Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails

Rik Peels has forcefully argued that, contrary to what is widely held, ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he has argued against the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and argued for what he calls “the New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. In this paper, I defend the Standard View against Peels’s latest case for the New View.     

On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

The New View on Ignorance Undefeated

In this paper, I provide a defence of the New View, on which ignorance is lack of true belief rather than lack of knowledge. Pierre Le Morvan has argued that the New View is untenable, partly because it fails to take into account the distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. I argue that propositional ignorance is just a subspecies of factive ignorance and that all the work that needs to be done can be done by using the concept of factive ignorance. I also defend two arguments of mine in favour of the New View against Le Morvan??s criticisms. As to the Linguistic Argument, I point out that the intuitions of the adherent of the New View about cases of true belief that fall short of knowledge are really intuitions about factive rather than propositional ignorance. As to the Excuse Argument, I argue that true belief is exculpatorily relevant: a true belief in a proposition p, where disbelief that p or suspension on p would provide at least a partial excuse, is relevant in that it renders one blameworthy for one??s action, unless further excuses hold. Finally, I reply to two closely related objections that might be levelled against the New View, namely that it seems false that one can reduce one??s ignorance by arbitrarily believing as many propositions as possible and that it seems false that an intellectually conscientious and critical person is more ignorant than an intellectually sloppy and credulous person just because the latter has more true beliefs.     

A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance

In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.

     

On Ignorance and Contradiction Considered as Truth-Values

A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valuedlogic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete informationis provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-valuesand information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions.So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on therelevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extensionof the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a toolfor reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questionsthe significance of partial logic. Received for publication 8 November 2007.     

A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance

Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility‐relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions.     

Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck‐sensitive moral practices.     

On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

Philosophia - Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman...     

Vindication of the Humpty Dumpty attitude towards language

Effective objective (sachlich) verbal communication is dependent upon the use of linguistic locutions which are: a) suitable for some special purposes, b) clear (i.e., having a satsifactorily high degree of subsumability), and c) in accordance with some ordinary (i.e., frequently occurring) language usages. Only in so far as point c is concerned is a study of actual language usage of (indirect) value to philosophers. And this holds true regardless of whether one's underlying assumption tends towards the view: 1) that ordinary language is perfect (Oxford), or: 2) that ordinary language is a mess (Oslo). In any case, one needs to know about the most ordinary usages to prevent unnecessarily drastic deviations from them. Drastic deviations may mislead the sender, as well as the receiver, create communicational disturbances, misunderstandings, and confusion (vide: Strawson's use of “presupposition"). However, considerations of a) suitability for special purposes, and b) clarity (subsumability) will most often, if not always, prevent a communicator from flatly adopting any one of the existing language usages of a given important linguistic locution. He would feel the need for: “explications,”; “rational reconstructions”; or conceptual alterations of one kind or another. In fact, there are instances where the sender finds it most advantageous to disregard completely ordinary language (vide: Einstein's use of “simultaneity"): He “makes words mean what he wants them to mean.”; This is the Humpty Dumpty sender attitude towards language. The corresponding receiver attitude manifests itself as awareness of and tolerance for language ambiguities.     

Ignorance of the Own Past

It is shown that for an inside observer it is impossible to distinguish all states in which a system was at some past time. This holds for classical and quantum systems, but an assumption of determinism is essential in the proof.     

也谈治贫必先治愚

当今中国社会,由漫长的农耕社会历史长河中衍生出来的封建迷信思想,愚昧落后的陈规陋俗,依然顽固地残存在人们的思想意识之中,流露在人们的生活习惯之上。它们虽然无力阻挡当今社会飞速前进的脚步,但时不时地在时代大潮中搅起一股股的逆流,激起一层层的浊浪,或多或少地干扰着社会发展的主旋律。     

Ignorance of ignorance

I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.     

Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan

In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge.     

哲学视域中的疼

疼是在特定情境下的世界对人作用时产生的否定性感受,也是人所呈现出来的一种世界对人的意味。疼具有切己性、返身性。在儒家思想史上,疼曾被视作为礼、仁、良知辩护的基石。在日常生活中,疼则被拿来进行自我确证。有了疼的经验,才能理解疼的现象,才能理解人情世界。疼人者为他人疼,能暂时超越自我而心系他人,并能在疼的驱动下诉诸行动而解除他人之疼。由疼确立的关系既高尚又真切,疼与所疼乃真正的一体。由此看,与天地万物一体实在是一个不易达到的境界。     

AIDS, Authoritarianism, and Scientific Ignorance: A Comment on Witt

Witt shows that scores on the F scale predict negative affect towards AIDS. He interprets this in the light of the authoritarian personality theory of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) despite the discredited nature of that theory. An alternative explanation of the findings in the light of the view that the F scale measures primarily an old-fashioned orientation is offered.