Information relevance, working memory, and the consideration of alternatives

People routinely focus on one hypothesis and avoid consideration of alternative hypotheses on problems requiring decisions between possible states of the world--for example, on the “pseudodiagnosticity” task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979). In order to account for behaviour on such “inference” problems, it is proposed that people can hold in working memory, and operate upon, but one alternative at a time, and that they have a bias to test the hypothesis they think true. In addition to being an ex post facto explanation of data selection in inference tasks, this conceptualization predicts that there are situations in which people will consider alternatives. These are:

1. “action” problems, where the alternatives are possible courses of action;

2. “inference” problems, in which evidence favours an alternative hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested the first prediction. Subjects were given action or inference problems, each with two alternatives and two items of data relevant to each alternative. They received probabilistic information about the relation between one datum and one alternative and picked one value from among the other three possible pairs of such relations. Two findings emerged; (1) a strong tendency to select information about only one alternative with inferences; and (2) a strong tendency, compared to inferences, to select information about both alternatives with actions.

Experiment 2 tested the second prediction. It was predicted that data suggesting that one alternative was incorrect would lead many subjects to consider, and select information about, the other alternative. For actions, it was predicted that this manipulation would have no effect. Again the data were as predicted.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

Does it all go together when it goes? The nineteenth Bartlett memorial lecture

As groups of people age, the differences in the cognitive abilities of the most and least able become more extreme. This increase in between-individual variance is accompanied by an increase in within-individual variance: the difference between individuals' levels of performance on their best and least well retained skills. The implications of increasing between-individual variance are discussed in terms of the range of different factors that may affect cognitive ageing. Increases in within-individual variance are discussed in terms of differences betweeen “fluid” and “crystallized” abilities. The usefulness of this distinction and its functional implications are questioned. The hypothesis that age-related declines in “fluid” abilities are best modelled in terms of declines in a single factor is evaluated. Evidence is presented of disparate rates of decline, even of “fluid” cognitive abilities, such as performance on IQ tests, ability on information-processing tasks, and efficiency on memory tasks. Data from large-scale cross-sectional studies suggests that cognitive skills do not “all go together when they go”, but that there may, rather, be characteristic patterns, or syndromes, of cognitive ageing.     

Lowering of an auditory threshold by a near threshold warning signal

Following previous experiments on the effect of suprathreshold “warning” signals in lowering the threshold for stimuli in another modality, we have used visual “warning” signals which are themselves within the threshold range. These near threshold “warnings” appear to act in exactly the same way as suprathreshold “warnings” provided they are seen. Very weak “warnings” have a reduced effect, probably because they are not always seen. The experiment is of interest in that it supports the theory that the effect is due to the “warning” signal reducing the subject's uncertainty about when the threshold stimulus will occur, and secondly because it indicates that under these conditions at least, the subject can attend effectively to two simultaneous near-threshold stimuli.     

Speech—Language clinicians'' and university students'' impressions of women and girls who stutter

To identify impressions speech—language clinicians and university students have of females who stutter, a 47-scale semantic differential form was administered to members of each group to obtain their responses to eight hypothetical constructs, i.e., “A Girl,” “A Girl Who Stutters,” “A Boy,” “A Boy Who Stutters,” “A Woman,” “A Woman Who Stutters,” “A Man,” and “A Man Who Stutters.” Both groups were found to possess negative stereotypes for all four categories of stutterers. The nature of the stereotypes appeared to be influenced by a stutterer's gender and relative age. Clinicians considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on females and on children. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Girl Who Stutters.” University students considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on males. Their stereotypes of stutterers seemed unaffected by the relative age of the stutterer. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Man Who Stutters.” Several theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Divided attention, order of report and responses to immediately successive signals

Two effects, “divided-attention” and “order of report”, are operationally denned. Their relative contributions to the reduction in efficiency which accompanies the recognition of difficult nonverbal signals, presented simultaneously, is considered. Experiment I evaluated the two effects in the absence of a fixed order of report and emphasis instructions, confounding features of previous studies. The results showed: an overall impairment of performance with simultaneous signals; a contribution of both effects to the decrement, with a suggestion of the primacy of the “order of report” effect; and a significant interaction between the latter effect and modality, such that visual signals showed the greater effect. Experiment II using similar signals tested the assumption that simultaneity of presentation is a necessary condition for obtaining reduced efficiency with multiple signals. The assumption was only partially confirmed, a significant decrement in performance occurring only for the second of two successively presented signals. Similarities between the two sets of results are noted, as well as between these and modality differences obtained with verbal materials. Two possible accounts of the data are proposed, one based on “input”, the other on “storage” models of divided-attention. The hypothesis that subjects report the most clearly perceived signal first is rejected as an independent explanation.     

