Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.     

Moral outrage and pragmatism: Explanations for collective action

Two explanations for collective behavior were contrasted. The first, exemplified by relative deprivation theory, stresses the importance of feelings of moral outrage and perceived economic injustice. The second focuses on more pragmatic considerations, such as the availability of resources for mobilization. The present study examines these explanations for collective behavior in a laboratory setting. Subjects were members of a disadvantaged group. In a 3 × 2 factorial design two independent variables were manipulated. The magnitude of pay inequality between the disadvantaged group and a more advantaged group was manipulated to be large, moderate, or small. Mobilization resources available to the disadvantaged group were manipulated to be either present or absent. In accord with predictions based on relative deprivation theory, as the magnitude of the inequality increased, stronger feelings of deprivation were expressed. However, contrary to relative deprivation theory, larger magnitudes of inequality and stronger feelings of deprivation were not associated with greater willingness to engage in legitimate or illegitimate forms of collective behavior. Instead, as predicted by some critics of relative deprivation theory, willinginess to engage in illegitimate forms of collective behavior was affected only by a gragmatic consideration: the presence or absence of mobilization resources.     

A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations

Some moral realists claim that moral facts are a species of natural fact, amenable to scientific investigation. They argue that these moral facts are needed in the best explanations of certain phenomena and that this is evidence that they are real. In this paper I present part of a biological account of the function of morality. The account allows the identification of a plausible natural kind that could play the explanatory role that a moral kind would play in naturalist realist theories. It is therefore a candidate for being the moral kind. I argue, however, that it will underdetermine the morally good, that is, identifying the kind is not sufficient to identify what is good. Hence this is not a natural moral kind. Its explanatory usefulness, however, means that we do not have to postulate any further (moral) facts to provide moral explanations. Hence there is no reason to believe that there are any natural moral kinds.     

Moral Evaluations of Lying for One's Own Group

This study investigated the development of moral judgments of blue lies, which occur when a speaker makes false statements to benefit a group of which he or she is a member. We investigated this issue in China, where there is substantial emphasis on the nature of children's associations with groups they belong to. Participants ranged in age from 9 to 17, and we asked them to evaluate lies that were told to benefit a team representing a speaker's class, school, or country. Judgments varied systematically as a function of age, with the 17‐year‐olds rating lying for any form of collective less negatively than did the younger age groups. In addition, across the age groups, children's affinity tended to shift from smaller groups to broader and more abstract collectives: 9‐ and 11‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's class, 13‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's school, and 17‐year olds were least critical of blue lies told to benefit a speaker's country. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subclinical Bias,Manners, and Moral Harm

Mundane and often subtle forms of bias generate harms that can be fruitfully understood as akin to the harms evident in rudeness. Although subclinical expressions of bias are not mere rudeness, like rudeness they often manifest through the breach of mannerly norms for social cooperation and collaboration. At a basic level, the perceived harm of mundane forms of bias often has much to do with feeling oneself unjustly or arbitrarily cut out of a group, a group that cooperates and collaborates but does not do so with me. Appealing to the subtle but familiar choreography of mannered social interaction, I argue, makes it easier to recognize how exclusion can be accomplished through slight but symbolically significant gestures and styles of interaction, where bias manifests not in announced hostility but in an absence of the cooperation and collaboration upon which we rely socially.     

Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect

Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out, we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments within moral feedback.

Threats to Moral Identity: Testing the Effects of Incentives and Consequences of One's Actions on Moral Cleansing

Individuals engage in moral cleansing, a compensatory process to reaffirm one's moral identity, when one's moral self-concept is threatened. However, too much moral cleansing can license individuals to engage in future unethical acts. This study examined the effects of incentives and consequences of one's actions on cheating behavior and moral cleansing. Results found that incentives and consequences interacted such that unethical thoughts were especially threatening, resulting in more moral cleansing, when large incentives to cheat were present and cheating explicitly harmed others. Implications are discussed in terms of ethics training, using incentives as motivators, and the depersonalized norms of science.     

Minding Minding God: A Response to Spezio and Bielfeldt

Abstract. Michael Spezio and Dennis Bielfeldt have each raised important issues with regard to my positions in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. In this article I respond to several of their criticisms, including issues of the nature of theology, my stance on epistemology and realism, and issues of physicalism, freedom, and determinism.     

