Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions

In recent years philosophers such as Paul Boghossian, David Velleman and Colin McGinn have argued against the view that colours are dispositional properties, on the grounds that they do not look like dispositional properties, and in particular that they are not represented in visual experience as dispositions to present certain kinds of appearances. Rather colours are represented as being these appearances, i.e., simple, non-dispositional properties. I argue that a proper understanding of how visual experiences represent physical objects as being coloured shows that colours do look like dispositions. In particular, I argue that if visual experiences are to represent properties as properties of physical objects, they must distinguish between these properties and their appearances, and thus cannot represent such properties as colours as being identical with their corresponding appearances.     

How Dispositions can be Causally Relevant

The problem this paper deals with is the problem of how dispositional properties can have causal relevance. In particular, the paper is focused on the question of how dispositions can have causal relevance given that the categorial bases that realise them seem to be sufficient to bring about the effects that dispositions explain. I show first that this problem of exclusion has no general solution. Then, I discuss some particular cases in which dispositions are causally relevant, despite of this exclusion problem. My claim is that dispositions have causal relevance in selection or recruitment processes, when they are converted into teleological functions.     

Opposing powers

A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.     

Skill theory v2.0: dispositions,emulation, and spatial perception

An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models.     

Unfinkable dispositions

This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws.     

Supervenience and causal necessity

Causal necessity typically receives only oblique attention. Causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, or dispositions are usually the immediate subject(s) of interest. All of these, however, have a common feature. In some way, they involve the causal modality, some form of natural or physical necessity. In this paper, causal necessity is discussed with the purpose of determining whether a completely general empiricist theory can account for the causal in terms of the noncausal. Based on an examination of causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, and dispositions, it is argued that no reductive program devoid of essentialist commitments can account for all the phenomena that involve causal necessity. Hence, neo-Humean empiricism fails to provide a framework adequate for understanding causal necessity.I am grateful to D. M. Armstrong, Ellery Eels, Kit Fine, Philip Quinn, Elliot Sober, Chris Swoyer, Bas van Fraassen, and an anonymous Synthese referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Do Expectations Have Time Span?

If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal.     

A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing—cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.     

Towards an Expansive Hybrid Psychology: Integrating Theories of the Mediated Mind

This article develops an integrative theory of the mind by examining how the mind, understood as a set of skills and dispositions, depends upon four sources of mediators. Harré’s hybrid psychology is taken as a meta-theoretical starting point, but is expanded significantly by including the four sources of mediators that are the brain, the body, social practices and technological artefacts. It is argued that the mind is normative in the sense that mental processes do not simply happen, but can be done more or less well, and thus are subject to normative appraisal. The expanded hybrid psychology is meant to assist in integrating theoretical perspectives and research interests that are often thought of as incompatible, among them neuroscience, phenomenology of the body, social practice theory and technology studies. A main point of the article is that these perspectives each are necessary for an integrative approach to the human mind.     

The role of personality in social identity: effects of field-dependence and context on reactions to threat to group distinctiveness

This article examines the role of personality dispositions as determinants of people's reactions to threats to social identity. It is argued that since individuals characterized as high field-dependents have a greater tendency to anchor their identity in the social group than low field-dependents, they will be more affected by threats to social identity, especially when the context is framed as an intergroup context. Threat to social identity was manipulated by inducing intergroup similarity, and intergroup differentiation was measured. The first experiment assessed the hypothesis with minimal groups. The second experiment assessed it with real groups (two rival schools). Findings provided support for the hypotheses. The discussion centers on the role of personality dispositions in the social identity perspective.     

