Is Neo‐Republicanism Bad for Women?

The republican revival in political philosophy, political theory, and legal theory has produced an impressive range of novel interpretations of the historical figures of the republican tradition. It has also given rise to a variety of contemporary neo‐republican theories that build on its historical themes. Although there have been some feminist discussions of its historical representatives, neo‐republicanism has not generated a great deal of enthusiasm among feminists. The present paper examines Phillip Pettit's theory of freedom as nondomination in order to assess its potential usefulness for those with feminist goals. It defends Pettit's account of interpersonal domination from certain feminist objections, but argues that his account of state domination needs to be amended if it is fully to protect the interests of women and other groups.     

With respect to prejudice

The basic assumptions of psychotherapy must necessarily reflect the cultural orientations and dilemmas of the western societies, and historical periods, in which these originated. This paper considers how the racialised biases of that period, namely, the era of European domination built upon the conquest, colonisation and enslavement of non‐European peoples, may linger in psychotherapeutic training and practice today. This not only limits the potential usefulness of the discipline in the multicultural populations of the west, but also risks it being read as covert neo‐colonialism in the ‘non‐west’. In a world that ever more clearly demonstrates the human costs of prejudice psychotherapists in general, and Jungians in particular, might wish to consider how, wittingly or otherwise, they maintain prejudiced ways of thinking. This paper examines material from the author's professional and personal experience, using literature that lies outside the specifically Jungian canon, to expose how such bias might work.     

Do the “Eyes” Have It? A Program Evaluation of Jane Elliott's “Blue‐Eyes/Brown‐Eyes” Diversity Training Exercise1

The effectiveness of Jane Elliott's well‐known “blue‐eyes/brown‐eyes” exercise in reducing college students’ stereotyping and prejudice was assessed. College students were randomly assigned to either the exercise group or a comparison group. Blue‐eyed and brown‐eyed exercise participants were given discriminatory versus preferential treatment, respectively; a procedure purportedly designed to sensitize participants to the emotional and behavioral consequences of discrimination. Participation in the exercise was found to be associated with White students (a) indicating significantly more positive attitudes toward Asian American and Latino/Latina individuals, but only marginally more positive attitudes toward African American individuals; and (b) reporting anger with themselves when noticing themselves engaging in prejudiced thoughts or actions—negative affect that theoretically could prove to be either helpful or detrimental in promoting long‐term reduction of stereotyping and prejudice.     

But I'm No Bigot: How Prejudiced White Americans Maintain Unprejudiced Self‐Images

Four experiments investigate a modern paradox: White Americans harbor racial prejudice, but view themselves as unprejudiced. We hypothesized that social representations of prejudice available in American culture lead many Whites to conclude that they are relatively unprejudiced. In Experiment 1, participants primed with the bigot stereotype viewed themselves as less prejudiced. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants exposed to media representations of racists viewed themselves as less prejudiced. In Experiment 4, participants sought exposure to media representations of prejudice after a threat to their unprejudiced self‐image. These experiments suggest that representations of prejudice in American culture lead prejudiced individuals to view themselves as unprejudiced, and the effect of these representations on people's unprejudiced self‐images can be passive or intentional.     

Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses among Aversive Racists

Might a hypocrisy induction procedure reduce prejudicial behavior among aversive racists? We identified aversive racists as individuals low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice toward Asians. Results revealed that aversive racists, but not truly low prejudiced participants (i.e., those low in both explicit and implicit prejudice), responded to a hypocrisy induction procedure with increased feelings of guilt and discomfort, compared to those in a control condition. Furthermore, aversive racists, but not low prejudiced participants, responded to a hypocrisy induction procedure with a reduction in prejudicial behavior. These results suggest that consciousness raising might play an important role in motivating aversive racists to reduce their prejudicial behavior.     

The interplay of individual differences,norms, and group identification in predicting prejudiced behavior in online video game interactions

Despite the increasing popularity of video games and the diversity of people who play, prejudice remains common in online gaming. In the current study, we use structural equation modeling to test the role of social norms, individual differences, and gamer identification as predictors of how likely someone is to report engaging in prejudiced behavior while playing online video games. We also test the relative importance of these predictors to assess how likely people are to confront prejudice when it occurs in online video games. Participants (N = 384) completed a series of questionnaires to assess their attitudes and perceptions of online gaming norms, as well as to report their own prejudiced and confrontation behavior in video games. We found that both social norms and individual differences are significant predictors of behavior in online gaming. The more normative people report prejudice to be, the more they report making prejudiced comments. Similarly, the more normative confrontation of prejudice is reported to be, the more likely people are to report confronting prejudice. The more people endorsed generally prejudiced attitudes, the more likely they were to report making prejudiced remakes in online gaming and the less likely they were to report confronting prejudiced remarks. These results provide a foundation to inform interventions to reduce prejudice in gaming and indicate that both individual differences and norms are important to consider when designing interventions.     

