Updating a progic

This paper presents a progic, or probabilistic logic, in the sense of Haenni et al. [8]. The progic presented here is based on Bayesianism, as the progic discussed by Williamson [15]. However, the underlying generalised Bayesianism differs from the objective Bayesianism used by Williamson, in the calibration norm, and the liberalisation and interpretation of the reference probability in the norm of equivocation. As a consequence, the updating dynamics of both Bayesianisms differ essentially. Whereas objective Bayesianism is based on a probabilistic re-evaluation, orthodox Bayesianism is based on a probabilistic revision. I formulate a generalised and iterable orthodox Bayesian revision dynamics. This allows to define an updating procedure for the generalised Bayesian progic. The paper compares the generalised Bayesian progic and Williamson's objective Bayesian progic in strength, update dynamics and with respect to language (in)sensitivity.     

How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist

Rational agents have (more or less) consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, and so in the remainder of the essay I offer an alternative account of how perceptual justification, as the Dogmatist understands it, can be incorporated into the Bayesian formalism.     

The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences

It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence (“incomplete” or “non‐specific” evidence), agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy‐centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy‐centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.     

We are All Bayesian,Everyone is Not a Bayesian

Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims. In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian reasoning. We suggest that acknowledging the potentiality of Bayesian statistics might contribute to clarify and improve comprehension of medical research. Nevertheless, despite Bayesianism may provide a better account for scientific inference with respect to the standard frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason lies in the supposed subjective elements characterizing this perspective. Hence, we discuss this objection presenting the so-called Reference analysis, a formal method which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statistics in order to define priors which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities. Furthermore, according to this method only available data are relevant sources of information, so that it resists the most common criticisms against Bayesianism.

     

Akrasia,instincts and revealed preferences

Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes’ and Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you’re unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based on the indifference principle. Later you learn how the game works and discover that the odds dictate you assign the very same credences. Examples like this show that if you initially have noreason to believe H, then intuitively E can give you reason to believe H even though Pr(H|E) ≤ Pr(H). I show that without the principle, the objections to dogmatism fail.     

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility (given her preferences). However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being (amongst other things) always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees of belief and full knowledge of all a priori truths. Ordinary subjects do not look very rational when compared to the kinds of agents usually talked about in decision theory. In this paper, I will develop an expected utility representation theorem aimed at the representation of those who are neither probabilistically coherent, logically omniscient, nor expected utility maximisers across the board—that is, agents who are frequently irrational. The agents in question may be deductively fallible, have incoherent credences, limited representational capacities, and fail to maximise expected utility for all but a limited class of gambles.     

How do individuals with Williams syndrome learn a route in a real‐world environment?

Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show a specific deficit in visuo‐spatial abilities. This finding, however, derives mainly from performance on small‐scale laboratory‐based tasks. This study investigated large‐scale route learning in individuals with WS and two matched control groups (moderate learning difficulty group [MLD], typically developing group [TD]). In a non‐labelling and a labelling (verbal information provided along the route) condition, participants were guided along one of two unfamiliar 1‐km routes with 20 junctions, and then retraced the route themselves (two trials). The WS participants performed less well than the other groups, but given verbal information and repeated experience they learnt nearly all of the turns along the route. The extent of improvement in route knowledge (correct turns) in WS was comparable to that of the control groups. Relational knowledge (correctly identifying spatial relationships between landmarks), compared with the TD group, remained poor for both the WS and the MLD group. Assessment of the relationship between performance on the large‐scale route‐learning task and that on three small‐scale tasks (maze learning, perspective taking, map use) showed no relationship for the TD controls, and only a few non‐specific associations in the MLD and WS groups.     

Syntactic Complexity Effects in Sentence Production: A Reply to MacDonald,Montag, and Gennari (2016)

In our article, “Syntactic complexity effects in sentence production” (Scontras, Badecker, Shank, Lim, & Fedorenko, 2015 ), we reported two elicited production experiments and argued that there is a cost associated with planning and uttering syntactically complex, object‐extracted structures that contain a non‐local syntactic dependency. MacDonald et al. ( 2016 ) have argued that the results of our investigation provide little new information on the topic. We disagree. Examining the production of subject versus object extractions in two constructions across two experimental paradigms—relative clauses in Experiment 1 and wh‐questions in Experiment 2—we found a strikingly similar pattern: reliable differences in latency and word durations, as well as in rates of disfluencies, signaling a greater cost associated with planning and uttering the syntactically more complex object extractions. MacDonald et al. reject that interpretation, namely that the differences we observed in the production of subject versus object extractions demonstrate asymmetric production difficulties. Here we address the concerns they raise by clarifying confusion and presenting novel experimental evidence in support of our original claims.     

