A sharp image or a sharp knife: norms for the modality-exclusivity of 774 concept-property items

According to recent embodied cognition theories, mental concepts are represented by modality-specific sensory-motor systems. Much of the evidence for modality-specificity in conceptual processing comes from the property-verification task. When applying this and other tasks, it is important to select items based on their modality-exclusivity. We collected modality ratings for a set of 387 properties, each of which was paired with two different concepts, yielding a total of 774 concept-property items. For each item, participants rated the degree to which the property could be experienced through five perceptual modalities (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). Based on these ratings, we computed a measure of modality exclusivity, the degree to which a property is perceived exclusively through one sensory modality. In this paper, we briefly sketch the theoretical background of conceptual knowledge, discuss the use of the property-verification task in cognitive research, provide our norms and statistics, and validate the norms in a memory experiment. We conclude that our norms are important for researchers studying modality-specific effects in conceptual processing.     

Processing of perceptual information is more robust than processing of conceptual information in preschool-age children: evidence from costs of switching

Is processing of conceptual information as robust as processing of perceptual information early in development? Existing empirical evidence is insufficient to answer this question. To examine this issue, 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with a flexible categorization task, in which target items (e.g., an open red umbrella) shared category membership with one test item (e.g., a folded umbrella) and perceptual characteristics with another test item (e.g., a red mushroom). Participants were instructed to either categorize stimuli by the same dimension (i.e., perceptual similarity or category membership) in both phases of the task, or switch from categorizing by one dimension to categorizing by the other dimension. Results pointed to a strong asymmetry in switch costs: conceptual switch costs were higher than perceptual switch costs. These results suggest that processing of perceptual information remains more robust than processing of conceptual information at least until 5 years of age.     

Conceptual versus Perceptual Priming in Incomplete Picture Identification

This paper examined conceptual versus perceptual priming in identification of incomplete pictures by using a short-term priming paradigm, in which information that may be useful in identifying a fragmented target is presented just prior to the target’s presentation. The target was a picture that slowly and continuously became complete and the participants were required to press a key as soon as they knew what it was. Each target was preceded by a visual prime. The nature of this prime varied from very conceptual (e.g., the name of the picture’s category) to very perceptual (e.g., a similar-shaped pictorial prime from a different category). Primes also included those that combined perceptual and conceptual information (e.g., names or images of the target picture). Across three experiments, conceptual primes were effective while the purely perceptual primes were not. Accordingly, we conclude that pictures in this type of task are identified primarily by conceptual processing, with perceptual processing contributing relatively little.     

Verifying different-modality properties for concepts produces switching costs

According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be slower after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless, switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to the cost of switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.     

Sensory load incurs conceptual processing costs

Theories of grounded cognition propose that modal simulations underlie cognitive representation of concepts [Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(4), 577-660; Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645]. Based on recent evidence of modality-specific resources in perception, we hypothesized that verifying properties of concepts encoded in different modalities are hindered more by perceptual short-term memory load to the same versus different sensory modality as that used to process the property. We manipulated load to visual and auditory modalities by having participants store one or three items in short-term memory during property verification. In the high (but not low) load condition, property verification took longer when the property (e.g., yellow) involved the same modality as that used by the memory load (e.g., pictures). Interestingly, similar interference effects were obtained on the conceptual verification and on the memory task. These findings provide direct support for the view that conceptual processing relies on simulation in modality-specific systems.     

Modality-specific auditory and visual temporal processing deficits

We studied the attentional blink (AB) and the repetition blindness (RB) effects using an audio-visual presentation procedure designed to overcome several potential methodological confounds in previous cross-modal research. In Experiment 1, two target digits were embedded amongst letter distractors in two concurrent streams (one visual and the other auditory) presented from the same spatial location. Targets appeared in either modality unpredictably at different temporal lags, and the participants' task was to recall the digits at the end of the trial. We evaluated both AB and RB for pairs of targets presented in either the same or different modalities. Under these conditions both AB and RB were observed in vision, AB but not RB was observed in audition, and there was no evidence of AB or RB cross-modally from audition to vision or vice versa. In Experiment 2, we further investigated the AB by including Lag 1 items and observed Lag 1 sparing, thus ruling out the possibility that the observed effects were due to perceptual and/or conceptual masking. Our results support a distinction between a modality-specific interference at the attentional selection stage and a modality-independent interference at later processing stages. They also provide a new dissociation between the AB and RB.     

Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple—green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond—sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane—noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.     

Perceptual processing affects the reactivation of a sensory dimension during a categorization task

According to grounded theories of cognition, knowledge is grounded in its sensory-motor features. Therefore, perceptual and conceptual processing should be based on the same distributed system so that conceptual and perceptual processes should interact. The present study assesses whether gustatory stimulation (participants tasted a sweet or a nonsweet yoghurt) could influence performance on a categorization task that involves the reactivation of the same sensory dimension. The results indicate that participants were slower (Experiment 1) or faster (Experiment 2), respectively, at categorizing pictures as representing edible sweet stimuli when they either simultaneously or had previously tasted a sweet yoghurt as compared to a nonsweet yoghurt. These results confirm the significant overlap between perceptual and memory mechanisms and suggest the functional equivalence between perceptually present and perceptually absent (memory reactivated) dimensions.     

