Religious involvement and self-forgiveness

The purpose of this study is to examine the interface between involvement in religion and self-forgiveness. The data come from a recent nationwide survey of adults age 18 and older (N?=?1774). A conceptual model was developed that contains the following hypotheses: (1) Evangelicals will attend worship services more frequently than members of other faith traditions; (2) people who go to church services more often will be more likely to get spiritual support from fellow church members; (3) individuals who receive more spiritual support from religious others will be more likely to believe that they have been forgiven by God; (4) people who believe that they have been forgiven by God will have a greater sense of self-worth; and (5) individuals who have a stronger sense of self-worth will be more likely to forgive themselves for the things they have done wrong. The data provide support for each hypothesis.     

Exploring self-forgiveness

This article presents the results of a phenomenological study of the experience of self-forgiveness. On the basis of in-depth interviews with seven subjects, self-forgiveness is described not as an achievement but rather as a gift where one moves from estrangement and brokenness to a sense of at-homeness.This article is based in part on a paper presented at the Eighth International Human Science Research Conference at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, in August 1989. The authors thank their colleagues Carolyn Grissom and Jodi Kelly for their helpful suggestions.     

从道德模范说起

这些年来,社会道德建设问题不仅引起了社会各界的严重关切,也引起了学术界的严重关切。然而如何建设良好的社会道德?却有着不同的答案。其中为我们大家所熟知、又     

Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation

In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.     

A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation

The paper articulates a puzzle that consists in the prima facie incompatibility between three widely accepted theses. The first thesis is, roughly, that there are intrinsically self-representational thoughts. The second thesis is, roughly, that there is a particular causal constraint on mental representation. The third thesis is, roughly, that nothing causes itself. In this paper, the theses are articulated in a less rough manner with the occurrence of the puzzle as a result. Finally, a number of solution strategies are considered, and a preliminary diagnosis is provided.     

On experiencing moral properties

Synthese - Do we perceptually experience moral properties like rightness and wrongness? For example, as in Gilbert Harman’s classic case, when we see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline...     

On human needs and moral appraisals

For a large and important range of cases the connection between ‘X needs y’ and ‘X ought to have y’, though not an entailment, is still non‐contingent. Sentences in which ‘needs’ occurs have several uses) one of which is normative; when such sentences are used to make statements, the statements constitute a good reason for asserting that what is needed ought to be done. It must, however, be recognized that such a reason may not be a sufficient reason for the moral appraisal that what is needed ought to be done. It is not self‐contradictory to assert ‘He needs it but he ought not to have it’, though in moral contexts if it is stated that someone needs something or that something is needed we are entitled to infer that, everything else being equal, he should have it or that it should be done. But often there are countervailing considerations which defeat that initial presumption. I attempt to support these contentions by 1) describing several key uses of “need sentences” and 2) by elucidating the relations between the uses of such sentences and moral judgments.     

论唐君毅的道德观——读《道德自我之建立》

唐君毅是中国现代史上著名的哲学家,也是现代新儒家的代表人物之一。其道德观是建立在其心本体论哲学之基础上的,他对道德生活本质、道德自我在宇宙中的地位、现实世界之物质是精神之体现的论述,以及希望建立一个充满高尚理想与道德价值的社会的思想,对于我们当今构建和谐社会无疑具有积极的启迪意义。     

Tipping the scales: Conciliatory behavior and the morality of self-forgiveness

Two studies examined whether conciliatory behavior aids self-forgiveness and whether it does so in part by making it seem more morally appropriate. Participants in Study 1 (n?=?269) completed an offense-recall procedure; participants in Study 2 (n?=?208) imagined a social transgression under conciliatory behavior (yes, no) and receipt of forgiveness (no, ambiguous, yes) conditions. Conciliatory behavior predicted (Study 1) and caused (Study 2) elevated self-forgiveness and increased perceptions of the moral appropriateness of self-forgiveness. Perceived morality consistently mediated the effect of conciliatory behavior on self-forgiveness. Received forgiveness and guilt were considered as additional mechanisms, but received mixed support. Results suggest that conciliatory behavior may influence self-forgiveness in part by satisfying moral prerequisites for self-forgiveness.