Implicit motivation to control prejudice

This research examines whether spontaneous, unintentional discriminatory behavior can be moderated by an implicit (nonconscious) motivation to control prejudice. We operationalize implicit motivation to control prejudice (IMCP) in terms of an implicit negative attitude toward prejudice (NAP) and an implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced (BOP). In the present experiment, an implicit stereotypic association of Blacks (vs. Whites) with weapons was positively correlated with the tendency to “shoot” armed Black men faster than armed White men (the “Shooter Bias”) in a computer simulation. However, participants relatively high in implicit negative attitude toward prejudice showed no relation between the race-weapons stereotype and the shooter bias. Implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced had no direct effect on this relation, but the interaction of NAP and BOP did. Participants who had a strong association between self and prejudice (high BOP) but a weak association between prejudice and bad (low NAP) showed the strongest relation between the implicit race-weapons stereotype and the Shooter Bias, suggesting that these individuals freely employed their stereotypes in their behavior.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

Dispositions of the Will

According to Aquinas (1888–1906), the virtue of justice is a habit, that is to say, a stable disposition of the will. Many commentators have found this claim to be puzzling, since it is difficult to see what this might entail, beyond a simple tendency to choose and act in accordance with precepts of justice. However, this objection does not take account of the fact that for Aquinas, the will is the principle of human freedom, and as such, it is expressed through, but not limited to a capacity for particular choices and actions. It therefore needs stable dispositions, towards characteristic aims, in order to function effectively. This paper sets out a case for the cogency of Aquinas’s overall account of the will and its dispositions, by way of an examination of familiar expressions of human freedom which cannot be reduced to a series of individual choices and acts. It then turns to a closer examination of Aquinas’ analysis of the will, arguing that Aquinas’ claims about the orientation of the will towards some overarching and comprehensive good can fruitfully be understood in terms of this expansive conception of human freedom.     

Prejudice as Self‐Control Failure1

Research has suggested that whereas stereotypical attitudes may be automatically activated, the response to these stereotypes can be controlled. Anything that interferes with self‐control may result in more biased behavior. The ego strength model hypothesizes that after exerting self‐control, subsequent self‐control performance will suffer. Hence, depletion of ego strength may lead to increased prejudice. In 2 studies, depletion was found only to affect individuals who normally try to control their prejudicial responses. Participants who do not normally try to control their use of stereotypes were equally prejudiced, regardless of their level of ego strength. The results have implications for prejudice and stereotyping, as well as models of self‐control.     

Property and prejudice: How racial attitudes and social‐evaluative concerns shape property appraisals

Property evaluations rarely occur in the absence of social context. However, no research has investigated how intergroup processes related to prejudice extend to concepts of property. In the present research, we propose that factors such as group status, prejudice and pressure to mask prejudiced attitudes affect how people value the property of racial ingroup and outgroup members. In Study 1, White American and Asian American participants were asked to appraise a hand‐painted mug that was ostensibly created by either a White or an Asian person. Asian participants demonstrated an ingroup bias. White participants showed an outgroup bias, but this effect was qualified. Specifically, among White participants, higher racism towards Asian Americans predicted higher valuations of mugs created by Asian people. Study 2 revealed that White Americans' prejudice towards Asian Americans predicted higher valuations of the mug created by an Asian person only when participants were highly concerned about conveying a non‐prejudiced personal image. Our results suggest that, ironically, prejudiced majority group members evaluate the property of minority group members whom they dislike more favourably. The current findings provide a foundation for melding intergroup relations research with research on property and ownership.     

"Prejudiced" behavior without prejudice? Beliefs about the malleability of prejudice affect interracial interactions

Prejudiced behavior is typically seen as emanating from prejudiced attitudes. Eight studies showed that majority-group members' beliefs about prejudice can create seemingly "prejudiced" behaviors above and beyond prejudice measured explicitly (Study 1b) and implicitly (Study 2). Those who believed prejudice was relatively fixed, rather than malleable, were less interested in interracial interactions (Studies 1a-1d), race- or diversity-related activities (Study 1a), and activities to reduce their prejudice (Study 3). They were also more uncomfortable in interracial, but not same-race, interactions (Study 2). Study 4 manipulated beliefs about prejudice and found that a fixed belief, by heightening concerns about revealing prejudice to oneself and others, depressed interest in interracial interactions. Further, though Whites who were taught a fixed belief were more anxious and unfriendly in an interaction with a Black compared with a White individual, Whites who were taught a malleable belief were not (Study 5). Implications for reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Action and Variation in Perception

In her paper, ‘Action and Self‐location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know‐how. That, in turn, requires self‐locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and an agent, viz., someone who has a capacity for actions. She also makes two objections, viz., the unification objection and the sentient statue objection, to Alva Noë's sensorimotor view, a different account of how perceptual experience depends on actions. I will argue that her objections jointly render problematic not only Noë's but also her own view.     