Modality switching costs emerge in concept creation as well as retrieval

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉的相互影响

通过3个实验探讨情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉是否存在相互影响, 以及加工深度对两者关系的影响。实验1采用情绪面孔启动范式, 探讨较深的情绪概念加工层面对情绪概念与情绪面孔的关系的影响。实验2更改概念任务, 探讨较浅的概念加工层面对两者关系的影响。实验3缩短启动面孔呈现时间, 探讨较浅的面孔知觉层面对两者关系的影响。通过研究主要得出以下结论：(1)情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉确实存在相互影响; (2)概念加工深度影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是单向的; (3)知觉加工深度也影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的知觉加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的知觉加工层面, 没有发现两者的相互影响。本研究为抽象概念的具身表征提供了实证支持。     

The prioritization of perceptual processing in categorization

In three experiments, the effects of selective attention on perceptual processes in a complex multidimensional object categorization task were investigated. In each experiment, participants completed a perceptual-matching task to gain estimates of the perceptual salience of each stimulus dimension, then a categorization task using the same stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 2, the perceptual processing of stimulus dimensions was faster when dimensions were more diagnostic of category membership, regardless of their perceptual salience. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this prioritization of perceptual processing was evident even when stimuli were presented in unpredictable locations during categorization, indicating that the physical characteristics of the stimulus guide selective attention to diagnostic stimulus dimensions.     

Attentional set interacts with perceptual load in visual search

In the present study, we examined the hypothesis that perceptual load is the primary factor that determines the efficiency of attentional selection. Participants performed a visual search task under conditions of high- and low-load. In line with the perceptual load hypothesis, presenting conditions of highand low-load in separate blocks of trials resulted in processing of to-be-ignored stimuli only in the lowload condition (Experiment 1). However when high- and low-load conditions were randomly mixed in blocks of trials, the participants showed processing of to-be-ignored stimuli in both conditions, suggesting that high perceptual load is not necessarily sufficient to obtain perceptual selectivity (Experiment 2). An analysis of intertrial transition effects showed that on high-load trials, processing of to-be-ignored stimuli occurred only when the previous trial was a low-load trial. The results suggest that low perceptual load can engender broad attentional processing. On the other hand, when a high-load trial was preceded by another high-load trial, little processing of task-irrelevant stimuli was observed. The present results are discussed in terms of the interaction between expectancies and bottom-up factors in the efficiency of attentional selection.     

Simultaneous auditory and tactile information processing

Subjects were required to perform perceptual tasks when stimuli were presented simultaneously in the auditory and tactile modalities and when they were presented in one of the modalities alone. The results indicated that when the demands on cognitive processes are small, auditory and tactile stimuli presented simultaneously can be processed as well as when stimuli are presented in only one modality. In a task which required a large amount of cognitive processing, it became difficult for subjects to maintain high levels of performance in both modalities and the distribution of attention became an important determinant of performance. The data were consistent with a theory that cognitive, but not perceptual, processing is disrupted when subjects have difficulty performing two perceptual tasks simultaneously.     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

Use of evidence in a categorization task: analytic and holistic processing modes

Category learning performance can be influenced by many contextual factors, but the effects of these factors are not the same for all learners. The present study suggests that these differences can be due to the different ways evidence is used, according to two main basic modalities of processing information, analytically or holistically. In order to test the impact of the information provided, an inductive rule-based task was designed, in which feature salience and comparison informativeness between examples of two categories were manipulated during the learning phases, by introducing and progressively reducing some perceptual biases. To gather data on processing modalities, we devised the Active Feature Composition task, a production task that does not require classifying new items but reproducing them by combining features. At the end, an explicit rating task was performed, which entailed assessing the accuracy of a set of possible categorization rules. A combined analysis of the data collected with these two different tests enabled profiling participants in regard to the kind of processing modality, the structure of representations and the quality of categorial judgments. Results showed that despite the fact that the information provided was the same for all participants, those who adopted analytic processing better exploited evidence and performed more accurately, whereas with holistic processing categorization is perfectly possible but inaccurate. Finally, the cognitive implications of the proposed procedure, with regard to involved processes and representations, are discussed.     

Conceptual and perceptual processing in prospective remembering

McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler, and Einstein (1998) recently reported findings in support of the proposal that prospective remembering is largely conceptually driven. In each of the three experiments they reported, however, the task in which the prospective memory target was encountered at test had a predominantly conceptual focus, thereby potentially facilitating retrieval of conceptually encoded features of the studied target event. We report two experiments in which we manipulated the dimension (perceptual or conceptual) along which a target event varied between study and test while using a processing task, at both study and test, compatible with the relevant dimension of target change. When the target was encountered in a sentence validity task at study and test, and the semantic context in which a target was encountered was changed between these two occasions, prospective remembering declined (Experiment 1). A similar decline occurred, using a readability rating task, when the perceptual context (font in which the word was printed) was altered (Experiment 2). These results indicate that both perceptual and conceptual processes can support prospective remembering.     

Perceptual load does not modulate auditory distractor processing

In vision, it is well established that the perceptual load of a relevant task determines the extent to which irrelevant distractors are processed. Much less research has addressed the effects of perceptual load within hearing. Here, we provide an extensive test using two different perceptual load manipulations, measuring distractor processing through response competition and awareness report. Across four experiments, we consistently failed to find support for the role of perceptual load in auditory selective attention. We therefore propose that the auditory system – although able to selectively focus processing on a relevant stream of sounds – is likely to have surplus capacity to process auditory information from other streams, regardless of the perceptual load in the attended stream. This accords well with the notion of the auditory modality acting as an ‘early-warning’ system as detection of changes in the auditory scene is crucial even when the perceptual demands of the relevant task are high.