Are My Temporal Parts Agents?

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub-personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me-in-my-twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action.     

Imagery and Motor Processes — When Are They Connected? The Mental Rotation of Body Parts in Development

Motor influences on the mental transformation of body parts have been observed in both children and adults. Previous findings indicated that these influences were more pronounced in children than in adults, suggesting a stronger link between motor processes and imagery in children. The present series of two experiments casts doubt on the general validity of such an interpretation. Kindergartners' (aged 5–6 years), first graders' (aged 7 years), and adults' performance in the mental rotation of pictures of body parts was monitored for influences of internal representations of motor constraints (motor effect). In both experiments, evidence for mental rotation was obtained for each group. Unexpectedly, kindergarten boys made significantly more errors than kindergarten girls. A motor effect was only found in the second experiment, where it was least pronounced in the youngest age group. Our results suggest that mental transformations of body parts do not necessarily involve motor processes and that embodiment may become stronger with development rather than weaker with certain tasks.     

The face inversion effect—Parts and wholes: Individual features and their configuration

The face inversion effect (FIE) is a reduction in recognition performance for inverted faces (compared to upright faces) that is greater than that typically observed with other stimulus types (e.g., houses). The work of Diamond and Carey, suggests that a special type of configural information, “second-order relational information” is critical in generating this inversion effect. However, Tanaka and Farah concluded that greater reliance on second-order relational information did not directly result in greater sensitivity to inversion, and they suggested that the FIE is not entirely due to a reliance on this type of configural information. A more recent review by McKone and Yovel provides a meta-analysis that makes a similar point. In this paper, we investigated the contributions made by configural and featural information to the FIE. Experiments 1a and1b investigated the link between configural information and the FIE. Remarkably, Experiment 1b showed that disruption of all configural information of the type considered in Diamond and Carey's analysis (both first and second order) was effective in reducing recognition performance, but did not significantly impact on the FIE. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that face processing is affected by the orientation of individual features and that this plays a major role in producing the FIE. The FIE was only completely eliminated when we disrupted the single feature orientation information in addition to the configural information, by using a new type of transformation similar to Thatcherizing our sets of scrambled faces. We conclude by noting that our results for scrambled faces are consistent with an account that has recognition performance entirely determined by the proportion of upright facial features within a stimulus, and that any ability to make use of the spatial configuration of these features seems to benefit upright and inverted normal faces alike.     

The Zeigarnik effect and intrinsic motivation: Are they the same?

The present study focused on delineating the parameters under which intrinsic motivation leads an individual to reengage an activity from those that result in the Zeigarnik effect. In a posttask free-choice period, participants not completing the experimental task displayed more reengagement behavior than participants completing the task (the Zeigarnik effect). When participants were also provided self-efficacious performance feedback via a prearranged competitive outcome manipulation, there was no evidence of the Zeigarnik effect, while there was support for intrinsic motivation from competent self-efficacious performance feedback. Results were discussed in terms of distinguishing between intrinsic motivation and the Zeigarnik effect as sources of reengagement motivation. It was concluded that, in the presence of self-efficacious performance feedback, the competent-incompetent impression was more salient than task-completion feedback.Preparation of this article was supported by Texas Christian University grant TCU/RF 5-23757.     

Are The Very Happy Too Happy?

Although positive emotions undoubtedly confer benefits, one can have too much of it. There is probably a point beyond which enjoyment interferes with realism, yet it is unclear where that point is. The original States of Mind (SOM) model (Schwartz and Garamoni, 1986; 1989) proposed that a ratio of [positive] to [positive plus negative] affective/cognitive states [P/(P+N)] of about 0.62 is optimal, but previous research indicated that higher ratios may go with good mental health. The revised balanced states of mind (BSOM) model (Schwartz, 1997) suggests a higher cutoff, with ratios above 0.90 being dysfunctional. This paper reports a study of 72 very positive subjects (mean ratio = 0.85) and assessed possible dysfunction by means of questionnaires, role-plays, and physiological responses to induced stress. Signs of dysfunction were no more frequent among the most positive subjects (ratios of 0.90 and above) than among moderately positive subjects. This suggests that there is nothing wrong with the high levels of happiness in present day society. As yet, it is still not established how much more happiness will be too much. One possibility is that standard cognition/emotion measures need to be revised in order to detect truly excessive positivity in a sensitive manner.     

Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?

In a number of influential papers, Hartry Fieldhas advanced an account of truth and referencethat we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disquotationand facts about what constitute a goodtranslation into our language. Field suggeststhat we might view quasi-disquotationalism aseither (a) an analysis of our ordinarytruth-theoretic concepts of reference andtruth, or (b) an account of certain otherconcepts that improve upon our ordinaryconcepts. In this paper, I argue that (i) ifthe view is understood along the lines of (a)it fails, and (ii) if it is construed along thelines of (b) it is, at best, under-motivated.     

Are Feminism and Competition Compatible?

