective taking

We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imagined in-group members' perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed with each explanation, to guess the attitude of the provider of each explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects. Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group members who imagined the same perspective. They responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared understanding about how both sides should explain attitude-consistent behavior, but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations.     

Reversing roles: a cognitive strategy for undoing memory deficits associated with token status

Tested whether having tokens (Ts) adopt the role of judge reduces cognitive deficits; examined several hypotheses to explain these deficits. In 3 experiments, Ss were asked to remember as many as possible of opinions exchanged in a group interaction with 3 actors. Experiment 1 demonstrated that judging majority members helped gender Ts improve their memory and ruled out self-denigration as a mediator of token deficits. Experiment 2 indicated that judging others was effective regardless of whether the others were said to know about it or not, ruling out insulation from evaluative scrutiny as a viable mediator for the judge role. Experiment 3 suggested the judge role restores completely the Ts, cognitive capacities and ruled out heightened responsibility as an explanation for the improved memory of judges. This work suggests that Ts may perform better if they can restructure cognitively their social environments.     

Exploring the Effects of the Naturalistic Fallacy: Evidence That Genetic Explanations Increase the Acceptability of Killing and Male Promiscuity

The naturalistic fallacy is the erroneous belief that what is natural is morally acceptable. Two studies assessed whether people commit the naturalistic fallacy by testing whether genetic explanations for killing and male promiscuity, as compared to experiential explanations (i.e., learning/“nurture” explanations) increase acceptance of these behaviors. In Study 1, participants who read a genetic explanation for why people kill bugs viewed bug killing as more morally acceptable than participants who read an experiential explanation, although they did not reliably kill more bugs. In Study 2, men who read a genetic explanation for why men are more promiscuous than women reported decreased interest in long‐term romantic commitment compared with men who read experiential explanations and women who read either explanation.     

Conditional reasoning and causation

An experiment was conducted to investigate the relative contributions of syntactic form and content to conditional reasoning. The content domain chosen was that of causation. Conditional statements that described causal relationships (if mean value of cause, then mean value of effect) were embedded in simple arguments whose entailments are governed by the rules of truth-functional logic (i.e., modus ponens, modus tollens, denying the antecedent, and affirming the consequent). The causal statements differed in terms of the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions that characterized the causal relationship. (A disabling condition is an event that prevents an effect from occurring even though a relevant cause is present). Subjects were required to judge whether or not each argument's conclusion could be accepted. Judgements were found to vary systematically with the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions. Conclusions of arguments based on conditionals with few alternative causes or disabling conditions were found to be more acceptable than conclusions based on those with many.     

The epistemic significance of consensus

Philosophers have often noted that science displays an uncommon degree of consensus on beliefs among its practitioners. Yet consensus in the sciences is not a goal in itself. I consider cases of consensus on beliefs as concrete events. Consensus on beliefs is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for presuming that these beliefs constitute knowledge. A concrete consensus on a set of beliefs by a group of people at a given historical period may be explained by different factors according to various hypotheses. A particularly interesting hypothesis from an epistemic perspective is the knowledge hypothesis: shared knowledge explains a consensus on beliefs. If all the alternative hypotheses to the knowledge hypotheses are false or are not as good in explaining a concrete consensus on beliefs, the knowledge hypothesis is the best explanation of the consensus. If the knowledge hypothesis is best, a consensus becomes a plausible, though fallible, indicator of knowledge. I argue that if a consensus on beliefs is uncoerced, uniquely heterogeneous and large, the gap between the likelihood of the consensus given the knowledge hypothesis and its likelihoods given competing hypotheses tends to increase significantly. Consensus is a better indicator of knowledge than “success” or “human flourishing”.     

The right hemisphere as an anomaly detector: evidence from visual perception

V. S. Ramachandran (1998) has suggested that the right hemisphere, which tends to be specialized for the analysis of global-level information, serves as an anomaly detector. Its role is to judge whether a given percept is possible and whether there are elements of that percept that seem incongruent with the other elements. In contrast, the left hemisphere tends to create a "story" to make sense of the incongruities. In the current study, pictures of possible or impossible objects were displayed for brief exposure durations to either the left visual field/right hemisphere or to the right visual field/left hemisphere). The results provide tentative support for the work of Ramachandran. In male participants, the right hemisphere was superior to the left in detecting impossible objects.     

Inferring accuracy for judges and items: Choice of unit of analysis reverses the conclusions

This study explores the relationship between the precision and the accuracy of forecasts using either judge or item as the unit of analysis. Participants in five experiments answered general-knowledge questions by indicating intervals that were likely to include the correct answer. Results indicate that the precision of an interval estimate is not a straightforward cue to the likelihood that such an interval includes the truth (hit rate). Whereas judges who state more precise estimates (i.e. who provide narrower interval estimates) have lower hit rates, questions for which the average judgment is more precise have higher hit rates. Thus, the relation between precision and accuracy depends on whether one ‘slices’ the data by judge or by question. We offer an explanation for this seemingly paradoxical effect and implement it as a computer simulation to demonstrate its validity. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects

Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Superiority of recognition over detection in judgments of visual orientation.

