NATURAL GOODNESS AND NATURAL EVIL

In Natural Goodness Philippa Foot gives an analysis of the concepts we use to describe the characteristics of living things. She suggests that we describe them in functional terms, and this allows us to judge organisms as good or defective depending on how well they perform their distinctive functions. Foot claims that we can judge intentional human actions in the same way: the virtues contribute in obvious ways to good human functioning, and this provides us with grounds for making moral judgements. This paper criticises Foot’s argument by challenging her notion of function. I argue that the type of judgement she makes about living things requires an evolutionary biological account of function. However, such an account would render her meta‐ethical claims implausible, since it is unlikely that human beings are adapted to be maximally virtuous. I conclude that Foot is wrong about the logical structure of our judgements of human action.     

ON SOCIAL EVIL AND NATURAL EVIL: IN CONVERSATION WITH CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

In this contribution, the author engages in a conversation with Christopher Southgate on the relationship between social evil and what is called natural “evil.” Theologically, this centers around an understanding of creation and fall. It is argued that Southgate typically treats soteriology and eschatology as themes pertaining to an evolutionary theodicy, whereas an adequate ecotheology would discuss the problem of natural suffering under the rubric of the narrative of God's economy. The question is then how that story is best told.     

EVIL, ORIGINAL SIN, AND EVOLUTION

This article has three sections. The first discusses the problem of evil; the second, the sins of both angels and men that originally introduced evil into the world; the third, a teleological theory of evolution that clarifies the relationship between the first two sections. At present there is a great deal of discussion about the nature of the evolutionary process. Some argue that ultimately it is a strictly random one. But it is quite impossible to prove scientifically that evolution is strictly random. From a Christian point of view the best way to view it is to see it not only as the result of divine intelligence, but also as due to a ferocious conflict between superhuman powers – the biblical angels and demons to whom God in the beginning gave the power to guide and develop his creation.     

GOD INCARNATE AND THE DEFEAT OF EVIL

In this essay, I assess Marilyn McCord Adams's important and provocative incarnation-centered approach to the problem of evil. In particular, I examine the central theological components of her approach: her novel but also problematic conceptions of creation, sin, redemption, grace, and eschatological consummation. My further goal is to use my critical analysis of Adams's approach in order to begin to articulate and defend an alternative incarnation-centered approach, based on a more classically orthodox conception of divine defeat of evil, which is both immune to the criticisms I raise against Adams's approach and possesses a higher degree of explanatory power.     

"BE NOT OVERCOME BY EVIL, BUT OVERCOME EVIL WITH GOOD"—AN ORIENTATIONAL APPROACH TO SUFFERING AND EVIL

I discuss two recent books by Ingolf U. Dalferth, which consider the problem of suffering and evil. Dalferth argues that evil is defined by events where someone experiences ills, not by an act of the will or an evil intention, as Kant thought. Suffering is seen in relation to evil, evil in relation to God, and God in relation to the history of Jesus Christ, in whom God created new life through the overcoming of evil. Christianity shall proclaim the end of evil, not the end of suffering. Dalferth contends that nothing connects human beings as strongly as the common experience of evil. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on the problem of sin , especially in relation to God.     

EXTINCTION,NATURAL EVIL,AND THE COSMIC CROSS

Did the God of the Bible create a Darwinian world in which violence and suffering (disvalue) are the means by which the good (value) is realized? This is Christopher Southgate's insightful and dramatic formulation of the theodicy problem. In addressing this problem, the Exeter theologian rightly invokes the Theology of the Cross in its second manifestation, that is, we learn from the cross of Jesus Christ that God is present to nonhuman as well as human victims of predation and extinction. God co‐suffers with creatures in their despair, abandonment, physical suffering, and death. What I will add with more force than Southgate is this: the Easter resurrection is a prolepsis of the eschatological new creation, and it is God's new creation which retroactively determines past creation. Although this does not eliminate the theodicy question, it lessens its moral sting.     

UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO HUMAN EVIL: A MULTICAUSAL APPROACH

One task of religion is delivering human beings from evil within and between themselves. Defining good as well‐being or functioning well, evil as impaired functioning, and doing evil as impairing the functioning of others, this essay explores how religions in consort with other social institutions might understand and respond to evil in light of contemporary scientific knowledge. To understand evil I use a multicausal approach that includes both biological and sociocultural environmental causes. I illustrate the use of this approach by analyzing how we might understand and respond to human rage and violence.     

A JUNGIAN VIEW OF EVIL

Abstract. On the one hand Jungian John Sanford criticizes Carl Jung for underestimating the importance granted evil by at least some strains of Christianity. On the other hand Sanford follows Jung in assuming that psychology is entitled to criticize Christianity whenever it fails to grant evil its due. Like Jung, Sanford contends that he is faulting Christianity on only psychological grounds: for failing to cope with evil in man–the shadow archetype. In fact, Sanford, like perhaps Jung as well, is also criticizing Christianity on metaphysical grounds: for failing to acknowledge not just psychological but also ontological evil. Whether Sanford is thereby using psychology to assess Christian metaphysics is the issue.     

A VIROCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE ON EVIL

Abstract. The coronavirus pandemic has stirred interest in viruses. This has been accompanied by a proliferation of popular works trying to explain how viruses fit into the Christian worldview. In an anthropocentric perspective, viruses are easily regarded as malicious entities. This article, however, shows that a proper understanding of the biology of viruses actually adds another level of complexity to our perception of good and evil. Interestingly, this additional layer of complexity might help us solve some of the most urgent difficulties in the discussion about good and evil, if we recognize the subjective nature of what we call natural evil. We need to be more nuanced not merely in our theological discussion about good and evil, but also in the way we talk about viruses.