Objective Bayesianism,Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification fails because diachronic Dutch book arguments are subject to a reductio: in certain circumstances one can Dutch book an agent however she changes her degrees of belief. One may also criticise objective Bayesianism on the grounds that its norms are not compulsory but voluntary, the result of a stance. It is argued that this second objection also misses the mark, since objective Bayesian norms are tied up in the very notion of degrees of belief.     

Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle

John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.     

Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.     

Globalisation and global justice

The discussion about justice has often been limited to a specific territory, i.e. a nation. However, globalisation has undermined the relevance of this presupposition. John Rawls's theory of justice is a starting point for contemporary discussions about justice. But, contrary to Rawls's view, principles of global justice should not only include principles of non-interference and respect for universal human rights, but also a principle of democratic legitimacy of global governance and a principle of global distributive justice. The notion of global justice is not uncontroversial. It is argued that the meaning of justice differs between different communities and, thus, one cannot hope for a universal approval of the concept of global justice, that a principle of global distributive justice does not take into account that global differences in wealth are caused by differences in the ambitions of individuals and nations and that the idea of global justice overlooks crucial institutional differences between a nation and the global situation. However, these arguments are not conclusive.     

A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know)))

The judgment that a given event is epistemically improbable is necessary but insufficient for us to conclude that the event is surprising. Paul Horwich has argued that surprising events are, in addition, more probable given alternative background assumptions that are not themselves extremely improbable. I argue that Horwich??s definition fails to capture important features of surprises and offer an alternative definition that accords better with intuition. An important application of Horwich??s analysis has arisen in discussions of fine-tuning arguments. In the second part of the paper I consider the implications for this argument of employing my definition of surprise. I argue that advocates of fine-tuning arguments are not justified in attaching significance to the fact that we are surprised by examples of fine-tuning.     

Conceivability,Explanation, and Defeat

Christopher Hill and Joseph Levine have argued that the conceivabilitiesinvolved in anti-materialist arguments are defeated as evidence ofpossibility. Their strategy assumes the following principle: theconceivability of a state of affairs S constitutes evidence for thepossibility of S only if the possibility of S is the bestexplanation of the conceivability of S. So if there is a betterexplanation of the conceivability of S than its possibility, then theconceivability of S is thereby defeated as evidence of possibility. Hilland Levine proceed to offer alternative explanations of theseconceivabilities, concluding that these conceivabilities are therebydefeated as evidence. However, this strategy fails because theirexplanations generalize to all conceivability judgments concerningphenomenal states. Consequently, one could defend absolutely any theoryof phenomenal states against conceivability arguments in just this way.This result conflicts with too many of our common sense beliefs aboutthe evidential value of conceivability with respect to phenomenalstates. The general moral is that the application of such principles ofexplanatory defeat is neither simple nor straightforward.     

Germ-line enhancement of humans and non-humans

The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify a distinction between human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified.     

International justice and individual self-preservation

The article explores the fundamental difference between two aspects of justice: international and global. It is then argued that for the sake of global justice, the difference can be overcome by taking a closer look at the basic human right of self-preservation in relation to moral agency, human well-being and social/distributive justice at both global and national levels. In an endeavour to attain global justice, the article defends an absolute moral right to a human minimum.     

Swindell,Frankfurt, and ambivalence

J.S. Swindell has argued that Harry Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is ambiguous and that it fails to do justice to the full range of this psychological phenomenon. Building on her criticism of Frankfurt, Swindell offers an analysis of ambivalence which is supposed to clarify ambiguities in Frankfurt's analysis and reveal varieties of ambivalence that Frankfurt's analysis allegedly overlooks. In this brief reply, I argue that Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is neither ambiguous nor objectionably narrow. I conclude with remarks on Swindell's analysis of the relationship between ambivalence and weakness of the will.     

