Phenomenology of Digital-Being

This paper explores the ontology of digital information or the nature of digital-being. Even though a digital-being is not a physical thing, it has many essential features of physical things such as substantiality, extensions, and thing-totality (via Heidegger). Despite their lack of material bases, digital-beings can provide us with perceivedness or universal passive pregivenness (via Husserl). Still, a digital-being is not exactly a thing, because it does not belong to objective time and space. Due to its perfect duplicability, a digital being can exist at multiple locations simultaneously – that is, it defies normal spatiotemporal constraints. With digital beings on the Internet, we can establish intercorporeal relationships. The World Wide Web opens up new possibilities of Dasein's being-able-to-be-with-one-another and new modes of Being-with-others (Mitsein). The new modes of communication based on digital-beings compel us to re-read Heidegger's basic concepts such as Dasein as Being-in-the-world, since Dasein becomes the Digi-sein as Being-in-the-World-Wide-Web. By exploring the ontological characteristics of digital-being, this paper suggests that we conceive digital-beings as res digitalis – a third entity which is located somewhere between res cogitans and res extensa.     

The critique of natural rights and the search for a non-anthropocentric basis for moral behavior

Conclusion MacIntyre, Clark, and Heidegger would all agree that the current problem with moral theory is its lack of a satisfactory conception of human telos. This lack leads us to resort to such fictions as rights, interests, and utility, which are disguises for the will to power. These thinkers would also agree that modern nation-states are cut off from the roots of the Western tradition. Modern political economy, with its individualism, its acquisitiveness and its elevation of the values of the market to a central social place is leading us into the coming age of barbarism and darkness. MacIntyre's grim depiction of the future, which Heidegger calls the time of the darkening of the earth and the flight of the gods, can only be met by re-appropriating our own tradition. Although Aristotle has much to tell us, I believe Heidegger is right to turn to Heraclitus for a non-anthropocentric conception of humanity's place in Nature. Other writers, however, such as Arne Naess, George Sessions, and Stuart Hampshire, argue that the writings of Spinoza may offer the most helpful vision of humanity needed to guide our efforts to find a more appropriate basis for our behavior toward each other and toward the non-human world as well. Yet Aristotle, Qark, Heidegger, Heraclitus, Maclntyre, and Spinoza all agree that in order to behave fittingly, we must understand what it means to be human.At this time, I would like to acknowledge the importance of the following objection to what I have been arguing here: While it may be true that the concept of human rights is a fiction, it is nevertheless a very useful fiction for changing how human beings relate to each other. The doctrine of the rights of man justified the American and French revolutions, which brought forth new and important human freedoms. Today, most of humanity still lacks the protection afforded by constitutionally guaranteed human rights. Moreover, even in constitutional democracies there are frequent abuses of and attempts to curtail human rights. Until far more people become committed to protecting human rights, it is unlikely that there will be a big movement to extend rights to non-human beings, much less to overcome the anthropocentrism inherent in the concept of rights. What the Buddhist tradition calls skillful means is appropriate in our current situation. We must approach people in a way sensitive to their current self-understanding. Before we can pass on to the stage of planetary unity made possible by non-anthropocentric thinking, we need to find ways that promote mutual respect among human beings. Out of such respect there can also arise respect for the non-human as well.While largely in agreement with this point of view, I would like to note that our means must be very skillful, indeed, if we are to transform our relationships to each other and to the natural world before irreparable damage is done to the earth, through nuclear war or environmental destruction. The time grows short for the transformation needed to bring us from the stage of anthropocentrism to a deeper awareness of our internal relationship to the whole world. Some people, such as Peter Russell, argue that we are witnessing the evolution of a non-anthropocentric mode of planetary consciousness that will be supported by the revolution in communications and computers. Other people, such as Jeremy Rifkin, maintain that the coming computer age promises ever greater intrusions into natural processes, such as the drive for control of genetic structures. In my view, while it is important to extend the idea of human rights wherever possible, it is also crucial that we consider seriously the possibility that the idea of human rights is merely a transitional way of conceiving of morality. As we learn more about the interrelationship of human life with all other aspects of the earth's life, our self-understanding will no longer be in harmony with the human-centered morality we know today. We will either learn to respect all beings and act toward them in appropriate ways, or else we will continue down the road we are now headed - a road which seems to have a very disturbing destination. Learning to dwell appropriately on earth is the most pressing moral issue of the day.