Minding Animals, Minding Earth: Old Brains, New Bottlenecks

Abstract. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth.     

Coercion in Groups: Finding One's Voice; Knowing One's Mind

Groups develop standards to facilitate their function and yet the standards that evolve are not always in line with the explicit task of the group. Group pressures and anxieties can move towards relief of strain in ways that may actually oppose the group's intended goals. The larger the group, the more difficult it may be to catch hold of relatively invisible coercive forces that guide behaviour. As Bion (1977 Bion, W. R. 1977. Seven Servants, New York: Jason Aronson.  [Google Scholar]) notes, group pressures tend to move towards cohesion and tradition, and away from the new idea that ultimately might be productive but would also be disregulating. Although clinicians learn about tensions between the individual and the group from a theoretical perspective, engaging with these tensions actively and reflectively can enhance both our understanding and our practice, as we discover ways in which we are buffeted by and at times succumb to these same processes. As a way of considering some of the more subtle ways in which we may find ourselves behaving out of line with our own integrity in relation to encounters with implicit group demands, I will use some of my own experiences in a group setting to highlight and illustrate some of these coercive forces that may work against the integration of new ideas in group settings.     

Diverging Perceptions of Personal Moral Values and the Values of One's Religious Group

A popular notion in many religions is that less pious individuals are also less moral. We sought to test the self-described moral values of religious and nonreligious individuals under the framework of Moral Foundations Theory. In Study 1, we found that atheists differ from Christians in some moral domains. We also found evidence that Christians’ self-ratings are consistently lower than what they perceive to be the moral values of other Christians. This finding contradicts previous findings that suggest that Christians may inflate their positive characteristics relative to their peers in other domains. In Studies 2 and 3, we tested several alternative explanations for this finding. Preliminary evidence suggests that Christians rate their moral values lower in comparison to Christian exemplars such as religious leaders, and not from a sense of humility. In contrast, atheists may not have exemplars for such a comparison.     

Brain and Machine: Minding the Transhuman Future

Abstract:  Ethical deliberations about brain‐machine interfaces (BMI) focus on how humanity will be changed in imagined future transhuman landscapes. I review some current developments in BMI and suggest that responsible deliberation about BMI proceed by recognizing the typically implicit central role given to the imagined futures and the humans who inhabit them. As responsible deliberators about BMI, we make choices when we engage in "minding the other" that precede and constrain the choices we then make about BMI. I suggest possibilities for such minding that emerge from a theoanthropology grounded in the analogia relationis and that connect to a growing program of neurophenomenology.     

Minding the gap: spatial perseveration error in dogs

We investigated a combination of perseveration and detour behaviour in 50 domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). They were required to make a detour through a gap at one end of a straight barrier in order to reach a target. After one, two, three or four repeats, the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier, and the detour behaviour of the dogs was recorded. Although the dogs could solve simple detour tasks (80% correct in the first trial), they committed a perseveration error of following the previously learned route despite the clearly visible change in the location of the gap. This ‘misbehaviour’ occurred in 29 of 30 dogs after only two learning trials. They never reached a 100% correct performance level again even after four runs through the second gap location. The results suggest that dogs are reluctant to unlearn acquired spatial motor responses and reinforced navigation, which has important implications for experimental design, everyday dog training and our understanding of their mental capacities.     

Perchance to Sleep: Minding the Unworded Body in Psychoanalysis

In contemporary relational psychoanalysis, influenced by developmental/attachment theories, infant research, and neurobiology, the effectiveness and transformational potential of “the talking cure” can be thought of as, at times, located in areas of nonverbal engagement. It has become increasingly evident that human experience is born in the body and structured in body-based memory that informs us of what we “know in our gut” and contributes to our relating as embodied beings—experiences that as psychoanalysts we cannot or need not necessarily translate directly into declarative discourse. A detailed case presentation from work with a patient suffering from a severe sleep disorder and other forms of bodily dysregulation will be offered to illustrate and explore the affectively meaningful engagement between patient and analyst of somatically encoded, presymbolic memory within the context of a symbolically rich, verbal treatment relationship.