On simplicity of formulas

Simple formula should contain only few quantifiers. In the paper the methods to estimate quantity and quality of quantifiers needed to express a sentence equivalent to given one.     

On the role of the simplicity heuristic in language processing: Evidence from structural and inferential processing

This paper evaluates whether or not simplicity or minimalistic heuristics, which are posited to account for local ambiguity resolution at the level of structural processing and for the lack of inferential elaboration during discourse processing, represent the most accurate account of language processing. Evidence from on-line studies is presented which suggests that alternative, more knowledge-based mechanisms for handling processing are brought to bear in these situations.     

On perceived conflicts between religion and science: the role of fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism

Volunteers from fundamentalist churches and a Psychology of Religion class (N = 77) completed Altemeyer and Hunsberger's 1992 Fundamentalism Scale, Altemeyer's 1988 Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale, and answered questions about science, religion, and their relationship. Scores on the scales were highly positively correlated. Neither orientation correlated with seeing science as improving life, and both correlated with being troubled by newer developments in science such as organ transplants or genetic engineering. Partial correlations showed that both orientations favored religious beliefs over scientific data when there was a perceived conflict. Three subscales of right-wing authoritarianism clarified how authoritarianism correlated with other measures, thereby supporting a multidimensional conceptualization of right-wing authoritarianism.     

A simplification of the theory of simplicity

Nelson Goodman has constructed two theories of simplicity: one of predicates; one of hypotheses. I offer a simpler theory by generalization and abstraction from his. Generalization comes by dropping special conditions Goodman imposes on which unexcluded extensions count as complicating and which excluded extensions count as simplifying. Abstraction is achieved by counting only nonisomorphic models and subinterpretations. The new theory takes into account all the hypotheses of a theory in assessing its complexity, whether they were projected prior to, or result from, projection of a given hypothesis. It assigns simplicity post-projection priority over simplicity pre-projection. It better orders compound conditionals than does the theory of simplicity of hypotheses, and it does not inherit an anomaly of the theory of simplicity of predicates — its failure to order the ordering relations. Drop Goodman's special conditions, and the problems fall away with them.     

On the science of Rorschach research

Wood et al.'s (1999b) article contained several general points that are quite sound. Conducting research with an extreme groups design does produce effect sizes that are larger than those observed in an unselected population. Appropriate control groups are important for any study that wishes to shed light on the characteristics of a targeted experimental group and experimental validity is enhanced when researchers collect data from both groups simultaneously. Diagnostic efficiency statistics--or any summary measures of test validity--should be trusted more when they are drawn from multiple studies conducted by different investigators across numerous settings rather than from a single investigator's work. There should be no question that these points are correct. However, I have pointed out numerous problems with specific aspects of Wood et al.'s (1999b) article. Wood et al. gave improper citations that claimed researchers found or said things that they did not. Wood et al. indicated my data set did not support the incremental validity of the Rorschach over the MMPI-2 when, in fact, my study never reported such an analysis and my data actually reveal that the opposite conclusion is warranted. Wood et al. asserted there was only one proper way to conduct incremental validity analyses even though experts have described how their recommended procedure can lead to significant complications. Wood et al. cited a section of Cohen and Cohen (1983) to bolster their claim that hierarchical and step-wise regression procedures were incompatible and to criticize Burns and Viglione's (1996) regression analysis. However, that section of Cohen and Cohen's text actually contradicted Wood et al.'s argument. Wood et al. tried to convince readers that Burns and Viglione used improper alpha levels and drew improper conclusions from their regression data although Burns and Viglione had followed the research evidence on this topic and the expert recommendations provided in Hosmer and Lemeshow's (1989) classic text. Wood et al. oversimplified issues associated with extreme group research designs and erroneously suggested that diagnostic studies were immune from interpretive confounds that can be associated with this type of design. Wood et al. ignored or dismissed the valid reasons why Burns and Viglione used an extreme groups design, and they never mentioned how Burns and Viglione used a homogeneous sample that actually was likely to find smaller than normal effect sizes. Wood et al. also overlooked the fact that Burns and Viglione identified their results as applying to female nonpatients; they never suggested their findings would characterize those obtained from a clinical sample. Wood et al. criticized composite measures although some of the most important and classic findings in the history of research on personality recommend composite measures as a way to minimize error and maximize validity. Wood et al. also were mistaken about the elements that constitute an optimal composite measure. Wood et al. apparently ignored the factor-analytic evidence that demonstrated how Burns and Viglione created a reasonable composite scale, and Wood et al. similarly ignored the clear evidence that supported the content and criterion related validity of the EMRF. With respect to the HEV, Wood et al. created a z-score formula that used the wrong means and standard deviations. They continued to use this formula despite being informed that it was incorrect. Subsequently, Wood et al. told readers that their faulty z-score formula was "incompatible" with the proper weighted formula and asserted that the two formulas "do not yield identical results" and "do not yield HEV scores that are identical or even very close." These published claims were made even though Wood et al. had seen the results from eight large samples, all of which demonstrated that their wrong formula had correlations greater than .998 with the correct formula. At worst, it seems that Wood et al. (199     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

An index of factorial simplicity

An index of factorial simplicity, employing the quartimax transformational criteria of Carroll, Wrigley and Neuhaus, and Saunders, is developed. This index is both for each row separately and for a factor pattern matrix as a whole. The index varies between zero and one. The problem of calibrating the index is discussed.The research reported in this paper was supported in part by the Office of Computing Activities, National Science Foundation.     

科学精神刍议——科学理念门外谈之三

弘扬科学精神是当前社会上各项活动中的一个时尚词。许多领导的讲话,传媒的报道和发表的文章,以至某些口号中常常离不开"科学精神"这个词语。中科院今年发表的《关于科学理念