Secondary control critiqued: is it secondary? is it control? Comment on Morling and Evered (2006)

In an insightful review on secondary control, B. Morling and S. Evered argued that the seminal article spawning the construct (F. Rothbaum, J. R. Weisz, & S. S. Snyder) contained the roots of two distinct conceptualizations focusing on "fit" and "control" and that distinguishing between them clarifies inconsistent research findings. They concluded that the best definition of secondary control focuses on fit. The author of the current commentary agrees with Morling and Evered's premises but draws the opposite conclusion. Herein, it is argued that (a) current control-focused definitions have more valid claims to the term secondary control, and (b) current incarnations that focus on "fit" are important, but they are not secondary and they are not control. Hence, fit-focused constructs should be liberated from the domain of control and studied in their own right, under their own more appropriate label, such as accommodative processes. Moreover, theoretical clarity and depth regarding the functions of fit-focused processes can be gained by examining these processes in relation to other underlying motives, such as belongingness or autonomy, to which they are more closely allied.     

Seemings: still dispositions to believe

According to phenomenal conservatism, seemings can provide prima facie justification for beliefs. In order to fully assess phenomenal conservatism, it is important to understand the nature of seemings. Two views are that (SG) seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, and that (D2B) seemings are nothing over and above dispositions to believe. Proponents of (SG) reject (D2B) in large part by providing four distinct objections against (D2B). First, seemings have a distinctive phenomenology, but dispositions to believe do not. Second, seemings can provide a non-trivial explanation for dispositions to believe, which wouldn’t be possible if seemings were dispositions to believe. Third, there are some dispositions to believe that are not seemings. Fourth, there are instances of seemings which are not dispositions to believe. I consider and reject each of these objections. The first and third objections rely on a misunderstanding of (D2B). The second objection fails because there are contexts in which an appeal to a previously unknown identity can provide an interesting explanation. The fourth objection overlooks the possibility of finkish and masked dispositions, phenomena which are widely accepted in the dispositions literature. I conclude that (D2B) escapes these common objections unscathed.     

The role of practice and habituation in Socrates’ theory of ethical development

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to challenge the standard view that Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues is an intellectualist with respect to virtue. Through a detailed analysis of the educational theory laid out in the early dialogues, it will be argued that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtues in his interlocutors is not to convince them of ethical truths by way of reason and argument alone, but to encourage them to participate in the practice of virtue. Habit and practice are essential to the cultivation of virtue because they mould the desires and dispositions of the agent and promote a kind of knowledge that cannot be achieved discursively – craft-knowledge. Only when agents have achieved craft-knowledge can they be counted on to act virtuously on every occasion; and craft-knowledge can only be achieved by way of practice and habituation.     

Identity maintenance in the affectively distant patient

Patients who are affectively distant, in that they appear to have little conscious emotional investment in the analyst, have been described increasingly in the psychoanalytic literature of the last twenty years. Typically, they have been understood either from a developmental point of view as defensively struggling against wishes for symbiotic union or, on the Kleinian model, as having unconscious fantasies of bodily fusion with the mother that, upon separation from her, result in annihilation anxiety that generates autistic defenses. Of special importance is the work of Heinz Lichtenstein, who stresses early identity maintenance and the role of mirroring experiences with the mother in the development of an "identity theme." This concept is used here as a symbiotic precursor of ego identity that ties the self to a particular mother. It is this primitive form of identity that can occasion regressive self-definition in the transference of the affectively distant patient. Two cases are presented that illustrate dynamics and transference dispositions occurring in the psychoanalysis of these patients. The discussion focuses on the role of the patient's catastrophic fear of acceptance, as well as on the consequent need for self-protective measures. It is argued that careful and consistent analysis of these conflicted areas of these patients' transference leads toward greater integration of their identity and personality.     

Reducing the gap between pro-environmental disposition and behavior: The role of feeling power

