After Moral Error Theory,After Moral Realism

Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral properties, and that no such properties exist. After error theory is established, abolitionism is one potential way to proceed. However, many error theorists suggest that we retain moral discourse as a sort of fiction. I evaluate some attractions of both fictionalism and abolitionism, arguing that abolitionism is a plausible position. No one doubts that error theorists can be abolitionists. However, what has gone largely undiscussed is that it is open to others to be abolitionists as well. I argue that moral realists of a metaphysically robust sort can and perhaps should be abolitionists. ‘Realist abolitionism’ makes for a surprisingly neat theoretical package, and I conclude that it represents an interesting new option in the theoretical landscape.     

Abolishing Morality

Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking. After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists and moral fictionalists have always cherished.

Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.     

Effects of situational demand in the role-play assessment of assertive behavior

Assertive and nonassertive subjects role played responses to interpersonal situations of known response difficulty in which various types of assertions were appropriate to evaluate the interactive effects of demand and difficulty on assertive performance. Subjects responded as they normally would (low demand) and as if they had just finished an extensive assertive training program (high demand). Role-play data, rated for overall assertion, revealed that (a) subjects were more assertive under high than low-demand; (b) assertive performance varied with situational difficulty; and (c) self-reports of assertive ability predicted behavior only when role-play situations were easy or demand low, and high demand had preceded low demand. It was concluded that assertive performance is strongly influenced by situational and cognitive variables, that self-reports predict behavior only in specific assessment circumstances, and that role plays tend to measure maximal, rather than typical, performance. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications concerning the validity of role-play assessment procedures.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual convention of the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Toronto, Canada, November 1981.     

The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences,moral norms,and preferences for inaction: Time,moral judgments,and the CNI model

It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.     

A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations

Some moral realists claim that moral facts are a species of natural fact, amenable to scientific investigation. They argue that these moral facts are needed in the best explanations of certain phenomena and that this is evidence that they are real. In this paper I present part of a biological account of the function of morality. The account allows the identification of a plausible natural kind that could play the explanatory role that a moral kind would play in naturalist realist theories. It is therefore a candidate for being the moral kind. I argue, however, that it will underdetermine the morally good, that is, identifying the kind is not sufficient to identify what is good. Hence this is not a natural moral kind. Its explanatory usefulness, however, means that we do not have to postulate any further (moral) facts to provide moral explanations. Hence there is no reason to believe that there are any natural moral kinds.     

Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts to reconcile the tension between the self-interested account of moral behaviour and the affective capacity for morality by showing that the latter could develop from the former without violating the constraints of instrumental rationality. I argue, first, that his account is incomplete and assumes what it has to demonstrate; and, second, that this cannot be remedied with any plausibility. Finally, I argue that Gauthier covertly relies on a substantive claim about human good that is inconsistent with the instrumental conception of reason. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.     

论道德相对性及其道德实践意义——兼析道德相对主义

道德相对性表现为道德准则规范具有具体性、差异性和不确定性.道德相对性中渗透了道德绝对性即存在普遍的、共同的、不变的道德价值.道德相对主义的错误在于夸大相对性而否定了绝对性.但道德相对主义基于道德相对性的某些主张有一定的合理性.正确理解道德相对性在道德实践中有重要意义.个体道德自主性的提高,既要把握绝对的道德价值观念,同时需要把握道德的相对性以提高具体情境中道德判断和选择能力.     

Evolutionary debunking: Can moral realists explain the reliability of our moral judgments?

Evolutionary debunking arguments, notably Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006), allege that moral realists need to explain the reliability of our moral judgments, given their evolutionary sources. David Copp (2008) and David Enoch (2010) take up the challenge. I argue on empirical grounds that realists have not met the challenge and moreover cannot do so. The outcome is that there are empirically-motivated reasons for thinking moral realists cannot explain moral reliability, given our current empirical understanding.     

Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument

The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic alternative.     