Objective Bayesianism,Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification fails because diachronic Dutch book arguments are subject to a reductio: in certain circumstances one can Dutch book an agent however she changes her degrees of belief. One may also criticise objective Bayesianism on the grounds that its norms are not compulsory but voluntary, the result of a stance. It is argued that this second objection also misses the mark, since objective Bayesian norms are tied up in the very notion of degrees of belief.     

False memories in Lewy‐body disease

Recently, de Boysson, Belleville, Phillips et al. (2011) found that patients with Lewy‐body disease (LBD) showed significantly lower rates of false memories than healthy controls, using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) experimental procedure. Given that this result could be explained by the practically null rate of true recognition in the LBD group (0.09), we decided to replicate the study by de Boysson et al. (2011), but including a new condition that would maximize the true recognition rate (and analyze its effect on the rate of false memories). Specifically, in a DRM experiment, we manipulated (within subjects) two study and recognition conditions: in the “immediate” condition, both the LBD patients and the control group of healthy older people received a different recognition test after each study list (containing twelve words associated with a non‐presented critical word), while in the “delayed” condition (similar to the one in de Boysson et al., 2011), the participants received the entire series of study lists and then took only one recognition test. The results showed that, in both samples, the “immediate” condition produced higher corrected rates of both true and false recognition than the “delayed” condition, although they were both lower in the LBD patients, which shows that these patients are capable of encoding and recognizing the general similitude underlying information (gist memory) in the right conditions.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Productive procrastination: academic procrastination style predicts academic and alcohol outcomes

Productive procrastination replaces one adaptive behavior with another adaptive—albeit less important—behavior (e.g., organizing notes instead of studying for an exam). We identified adaptive and maladaptive procrastination styles associated with academic and alcohol outcomes in 1,106 college undergraduates. Cluster analysis identified five academic procrastination styles—non‐procrastinators, academic productive procrastinators, non‐academic productive procrastinators, non‐academic procrastinators, and classic procrastinators. Procrastination style differentially predicted alcohol‐related problems, cravings, risk of alcohol use disorders, and grade point average (all ps < .01). Non‐procrastination and academic productive procrastination were most adaptive overall; non‐academic productive procrastination, non‐academic procrastination, and classic procrastination were least adaptive. Productive procrastination differed from other procrastination strategies, and maladaptive procrastination styles may be a useful risk indicator for preventative and intervention efforts.     

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations,Belief Inertia,and Other Puzzles

The move to imprecise credence models leaves many formal norms of rationality surprisingly intact, as rational constraints on precise credences are often reinterpreted as constraints on individual elements of a rational agent’s representor. However, constraints on imprecise credences needn’t take this form. Whether an imprecise agent is rational might just as easily depend on global features of her representor. This paper is an extended investigation of global rules of rationality. I begin by distinguishing and defining multiple notions of globalness. Then I use these notions to solve several problems faced by fans of imprecise credences. On behalf of fans of imprecise credences, I respond to the problem of belief inertia, according to which certain imprecise agents are unable to engage in inductive learning. In addition, I answer the objection that that imprecise agents are doomed to violate the rational principle of Reflection.     

Factor structure and aetiological architecture of the BRIEF: A twin study

Executive function is a broad construct that encompasses various processes involved in goal‐directed behaviour in non‐routine situations (Banich, 2009). The present study uses a sample of 560 5‐ to 16‐year‐old twin pairs (M = 11.14, SD = 2.53): 219 monozygotic twin pairs (114 female; 105 male) and 341 dizygotic twin pairs (136 female, 107 male; 98 opposite sex) to extend prior literature by providing information about the factor structure and the genetic and environmental architecture of the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia et al., 2000, Child Neuropsychol., 6, 235; Gioia et al., 2000, Behavior rating inventory of executive function, Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources), a multifaceted rating scale of everyday executive functions. Phenotypic results revealed a 9‐scale, 3‐factor model best represents the BRIEF structure within the current sample. Results of the genetically sensitive analyses indicated the presence of rater bias/contrast effects for the Initiate, Working Memory, and Task‐Monitor scales. Additive genetic and non‐shared environmental influences were present for the Initiate, Plan/Organize, Organization of Materials, Shift, and Monitor and Self‐Monitor scales. Influences on Emotional Control were solely environmental. Interestingly, the aetiological architecture observed was similar to that of performance‐based measures of executive function. This observed similarity provided additional evidence for the usefulness of the BRIEF as a measure of ‘everyday’ executive function.     