Environmental issues are some of the most pressing threats the world is facing nowadays. In this context, motivating individual pro-environmental behavior becomes highly relevant. One strategy is to harness people's pro-environmental dispositions (e.g., biospheric values, pro-environmental attitudes). Although acknowledging the need to behave pro-environmentally lies at the core of these dispositions, the extent to which they are reflected in day-to-day pro-environmental practices fluctuates to a great extent. How to bridge this gap between dispositions and behaviors in pro-environmentalism? This research tests a novel psychological solution, that is, to heighten subjective feelings of power. Power depicts people's control over their own and others’ outcomes. Two studies (total N = 338, with n = 200 in Study 1 and n = 138 in Study 2) manipulated people's situational sense of high versus low power (by recalling and writing about relevant incidents), measured pro-environmental dispositions (biospheric values in Studies 1 and 2; attitude toward a specific environmental cause in Study 2), and examined their effects on pro-environmental behaviors (spending time on environmental persuasion in Study 1 and spending money on environmental donation in Study 2). Overall, both studies revealed that pro-environmental dispositions predicted pro-environmental behaviors, but only when the actors were prompted to experience a high instead of a low sense of power. The findings illuminate power as an important and viable communication tactic—to orient people toward their dispositions and practice what they preach in pro-environmentalism.     

Diagnosing true virtue? Remote scenarios,warranted virtue attributions,and virtuous medical practice

Immanuel Kant argues in the Foundations that remote scenarios are diagnostic of genuine virtue. When agents commonly thought to have a particular virtue fail to exhibit that virtue in an extreme situation, he argues, they do not truly have the virtue at all, and our propensities to fail in such ways indicate that true virtue might never have existed. Kant’s suggestion that failure to show, say, courage in extraordinary circumstances necessarily silences one’s claim to have genuine courage seems to rely on an implausibly demanding standard for warranted virtue attributions. In contrast to this approach, some philosophers—such as Robert Adams and John Doris—have argued for probabilistic accounts of warranted virtue attributions. But despite the initial plausibility of such accounts, I argue that a sole reliance on probabilistic approaches is inadequate, as they are insufficiently sensitive to considerations of credit and fault, which emerge when agents have developed various insurance strategies and protective capacities against their responding poorly to particular eventualities. I also argue that medical graduates should develop the sorts of virtuous dispositions necessary to protect patient welfare against various countervailing influences (even where such influences might be encountered only rarely), and that repeated failures to uphold the proper goals of medicine in emergency scenarios might indeed be diagnostic of whether an individual practitioner does have the relevant medical virtue. In closing, I consider the dispositions involved in friendship. I seek to develop a principled way of determining when remote scenarios can be illuminating of genuine friendship and genuine virtue.     

The emerging self: the convergence of mind,personality and thinking styles

This paper aims to integrate research and theorizing about problem solving, self and personality into a comprehensive theory. With this purpose, the paper attempts to answer three questions: how do humans become aware of themselves and how do the products of self-awareness interrelate to produce an integrated self-system, which includes the domains of cognition and personality? How do persons know and influence each other? How do these processes change with development? The answers given to these questions by self, personality and cognitive developmental psychology are critically examined. It is concluded that an overarching model would have to assume a multilevel and multidimensional architecture. This would involve three main levels: the first includes general-purpose processes and functions, such as processing efficiency and working memory, which define current cognitive potentials; the second includes several domain-specific systems directed to different aspects of the environment; the third includes self-oriented processes that register, represent and regulate processes at the other two levels. Each person’s self-concepts result from the application of the third level on the other two and they differentially reflect their condition. Personality reflects the interaction between these self-concepts and dispositions to act in particular ways. Because humans share this architecture they can negotiate and affect each other’s self- and reflected representations. Thus, the formation of mind, self and personality results from a continuous flow of interactions between the levels and domains of mind within and across persons. The article summarizes a series of studies lending support to this general model.     

Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others

Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that 'Colours do not look like dispositions'. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in 'Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions', The Philosophical Quarterly , 50 (2000), pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism about colours is false.     

Tracks and affordances: The sources of a physical ontology

How is meaning assigned to those terms in a theory which are remote from direct observational instantiation? Models and analogies play a role, but close examination of theories in high energy physics shows that the design of experimental apparatus also influences the interpretation of such terms. Certain apparatus favours certain kinds of effects, and this affects the way mathematical theories are interpreted. In particular track producing apparatus becomes involved with theories in which photonic terms are picked out in the theory. A further conceptual constraint is thus introduced. It is argued that this situation favours the interpretation of dispositional properties as affordances rather than as simple dispositions.