Categorization and communication in the face of prejudice: when describing perceptions changes what is perceived

In the face of prejudice against an ingroup, common ground for communication exists when people use similar social categories to understand the situation. Three studies tested the hypothesis that describing perceptions of prejudice can fundamentally change those perceptions because communicators account for the common ground in line with conversational norms. When women (Study 1), African Americans (Study 2), and Americans (Study 3) simply thought about suspected prejudice against their ingroup, categorization guided their perceptions: Participants assimilated their views of the prejudiced event toward the perceptions of ingroup members but contrasted away from the perceptions of outgroup members. Conversely, when participants described their perceptions, they contrasted away from the given category information and actually arrived at the opposite perceptions as those who merely thought about the prejudiced event. Study 3 identified an important qualification of these effects by showing that they were obtained only when participants could assume their audience was familiar with the common ground. Implications are discussed for understanding the role of communication in facilitating and inhibiting collective action about prejudice.     

Developing an Understanding of Race Talk

The aim of this paper is to give an outline of the discursive psychological literature focussing on prejudice and race talk and to show how recent findings suggest a development in this understanding. The paper begins with an outline of the discursive approach and the way in which it conceptualises race talk. Next, an overview of the ways in which people attempt to make prejudicial arguments so as to prevent them from appearing to be prejudiced, because of a norm against prejudice, is presented. It is then shown how challenges are being made to this norm against prejudice so that in some cases, prejudice can be viewed as acceptable, and in others, the taboo against prejudice is presented as being discriminatory on the grounds of preventing freedom of speech and proper debate.     

In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1

Section 1 articulates a genus‐species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus‐species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus‐species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo‐Moorean response to skepticism.     

guilty until proven innocent: conviction orientation,racial attitudes,and support for capital punishment

A long-standing objection to the death penalty is that it has been applied disproportionately to African Americans. A more recent objection centers on concern that standards for selecting death qualified juries bias these juries in the favor of the prosecution. This research investigates the empirical connections between these two objections by analyzing the structure of attitudes and beliefs that connect support for the death penalty with attitudes suggesting racial prejudice on the one hand and a conviction-prone orientation on the other. Multivariate analysis of data from the 1990 and 1996 General Social Surveys suggest that those who are more likely to be allowed to serve on death penalty cases are not only more likely to harbor racially prejudiced attitudes, but also are more likely to favor the conviction of innocent defendants over letting guilty ones go free. The results also show punishment orientation to be influenced by a negative view of human nature and belief in a rigid adherence to law.     

Explanatory Roles for Minimal Content

A standard objection to so‐called ‘minimal semantics’ (Borg 2004, 2012, Cappelen and Lepore 2005) is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication (those making this objection include Levinson 2000, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004). This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and how we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio‐linguistic terms (resting on the degree of liability a speaker is held to have for linguistically conveyed content).     

Neo‐pragmatism,Representationalism and the Emotions

This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, but this need not be thought of in terms of a metaphysically heavyweight relation. In applying neo‐pragmatist techniques to the domain of the emotions, the result will be an alternative to currently popular accounts that individuate emotions partly in terms of what they represent. This alternative continues to allow us to use representational language in connection with some emotions. And it also helps to explain the awkwardness of representational talk in connection with other emotions: an awkwardness that was always a liability of monolithic representationalist views.     

Prejudiced People Perceive More Community Support for Their Views: The Role of Own,Media, and Peer Attitudes in Perceived Consensus

People often overestimate others' support for their views (false consensus effect). Recent research has shown that this is particularly marked in the relation between perceived consensus and prejudice. The current research asked whether this partly arises in an in‐group stereotype of the community as prejudiced. We investigated relations between different sources of normative information (self, media, peers), estimates of community attitudes, and perceived consensus in a sample of 135 community members. Media prejudice predicted community attitudes, and this further predicted consensus. However, strongest was a direct relation between own prejudice and perceived consensus. The results indicate a desire to appear nonprejudiced, relative to others. Confronting prejudiced people with information about community norms is a promising intervention under these circumstances.