A Method for Improving the Integrity of Peer Review

Peer review is the most important aspect of reputable journals. Without it, we would be unsure about whether the material published was as valid and reliable as is possible. However, with the advent of the Internet, scientific literature has now become subject to a relatively new phenomenon: fake peer reviews. Some dishonest researchers have been manipulating the peer review process to publish what are often inferior papers. There are even papers that explain how to do it. This paper discusses one of those methods and how editors can defeat it by using a special review ID. This method is easy to understand and can be added to current peer review systems easily.     

Peer review and innovation

Two important aspects of the relationship between peer review and innovation includes the acceptance of articles for publication in journals and the assessment of applications for grants for the funding of research work. While there are well-known examples of the rejection by journals of first choice of many papers that have radically changed the way we think about the world outside ourselves, such papers do get published eventually, however tortuous the process required. With grant applications the situation differs in that the refusal of a grant necessarily curtails the possible research that may be attempted. Here there are many reasons for conservatism and reservation as to the ability of a grant allocation process based on peer review to deliver truly innovative investigations. Other methods are needed; although such methods need not be applied across the board, they should constitute the methods whereby some 10–20% of the grant monies are assigned. The nomination of prizes for specific accomplishments is one way of achieving innovation although this presumes that investigators or institution already have available the money necessary to effect the innovations; otherwise it is a question of the selection and funding of particular individuals or institutions and requiring them to solve particular problems that are set in the broadest of terms.     

Should Authors be Requested to Suggest Peer Reviewers?

As part of a continuous process to explore the factors that might weaken or corrupt traditional peer review, in this paper, we query the ethics, fairness and validity of the request, by editors, of authors to suggest peer reviewers during the submission process. One of the reasons for the current crisis in science pertains to a loss in trust as a result of a flawed peer review which is by nature biased unless it is open peer review. As we indicate, the fact that some editors and journals rely on authors’ suggestions in terms of who should peer review their paper already instills a potential way to abuse the trust of the submission and publishing system. An author-suggested peer reviewer choice might also tempt authors to seek reviewers who might be more receptive or sympathetic to the authors’ message or results, and thus favor the outcome of that paper. Authors should thus not be placed in such a potentially ethically compromising situation, especially as a mandatory condition for submission. However, the fact that they do not have an opt-out choice during the submission process—especially when using an online submission system that makes such a suggestion compulsory—may constitute a violation of authors’ rights.     

The Air We Breathe: A Critical Look at Practices and Alternatives in the Peer-Review Process

ABSTRACT— Anonymous peer review has served as the bedrock of research dissemination in scientific psychology for decades and has only sporadically been questioned. However, other disciplines, such as biomedicine and physics, have found the traditional peer-review system to be wanting and have begun to test and try alternative practices. In this article, we survey criticisms of the traditional peer-review system and describe several alternatives in the interests of facilitating discussion and debate. We also consider why the natural sciences tend to employ fewer reviewers and have lower rejection rates than do the social sciences. Our two recommendations are that a serious discussion of problems and alternatives to peer review should be started at all levels of psychology and that a science of research communication should be a priority, with psychologists as part of its advance guard because of their relevant substantive and methodological knowledge.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Psychoanalysis and the Body–Mind Problem

In this paper I have tried to clarify some of the differences between on the one hand ordinary doubts and uncertainties that are part and parcel of the psychoanalytic process, and on the other hand the sort of doubt that Socrates called 'aporia', that is, philosophical and conceptual. I have described one point at which philosophical doubt may creep into psychoanalytic thinking on body/mind issues. I presented a psychoanalytical model of the mind, based largely on Bion and Anzieu, in which mind is seen to be emergent from a body–mind nexus, to which we may, under pressure, regress. I elaborated this by reference to an example of my own somatisation, and to Anzieu's theory of a skin ego. Finally I made some comparisons between philosophical solutions to anxieties arising both in the mind/body area and in general epistemology, and psychoanalytic approaches to similar anxieties in life.     

