On a unified theory of models and thought experiments in natural sciences

In this paper a unified theory of models and thought experiments is proposed by considering them as fictions, á la Vaihinger. In order to reach this aim, the Hertzian and Botzmannian interpretation of theories as Bilder is reconsidered.     

High-performance computer applications in the behavioral sciences

This symposium revisited the 1985 conference on Advanced Computing for Psychology. That meeting examined the application of new supercomputers in the behavioral sciences. The present symposium reviewed high-performance computing as applied to psychological models, human vision, neuralphysiological processes, and statistical analysis. The recent past and the projected future of high-performance computing in the behavioral sciences were evaluated.     

The step to rationality: the efficacy of thought experiments in science, ethics, and free will

Examples from Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others suggest that fundamental laws of physics were—or, at least, could have been—discovered by experiments performed not in the physical world but only in the mind. Although problematic for a strict empiricist, the evolutionary emergence in humans of deeply internalized implicit knowledge of abstract principles of transformation and symmetry may have been crucial for humankind's step to rationality—including the discovery of universal principles of mathematics, physics, ethics, and an account of free will that is compatible with determinism.     

Imagining the future self through thought experiments

The ability of the mind to conceptualize what is not present is essential. It allows us to reason counterfactually about what might have happened had events unfolded differently or had another course of action been taken. It allows us to think about what might happen – to perform 'Gedankenexperimente' (thought experiments) – before we act. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms mediating this ability are poorly understood. We suggest that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) keeps track of and evaluates alternative choices (what we might have done), whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC) compares simulations of possible future scenarios (what we might do) and evaluates their reward values. Together, these brain regions support the construction of suppositional scenarios.     

Learning from the existence of models: On psychic machines,tortoises, and computer simulations

Using four examples of models and computer simulations from the history of psychology, I discuss some of the methodological aspects involved in their construction and use, and I illustrate how the existence of a model can demonstrate the viability of a hypothesis that had previously been deemed impossible on a priori grounds. This shows a new way in which scientists can learn from models that extends the analysis of Morgan (1999), who has identified the construction and manipulation of models as those phases in which learning from models takes place.     

The role of variation in thought experiments

The main concern of this paper is to show that understanding mental variation may prove to be relevant to inquiry into thought experiments. First, I examine why Ernst Mach considered the ability to vary the contents of one's thoughts the principal requirement for thought experimentation. Second, I illustrate the wide applicability of mental variation in thought experiments. Third, I suggest, following Kathleen Wilkes, that variation is frequently employed in “realistic” thought experiments.     

Imagination and insight: a new acount of the content of thought experiments

This paper motivates, explains, and defends a new account of the content of thought experiments. I begin by briefly surveying and critiquing three influential accounts of thought experiments: James Robert Brown’s Platonist account, John Norton’s deflationist account that treats them as picturesque arguments, and a cluster of views that I group together as mental model accounts. I use this analysis to motivate a set of six desiderata for a new approach. I propose that we treat thought experiments primarily as aesthetic objects, specifically fictions, and then use this analysis to characterize their content and ultimately assess their epistemic success. Taking my starting point from Kendall Walton’s account of representation (Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990), I argue that the best way to understand the content of thought experiments is to treat them as props for imagining fictional worlds. Ultimately, I maintain that, in terms of their form and content, thought experiments share more with literary fictions and pictorial representations than with either argumentation or observations of the Platonic realm. Moreover, while they inspire imaginings, thought experiments themselves are not mental kinds. My approach redirects attention towards what fixes the content of any given thought experiment and scrutinizes the assumptions, cognitive capacities and conventions that generate them. This view helps to explain what seems plausible about Brown’s, Norton’s, and the mental modelers’ views.     

Improvisation Unfolding: Process,Pattern, and Prediction

The main aim of this article is to argue the case for understanding improvising as a real-time emergent process grounded in collaborative action, while noting that talking about improvisation, bluntly put, is not the same as improvising. The ways in which improvisers respond and adapt to changing circumstances in the moment and over time, it is argued, connect directly to the discipline of process philosophy and involve pattern recognition and creation skills as well as the ability to predict the actions of conspecifics. The conclusion considers some benefits and challenges in approaching improvisation from a process-based and systems-theoretical perspective.     

Subtyping versus bookkeeping in stereotype learning and change: connectionist simulations and empirical findings

A distributed connectionist network can account for both bookkeeping (M. Rothbart, 1981) and subtyping (M. B. Brewer, V. Dull, & L. Lui, 1981; S. E. Taylor, 1981) effects. The finding traditionally regarded as demonstrating subtyping is that exposure to moderate (compared with extreme) disconfirmers leads to subsequent ratings of the group that are less stereotypic. Despite learning that is incremental and analogous to bookkeeping, the simulations replicate this finding and suggest that the "subtyping" pattern of results will be drastically reduced if disconfirmers are encountered before the stereotype is well-established. This novel prediction holds with human participants and offers a tantalizing suggestion: Although moderate disconfirmers may produce more stereotype change. stereotype development might be discouraged by exposure to either extreme or moderate disconfirmers.     

Demonstration experiments in perception and cognitive psychology for the Macintosh computer

A package of programs demonstrating psychology experiments widely cited in perception and cognitive psychology textbooks is described. The programs are suitable for laboratory research projects and in-class demonstrations. An attractive feature of the programs is that they have provisions for changing experimental parameters to allow students to design different experiments from the original programs. Iconic memory, memory scanning (using the additive factors approach), lexical decision, target detection, speeded classification, picture recognition/picture memory, and the Phi phenomenon can be demonstrated.     

Toward a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science

This paper presents a critical analysis of Tamar Szabó Gendler’s view of thought experiments, with the aim of developing further a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science. While the execution of a thought experiment cannot be reduced to standard forms of inductive and deductive inference, in the process of working though a thought experiment, a logical argument does emerge and take shape. Taking Gendler’s work as a point of departure, I argue that performing a thought experiment involves a process of self-interrogation, in which we are compelled to reflect on our pre-existing knowledge of the world. In doing so, we are forced to make judgments about what assumptions we see as relevant and how they apply to an imaginary scenario. This brings to light the extent to which certain forms of skill, beyond the ability to make valid logical inferences, are necessary to execute a thought experiment well.     

Non-empirical and empirical components in the hypotheses of five social psychological experiments

Five studies published in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and selected without advance knowledge of their contents, were analyzed with respect to the epistemic and modal status of their hypotheses. It was found that the general hypotheses were a priori and noncontingent (necessarily true), whereas the local auxiliary hypotheses were empirical and contingent. Hence, the data were only relevant for the latter. It is conjectured that such pseudoempirical studies may abound in contemporary psychology. They remain undiscovered because researchers unreflectively believe that all propositions that can be related to data are empirical and that psychological terms need not be defined. Only when terms are defined and presuppositions (axioms) are stated, can one determine the epistemic and modal status of a given proposition, and, hence, whether or not a study is pseudoempirical.     

ARTIST: A computer system for creating and running psychology experiments

A flexible computer system for research and teaching experiments in psychology is described. Special features of the system include (1) separate phases for the generation and running of experiments, (2) facilities to control presentation of stimuli according to any factorial design, and (3) different modes of operation depending on the prior knowledge of the users. The system is evaluated both in terms of the range of experiments that can be performed and in terms of the time and effort required to create new experiments or modify old ones. General principles for designing interactive systems are discussed in the light of experiences with this particular system.