2 human subjects were tested in two separate visual psychophysical tasks--detection and recognition. Using tachistoscopic presentation, single lines were shown at five different exposure durations. It was determined that it is easier to judge which of two lines, differing only in orientation, was flashed than to judge whether or not a given line was presented. The statistically significant superiority of recognition over detection occurred along a wide performance range, roughly from 60% to 95% correct. The data indicate that the effect is not peculiar to a simultaneous detection-recognition task or to a midrange performance level, both of which were used in a previous study. Other relevant data and theoretical explanations of the effect are discussed.     

A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be regarded as valid for commonsense reasoning. An explanation of this puzzling failure is given, arguing that a problem in the theory of rational choice transfers to the realm of belief formation.     

Motor execution affects action prediction

Previous studies provided evidence of the claim that the prediction of occluded action involves real-time simulation. We report two experiments that aimed to study how real-time simulation is affected by simultaneous action execution under conditions of full, partial or no overlap between observed and executed actions. This overlap was analysed by comparing the body sides and the movement kinematics involved in the observed and the executed action. While performing actions, participants observed point-light (PL) actions that were interrupted by an occluder, followed by a test pose. The task was to judge whether the test pose depicted a continuation of the occluded action in the same depth angle. Using a paradigm proposed by Graf et al., we independently manipulated the duration of the occluder and the temporal advance of the test pose relative to occlusion onset (occluder time and pose time, respectively). This paradigm allows the assessment of real-time simulation, based on prediction performance across different occluder time/pose time combinations (i.e., improved task performance with decreasing time distance between occluder time and pose time is taken to reflect real-time simulation). The PL actor could be perceived as from the front or back, as indicated by task instructions. In Experiment 1 (front view instructions), evidence of action simulation was obtained for partial overlap (i.e., observed and performed action corresponded either in body side or movement kinematics), but not for full or no overlap conditions. The same pattern was obtained in Experiment 2 (back view instructions), ruling out a spatial compatibility explanation for the real-time pattern observed. Our results suggest that motor processes affect action prediction and real-time simulation. The strength of their impact varies as a function of the overlap between observed and executed actions.     

"Company motivates the miserable": the impact of consensus information on help seeking for psychological problems

Based on an attribution theory analysis, it was predicted that normal individuals (people who do not evidence a particular target problem) would be least motivated to seek help for a psychological problem when they believe that the problem is actuarially common (i.e., high consensus). Based on an analysis of how target problem people evaluate their psychological problem, however, it was predicted that such individuals (unlike normal individuals) should be maximally motivated to seek help when they believe that the problem is common. To test these predictions, target problem and normal individuals (high vs. average test anxious females) were given feedback that they possessed a problem (test anxiety). Individuals were then told that their problem was either common, uncommon, or given no consensus information. As predicted, the higher consensus information led to the least help-seeking behavior for the normal individuals and to the most help-seeking behavior for the target problem individuals.     

Stimulus congruence and the Simon effect

Summary A standard experimental procedure was implemented with novel response requirements to assess the hypothesis that the Simon effect is attributable not to the irrelevant stimulus-response relationship, but to the congruence between stimulus attributes. The stimulus ensemble consisted of the words LEFT and RIGHT, one of which was presented on each trial to the left or right of a central fixation point. The distinctive feature of the task is that subjects were asked to respond, by laterally placed keys, whether or not the stimulus word was in accord (i. e., congruent) with its location on the display. Asking subjects to judge stimulus congruence directly enables the effect of congruence to be assessed, as well as independent estimates of the two irrelevant S-R relationships that apply in the task — that is, between the response location and (1) the stimulus location (the Simon effect) and (2) the stimulus word (the reverse Simon effect). Marked effects were obtained in all three cases. Stimulus congruence remains in contention as a factor in the explanation of the Simon effect, but the strong effects of irrelevant S-R factors suggest that a more comprehensive account of the Simon effect is needed. An explanation in terms of stimulus salience, based on an interactive activational model, is briefly discussed.     

What Does it Mean to be a Common Factors Informed Family Therapist?

The common factors paradigm in couple and family therapy has gained popularity over the past several decades, leading many therapists to refer to themselves as common factors family therapists. Despite this, no consensus exists on what it means to be a common factors family therapist, or if such a designation even makes sense given that the common factors paradigm is not a model. Synthesizing the existing common factors literature, a case is made for the designation “common factors informed family therapist,” and the following six core principles are outlined that characterize this designation: (1) sees overlap among theories; (2) passionate about theory, not a theory; (3) client centered; (4) monitors hope and the therapeutic alliance; (5) views clients as people rather than objects; and (6) prioritizes healing over therapy. Each of the concepts is discussed in depth, and clinical implications are provided.     

The false consensus effect: A meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests

False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus for their own behaviors. Specifically, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than it is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors. A meta-analysis was conducted upon 115 tests of this hypothesis. The combined effects of the tests of the false consensus hypothesis were highly statistically significant and of moderate magnitude. Further, the 115 tests of false consensus appear to be relatively heterogeneous in terms of significance levels and effect sizes. Correlational analyses and focused comparisons indicate that the false consensus effect does not appear to be influenced by the generality of the reference population, nor by the difference between alternative choices in actual consensus. However, the significance and magnitude of the false consensus effect was significantly predicted by the number of behavioral choices/estimates subjects had to make, and the sequence of measurement of choices and estimates. These patterns of results are interpreted as being inconsistent with the self-presentational, motivational explanation for the false consensus effect.