What's wrong with promising to try?

There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, I contend that sometimes the promise to try places undue burdens on the promisee.     

Paying attention to distress: What's wrong with rumination?

We explored the notion—derived from conceptualisations of mindfulness—that what makes attention to distress harmful is negative judgement about it. In Study 1 we examined factors of Nolen-Hoeksema's Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). A “Brooding” scale included items describing negative judgements of experience, and a “Reflection” scale, comprised items describing analysis of thoughts and feelings without obvious judgement. Correlations of Reflection with depression and thought suppression were lower than those for Brooding, but still significant, perhaps because all items implied some judgement. In Study 2, items were reworded to de-emphasise evaluative judgements (RRS-nonjudging) and compared to the original RRS. Although the factor structures of the original and RRS-nonjudging versions were essentially identical, the RRS-nonjudging Reflection scale was uncorrelated with depression and thought suppression, and was more highly correlated with emotional processing than was the original Reflection scale.     

What's wrong with cross-cultural comparisons of subjective Likert scales?: The reference-group effect

Social comparison theory maintains that people think about themselves compared with similar others. Those in one culture, then, compare themselves with different others and standards than do those in another culture, thus potentially confounding cross-cultural comparisons. A pilot study and Study 1 demonstrated the problematic nature of this reference-group effect: Whereas cultural experts agreed that East Asians are more collectivistic than North Americans, cross-cultural comparisons of trait and attitude measures failed to reveal such a pattern. Study 2 found that manipulating reference groups enhanced the expected cultural differences, and Study 3 revealed that people from different cultural backgrounds within the same country exhibited larger differences than did people from different countries. Cross-cultural comparisons using subjective Likert scales are compromised because of different reference groups. Possible solutions are discussed.     

On the need for real dialogue: What's wrong with monological contractualism?

According to T.M. Scanlon, the core idea of contractualism consists in the claim that what we are morally required to do is conceptually grounded in the value of living in “relations of mutual recognition” with others. Specifically, Scanlon's contractualist idea of “living in relations of mutual recognition with others” requires that one act only in ways that cannot be reasonably rejected by all of those affected, according to the results of a hypothetical reflection conducted within one's own mind. I claim, however, that Scanlon is mistaken to rely on a single individual's hypothetical reflection (monological reflection) to determine what no one affected could reasonably reject. Instead, following Jürgen Habermas, I claim that we must engage in actual dialogue with all who stand to be affected, in order to live in relations of mutual recognition with others.     

What is wrong with the indeterminacy of language-attribution?

One might take the significance of Davidson’s indeterminacy thesis to be that the question as to which language we can take another to be speaking can only be settled relative to our choice of an acceptable theory for interpreting the speaker. This, in turn, could be taken to show that none of us is ever speaking a determinate language. I argue that this result is self-defeating and cannot avoid collapse into a troubling skepticism about meaning. I then offer a way of trying to make sense of the idea that some utterances do belong to determinate languages even though there is no determinate language one can take another to be speaking. This, however, results in an uninviting picture of communication in which no speaker is really in a position to say what another’s words mean.     

What is wrong with incest?

Incest taboos should be seen as involving non‐sexual objections to sexual relations, that is, objections based on who people are in relation to each other, rather than their activities. What is at stake is brought out by considering certain objections to father‐daughter incest and certain features of taboos. The objections that matter do not depend on social ties and distinctions having a biological basis, but there is nonetheless a biological element in incest taboos. To see it, one must look to the nature of the Oedipus complex, and to the conditions for the development of the individual and of society. There may be prohibitions which are necessary (to morality, to society, to humanity) even though they may not be justifiable within a narrower conception (e.g. utilitarian) of morality and justification. And so taboos which are universal (occur, in one form or another, in every society), and absolute (allow no questioning), and impose strict liability (allow no excuse), may not be irrational: they may mark the boundaries that shape a way of life.     

What's Wrong with Prepunishment?

Punishing someone for a crime before they have committed it is widely considered morally abhorrent. But there is little agreement on what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it. In this paper, I critically evaluate several objections to the permissibility of prepunishment, making points along the way about the connections between time, knowledge, desert, deterrence and duty. I conclude that, although the conditions under which it could permissibly be administered are unlikely ever to arise in practice, nevertheless in principle, nothing is wrong with prepunishment after all.     

What is wrong with imagery questionnaires?

Research evidence is reviewed which shows that the questionnaire method represents a deviant case in imagery research: Whereas experimental techniques consistently produce strong effects for the imagery variable in a large specter of cognitive tasks, research based on imagery questionnaires yields ambiguous and most frequently negative results. Existing explanations of the discrepant findings are critically examined and found to be inadequate. An alternative interpretation is offered, where it is hypothesized that the questionnaire approach to the study of imagery is infected by a serious methodological flaw, due to differences in subjective conceptions of the rating scale employed in imagery questionnaires. Experimental evidence is reported which supports this interpretation.     

Is there anything wrong with ``God of the gaps' reasoning?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

What's Wrong with Creativity Testing?

Creativity testing as it is now done is often based on a defective assumption that different kinds of creativity can be compressed into a single unidimensional scale. There is no reason to believe that the different kinds of creativity represent, simply, different amounts of a single unidimensional construct. The article shows how three different ways of viewing creativity lead to different ways of measuring creativity, all at variance with current unidimensional models. The point of view presented here does not suggest that current creativity tests are invalid, but rather, that care must be taken in the nature of claims made for them. Moreover, many of the same arguments could be applied to the measurement of intelligence and even wisdom as well.