IMAGINATION'S GRIP ON SCIENCE

Abstract: In part because “imagination” is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.     

Grounding spatial language in the motor system: Reciprocal interactions between spatial semantics and orienting

Shifts of attention that are directed by spatial words are thought to be mediated by a spatial frame of reference. Previous studies have documented a selection cost when visual attention is directed along the left/right axis relative to the above/below axis due to the greater ambiguity of the horizontal endpoints. The present study investigated whether the horizontal endpoints may be more fully disambiguated when “left/right” cues are first enacted by nondivisible, more discrete, modes of orienting such as directional motor responses. This issue was investigated using a repetition priming paradigm in which the effects of prior enactments were measured on the subsequent conceptual control of visual attention. The results of four experiments showed that grounding spatial language in the motor system can enhance the focus of visual attention by disambiguating the endpoints of the horizontal axis. In so doing, the present study extends previous research demonstrating that spatial concepts can influence the spatial distribution of attention by demonstrating that different modes of orienting can also influence the semantics of space. Implications for the premotor theory of attention and grounded theories of cognition are also discussed.     

Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).

     

Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner

Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue that my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to rivals of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity like Marya Schechtman’s Person Life View.     

Attention to configural information in change detection for faces

In recent research the change-detection paradigm has been used along with cueing manipulations to show that more attention is allocated to the upper than lower facial region, and that this attentional allocation is disrupted by inversion. We report two experiments the object of which was to investigate how the type of information changed might be a factor in these findings by explicitly comparing the role of attention in detecting change to information thought to be 'special' to faces (second-order relations) with information that is more useful for basic-level object discrimination (first-order relations). Results suggest that attention is automatically directed to second-order relations in upright faces, but not first-order relations, and that this pattern of attentional allocation is similar across features.     

Kicking the (barking) dog effect: the moderating role of target attributes on triggered displaced aggression

Sometimes aggression is displaced onto a target who is not totally innocent but emits a mildly irritating behavior called a triggering event. In three experiments, the authors examine stable personal attributes of targets that can impact such triggered displaced aggression (TDA). Lower levels of TDA were directed to targets whose attitudes were similar as compared to dissimilar to those of the actor (Experiment 1) and to targets who were ingroup as compared to out-group members (Experiment 2). Conceptually replicating the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, the manipulated valence of the target (viz., liked, neutral, and disliked) functioned in a similar manner, with positive valence serving a buffering function against a triggering action that followed an initial provocation (Experiment 3). The results from all three experiments are consistent with cognitive neoassociationist theory.     

The logic of thought experiments

In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well.     

Transplanting brains?

Brain transplant thought experiments figure prominently in the debate on personal identity. Such hypotheticals are usually taken to provide support for psychological continuity theories. This standard interpretation has recently been challenged by Marya Schechtman. Simon Beck argues that Schechtman's critique rests upon ‘two costly mistakes’—claiming that (1) when evaluating these cases, philosophers mistakenly try to figure out the intuitions that they think people inhabiting such a possible world ought to have, instead of pondering their own intuitions. Beck further asserts that (2) brain transplant thought experiments cannot confirm any given theory of personal identity but rather they can only rule out theories. I argue on grounds of the social ontology of personhood that Beck has things back to front. Since our concept of personhood is shaped and informed by contingent de facto norms and structures of the natural world, and as such is heavily normatively laden, the conceptual genesis of personhood must be taken into account. This calls for constructing thought experiments as realistically as possible in order to trigger reliable intuitions. Furthermore, drawing on recent evidence from cognitive science, an empirically informed look at brain transplant thought experiments considering ‘Embodied Cognition’ reveals that Beck's arguments not only fall short for supporting psychological continuity theories, but also suggests an advantage of Schechtman's ‘Person Life View’.     

The conjunction fallacy?