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Heidegger's formal indication: A question of method in Being and Time

For Heidegger, phenomenological investigation is carried out by formal indication, the name given to the methodical approach he assumes in Being and Time. This paper attempts to draw attention to the nature of formal indication in light of the fact that it has been largely lost upon American scholarship (mainly due to its inconsistent translation). The roots of the concept of formal indication are shown in two ways. First, its thematic treatment in Heidegger's 1921/22 Winter Semester course, Phenomenological Investigations into Aristotle, is examined to make clear what Heidegger silently assumes in Being and Time. Second, Heidegger's adaptation of Husserl's use of the term, indication, is outlined to clarify the concept even more. The enhanced understanding of formal indication granted by these two points leads to a better grasp of Heidegger's concept of truth, for formal indication and truth are mutually implied for Heidegger. Finally, it is suggested that the reader of Being and Time, on the basis of what formal indication demands, approach the work not as a doctrine to be learned but as a task always requiring further completion.     

Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein's world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells.     

Constructing an Aesthetic Weltanschauung: Freud,James, and Ricoeur

I will investigate in this paper what kind of Weltanschauung Freud suggests. Although Freud argues in the lecture XXXV, The Question of a Weltanschauung (1933), that psychoanalysis is incapable of creating a Weltanschauung of its own, I think that he has a certain Weltanschauung, i.e., the aesthetic worldview, which involves his scientific, psychoanalytic, and artistic principles. Furthermore, I will explicate that Freud's aesthetic worldview is ultimately related to the Weltanschauungen of William James and Paul Ricoeur. I will focus particularly on their terms, sympathetic and poetic, which are the crucial elements that constitute the aesthetic Weltanschauung. Finally, I will briefly present my intention in drawing this aesthetic Weltanschauung. I will conclude that throughout the aesthetic Weltanschauung we may accept that everything is precious, pertinent, and worthy to be viewed as a part and a whole, and as home (Heim).     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Can there be one-way causal conditionship?

I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is at its base a counterfactual one. Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that necessary for in the circumstances is nontransitive.     

Depression and Anxiety in Persons with Parkinson's Disease With and Without “On–Off” Phenomena

On–off phenomena in Parkinson's disease (PD) are unpredictable motor fluctuations associated with long-term levodopa use. Mood fluctuations have been found to coincide with the motor fluctuations in that depression and anxiety increase while the person with PD is in the off state. What has been relatively unexplored is whether those persons with PD who have on–off phenomena differ psychologically in fundamental ways from those who do not have on–off phenomena. In the present study, depression and anxiety symptoms were assessed in 36 persons with PD (n = 14 with on–off phenomena, n = 22 without on–off phenomena). All those with on–off phenomena were assessed in their on state. Those persons with PD with on–off phenomena had significantly higher levels of anxiety than those without on–off phenomena. However, both groups, regardless of on–off status, were mildly depressed. Neurobiological interpretations of the results implicate the locus coeruleus in the pathogenesis of both on–off phenomena and anxiety, whereas psychological interpretations of the results involve the issues of learned helplessness and control over health symptoms in PD.     

Responsibility and evil imagination

In this Niebuhrian perspective on hostile and violent discourse the author utilizes H. R. Niebuhr's fourfold notion of responsibility and his concept of evil imagination to examine relations marred by protracted hostility toward hated other or others. The author argues that violent and hostile discourse manifests a particular form of responsibility whereby persons expressing hostility toward hated others construct, by way of negative representations, maligned histories and identities for the other and at the same time construct an idealized or glorified history and identity for themselves. These positive and negative representations and histories, then, are utilized to answer questions regarding interpretation, accountability, and solidarity. Niebuhr's concept of evil imagination is employed to hypothesize about the intransigence of this form of responsibility and to suggest reasons why elevated and maligned representations, identities, and histories are, more often than not, inextricably and tragically linked.     

