Where is the “D” in dissonance?1

The experiment tested the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance has a general drive arousal component which facilitates performance on simple cognitive tasks and impairs performance on complex cognitive tasks After writing a consonant or a dissonant essay dealing with proposed changes in university parking regulations, subjects were given either a simple or a complex task (rote memory or creativity). To maximize dissonance, free choice regarding participation was deliberately emphasized, resulting in a high proportion of subjects who refused to comply with the request Data from refusers were retained and compared with data obtained from compliers Appropriate control groups were employed in order to ascertain whether the results were attributable to the process of self-selection among complier and refuser subjects The dissonance manipulation was successful subjects who wrote dissonant essays subsequently displayed more favorable attitudes toward the parking proposal Their performance on complex cognitive tasks was not unpaired, however, nor did they perform better on simple cognitive tasks than did subjects who experienced no dissonance Subjects who refused to write dissonant essays did better on the complex task than subjects who complied in either the consonant or dissonant conditions Data from the control groups indicated that refusers did not differ from compliers in their initial attitudes toward the proposal nor in their ability to perform the complex cognitive task The results seem to be due to the facilitating effects of refusing to comply with the dissonance instructions, and suggest that the practice of eliminating subjects who refuse to comply may result in the loss of some highly informative data     

Is the truth in the details? Extended narratives help distinguishing false “memories” from false “reports”

The present study examined the effects of fantasy proneness on false "reports" and false "memories", of existent and non-existent footage of a public event. We predicted that highly fantasy prone individuals would be more likely to stand by their initial claim of having seen a film of the event than low fantasy prone participants when prompted for more details about their experiences. Eighty creative arts students and 80 other students were asked whether they had seen CCTV footage preceding the attack on Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh up to, and including, non-existent footage of the actual moment of the attack. If affirmative, they were probed for extended narratives of what they claimed to have seen. Overall, 64% of participants provided a false "report" by answering yes to the initial question. Of these, 30% provided no explicit details of the attack, and a further 15% retracted their initial answer in their narratives. This left 19% of the sample who appeared to have false "memories" because they provided explicit details of the actual moment of the attack. Women scored higher than men and art students scored higher than other students on fantasy proneness, but there was no effect on levels of false reporting or false "memory". Memories were rated more vivid and clear for existent compared to non-existent aspects of the event. In sum, these data suggest a more complex relationship between memory distortions and fantasy proneness than previously observed.     

Omission bias in vaccination decisions: Where’s the “omission”? Where’s the “bias”?

Several studies have reported that parents are often reluctant to vaccinate their own or other people’s children, even when the balance of health risks and benefits clearly favors vaccination. This reluctance has been interpreted as a manifestation of “omission bias”, a general tendency to prefer inactive to active options even when inaction leads to worse outcomes or greater risks. The research raises significant public health concerns as well as worries about human decision biases in general. In this paper we argue that existing research on vaccination decisions has not convincingly demonstrated any general reluctance to vaccinate nor has it made the case that such a tendency, if found, would constitute a bias. We identify several conceptual and methodological issues that, we argue, cloud interpretation of earlier studies. In a new questionnaire-based study (Experiment 1) we examined the vaccination decisions of undergraduate students (N=103) and non-student adults (N=192). In both groups a clear majority chose to vaccinate when disease and vaccination risks were balanced. Experiments 2 and 3 identify several problems associated with the measures used in earlier studies, and show how these problems could have led to the misleading appearance of majority anti-vaccination preferences. In our data, vaccination intentions appear to be less a function of generalized preferences for action or inaction than they are of the regret respondents expect to feel if vaccination or non-vaccination were to lead to a poor outcome. Regret-avoiding choices led some respondents to favor vaccination, others to oppose it. In two follow-up studies, few respondents mentioned action or inaction per se in explaining their choices. We conclude that there is no convincing evidence that a generalized “omission bias” plays any important role in vaccination decisions.     

Where should the balance be between “scientist” and “practitioner” in Australian undergraduate psychology?

