An ecological analysis of knowing by wielding.

The ecological approach to perception, as developed by James Gibson, is described and applied to how one knows, by means of the haptic perceptual system, various properties of hand-held objects. Four sets of experiments are reviewed in which subjects reported on the extent, orientation, shape, and fractional components of unseen objects wielded freely. For each task, an invariant specific to the object property in question is identified in the structured arrays of rotational moments and strains produced by the act of wielding. Results are discussed in relation to the concepts of attention and stimulation, as reformulated by the ecological approach, and the general theory of perception as information pickup.     

Recurrence analysis of sensorimotor trajectories in a minimalist perceptual task using sonification

Cognitive Processing - Active Perception perspectives claim that action is closely related to perception. An empirical approach that supports these theories is the minimalist, in which participants...     

An analysis of the determinants of the feeling of knowing

Research has demonstrated that feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments are affected by the amount of accessible information related to an inaccessible target. Further, studies have demonstrated that, in some situations, FOK judgment magnitude is not only related to the amount (quantity) of accessed features, but also the correctness of those features (Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2011). The present study examined the conditions under which the correctness of features would influence FOK judgment magnitude. We hypothesized that accuracy of retrieved features would influence FOK judgments, but only in situations where semantically meaningful information was accessible. In three experiments, we manipulated accessibility of semantic information. In all experiments, the quantity, or amount of retrieved partial information had a greater impact on FOK judgments than the accuracy of that information. However, in situations where semantic information was accessible, accuracy of retrieved semantic features also influenced FOK judgment magnitude, and later recognition.     

Bodily knowing

This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.     

The minimalist program in syntax

The Minimalist program, a development of earlier work in transformational generative grammar, proposes that the computational system central to human language is a 'perfect' solution to the task of relating sound and meaning. Recent research has investigated the complexities evident in earlier models and attempted to eliminate them, or to show how they are only apparent, following from deeper but simpler properties. Examples of this include the reduction of the number of linguistic levels of representation in the model, and the deduction of constraints on syntactic derivations from general considerations of economy and computational simplicity.     

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.     

A proposal for a minimalist ontology

Synthese - This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is a minimal set of entities that form an ontology of the natural world, given our well-established physical theories? The...     

Remembering entails knowing

In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.     

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do

Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in saying that desire is essential for motivating us. The right response to the Humean theory of motivation is to see that moral knowledge is desire-related rationality or thought-related desire. Moral knowledge is neither knowing that nor knowing how but rather a third species of knowledge which we may call “knowing to do.” Knowing to do is to be rationally disposed to do the right thing. This understanding of moral knowledge is exactly what we can learn from Aristotle’s ethics.     

Remembering without knowing

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.     

Austin on knowing

Philosophical anthropology is a broad‐gauged study of man drawing on the findings of empirical sciences and the humanities. The paper is intended as a tribute to one of the pioneers in this field. The first part outlines central features of Plessner's conception, focusing on man's instinctual deficiency and his ‘eccentric position’ in the world; man from this perspective is an ‘embodied’ creature in the dual sense of experiencing the world through his bodily organs and of ‘having’ a body and being able to reflect on his mundane situation. In social terms the perspective implies that man can find himself only through embodiment in institutional settings and role patterns ‐ settings which, however, remain open to reinterpretation and revision. Subsequently Plessner's outlook is compared and contrasted with alternative views of the human condition. According to Gehlen, man's instinctual deficiency an openness need to be corrected through institutional stability and the standardization of role structures. Reviewing leading writings of the ‘counter‐culture’, a final section explores contemporary anti‐institutional trends which see man as a fugitive from social constraints and his search for self‐fulfilment as antithetical to role patterns.     

Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment

How in real-life or through the use of technical devices can we recognize the presence of other persons and under what conditions can we differentiate them from objects? In order to approach this question, in the study reported here we explored the most basic conditions necessary for participants to recognize the presence of another person during a perceptual interaction. We created a mini-network of two minimalist devices and investigated whether participants were able to differentiate the perception of another person from the perception of a fixed and a mobile object even when the pattern of sensory stimulation was reduced to a bare minimum. We show that participants can recognize when the all-or-none tactile stimulation they experienced was attributable to an encounter with the other participant's avatar or the mobile object rather than with a fixed object. Participants were also able to establish different strategies in order to favor the situations of mutual perception. Thus, in the minimalist conditions of our experiment, the perception of another intentional subject was not based purely on any particular shape or objective trajectories of displacement; it was also based on properties that are intrinsic to the joint perceptual activity itself.     

How to be a minimalist about sets

According to the iterative conception of set, sets can be arranged in a cumulative hierarchy divided into levels. But why should we think this to be the case? The standard answer in the philosophical literature is that sets are somehow constituted by their members. In the first part of the paper, I present a number of problems for this answer, paying special attention to the view that sets are metaphysically dependent upon their members. In the second part of the paper, I outline a different approach, which circumvents these problems by dispensing with the priority or dependence relation altogether. Along the way, I show how this approach enables the mathematical structuralist to defuse an objection recently raised against her view.