Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma

In a series of influential essays, Sharon Street has argued, on the basis of Darwinian considerations, that normative realism leads to skepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that if we begin with the account of moral knowledge provided by Aristotelian naturalism, then we can offer a satisfactory realist response to Street’s argument, and that Aristotelian naturalism can avoid challenges facing other realist responses. I first explain Street’s evolutionary argument and three of the most prominent realist responses, and I identify challenges to each of those responses. I then develop an Aristotelian response to Street. My core claim is this: Given Aristotelian naturalism’s account of moral truth and our knowledge of it, we can accept the influence of evolutionary processes on our moral beliefs, while also providing a principled, non-question-begging reason for thinking that those basic evaluative tendencies that evolution has left us with will push us toward, rather than away from, realist moral truths, so that our reliably getting things right does not require an unexplained and implausible coincidence.     

Must the Scientific Realist be a Rationalist?

Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen’s primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an “inferential wand” must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the empirically-minded realist as either disjunct leads to unwanted consequences. In this paper, I split the horns of this dilemma by arguing that the realist can justify one particular such mode of inference – abduction – without committing himself to rationalism. The realist may justify this mode of inference by appealing to the analytic a priori axioms of the probability calculus. I show that Peter Lipton’s tripartite defense of abduction constitutes such a method of justification.     

Must an Educated Being Be a Human Being?

This paper argues that an educated being logically does not have to be a human. Philosophers analyzing the concept of education have reached a consensual notion of the matter; but in applying that idea, they have barely discussed whether or not human beings are the only entities that may be educated. Using their notion as the core of a heuristic conception of education, this paper attempts to show that in some contexts it might make sense to predicate education of certain non-human entities. In addition, the paper examines the place of beliefs, reflective intelligence, practical thinking, and feelings in education. It concludes by discussing its implications for educational theory and practice and for the connections between the educated being and personhood and the right to education.

Must naive realists be relationalists?

Relationalism maintains that perceptual experience involves, as part of its nature, a distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be upheld without a commitment to relationalism.     

Must overlearned lists be scanned?

Ss were presented given names as test items and asked either to indicate whether each test name was a member of a previously memorized list of names or whether each test name was the name of one of their siblings. The data indicated that the memorized hst of names was scanned in a serial fashion but that (disregarding the case where S had just one sibling) S did not have to scan the list of his own siblings’ names to decide about a test name.     

Must boxing verdicts be biased?

A model of judgment made by sports judges is outlined. Its main assumptions are as follows. (1) From the beginning a judge tries to form a hypothesis about which of the two competitors should be awarded the victory. (2) The advantages of both competitors are assessed, and these values are changed according to successive observations. (3) However, the meanings assigned to successive actions are not impartial: the greater the initial advantage of one competitor, the more his gains are enhanced and his losses de-emphasized. Both statistical analysis of judgments made at a boxing championship and in a special experiment with boxing judges revealed several regularities which seem to fit the outlined model, including a pervasive primacy effect. This effect seems to be a consequence of early preselection of the potential winner and a subsequent one-sided processing of sequentially presented information. Possible ways of avoiding partiality in boxing assessments are briefly discussed.     

Must All be Saved? A Kierkegaardian Response to Theological Universalism

In this paper, I consider how a Kierkegaardian could respond critically to the question of strong theological universalism, i.e., the belief that all individuals must eventually be reconciled to God and experience everlasting happiness. A Kierkegaardian would likely reject what Thomas Talbott has called “conservative theism,” but has the resources to mount a sustained attack on the view that all individuals must experience everlasting happiness. Some have seen that Kierkegaard has some potential in this regard, but a full Kierkegaardian response to strong theological universalism has yet to be given. In this paper, I give such an account. That God could create beings free over against himself is the cross which philosophy could not bear but upon which it has remained hanging. – Kierkegaard     

Must new worlds also be Good?