Adaptation to displaced vision: Reafference is a special case of the cue-discrepancy hypothesis

Subjects were exposed to a prismatically displaced view of their actively-moved right hand which was optically “stopped”; they achieved as much adaptation in this condition as in one in which they were allowed full “reafferent” stimulation. This provides further evidence against Held's “reafference“ hypothesis.     

The effect of orthographic structure and lexical meaning on “same-different” judgments

Pairs of high frequency English words, orthographically acceptable pseudo-words, and non-word letter strings were presented in a “same”-“different” task. The mean reaction times for “same” judgments were ordered; real words were faster than pseudo-words, and pseudo-words were faster than non-words. The RTs for the “different”, judgments showed no differences among the three types of words, except in the first two days of practice in a blocked presentation condition when the difference between the real words and non-words was marginally significant. These and other results suggest that “same” judgments are based upon a comparison process which efficiently uses higher order semantic and orthographic information in words, whereas “different” judgments are based upon comparison process which performs a self-terminating search of the graphemic information in words. The results were also discussed with reference to hierarchical models of word perception and reading.     

A study of the effect of structural information and familiarity in form perception

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the influence of structural information and familiarity on the processing of visual forms. Pairs of “well” structured and nameable and “poorly” structured and non-nameable fragmented forms were employed as stimuli. The effects of structure and familiarity were assessed by manipulating the visual hemifield of presentation and the task. In Experiment 1 stimuli were judged as being either in the same orientation or mirror-reversed, a task that does not require high-level semantic information to be processed. Experiment 2 required physically identical forms to be matched, which may use either physical or name information. In Experiment 1 “same” judgements were equivalent for both types of stimuli, and “different' judgements were longer for the “poorly” structured (non-nameable) forms. In Experiment 2 there was little overall difference between “well” and “poorly” structured forms, though response times to “well” structured (nameable) forms were slowed for right-visual-field presentations. It is suggested that familiarity may not be sufficient to provide a perceptual advantage for nameable forms, as the advantage for nameable stimuli was confined to “same” judgements in Experiment 1 and response times were shorter for non-nameable stimuli in Experiment 2. Rather, performance depends upon factors such as the computation of global shape (due to structural properties of collinearity and closure) and on the use of different kinds or representations (physical versus name) in matching.     

Discriminability and central intermittency in same-different judgements

Four sets of paired visual stimuli (OO, XX, XO, or OX) were judged by 48 subjects to be either “same” or “different.” Decision latencies of the same and different judgement were studied as a function of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). In Experiments I and II, in which stimulus durations were 70 millisec., decision latencies showed marked increases when the ISI was reduced to 100 millisec., but in Experiments III and IV, in which the stimulus durations were only 40 millisec., comparable increases did not occur until the ISI was reduced to 50 millisec. These increases were more marked for “same” than for “different” judgements, although overall decision latencies were generally shorter for “same” judgements. The effects of varying ISIs and stimulus durations are interpreted in terms of masking; they fail to support an hypothesis of central intermittency.     

The personality assessment system: A radical hypothesis

Two stories are presented. The first story is about a clinical practitioner developing an assessment method beginning with a connection of test “signs” with behavior, and proceeding to a system that could mystify observers. The second story is about the application of scientific methods to explain how the system could work. Together the stories are an example of practice informing science, and science informing practice. The basic hypothesis used is that much of what we call personality is “caused” by differential aptitudes as modified by long-term learning. It is also assumed that people would prefer to use those aptitudes they feel are their better ones and avoid those in which they feel weaker.     

