“Coming from Afar” and “Temporarily Becoming the Patient Without Knowing it”: Two Necessary Analytic Conditions According to Ferenczi’s Later Thought

In this paper the author discusses two points regarding Ferenczi’s views of psychoanalysis. The first concerns the fact that analysts, like their patients, “come from afar” (a concept of Borgogno, 2011). The second, closely linked to the first, has to do with Ferenczi’s belief that psychoanalytical knowledge is not intellectual but visceral, seeing that if analysts are to truly understand their patients they must first “take on” their suffering in such a way as to “become the patient.” The author follows Ferenczi’s progression along these two points through his whole oeuvre, from his first psychoanalytical writings to the Clinical Diary (1932a) of the last year of his life.     

“FREEDOM TO GROW”

Writing is a dangerous activity, especially as it is seemingly harmless: we rarely know what we are getting into at the start. Continuing her work on the writings of J.M. Barrie, especially on the question of the “lost child” who never grows up, the author invites the reader to listen to Sándor Ferenczi’s “lost childhood” between the lines of his Clinical Diary. He begins the Diary on January 7, 1932 and the last entry is October 2 of the same year; Ferenczi died on May 22, 1933. The exceptional text of the diary is the fruit of his incisive clinical insights, his disappointment and anger with Freud and his ruthless self-analysis. The author pinpoints her reading of Ferenczi, the “wise baby—lost child”.     

THWARTING THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DETECTIVES: DEFENDING THE SEVERN LEGACY

In 1993, The Legacy of Sandor Ferenczi (Aron & Harris) was published. This groundbreaking volume contained the chapter, The Case of “RN”: Sandor Ferenczi’s Radical Experiment in Psychoanalysis (Fortune, 1993), which told the story of “RN”—Ferenczi’s code-name in his Clinical Diary for his critically important patient, Elizabeth Severn. The chapter presented biographical details and original research supporting the rich clinical material revealed in Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary. Now, two decades later, RN has continued to affirm her place as one of the most important patients in the history of psychoanalysis. On this twentieth anniversary, just past, of the recognition of her story, I would like to reflect back and recount the beginnings of my “detective” work on the Case of RN, particularly my encounter with Severn’s daughter, Margaret.     

“Uterus Loquitur”: Trauma and the Human Organism in Ferenczi’s “Physiology of Pleasure”

The paper reconstructs Ferenczi’s unique and largely neglected physiology of pleasure. It highlights the prominent place of the libido in Ferenczi’s writings, the transition from the physiology of use to the physiology of pleasure and the role of trauma in Ferenczi’s work with a special emphasis on the beauty and plasticity of the body, the relations between its organs as well as the adaptive potential, the Orphic powers, and the natural vigor of the human organism. Ferenczi’s theoretical assumptions and his powerful images of the human organism are examined in the light of Goethe’s, Schopenhauer’s, and Nietzsche’s philosophies.     

THE BLOOD CRISIS: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A CHOICE BETWEEN DYING AND REARRANGING?</Emphasis>

I began my Ferenczi studies in the fall of 1987, a year before the English translation of his Clinical Diary was published. Since then, I have demonstrated in writing, teaching, working, and living that there is scarcely a passage in this “laboratory notebook of psychoanalysis” that fails to illuminate the clinical and the personal. And above all is Ferenczi’s late awareness that his personality had been constructed upon false assumptions. This is a reckoning of thirty years’ conscious and unconscious usage of Ferenczi’s experience to illustrate, to interpret, and to expose the clinical and personal dimensions of my own life lived as “the will of another person.” What constitutes, what allows, a choice between dying and rearranging? Now that I am long past Ferenczi’s fifty-nine years, I take the risk every day, and I know it.     

The Environment of Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary

The author evokes the tragic death of Ferenczi’s colleague and analysand Dr. Elisabeth Radó-Révész in 1923. She died of pernicious anemia, the same illness that ended the life of Ferenczi 10 years later, at age 59. Can this be a tragic coincidence? Following notes in Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary, the author considers the deep disappointments both Ferenczi and Radó-Révész had experienced and explores some of the Tragic Man qualities of Ferenczi.     

FREE TO MOVE,FREE TO BE

The Hungarian Pikler-Lóczy Institute for Infants’ Well-being and Healthy Development could not have been created without the fundamental contribution of the Budapest School’s approach to Object Relations. For historical reasons, very little is known in psychoanalytical circles about this extraordinary experience and work. Pikler created an original model with a space for partnership, reciprocity, and the baby’s “true” autonomy, which focuses on the baby’s self-initiated motor development: “freedom to move”. The atmosphere of this world around babies can be related to the “rêveries” of Ferenczi about the necessity for an early, caring environment provided through adult tenderness as it appears in his Clinical Diary.     