The center of gravity

In As far as possible: discovering our limits and finding ourselves (Barish and Vida, 1998), we struggled with the constraints of being two nice girls in the context of our individual professional identities as traditionally trained psychoanalysts. We were surprised to discover, through sharing with one another some painful, confusing, and even terrifying clinical experiences, how wedded we were to certain psychoanalytic conventions. It was not a pleasant discovery. What we had to face was the extent of our submissiveness to psychoanalytic theory, and of the cost to our authentic selves of that submissiveness. This daughter-paper is about our learning not to do what we were supposed to do. Its gestation has taken a form that we could not have anticipated, for, as we pursued the writing of this sequel, we seemed to get lost along the way. After working with this over a very long time, we can see now that the paper that was ultimately born, this paper, has functioned as a vehicle for us to experience ourselves in relation in an uncertain, mingling way, conscious and unconscious, trying not to be self-conscious and not defensive. This, we can also see, is how we approach the center of gravity, where our irreducible and irreconcilable tendencies are struggling to maintain a balance. And even more to the point, this paper is also a demonstration, a look at what developmental transformation is really like, the process to which we all give lip service, but hardly any of us ever pays attention to it in our real lives, and if we do, we never, never talk about it.     

Of Orchids,insects, and natural theology: Timing,tactics, and cultural critique in darwin's post-“Origin” strategy

This essay examines the relation of Darwin's orchids book to a central persuasive flaw in theOrigin: Its inability to give variation sufficient presence to break the hold of design in the mind of the reader. Darwin characterized the orchids book as a flank movement on the enemy; this essay identifies the enemy as Paley's natural theology and the flank as thetopoi, maxims, and habits of perception that led Darwin's colleagues and contemporaries to see design in nature. Moreover, this essay examines three aspects of rhetorical timing pertinent toOrchids - time askairos, time as adequate duration, and time as transformation - and then relates those features to Robert Cox's Heideggerian logic of repetition, disavowal, and transcendence. The essay concludes with implications of the tactical and temporal aspects of Darwin's reasoning for understanding both the logic of science and of Darwin as a rhetorical artist.An earlier version of this essay appeared in the Proceedings of the Sixth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation.     

John Dewey's impact on Turkish education

Conclusion The cultural characteristics of any country generally give shape to the educational system. However, no country can assert its own educational system to be wholly indigenous. All the systems come into being as a synthesis of various ingredients of the home country and other countries. And it is quite natural to make use of the experiences and stock of knowledge of the others. This fact is indispensable especially when education is concerned. The curicial problem is to what extent the borrowing process should be used. When the process of borrowing ideas become to take the form of imitation or copy, unexpected results and failure are unavoidable.     

Clients Helping Therapists Find Solutions to their Therapy

This paper is offered as a beginning toward including client perspectives on treatment and client participation in supervision. Rather than see therapists as technical experts who do things to people, many of us now see therapists as nonexperts who create conversations with people (Goolishian & Anderson, 1992). This new shift challenges the traditional training positions of supervisor and supervisee, respectively. Including clients' voices the supervisor participate from a nonexpert position.     

Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility versus Free Will

Harry Frankfurt's early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt's later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt's later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt's view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction.     

LIBERAL INDOCTRINATION AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNITY

Responding to claims to the contrary, this essay shows how liberal education, the education of critical exposure, indoctrinates students into a style of belief and belief formation. It argues that a common liberal view about what constitutes freedom from indoctrination is precisely the form of indoctrination feared by many conservative communitarians. While I support the style and procedures of liberal education, I argue that we cannot excise all indoctrinating components from it by semantic, logical or epistemic analyses of what indoctrination or education means.     

Emotions,Cognition, Affect: On Jerry Neu's A Tear is an Intellectual Thing

Jerome Neu has been one of the most prominent voices in the philosophy of emotions for more than twenty years, that is, before the field was even a field. His Emotions, Thought, and Therapy (1977) was one of its most original and ground-breaking books. Neu is an uncompromising defender of what has been called the cognitive theory of emotions (as am I). But the ambiguity, controversy, and confusions own by the notion of a cognitive theory of emotion is what I would like to focus on here. In so doing I will indicate some of the way sin which my own theory has developed.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

What is a Correspondence Theory of Truth?

It is often thought that instances of the T-schema such as snow is white is true if and only if snow is white state correspondences between sentences andthe world, and that therefore such sentences play a crucial role in correspondence theories oftruth. I argue that this assumption trivializes the correspondence theory: even a disquotationaltheory of truth would be a correspondence theory on this conception. This discussionallows one to get clearer about what a correspondence theory does claim, and toward the end of thepaper I discuss what a true correspondence theory of truth would involve.