Contemporary feminist interest in the persistent underrepresentation of women in top professions suggests an implicit approval of the competition required to achieve these posts. Competition, however, seems to be in tension with feminist opposition to domination and oppression. This paper outlines the dimensions of this tension and examines three attempts to resolve the incompatibility. The first two try to separate the undesirable elements of competition from the positive by way of the competitiveness/competition and the challenge/scarcity distinctions. I argue that these distinctions fail to alleviate worries about competition, particularly in the context of the professions. Meanwhile, the third reconciliatory attempt offers a pragmatic argument for compatibilism based on the value of women's participation in the professions (and their associated competitions). Although this pragmatic argument has some merit, I argue that it significantly overestimates the amount of competition acceptable for feminist participation. The end result is that, within the context of the professions, competition remains fundamentally in tension with feminism.     

Are risk preferences consistent?: The influence of decision domain and personality

This paper examines the consistency of risk preferences across three decision domains important in most people’s lives: work, health and personal finance. We consider the degree to which the five factor model of personality and a range of factors that influence risk-related decision-making (perceived risk, framing, emotions and cost–benefit analysis) impact upon cross-domain consistency. Data were gathered from a sample of participants for whom approaches to risk were likely to vary (academics, chess players, firefighters, mountaineers and City traders). The results showed that participants could be categorised into two groups: those who were consistent in their risk preferences in three decision domains, and those who were inconsistent or domain-specific. The consistent group was significantly lower on neuroticism and higher on agreeableness and conscientiousness with a less variable approach to weighing up the costs and benefits of taking risks than the inconsistent group. The majority of the consistent group was risk averse.When the domain-specific risk preferences of the inconsistent group were examined, data showed that different combinations of personality and decision-making factors predicted risk preferences within each domain.     

‘Mutual Obligation’ and ‘New Deal’: Illegitimate and Unjustified?

It is now commonplace for governments in Western countries to require the unemployed to work in exchange for their unemployment benefits. In this article I raise some serious doubts about the most promising and philosophically interesting defence of this argument, which relies on the ‘principle of reciprocity’. I argue that it is seriously unclear whether the obligations imposed on welfare claimants by ‘workfare’ schemes are legitimate and justified according to the principle of reciprocity. I do this by reconstructing the arguments for the obligations of the unemployed put forward in both the United Kingdom and Australia.     

How Alluring Are Dark Personalities? The Dark Triad and Attractiveness in Speed Dating

Dark Triad traits (narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) are linked to the pursuit of short‐term mating strategies, but they may have differential effects on actual mating success in naturalistic scenarios: Narcissism may be a facilitator for men's short‐term mating success, while Machiavellianism and psychopathy may be detrimental. To date, little is known about the attractiveness of Dark Triad traits in women. In a speed‐dating study, we assessed participants' Dark Triad traits, Big Five personality traits, and physical attractiveness in N = 90 heterosexual individuals (46 women and 44 men). Each participant rated each partner's mate appeal for short‐ and long‐term relationships. Across both sexes, narcissism was positively associated with mate appeal for short‐ and long‐term relationships. Further analyses indicated that these associations were due to the shared variance among narcissism and extraversion in men and narcissism and physical attractiveness in women, respectively. In women, psychopathy was also positively associated with mate appeal for short‐term relationships. Regarding mating preferences, narcissism was found to involve greater choosiness in the rating of others' mate appeal (but not actual choices) in men, while psychopathy was associated with greater openness towards short‐term relationships in women. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem

Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.     

Is `Property' Necessary? On Owning the Human Body and its Parts

Courts usually treat control over human bodies and body parts as a property issue and find that people do not have property rights in themselves. This contradicts the liberal philosophical principle that people should be able to perform any self-regarding actions that do not cause harm to others. The philosophical inconsistencies under pinning the legal treatment of body parts arguably stem from a misplaced judicial preoccupation with‘property’. A better approach would be to hold a policy inquiry into the degree of liberty a society wishes to grant its inhabitants. Only once this substantive issue has been addressed should property be raised as a possible method of implementing the policy. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Are Events and Affordances Commensurate Terms?

In this article, I argue that the dichotomy between events and affordances as Stoffregen (target article, this issue) devises is unwarranted and potentially misleading. I challenge the notion that the role of the actor distinguishes events from affordances in any useful way. The research labeled event perception is neither less ecological nor qualitatively different from research on affordances. Instead, the main distinction is constituted by affordance being a perceptual property, whereas event pertains to a different semantic category. Nonetheless, the contemplation of these concepts, in particular an elaboration of the concept of affordance, is desperately needed.     

Are Science and Religion in Conflict?

The widely held legend of historical conflict between science and religion cannot be sustained on the basis of research. Different sciences show different relationships to religion; the physical sciences show rapprochement, whereas the human sciences often are antagonistic to religion. Reconciling science and religion by regarding each as applicable to a different domain is rejected in favor of seeing them as complementary perspectives on the same phenomena. The science and theology of human nature represents a fruitful arena for the development of this approach. A key general requirement is the epistemological reconciliation of science and religion.