On some limits of hypothetical thinking

Faced with extreme demands, hypothetical thinking runs the danger of total failure. Paradoxical propositions such as the Liar (“I am lying”) provide an opportunity to test it to its limits, while the Liar's nonparadoxical counterpart, the Truthteller (“I am telling the truth”), provides a useful comparison. Two experiments are reported, one with abstract materials (“If I am a knave then I live in Emerald City”) and one with belief-laden materials (a judge says: “If I am a knave then I enjoy pop music”). In both experiments, conditionals with Truthteller-type antecedents were “collapsed” to responses of conditional probability closely resembling estimates of control items. Liar-type antecedents, in contrast, dramatically weakened belief in conditionals in which they were embedded. The results are discussed in the framework of the theory of hypothetical thinking.     

Acoustic factors in visual search

Previous work has shown that in searching for existing or absent “e.s” in printed prose, the presence or absence of silent “e.s” was less likely to be detected than that of pronounced “e.s.” It was suggested that the acoustic or kinaesthetic “image” was searched for evidence of an “e” in addition to the visual stimulus and that evidence from both sources was considered in making the appropriate response.

The present experiment employs mainly substitutive errors within words, which may or may not change their pronunciation. The results suggest that the form of the acoustic correlates has no bearing upon whether the words are detected as wrongly spelt, but that the presence or absence of an acoustic event corresponding in time to the spatial location of the error is important.     

Perceptions of speakers with minimal eye contact: Implications for stutterers

One hundred and thirty-three college students responded to percentage definitions of “good,” “minimal,” and “no” eye contact. They also judged their perceptions of a speaker with “little or no eye contact” on a semantic differential scale containing 60 polarized adjective pairs regarding personality traits. The majority of the student respondents defined an individual with “good” eye contact as looking at his/her audience/listener 90–100% of the time. This is a more stringent definition than other literature has indicated. Furthermore, speakers with little or no eye contact were judged less favorably on 70% of the items, which indicates that low eye contact adversely affects perceptions of a speaker's personality. Therefore, stutterers need to be made aware of the importance of and determinants of effective eye contact in communication. Also, the development of effective eye contact needs to be incorporated as a major goal in stuttering therapy.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

The development of socialization skills in an electively mute child

In a booth designed especially for work with both autistic and electively mute children, a 4-yr-old girl named Dolly, who had no communicative speech or imitative skills, was given a preliminary session in which her verbal output was assessed. To elicit sounds from Dolly, an instrument called a “color organ” was used as a positive reinforcer. After this baseline assessment, in 40 half-hour sessions, Dolly was taught to make eye contact with E, and to obey instructions—although it was first necessary to extinguish her disruptive behavior, particularly her opérant crying. In addition, she learned non-verbal imitative behavior, such as hand clapping; and verbal imitative behavior, such as saying “Hi!” Social (play) sessions were begun after session 21, and continued for the remaining time. These were helpful in generalizing Dolly's learned skills to an environment other than the booth; and to other tasks, such as singing “Ee-eye-ee-eye-oh” in the refrain of the song, “Old McDonald”; and pointing to E's eyes, saying “ice”.     

Driye-leyel and flexibility in paired-associate nonsense-syllable learning

“High-anxiety” and “low-anxiety” subjects, selected for extreme scores on the Taylor Anxiety Scale, learned a list of paired-associate nonsense syllables in the belief that they were undergoing an intelligence test. Both groups were then given a second list of paired associates to learn, the stimulus-items being the same as those of the first list but the responses being changed. Before the presentation of the second list, half the subjects in each group were given anxiety-increasing instructions and the remaining half were given reassuring instructions.

The results verified two predictions made from Hull's behaviour theory, using the concept of fear or anxiety as a secondary drive:—“high anxiety” subjects took more trials to master the second learning task than “low-anxiety” subjects; and there was a significant interaction between initial anxiety-level and type of instructions, such that “high-anxiety” subjects who received drive-increasing instructions had a worse performance in the second part than all other sub-groups. There was no indication that “low-anxiety” subjects were significantly affected by the type of instructions received. The “high-anxiety” group had greater difficulty than the “low-anxiety” group in learning the first list, but the difference was non-significant.