The misinterpretation of noncanonical sentences

Research on language comprehension has focused on the resolution of syntactic ambiguities, and most studies have employed garden-path sentences to determine the system's preferences and to assess its use of nonsyntactic sources information. A topic that has been neglected is how syntactically challenging but essentially unambiguous sentences are processed, including passives and object-clefts--sentences that require thematic roles to be assigned in an atypical order. The three experiments described here tested the idea that sentences are processed both algorithmically and heuristically. Sentences were presented aurally and the participants' task was to identify the thematic roles in the sentence (e.g., Who was the do-er?). The first experiment demonstrates that passives are frequently and systematically misinterpreted, especially when they express implausible ideas. The second shows that the surface frequency of a syntactic form does not determine ease of processing, as active sentences and subject-clefts were comprehended equally easily despite the rareness of the latter type. The third experiment compares the processing of subject- and object-clefts, and the results show that they are similar to actives and passives, respectively, again despite the infrequent occurrence in English of any type of cleft. The results of the three experiments suggest that a comprehensive theory of language comprehension must assume that simple processing heuristics are used during processing in addition to (and perhaps sometimes instead of) syntactic algorithms. Moreover, the experiments support the idea that language processing is often based on shallow processing, yielding a merely "good enough" rather than a detailed linguistic representation of an utterance's meaning.     

The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism

Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes (or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism.     

Evolutionary skepticism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Burgeoning skepticism

This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.     

The catastrophic misinterpretation of physiological distress.

Cognitive theories of panic disorder suggest that the catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations is the trigger for a panic attack. A challenge to cognitive theories is the suggestion that dyspnea (shortness of breath) is central to the development of panic and that negative cognitions are by-products of panic. To examine these seemingly contradictory theoretical perspectives, the present study investigated panic symptomatology in a sample of patients with chronic shortness of breath (i.e. pulmonary patients). Past studies have shown an increased prevalence of panic in pulmonary patients, a finding that may be useful in elucidating panic etiology. The current sample of pulmonary patients (N = 28) confirmed previous reports of high prevalence rates of panic in this population. Based on self-report of panic symptomatology, a total of nine patients (32%) met DSM-IV criteria that were consistent with panic disorder. Multivariate comparison of participants with and without panic symptomatology revealed that panickers had significantly higher levels of anxiety, depression and agoraphobic cognitions. However, these groups showed no significant differences on physiological measures of pulmonary functioning. The authors conclude that dyspnea alone is inadequate in predicting panic development. High levels of panic symptomatology in pulmonary samples may reflect increased opportunities for these patients to misinterpret bodily sensations and, in particular, their pulmonary symptoms.     

Disjunctivism and skepticism

Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge.     

The catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder.

In the catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic Clark [Behav. Res. Ther. 24(1986)1461] proposes that panic attacks result from the misinterpretation of autonomic arousal stimuli as precursors to a physical or psychological emergency. The model has been widely examined, with many researchers suggesting that this specific cognitive bias is implicated in both the phenomenon of panic, and the aetiology and maintenance of panic disorder. Various research methodologies have provided only partial or inconclusive support for the model as being uniquely associated with panic, and as a cognitive process underpinning the experience of panic. This paper reviews the body of existing evidence and its implications for the model and proposes future research directions. The influence of implicit operational definitions of key terms in the catastrophic misinterpretation literature (e.g. 'catastrophe', 'threat', 'anxiety-related') are examined, and clarifications proposed. Inconsistencies and limitations in the measurement of catastrophic misinterpretation are highlighted, and subsequently developments to measurement instruments are proposed.     

The logical structure of Michael Williams's response to skepticism

This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti-skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses. According to the account developed here, this claim is misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that response.