Philosophy,Addiction and Inquiry

ABSTRACT

This introductory paper raises, partly as a preparation for the other papers in this issue, questions about how philosophy ought to proceed in the light of knowledge we have in surrounding disciplines, with a focus on the case of addiction. It also raises issues about how addiction research might be enlightened by philosophical work. In the background for the paper are two competing approaches to the evidential grounding of philosophical insight. According to a widespread view, philosophical knowledge rests on a set of intuitions. According to another, philosophy has no special evidential grounding. This paper resists the attractions of the first picture, and argues against the separateness of philosophy that it lends support. I try to make plausible that such a picture is harmful both for philosophy and for empirical science. We should replace it with a mild form of unity of science or unity of inquiry, in the spirit of the founder of this journal.     

用公评审稿促进中国科技期刊的快速发展

学术论文评价目前普遍采用的同行评审系统,存在严重缺陷,在我国具体国情下,不易保证审稿过程的公正性,难以有效提高科研群体的审稿水平。作者提出一个“公评审稿”方案,包括实名的公开推荐和匿名的公开评审两个过程,使学术成果的发表和评价实现了清晰的功能分离,解决了发表注重快速及时、而评价注重慎重仔细这一根本矛盾。公评系统融合了中国传统的举贤制度和互联网新近发展的微博技术,其公开和共享理念,在保证学术公正的同时,能大幅度促进科研知识和经验在科研群体内的传播,迅速、有效地提高我国科技期刊的办刊质量。     

Social Biases and Solutions for Procedural Objectivity

An empirically sensitive formulation of the norms of transformative criticism must recognize that even public and shared standards of evaluation can be implemented in ways that unintentionally perpetuate and reproduce forms of social bias that are epistemically detrimental. Helen Longino's theory can explain and redress such social bias by treating peer evaluations as hypotheses based on data and by requiring a kind of perspectival diversity that bears, not on the content of the community's knowledge claims, but on the beliefs and norms of the culture of the knowledge community itself. To illustrate how socializing cognition can bias evaluations, we focus on peer‐review practices, with some discussion of peer‐review practices in philosophy. Data include responses to surveys by editors from general philosophy journals, as well as analyses of reviews and editorial decisions for the 2007 Cognitive Science Society Conference.     

Ensuring the Quality,Fairness, and Integrity of Journal Peer Review: A Possible Role of Editors

A growing body of literature has identified potential problems that can compromise the quality, fairness, and integrity of journal peer review, including inadequate review, inconsistent reviewer reports, reviewer biases, and ethical transgressions by reviewers. We examine the evidence concerning these problems and discuss proposed reforms, including double-blind and open review. Regardless of the outcome of additional research or attempts at reforming the system, it is clear that editors are the linchpin of peer review, since they make decisions that have a significant impact on the process and its outcome. We consider some of the steps editors should take to promote quality, fairness and integrity in different stages of the peer review process and make some recommendations for editorial conduct and decision-making.     

Scientific Peer Review: A Case Study From Local And Global Analyses.

The dialog between Staddon (2001, 2004) and Baum (2004) raises general questions about the nature of scientific peer review. Their dialog displays effects on peer review of differences of opinion about the relative merits of local and global analyses. Baum (1995, 1997, 2001, 2002) favors global analyses as a paradigm different, newer, and better than the local, dynamic, real‐time approach that plays a significant role in Staddon (2001). According to the Kuhnian perspective (Kuhn, 1996) Baum advocates, we can better understand his review of Staddon (2001) by considering the implications for it of his commitment to the idea that a global analysis is a superior scientific paradigm. This commentary examines some characteristics of local and global analyses, as well as some of their possible implications for peer review in the context of a reviewer's belief in the Kuhnian idea of incommensurability: According to this idea, a reviewer who either is, or who believes he is, from one paradigm is unlikely, for better or worse, to understand or perhaps even tolerate work from a different paradigm. It is recommended that a process be developed to encourage “truth in peer reviewing” to reduce possible conflicts of interest embedded in the current conception of scientific peer review.     