Driving aggression in forensic and non‐forensic populations: Relationships to self‐reported levels of aggression,anger and impulsivity

A series of four questionnaires — the Buss‐Perry Aggression Questionnaire (AQ), the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS‐11), the Driving Anger Scale (DAS) and a Driving Violence Inventory (DVI) — were administered to a sample of 473 British drivers consisting of undergraduates (N=185), members of the public (N=106) and offenders (N=182) serving sentences in closed prisons in England (violent=82, non‐violent=100). Offenders consistently rated acts of driving aggression as less severe compared with other drivers. Offender attributions of driving violence differed to other drivers in that they were equally likely to perceive obscene gesturing as high or low intensity responses; they also viewed assault as a high intensity response whereas members of the public rated it more severely. Trait levels of anger and aggression were the predictors of driving violence in all groups but previous aggressive behaviour was only a predictor for the offenders. Gender and age were found to be predictors of aggressive driving in non‐offenders. Even with the effects of age controlled, offenders (and violent offenders in particular) scored higher on measures of driving anger and aggression. These data suggest that offenders differ in their perceptions of aggressive behaviours experienced in everyday driving and as a consequence are more likely to commit acts that other drivers perceive as violent. As offenders are known to display similar perceptual biases in other domains, identified as precursors to their aggressive behaviour, it seems likely that experience effects (as reflected in the trait measures) underpin differences in driving aggression between offenders and non‐offenders.     

Influences on Member Assimilation in Workgroups in High‐Reliability Organizations: A Multilevel Analysis

This multilevel investigation examined the effect of group interaction and its influence on individual‐level membership variables and group assimilation. The study is based on a model of group socialization developed by Moreland and Levine (1982) and was modified in this study to investigate the development and maintenance of highly interdependent workgroups in a high‐reliability organization: a municipal fire department. Using hierarchical linear modeling, we examined individual‐ and crew‐level influence on four assimilation outcomes: involvement, trustworthiness, commitment, and acceptance. At the individual level, acculturation predicted all the four assimilation outcomes. Involvement also was a predictor of the latter sequences of assimilation: commitment and acceptance. The study also found that one crew‐level variable—crew performance—affected and modified the influence of tenure, proactivity, involvement, acculturation, and trust on members’ commitment. Implications are offered for the influence of group interaction on member assimilation and support for continuing group‐level research on assimilation. This study also underscores the utility of multilevel analysis in examining communication at the interpersonal and group levels.     

A general proof of consistency of heuristic classification for cognitive diagnosis models

The Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis (Chiu et al., 2009, Psychometrika, 74, 633–665) determined the conditions that cognitive diagnosis models must satisfy so that the correct assignment of examinees to proficiency classes is guaranteed when non‐parametric classification methods are used. These conditions have only been proven for the Deterministic Input Noisy Output AND gate model. For other cognitive diagnosis models, no theoretical legitimization exists for using non‐parametric classification techniques for assigning examinees to proficiency classes. The specific statistical properties of different cognitive diagnosis models require tailored proofs of the conditions of the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis for each individual model – a tedious undertaking in light of the numerous models presented in the literature. In this paper a different way is presented to address this task. The unified mathematical framework of general cognitive diagnosis models is used as a theoretical basis for a general proof that under mild regularity conditions any cognitive diagnosis model is covered by the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis.     

Posterior predictive checks can and should be Bayesian: Comment on Gelman and Shalizi, ‘Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics’

Bayesian inference is conditional on the space of models assumed by the analyst. The posterior distribution indicates only which of the available parameter values are less bad than the others, without indicating whether the best available parameter values really fit the data well. A posterior predictive check is important to assess whether the posterior predictions of the least bad parameters are discrepant from the actual data in systematic ways. Gelman and Shalizi (2012a) assert that the posterior predictive check, whether done qualitatively or quantitatively, is non‐Bayesian. I suggest that the qualitative posterior predictive check might be Bayesian, and the quantitative posterior predictive check should be Bayesian. In particular, I show that the ‘Bayesian p‐value’, from which an analyst attempts to reject a model without recourse to an alternative model, is ambiguous and inconclusive. Instead, the posterior predictive check, whether qualitative or quantitative, should be consummated with Bayesian estimation of an expanded model. The conclusion agrees with Gelman and Shalizi regarding the importance of the posterior predictive check for breaking out of an initially assumed space of models. Philosophically, the conclusion allows the liberation to be completely Bayesian instead of relying on a non‐Bayesian deus ex machina. Practically, the conclusion cautions against use of the Bayesian p‐value in favour of direct model expansion and Bayesian evaluation.     

The Absence of Multiple Universes of Discourse in the 1936 Tarski Consequence-Definition Paper

This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page 1936 Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework—like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as ‘the class of all individuals’. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework—like the 1931 Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework recognizes multiple universes of discourse serving as different ranges of the individual variables in different interpretations—as in post-WWII model theory. In the early 1960s, many logicians—mistakenly, as we show—held the ‘contrary alternative’ that Tarski 1936 had already adopted a Gödel-type, pluralistic, multiple-universe framework. We explain that Tarski had not yet shifted out of the monistic, Frege–Russell, fixed-universe paradigm. We further argue that between his Principia-influenced pre-WWII Warsaw period and his model-theoretic post-WWII Berkeley period, Tarski's philosophy underwent many other radical changes.