ON “POLYGAMOUS ANALYSIS”

The close relationships among Ferenczi’s analysands at the time the Clinical Diary was written are explored, and their potential influences on their analyses are discussed. It is suggested that the fact that “a virtual group” emerged in this context may have sabotaged to some extent Ferenczi’s clinical work, because this setting did not allow the open joint exploration possible in an actual analytic group, and at the same time stood in the way of achieving “a background of safety” fostered by the privacy and confidentiality of a fully individual analysis. Several examples are given of situations that may have made analysands feel betrayed or abandoned by the divided loyalties of their analyst, and may have created painful splits in Ferenczi’s own countertransferences.     

BECOMING A PETER PAN: OMNIPOTENCE,DEPENDENCY AND THE FERENCZIAN CHILD

The aim of this paper is to provide a short history of the changes in Ferenczi’s concept of early childhood, during the two decade period, 1913–1932. Initially, Ferenczi mainly emphasized children’s feelings of omnipotence, which enable them to perceive themselves as strong, independent and capable human beings. By the mid-1920s, however, he felt that his earlier work did not give a good account of what comes after the stage of omnipotence, and that it did not adequately describe the difficulties in the transition from pleasure to reality principles. However, in his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi became fully aware of how fragile and insecure children are, and therefore how dangerous—yet necessary—it is for them to abandon the “stage of omnipotence” and to gain a “sense of reality”. For Ferenczi, traumatized children are children who had not been loved in their early childhood, and therefore could not develop the capacity to make the journey from pleasure principle to that of reality. It will be suggested that a paradigmatic example for this kind of child is Peter Pan.     

Ferenczi and Groddeck: Simpatico

Sigmund Freud introduced Sandor Ferenczi to Georg Groddeck in 1917. The warm personal friendship that these two men shared for the rest of their lives was a breeding ground for many of their respective theoretical and clinical contributions. 1923 was a schismatic year in the history of psychoanalysis. Freud's appropriation of Groddeck's Das Es and its adaptation to Heinroth's tri-partite model (Freud, 1923; Poster, 1997) marked the beginning of Ego psychology. Almost simultaneously there appeared Groddeck's Book of the It (Groddeck, 1923), together with Rank and Ferenczi's The Development of Psychoanalysis (Rank and Ferenczi, 1924), and Ferenczi's Thalassa (Ferenczi, 1924). These three seminal publications set the stage for a paradigm shift (Hoffer, 2008; Rudnytsky, 2002). They were the forerunner of later developments in object relations, self-psychology, interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis. Taken together, the contributions of Groddeck and Ferenczi and Rank reinvigorated psychoanalysis, Freud's baby, with “the constructive aspect” that Groddeck told Freud had been lost in Freud's re-definition of Das Es (Groddeck, 1977, p. 13). Each of these pioneers stimulated the thinking of the others. Always an independent thinker, Groddeck was welcomed into the psychoanalytic circle by both Freud and Ferenczi. Suffering under the “crushing paternal(ism)” of Freud, Ferenczi was supported by Groddeck to carry out his own clinical experiments. Preoccupied with his own legacy and intolerant of dissent, Freud was able to maintain cordial contact with these two creative spirits and allow them to modify his own ideas.     

Thinking emergence as interaffecting: approaching and contextualizing Eugene Gendlin’s Process Model

Prior to A Process Model, Gendlin’s theoretical and practical work focused on the interfacing of bodily-felt meaningfulness and symbolization. In A Process Model, Gendlin does something much wider and more philosophically primary. The hermeneutic and pragmatist distinction between the concept of experience, on the one hand, and actual experiential process, on the other, becomes for Gendlin the methodological basis for a radical reconceptualization of the body. Wittgenstein’s formulation of “meaning” as “language-use in situations” is spelled out by Gendlin in embodied terms, yielding a profound new grasp of language, meaning, situation, language-use and culture as interactional body-process. Gendlin, in building his text, answers the pragmatist critique of a wrong progression of thinking where the results of an inquiry are read back to be its premises. With his central concept “eveving” (“everything interaffected by everything”) Gendlin shows how the seeming determinacy of preceding structure is opened in the actual occurring. He thereby elaborates a new conception of continuity where the possibility for responsive novelty is emergent in the event itself. The conceptual development of the text itself instances this kind of emergent novelty. We will somewhat follow Gendlin’s own path in using language-in-situations as entry-point into his more fundamental process-thinking, thereby asking ourselves how to engage his new kind of model. In the last part, we introduce some of the philosophical roots of Gendlin’s A Process Model.     