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) showed that when subjects are asked to rate the likelihood of several alternatives, including single and joint events, they often make a "conjunction fallacy." That is, they rate the conjunction of two events as being more likely than one of the constituent events. This, they claim, is a fallacy, since the conjunction of two events can never be more probable than either of the component events. In addition, they found that prior training in probability theory does not decrease the likelihood of making this fallacy. We argue that in some contexts, an alternative that contains the conjunction of two events can be more probable than an alternative that contains only one of the conjunction's constituent events. We carried out four experiments in which we manipulated this context. The frequency of making a conjunction fallacy was affected by the manipulation of context. Furthermore, when the context was clearly specified, prior training in statistics influenced the ratings.     

超越弗雷格的“第三域”神话

<正>如达米特所指出的:"弗雷格关于思想及其构成涵义的看法是神话式的。这些恒久不变的实体居住在‘第三域’(the third realm),后者既不同于物理世界,也不同于任何经验主体的内心世界……。     

THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

Abstract: This article seeks to explain how thought experiments work, and also the reasons why they can fail. It is divided into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy and science should be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought experiments. According to this account, a thought experimenter manipulates her worldview in accord with the “what if” questions posed by a thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried through, the result is either a consistent model or a contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved, the thought experimenter can conclude that the scenario is possible; if a consistent model cannot be constructed, then the scenario is not possible. The fourth section of the article uses this account to shed light on the circumstances in which thought experiments fail.     

Visual discrimination of texture

Julesz (1975) proposed a theory of texture discrimination, based on an order statistics principle, which states that no two textures can be perceptually discriminated if they have identical second-order statistics. The experiments reported here demonstrate that this principle is not adequate to predict visual texture discriminability. Both letter and dot micropatterns were used to create texture pairs that either differed or were identical with respect to secondorder statistics. The subject’s task was to decide which quadrant of an array contained a disparate texture. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, when controlling for spatial overlap, texture pairs having identical second-order statistics were discriminated more quickly than similar texture pairs having different second-order statistics, in contradiction to the principle. Although a significant effect in the direction predicted by the order statistics principle was found in Experiment 4 for texture pairs created from the dot micropatterns, other factors, such as spatial overlap, border differences, and goodness of pattern, must also be considered in predicting texture discriminability.     

Is the number of trials a primary determinant of conditioned responding?

Acquisition of conditioned responding is thought to be determined by the number of pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US). However, it is possible that acquisition is primarily determined not by the number of trials but rather by quantities that often correlate with the number of trials, such as cumulative intertrial interval (ITI) and the number of sessions. Four experiments examined whether the number of trials has an effect on acquisition of conditioned responding, once cumulative ITI and number of sessions are equated. Results of the experiments with rats and mice favor the hypothesis that over an eightfold range, variation in number of CS-US pairings has little effect. It is suggested that learning curves might more accurately be plotted across cumulative ITI or number of sessions, and not across number of trials. Results pose a challenge to trial-centered accounts of conditioning, as demonstrated by simulations of the Rescorla-Wagner model, a simplified version of Wagner's standard operating procedure model (SOP), and Stout & Miller's sometimes competing retrieval model (SOCR). A time-centered account, rate estimation theory (RET), predicts the main finding but has trouble with other aspects of the learning process more easily accommodated by trial-centered models.     

What's new in visual masking?

A brief display that is clearly visible when shown alone can be rendered invisible by the subsequent presentation of a second visual stimulus. Several recently described backward masking effects are not predicted by current theories of visual masking, including masking by four small dots that surround (but do not touch) a target object and masking by a surrounding object that remains on display after the target object has been turned off. A crucial factor in both of these effects is attention: almost no masking occurs if attention can be rapidly focused on the target, whereas powerful masking ensues if attention directed at the target is delayed. A new theory of visual masking, inspired by developments in neuroscience, can account for these effects, as well as more traditional masking effects. In addition, the new theory sheds light on related research, such as the attentional blink, inattentional blindness and change blindness.     

Empathy and the Limits of Thought Experiments

This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these experiments subjects must deploy theory‐theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would (or ought to) do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in‐their‐shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off‐loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects.     