Einige kritische Bemerkungen zu Stauffer's Darstellung der spätjüdischen Ketzergesetzgebung

This article discusses the possibilities for and the point of using religious and moral arguments in current public, political discourse. A solution building upon the concept of overlapping consensus is critically analyzed. The author finds that this Rawlsian idea fails to see the close relation between justifying arguments and the conclusions reached. It also emphasizes justifying reasoning too much. The article points at a need to start in concrete social practice. Related to that, a discussion between Jeffrey Stout and Stanley Hauerwas concerning the relation between religion, ethics and democratic life is analyzed. The final section of the article deals with some implications of the main arguments for an understanding of Nordic Lutheran social ethics today.     

Desert, Effort and Equality

Abstract  Desert theories of distributive justice have been attacked on the grounds that they attempt to found large inequalities on morally arbitrary features of individuals: desert is usually classified as a meritocratic principle in contrast to the egalitarian principle that goods should be distributed according to need. I argue that there is an egalitarian version of desert theory, which focuses on effort rather than success, and which aims at equal levels of well-being; I call it a 'well-being desert' theory. It is argued that this egalitarian conception of desert is preferable to a meritocratic conception, and that its adoption would encourage greater clarity in arguments over wage differentials and in debates about criteria for job and educational competitions.     

Smilansky, Arneson, and the asymmetry of desert

Desert plays an important role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, but an unimportant role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. Saul Smilansky has recently put forward a defense of this asymmetry. In this study, I argue that it fails. Then, drawing on an argument of Richard Arneson’s, I suggest an alternative consequentialist rationale for the asymmetry. But while this shows that desert cannot be expected to play the same role in distributive justice that it can play in retributive justice, it does not fully vindicate the asymmetry, since desert can still play an important role in the former.     

Procedural justice,identity and deference to the law: What shapes rule‐following in a period of transition?

The group engagement model has two core arguments. The first is that procedural justice shapes rule‐following in groups, organisations and societies. The second is that the influence of procedural justice upon rule‐following is mediated by changes in people's identification with groups. This study uses a sample of South Africans to test both arguments. While the procedural justice argument has already been widely tested and supported, this study extends that test to a society in rapid transition and upheaval. Further, it tests the identity mediation argument in the same context. The results support both arguments. Procedural justice shapes rule‐following and that influence is mediated by identification with superordinate authority.     

Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism

In a number of articles Donald Davidson has argued that the charitable nature of his method of radical interpretation rules out the possibility of massive error and thus refutes Cartesian skepticism. The diversity of such arguments and the suggestions that are all being made under the name of the principle of charity have prompted a large body of conflicting responses, adding only to the obscurity of the issues that are generally associated with the question of skepticism. In this paper I propose to consider the debate in a new light by reconstruing the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint on belief attribution. This would help explain some of the puzzling features of Davidson's arguments, like the idea of an omniscient interpreter, and the ensuing commentaries. Having provided an analysis of the limitations of Davidson's arguments, I shall then suggest an alternative explanation of the purported necessity of the principle of charity. Finally, having construed the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint, I shall examine what consequences this construal has for the logical status of the principle itself and its alleged epistemic potentials.     

Constitutivism About Practical Principles: Its Claims,Goals, Task and Failure

The aim of this paper is twofold: In its first part, we work out the key features of constitutivism as presented by Christine Korsgaard. This reconstruction serves to clarify which goals Korsgaard wants to achieve with her account and which of its central claims she has to defend in particular. In the second part, we discuss whether Korsgaard can vindicate constitutivism's most central claim. To do this, we analyse two important arguments - the argument from unavoidability and the argument from the abstract constitutive principle - that have been made in support of constitutivism. We show how both these arguments go amiss and conclude that at least for now, constitutivism's most central claim has not been successfully argued for.     