How does culture shape our moral identity? Moral foundations in Saudi Arabia and Britain

North American measures of moral identity (MI) assume that caring and fairness are the most prototypical features of morality. Moral foundations theory describes such individualising foundations of morality as dominant in individualist cultures and binding foundations of morality as more particular to collectivist cultures. We weighed the criticism that moral identity scales are guilty of “liberal ethnocentrism” in two studies drawing on participants in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Only individualising traits were prototypical of concepts of moral people in Britain, while individualising and binding traits were both prototypical of such concepts in Saudi Arabia (Study 1, N = 160). In Study 2 (N = 539), participants completed the moral identity scale following typical instructions that referred to the prototypical traits of one of five moral foundations. Overall MI scores were lower in Britain than in Saudi Arabia, particularly when instructions described binding traits as characteristics of a moral person. Cross-cultural differences were mediated by the perceived cultural importance attributed to these traits, particularly binding traits. These results justify concerns that existing moral identity scales underestimate important cultural variation in conceptualising moral identity, but justice and caring concerns remain the best single candidates for a universal foundation of human morality.     

Personality and self-actualizing profiles of assertive people

This study tested the hypothesis that assertive and nonassertive people have different personality profiles and self-actualizing values. Results indicated that assertive and nonassertive groups differed significantly, in terms of their personality profiles based on the Personality Research Form, and their self-actualization profiles based on the Personal Orientation Inventory, supporting the tested hypothesis.     

The Effect of Hypophysectomy on Personality in Women with Metastatic Breast Cancer as Revealed by the Rorschach Test

This study tested the hypothesis that assertive and nonassertive people have different personality profiles and self-actualizing values. Results indicated that assertive and nonassertive groups differed significantly, in terms of their personality profiles based on the Personality Research Form, and their self-actualization profiles based on the Personal Orientation Inventory, supporting the tested hypothesis.     

The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals

So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form of moral realism. While accepting the presuppositions of the evolutionary error theorist, I argue that contract-based approaches to morality can be sensitive to those presuppositions while still vindicating morality. Invoking Stephen Darwall’s distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, I go on to offer an evolutionary-based contractarianism.     

Reasonable Partiality from a Biological Point of View

Speculation about the evolutionary origins of morality has yet to show how a biologically based capacity for morality might be connected to moral reasoning. Applying an evolutionary approach to three kinds of cases where partiality may or may not be morally reasonable, this paper explores a possible connection between a psychological capacity for morality and processes of wide reflective moral equilibrium. The central hypothesis is that while we might expect a capacity for morality to include aspects of partiality, we might also expect these same aspects of the capacity to produce systemic forms of performance-based error. Understanding these errors helps point the way toward a theory of moral competence that includes aspects of both partiality and impartiality.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

The Influence of Applicant Communication Style and Interviewer Characteristics on Hiring Decisions1

This study examined the influence of the gender and communication style of job applicants, as well as the gender and sex-role stereotyping of interviewers, on hiring decisions. Fifty-six personnel officers viewed videotapes of simulated employment interviews, in which male and female candidates used either aggressive, assertive, or nonassertive styles of communication. Personnel officers rated job candidates on likeability, similarity to the officers themselves, and hireability. Interviewers were most likely to employ assertive applicants, and the sex-role stereotypes of interviewers did not influence their perceptions of these candidates. Sex-role beliefs, however, did affect evaluations of aggressive and nonassertive job applicants. Interviewers who were low in sex-role stereotyping were more likely to hire a nonassertive than an aggressive candidate, while interviewers with higher levels of sex-role stereotyping were more likely to hire aggressive candidates. For assertive candidates, judgments by the interviewers of the perceived similarity of the candidate to themselves and their liking for the applicant both influenced their decision to hire the candidate. For aggressive and nonassertive candidates, however, the interviewers' liking toward the candidate mediated the relationship between perceived similarity and hiring decisions.