The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation

It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S??s merely having propositional justification that p and S??s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S??s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute causally to S??s having that belief. Though this suggestion is plausible, causal accounts of the basing relation that have been proposed have not fared well. In particular, cases involving causal deviancy and cases involving over-determination have posed serious problems for causal accounts of the basing relation. Although previous causal accounts of the basing relation seem to fall before these problems, it is possible to construct an acceptable causal account of the basing relation. That is, it is possible to construct a causal account of the basing relation that not only fits our intuitions about doxastic justification in general, but also is not susceptible to the problems posed by causal deviancy and causal over-determination. The interventionist account of causation provides the tools for constructing such an account. My aim is to make use of the insights of the interventionist account of causation to develop and defend an adequate causal account of the basing relation.     

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer??s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311?C313, 1971). We show that Lehrer??s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer??s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer??s own account is more plausible.     

西方有关父母教养方式与青少年问题行为关系的理论及其研究综述

对父母教养方式和青少年问题行为之间关系的研究主要集中在西方心理学和社会学界,国内在此领域内的理论探讨和经验性研究都很缺乏。本文对近五十年来西方在父母教养方式和青少年问题行为发展之间的关系上的几种主要理论模型及部分经验性研究进行了客观的回顾,简要介绍了双因素论(危险性因素与保护性因素)、社会控制理论、社会背景模型和强制模型。     

The relation between problem categorization and problem solving among experts and novices

These investigations were conducted to examine the relationship between problem-solving ability and the criteria used to decide that two classical mechanics problems would be solved similarly. We began by comparing experts and novices on a similarity judgment task and found that the experts predominantly relied on the problems' deep structures in deciding on similarity of solution, although the presence of surface-feature similarity had a clear adverse effect on performance. The novices relied predominantly on surface features, but were capable of using the problems' deep structures under certain conditions. In a second experiment, we compared groups of novices, at the same level of experience, who tended to employ different types of reasoning in making similarity judgments. Compared to novices who relied predominantly on surface features, novices who made greater use of principles tended to categorize problems similarly to how experts categorized them, as well as score higher in problem solving. These results suggest that principles play a fundamental role in the organization of conceptual and procedural knowledge for good problem solvers at all levels.     

论抗生素与细菌的耐药性

针对细菌耐药问题日益严重的现状,剖析了抗生素的应用与细菌耐药性的产生之间既对立又统一的关系,说明应辨证地认识细菌耐药问题。     

On the spontaneous discovery of a mathematical relation during problem solving

People spontaneously discover new representations during problem solving. Discovery of a mathematical representation is of special interest, because it shows that the underlying structure of the problem has been extracted. In the current study, participants solved gear-system problems as part of a game. Although none of the participants initially used a mathematical representation, many discovered a parity-based, mathematical strategy during problem solving. Two accounts of the spontaneous discovery of mathematical strategies were tested. According to the automatic schema abstraction hypothesis, experience with multiple, unique problem exemplars facilitates extraction of the parity relation. According to the comparison-based abstraction hypothesis, explicitly comparing gear pathways that have different number, but the same parity, should result in extraction of parity. An event history analysis showed that accumulation of experiences with different-number, same-parity comparisons predicted discovery of parity; accumulation of unique exemplars did not. Results suggest that comparison-based abstraction processes can lead to the discovery of a mathematical relation.     

道家与道教的关系研究现状及存在的问题

道家和道教的关系问题,这是一个近年来曾引起学术界重视和较多讨论的问题。第一、二届国际道教大会对道家和道教之关系问题给予了较多讨论。一般来说,"欧美学者将以老庄思想为中心的道家与作为宗教的道教视为一体,而在日本则区     

A multi-objective mathematical programming problem with fuzzy relation constraints

In this study we discuss the problem of multi-objective mathematical programming with constraints defined by ‘max-min’ composite fuzzy relation equations. Since the feasible region is normally non-convex, the properties of the efficient points of a non-convex feasible region under multi-objectives are investigated and illustrated by examples. The necessary and sufficient conditions are proposed and proved. To facilitate decisions, a procedure that transforms these efficient points of an interval-valued decision space into a constant-valued decision space is proposed when the level of confidence is given by a decision maker. Then the transformed problem becomes a multi-attribute decision problem that can be evaluated by Yager's method to find the optimal alternative.     

Inferential basing and mental models

In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less empirically risky.     

The specificity of the generality problem

In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue that the examples that Bishop presents pose no such problem for some theories. I will illustrate the exempt theories by describing how an evidentialist view can account for the justification in the examples without having any similar problem. It will be clear that other views about justification are likewise unaffected by anything like the generality problem.     

The "consciousness problem" is not the problem.

Although the concept of consciousness is not necessary for the behavioral scientist, it is closely related to a number of psychological concepts that are generally believed to be necessary. Consciousness may be defined as the very short-term memory of a just-completed perceptual act. It may thus be understood as a psychological consequence of psychological antecedents. The question of how brain processes result in consciousness is a misleading one and should be replaced by questions concerning the relationships between the brain and perception, memory, and the other psychological processes that precede consciousness.     

On the relation between justification of solution method and correctness of solution in statistical problem solving

The relation between the justification of a choice of solution method and the correctness of that choice in statistical problem solving was investigated. In the first of two studies 16 subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The results showed that an incorrect choice of solution method was more common when subjects did not justify their choice of solution as compared to when they justified their choice with domain-specific knowledge. Study 2 employed an experimental design. A group of 20 subjects were instructed to provide a justification for each choice of solution method, while another group of 20 subjects received no such instructions. The results showed no difference between the groups with respect to number of correct choices of solution method. A qualitative analysis of the justifications in the instructed group showed that the justifications for incorrect solution methods were more often incorrect than subjects' justifications for correct solution methods. The results in Study 2 suggested that the association found between incorrect choice of solution method and lack of justification in Study 1 was not in the first place due to a strategical deficiency on the part of the subjects but due to a lack of domain-specific knowledge.