The scientist—practitioner model of training in psychology has been widely influential in the development of undergraduate curricula in Australia. The model had its origins in post‐war America and has formed the basis for accreditation of psychology courses in Australia since the late 1970s. Recently a reconsideration of the model in Australian undergraduate psychology was argued for, suggesting that the absence of significant practical skills development in most curricula is detrimental to the discipline's graduates and their employers. The authors agree that the need for some practical skills development in undergraduate curricula is becoming increasingly important for psychology. Many of the exemplars of curriculum revision provided, however, are impractical and are unlikely to make significant contributions to Australian programs. There is an urgent need to consider the graduate attributes desired for 3‐year and 4‐year trained psychology graduates who will go on to employment without completing postgraduate study. Curriculum innovation to enhance graduates' employability will flow from this development, and will be likely to incorporate information technology solutions, rather than placement experience. This process is entirely compatible with the scientist—practitioner model of training and education in psychology.     

What's in a Name? The Effects of the Labels “Fat” Versus “Overweight” on Weight Bias1

This research examined the effects of the labels “fat” vs. “overweight” in the expression of weight bias, with the prediction that the label “fat” biases individuals to respond more negatively than does the label “overweight.” In Study 1, participants' attitudes toward people labeled as fat were less favorable than were their attitudes toward people labeled as overweight. In Studies 2 and 3, although participants chose similar‐sized figures to depict fat and overweight targets, weight stereotypes and weight attitudes were more negative toward people labeled as fat than those labeled as overweight. In addition, the endorsement of weight stereotypes mediated the biasing effect of the “fat” label on weight prejudice. Implications of this work for prejudice researchers and for public attitudes are discussed.     

What Are the “True” Statistics of the Environment?

A widespread assumption in the contemporary discussion of probabilistic models of cognition, often attributed to the Bayesian program, is that inference is optimal when the observer's priors match the true priors in the world—the actual “statistics of the environment.” But in fact the idea of a “true” prior plays no role in traditional Bayesian philosophy, which regards probability as a quantification of belief, not an objective characteristic of the world. In this paper I discuss the significance of the traditional Bayesian epistemic view of probability and its mismatch with the more objectivist assumptions about probability that are widely held in contemporary cognitive science. I then introduce a novel mathematical framework, the observer lattice, that aims to clarify this issue while avoiding philosophically tendentious assumptions. The mathematical argument shows that even if we assume that “ground truth” probabilities actually do exist, there is no objective way to tell what they are. Different observers, conditioning on different information, will inevitably have different probability estimates, and there is no general procedure to determine which one is right. The argument sheds light on the use of probabilistic models in cognitive science, and in particular on what exactly it means for the mind to be “tuned” to its environment.     

“Playing God? Yes!” Religion in the Light of Technology

If we appeal to God when our technology (including medicine) fails, we assume a " God of the gaps." It is religiously preferable to appreciate technological competence. Our successes challenge, however, religious convictions. Modifying words and images is not enough, as technology affects theology more deeply. This is illustrated by the history of chemistry. Chemistry has been perceived as wanting to transform and purify reality rather than to understand the created order. Thus, unlike biology and physics, chemistry did not provide a fertile basis for natural theologies. It is argued that an active, transformative role of humans is appropriate in biblically inspired religions and called for in the light of imperfections and evil in the world. When the expression "playing God" is used dismissively, as if we trespass upon God–given territory, a theologically problematical association of God and the given order is assumed. A different view of the human calling can be articulated by drawing upon the Christian heritage and by developing an antinatural religious naturalism.     

Estimating the Prevalence of Shyness in the “Global Village”: Pluralistic Ignorance or False Consensus?

ABSTRACT Only a minority of those who experience shyness consider themselves to be shy people One explanation for this lies in the possibility that those who so label themselves underestimate the extent to which their feelings are shared by others (i.e, perceive the consensus surrounding their experiences as low [Kelley, 1967]), resulting in an internal rather than external attribution This proposition was tested by asking shy and not-shy followers of two TV soap operas to rate a number of characters from the programs, together with a list of their friends and relatives, for shyness, competitiveness, and optimism Although there were no differences between the groups in their ratings of competitiveness and optimism, the shy subjects reported greater shyness among both the soap-opera characters and their friends and relatives than the not-shy group Whatever the basis for the self-labeling of shyness, therefore, it does not appear to he in the low consensus/pluralistic ignorance notion A number of alternative explanations are discussed, together with the implications of these findings for explanations of the false consensus effect     

On “knowing your partner”: Dangerous illusions in the age of AIDS?

We identified two characteristics of the impression formation process that may cause people to underestimate the riskiness of potential sexual partners. In Study 1, participants were quite confident that they could determine whether someone was lying to them about risk-related behavior when, in reality, they could not. Particularly troubling was a “truth bias” that resulted in relatively high rates of truth detection, but poor lie detection. In Study 2, increased familiarity with a target person (who actually was HIV+) caused participants to lower their estimates of the target's riskiness, despite the fact that we explicitly warned them that the target might be HIV+. We suggest that such processes may foster the illusion of knowing one's partner when one does not.     