Recollection Is a Continuous Process: Implications for Dual-Process Theories of Recognition Memory

ABSTRACT— Dual-process theory, which holds that recognition decisions can be based on recollection or familiarity, has long seemed incompatible with signal detection theory, which holds that recognition decisions are based on a singular, continuous memory-strength variable. Formal dual-process models typically regard familiarity as a continuous process (i.e., familiarity comes in degrees), but they construe recollection as a categorical process (i.e., recollection either occurs or does not occur). A continuous process is characterized by a graded relationship between confidence and accuracy, whereas a categorical process is characterized by a binary relationship such that high confidence is associated with high accuracy but all lower degrees of confidence are associated with chance accuracy. Using a source-memory procedure, we found that the relationship between confidence and source-recollection accuracy was graded. Because recollection, like familiarity, is a continuous process, dual-process theory is more compatible with signal detection theory than previously thought.     

Methodology in aesthetics: the case of musical expressivity

A central method within analytic philosophy has been to construct thought experiments in order to subject philosophical theories to intuitive evaluation. According to a widely held view, philosophical intuitions provide an evidential basis for arguments against such theories, thus rendering the discussion rational. This method has been the predominant way to approach theories formulated as conditional or biconditional statements. In this paper, we examine selected theories of musical expressivity presented in such logical forms, analyzing the possibilities for constructing thought experiments against them. We will argue that philosophical intuitions are not available for the evaluation of the types of counterarguments that would need to be constructed. Instead, the evaluation of these theories, to the extent that it can succeed at all, will centrally rely on inferential, non-immediate access to our subjective musical experiences. Furthermore, attempted thought experiments lose their methodological function because no proper distinction can be drawn between the persons figuring in the thought-experimental scenario and the evaluator of the scenario. Consequently, some of the central contributions to what is generally understood to be analytic philosophy of art are shown to represent a form of aesthetic criticism, offering much less basis for rational argumentation than is often thought.     

Prioritization within visual working memory reflects a flexible focus of attention

When motivated, people can keep nonrecent items in a list active during the presentation of new items, facilitating fast and accurate recall of the earlier items. It has been proposed that this occurs by flexibly orienting attention to a single prioritized list item, thus increasing the amount of attention-based maintenance directed toward this item at the expense of other items. This is manipulated experimentally by associating a single distinct feature with a higher reward value, such as a single red item in a list of black items. These findings may be more parsimoniously explained under a distinctiveness of encoding framework rather than a flexible attention allocation framework. The retrieval advantage for the prioritized list position may be because the incongruent feature stands out in the list perceptually and causes it to become better encoded. Across three visual working memory experiments, we contrast a flexible attention theory against a distinctiveness of encoding theory by manipulating the reward value associated with the incongruent feature. Findings from all three experiments show strong support in favor of the flexible attention theory and no support for the distinctiveness of encoding theory. We also evaluate and find no evidence that strategy use, motivation, or tiredness/fatigue associated with reward value can adequately explain flexible prioritization of attention. Flexible attentional prioritization effects may be best understood under the context of an online attentional refreshing mechanism.

     

情绪一致性对有意遗忘的影响

有意遗忘是强调遗忘的有意性和指向性。对负性情绪的有意遗忘有利于个体的身心健康。本研究采用单字范式,实验一以正性、负性和中性情绪词为材料,探讨了情绪材料对有意遗忘的影响。结果发现,三类词语均表现出了显著的有意遗忘效应;实验二在实验一的基础上加入了情绪状态,探讨了情绪状态和情绪材料对有意遗忘的影响,结果发现,在积极情绪状态下,被试更多地遗忘负性情绪词;在消极情绪状态下,被试更多地遗忘中性词。表明个体对情绪信息的有意遗忘既受信息的情绪性影响,又受个体情绪状态的影响。     

On thought experiments as a priori science

Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non‐propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a new natural interpretation in terms of which the phenomenon can be redescribed free of contradiction.