论柯亨对社会主义的平等主义的辩护

柯亨是分析学马克思主义的主要代表人物之一。在《自我所有、自由和平等》等著作中,他从早期专注于历史唯物主义转向了对政治哲学的研究。柯亨结合当代西方社会历史条件的变化,通过批     

Sen and Sensibility

Abstract

In The idea of justice (2009), Amartya Sen builds on his previous work on capabilities to develop a theory of comparative justice which he contrasts to the contractarian approach. The theory has two parts: the proper materials of justice (capabilities); and, a procedure for assessing those materials. The procedure that Sen advocates is one of open impartial deliberation opera-tionalised through Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, which he contends is superior to contractarian view operationalised by Rawls’ original position. In this paper we argue that Sen’s open impartiality is too open and defend a more bounded version as more workable regardless of the operationalising device used. Moreover, we demonstrate that Sen’s own arguments against the possibility of agreement, though aimed at the contractarian tradition, undermine his own attempts to generate a contentful account of justice by driving a wedge between the materials and procedures. Sen’s attempt to provide an alternative approach to political philosophy, we conclude, fails.     

The concept of formal justice

Conclusion In Greek mythology, Themis, the goddess of justice, is blindfolded so that she may not see those who stand before her, and consequently, so that she can administer justice consistently and impartially. The imagery provides an apt illustration of the formal dimension of justice. Yet it serves only to blind us to the actual workings and character of the practice of doing justice. I have argued here that we must take seriously the full implications of material principles of jusitce. And when we do, there is no longer any conceptual space left in our reflections on justice for the virtue of formal justice. Of course, the just treatment of relevantly similar subjects does result in the equal treatment of these subjects; this, after all, is a logical consequence of acting upon a material principle of justice in similar cases. But this, let me emphasize, is only a consequence of doing justice and as such it reveals only a contingent feature of doing justice. The proponents of the formal dimension of justice have, so to speak, failed to see the trees through the forest. Impressed by the consequence of equality of treatment between cases, they have generalized their observations into specific claims about what it means to do justice to certain subjects. These generalizations, in turn, have led to the unfortunate and misleading reification of the concept of formal justice.Moreover, by exposing the myth of formal justice, the image of justice as an austere, rationalistic, and abstract virtue is also called into question. Justice is not blind to particular subjects. Quite the contrary, it looks to those who stand before her and demands from us the response which is appropriate for them. The practice of doing justice, this is to say, signals the need to respect the rights and deserts of particular subjects. Or rather, we comprehend and express this need by means of the practice of doing justice.     

Poisoning the Well

In this paper it is shown is that although poisoning the well has generally been treated as a species of ad hominem fallacy, when you try to analyze the fallacy using ad hominem schemes, even by supplementing with related schemes like argument from position to know, the analysis ultimately fails. The main argument of the paper is taken up with proving this negative claim by applying these schemes to examples of arguments associated with the fallacy of poisoning the well. Although there is a positive finding in this quest, in that poisoning the well is shown to be based on and associated with these forms of argument in interesting ways, the paper in the end is led to the conclusion that the fallacy is irreducibly dialectical. Poisoning the well is thus analyzed as a tactic to silence an opponent violating her right to put forward arguments on an issue both parties have agreed to discuss at the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. It is concluded that it is a special form of strategic attack used by one party in the argumentation stage of a critical discussion to improperly shut down the capability of the other party for putting forward arguments of the kind needed to properly move the discussion forward.     

Equality in Education – Why We Must Go All the Way

In this paper I present and defend a highly demanding principle of justice in education that has not been seriously discussed thus far. According to the suggested approach, “all the way equality”, justice in education requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual students. This means not merely between equally able children, or between children from different groups and classes, but rather between all children, regardless of social background, race, sex and ability. This approach may seem implausible at first, due to the far-reaching implications it entails, primarily its requirement to deny better-off children their advantage for the sake of equality. However the paper argues that all-the-way-equality, in fact, does a better job realizing the goals of justice in education than alternative conceptions of justice. It is further argued that at least some of the principle’s most radical consequences, those that make it seem counterintuitive, can be mitigated by balancing all-the-way-equality with competing interests.