“Being Religious” or “Being Spiritual” in America: A Zero‐Sum Proposition?

Recent discussions of religious attitudes and behavior tend to suggest—and in a few cases, provide evidence—that Americans are becoming “more spiritual” and “less religious.” What do people mean, however, when they say they are “spiritual” or “religious”? Do Americans see these concepts as definitionally or operationally different? If so, does that difference result in a zero‐sum dynamic between them? In this article, we explore the relationship between “being religious” and “being spiritual” in a national sample of American Protestants and compare our findings to other studies, including Wade Clark Roof’s baby‐boomer research (1993, 2000), 1999 Gallup and 2000 Spirituality and Health polls, and the Zinnbauer et al. (1997) study of religious definitions. In addition to presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence about the way people think about their religious/spiritual identity, the article draws implications about modernity, the distinctiveness of religious change in the recent past, and the deinstitutionalization of religion.     

Acknowledging One's Physical Disability in the Interview: Does “When” Make a Difference?

The current research investigates acknowledgments that physically disabled individuals make in an interview setting, and examines whether the timing of an acknowledgment makes a difference to the impressions that evaluators form. A total of 137 participants watched an interview of a disabled applicant who (a) made no acknowledgment about the disability; or who acknowledged the disability at the (b) beginning, (c) middle, or (d) end of a job interview. Applicants who did not acknowledge or who acknowledged at the end of the interview were perceived less favorably than were those who disclosed earlier in the interview. Furthermore, participants' perceptions of the applicant's psychological well-being mediated the effect of acknowledgment timing on hiring-related outcomes. Results are discussed in terms of self-presentational strategies that physically disabled individuals might adopt and the importance of establishing one's psychological well-being early in the impression-formation process.     

How Do Coworkers “Make the Place”? Examining Coworker Conflict and the Value of Harmony in China and the United States

The goal of this study was to test cross‐cultural/cross‐national differences in the association between coworker interpersonal justice and coworker conflict and the implications of such differences for employee effectiveness. Harmony is a central value in China but is less important in the United States, and the individual value of harmony may influence Chinese and US employees differently in their response to low levels of coworker interpersonal justice. We collected data from employees and their coworkers in China (214 dyads) and the US (301 dyads). There were three major findings. First, coworker interpersonal justice was negatively related to coworker conflict. Second, coworker conflict significantly mediated coworker interpersonal justice in relation to the employee effectiveness variables of task performance, organisational citizenship behaviours, and counterproductive work behaviours. Finally, in the Chinese sample, harmony significantly buffered the indirect effect of coworker interpersonal justice on employee effectiveness via coworker conflict, whereas in the US sample, harmony significantly intensified the indirect effect of coworker interpersonal justice on employee effectiveness via coworker conflict.     

“What shall we do with the inebriate?” asylum treatment and the disease concept of alcoholism in the late nineteenth century

During the late nineteenth century a number of physicians, sometimes called inebriety specialists, combined a narrowly physicalistic disease concept of alcoholism with a high regard for the curative power of asylum treatment to advocate the development of specialized asylums for the treatment of alcoholism. Central to the idea of such an inebriate asylum was the belief that the power to detain the alcoholic was necessary to cure his disease. This article considers why inebriety specialists held this belief as well as why others opposed it. It also describes alternative approaches to alcoholism and the fate of efforts, during this period, to treat the alcoholic by confining him.     

Extraversion: A “Hidden” Personality Factor in Coping?

Recent evidence suggests a larger role for personality determinants of the coping response than has been traditionally held. In the two studies presented here, we examined the influence of personality on the use of social support and other coping strategies in samples of undergraduate students. The first study surveyed a range of coping responses to naturally occurring stressors and found that Extraversion was related to social support seeking, optimism (identified as germane to coping in prior research) was related to problem solving, and both dispositions were negatively related to avoidance. The second study used an experimental approach and multiple personality measures to correct for possible methodological problems in the first. Extraversion again proved to be associated with help seeking; moreover, this relationship accounted for that of another disposition, self-esteem—a construct considered crucial in the literature. The utility of personality variables, particularly Extraversion, in predicting and explaining the choice of a coping strategy is discussed.