The activities analysed by Spinosa et al., viz entrepreneurship, citizen action, and cultural leadership, are all central to the American experience. They have a common phenomenological structure and a common purpose, which is to ‘disclose new worlds’, i.e. so to reconfigure the collective perceptions as to bring about ‘large‐scale cultural and historical changes’. Each, more or less unselfconsciously, is an exercise of skill, an expression of freedom, and a building of solidarity through the recovery or discovery of human meanings. I argue that unless we know the ends to which skill and freedom tend, and in which meaning is found, all three (which the authors treat rather as ends in themselves) are underdescribed, and impossible to see as possessing or conferring value simply per se. The same goes for the original three activities. Cultural leadership, citizen action, and entrepreneurship can work as easily towards bad ends as good. To see them as virtual ends in themselves, then, is premature, and a kind of formalism.     

Who wants to be a psychologist?

Every significant piece of public policy, every important generalization in history, economics, political science, and sociology depends on (largely unevaluated) assumptions about human nature. Personality psychology concerns the nature of human nature; it is, therefore, concerned with one of the most powerful and dangerous forces on earth. Developing adequate methods for conceptualizing human nature and forecasting significant components of social behavior-for example, integrity, creativity, leadership-would seem to be a matter of real urgency. Nonetheless, personality psychology has a minor and marginal status in academic psychology. I have spent my career trying to understand the origins of human behavior, trying to develop measurement models for capturing key elements of social performance, and trying to defend the study of personality against the complaints of a seemingly endless supply of academic critics.     

Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?

Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q (as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then rational differential dubitability does not presuppose that differences in cognitive value are transparent. The significance of this argument lies in what it tells us, both about the notion of cognitive value and its relation to the differential dubitability test, but also about the prospects for a Burge-type position which aims to combine attitude anti-individualism with a (qualified) reliance on the differential dubitability test.

Must a hermeneutical psychoanalysis exclude science?

The work on this article was made possible in part by a grant to all three authors from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (410-91-0422) and a St. Paul University research award. All three authors contributed equally to the text. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Division of Psychoanalysis of the American Psychological Association annual meeting, August 1990. We are grateful to James Pambrun, Ph.D., Ted O'Grady, and Bertram P. Karon, Ph.D. for their advice and encouragement. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul Rigby, St. Paul University, 223 Main St. E., Ottawa, Ont, Canada K1S 1C4.     

What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?

In a recent paper, 'On the Persistence of Phenomenology' (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience , Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the core thought shared by many of the friends of qualia, namely, that our conceptual resources are inadequate for capturing the richness of experience. Experience is ineffably determinate. Moreover, Raffman's argument in support of this thought seems especially embarrassing to scientific-minded materialists, since the argument relies largely on well established empirical facts. We show, however, that Raffman's argument fails. So, if we are correct that her argument highlights what is tempting about qualia, then we have also shown that it is not tempting.     

Should there be a duty to report crime?

A number of studies have examined why people do or do not respond when they observe criminal activities. Traditionally, the legal system has not punished the failure to report a crime. This study sought to ascertain whether a sample of college students and public citizens thought there should be legal punishments for the failure to report crimes. Respondents (N = 301) were presented a list of illegal acts and asked to select from a list (no punishment, fine, or prison sentences) what type of punishment should be enforced for failure to report that crime. Analysis indicated that the sample thought there should be punishments for most of the crimes, with a fine as the modal response. For more serious crimes, more serious punishments were selected, and there were some sex differences. It appeared that public support for such laws might be strong.     

When does being paid an hourly wage make it difficult to be a happy volunteer?

When people willingly volunteer their time, how does the salience of the opportunity costs of their time influence their experience of the activity? Study 1 uses the American Time Use Survey Well-Being module to examine whether the subjective experience of happiness while volunteering is influenced by how people are paid and the opportunity costs of their time spent volunteering. Among hourly paid workers for whom there is a salient heuristic for the opportunity costs of time, we found that higher opportunity costs of time as indicated by income and duration of the activity were associated with diminished happiness experienced during volunteering. No differences across income and duration emerged among non-hourly workers for whom there was not a salient heuristic for the opportunity costs of time. Using a student population who all volunteered for the same charity activity, Study 2 tested whether making the opportunity costs salient caused less happiness to be reported from the activity than those in the control condition. These studies contribute to our understanding of the psychological consequences of thinking about time in terms of money and how it may influence the hedonic experience of activities people choose to undertake in the applied context of volunteering.