The Failure of Clara Thompson’s Ferenczian (Proxy) Analysis of Harry Stack Sullivan*

After hearing Ferenczi’s talks on theory and practice in New York in 1926, psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan urged his friend and colleague Clara Thompson to get analyzed by Ferenczi so they could learn his technique. After saving for 2 years Thompson was a patient of Ferenczi for three summers and then moved to Budapest full-time for analysis until Ferenczi’s death. Two years after she returned to New York she attempted to analyze Sullivan. Analysis was broken off in anger by Sullivan after 14 months. Before the promised Ferenczian analysis began Thompson discovered Wilhelm Reich’s Character Analysis (1933) and she tried an aggressive attack on character with Sullivan rather than Ferenczian trauma-oriented “relaxation” and “neocathartic” therapy. Sullivan could not tolerate this. Because of their own unhealed trauma both individually and in relation to each other, neither Thompson nor Sullivan was able to advance Ferenczi’s views on trauma or its healing in America.     

Edmund Husserl, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic</Emphasis>

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”), which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль (Russian Thought) in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an ontological realist, Lossky thought he had found in the author of the Logische Untersuchungen an ally against the subjectivistic trends then still prevalent in Germany. The review is significant in intellectual history for its vanguard role in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl’s thought in Russia. (Frédéric Tremblay)     

KLEIN,FERENCZI AND THE CLINICAL DIARY

The aim of this article is to revisit Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary (1932) to investigate the influence he had on Melanie Klein’s work. It starts from the position that insufficient recognition has been given to Ferenczi’s contribution to Klein’s body of work and her professional development. Her analysis with Ferenczi lasted 5 years, a relatively long analysis for the period. It explores his influence in three specific areas: the importance of raw and early emotion in the maternal bond, the importance of freedom and authenticity in the analytic relationship, and finally the use of transference and countertransference feelings. Ferenczi’s ill-fated experiment with mutual analysis will be discussed as it opened up a route to explore the analytic relationship, with important consequences for the future development of psychoanalysis.     

Soames on Russell’s logic: a reply

In “What is History For?,” Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell’s logic in volume 1 of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. This note rebuts two of Soames’s replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell’s logic does not fit the argument of the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and that Soames’s contextual definition of classes does not match Russell’s contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames’s presentation of Russell’s logic misrepresents what Russell took to be its technical achievement and its philosophical significance.     

Desiring (With) Bion: An Experience in Reading

This article considers my experience of reading Wilfred R. Bion’s book Learning from experience (1962) and how transference operates in and around his work. I argue that Bion’s work cannot simply be read but must be felt. I highlight the importance of Learning from experience for psychoanalytic practitioners becoming more self-reflexive about our theoretical and clinical practices, but also to bring attention to the process through which many of us come to Bion’s insights “first hand” if you like, which is through his writings, in our position as readers.     

John Dewey and the Virtue of Cook Ding’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dao</Emphasis>

Certain discussions about “relativism” in the philosophy of Zhuangzi turn on the question of the morality of his dao 道. Some commentators, most notably Robert Eno, maintain that there is no ethical value whatsoever to Zhuangzi’s dao as presented in the Cook Ding episode and other “knack passages.” In this essay, it is argued that there is indeed a moral dimension to Cook Ding’s dao. One way to recognize it is to explore the similarity between that dao and John Dewey’s notion of educational method. There are moral traits that Dewey can appeal to in recommending his method. It is argued here that these traits represent the moral features of Cook Ding’s dao as well.     

The Carnival’s Edge: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Charlie Hebdo</Emphasis> and Theories of Comedy

This article reexamines the satire of Charlie Hebdo through the lens of comedy theory and cultural studies. Drawing upon Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “the carnivalesque” and Linda Hutcheon’s concept of “irony’s edge,” it considers the wide variety of potential meanings that are encoded within Hebdo’s highly controversial comedy and religious representations. Introducing the notion of the “ambigramic carnival,” I argue that competing notions of hegemony in French culture encourage radically different understandings of the ethical and political implications of Hebdo’s content. Ultimately, I contend that while Hebdo’s approach to satire is in no way responsible for the terroristic violence visited upon the magazine, the publication nonetheless crafted a style intended to evoke a range of responses, including profound anger. As an empirical companion to this theoretical approach, the article then turns to coverage of the Hebdo massacre in the Jewish press, arguing that in the United States the Forward used the Hebdo story to represent Jewish empowerment and disempowerment simultaneously.