Exploring Initiative as a Signal of Knowledge Co‐Construction During Collaborative Problem Solving

Peer interaction has been found to be conducive to learning in many settings. Knowledge co‐construction (KCC) has been proposed as one explanatory mechanism. However, KCC is a theoretical construct that is too abstract to guide the development of instructional software that can support peer interaction. In this study, we present an extensive analysis of a corpus of peer dialogs that we collected in the domain of introductory Computer Science. We show that the notion of task initiative shifts correlates with both KCC and learning. Speakers take task initiative when they contribute new content that advances problem solving and that is not invited by their partner; if initiative shifts between the partners, it indicates they both contribute to problem solving. We found that task initiative shifts occur more frequently within KCC episodes than outside. In addition, task initiative shifts within KCC episodes correlate with learning for low pre‐testers, and total task initiative shifts correlate with learning for high pre‐testers. As recognizing task initiative shifts does not require as much deep knowledge as recognizing KCC, task initiative shifts as an indicator of productive collaboration are potentially easier to model in instructional software that simulates a peer.     

The perils of centralized research funding systems

The distribution of research funds by key funding agencies in Canada and the U.S. is based on the idea of selectivity, i.e., the policy of NOT funding a significant fraction of the applicants. Despite the fact that this policy is superficially justified by the peer review-enforced goal of "excellence," in practice it tends to favor research along well-established lines and discourages novel approaches, innovation, and risk taking. Furthermore, the secretive nature of the funding system efficiently turns it into a self-serving network operating on the principle of an "old boys’ club." This even further undercuts the veneer of objectivity in the peer review assessment because funding panels can arbitrarily interpret reviews at their whim without oversight. Although the system calls itself "competition,", the idea of real interactive competition is actually betrayed. What we have, in fact, is a centralized and authoritarian quasi-socialist grant distribution system. The article disputes the common belief that the major problem of a granting system is "government under-funding." On the contrary, it argues that much of a trivial research is actually OVER-funded. The main problem is the distribution system, not the overall level of funding. An alternative funding model is proposed. In a nutshell, it is a "fund researchers, not proposals" strategy. Drastic simplification of the funding process is advocated. The proposed measures are largely at odds with the present paradigm of selectivity and fierce competition as catalyzers of "excellence." The latter notion is dismissed as misleading. In order to see more innovation, we need a more uniform funding system (a sliding funding scale), even it means lower average funding levels. He immigrated to Canada in 1978 and in 1980 joined the Engineering faculty of McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, where he is presently professor of Engineering Physics. He is an author or co-author of over 120 peer-reviewed papers in semiconductor and plasma physics, electronics, environmental engineering, biophysics, philosophical problems of physics, and social aspects of scientific research.     

Counseling Theory: The Problem of Definition

It is proposed that (a) research in counseling and counseling practice do not generally make explicit their roots in counseling theory, (b) this lack of connectedness to theory may represent a weakness in our theories for failing to be useful, (c) this fault may be a function of our current definitions of theory, and (d) we should focus upon philosophical premises at this time. The philosophical premise of syntony is used to illustrate how many of the commonly accepted assumptions which set our standards are not necessarily so, and how the broadening of such assumptions may encourage more activity in theory development. Counseling approaches which do not qualify as theory must at least qualify in the realm of rationale by making explicit their philosophical or value premises.     

Guo Xiang on Self-so Knowledge

The perspective on zhi 知 (‘knowledge’) is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi (e.g. da zhi 大知 ‘greater knowledge’ or zhen zhi 真知 ‘genuine knowledge’.) In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which, like his intellectual contemporaries, is to unify Daoist and Confucian ideas. In addition, I will argue that if we look at the larger context of Guo Xiang’s own philosophical approach, and interpret his notion of zhi within this framework, then we find a strong argument for an alternative to the epistemological perspectives in the Zhuangzi – one that includes mysticism and relativism, but goes beyond them.     

Locke's Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality

Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke's stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke's claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke's general remarks about demonstration as well as his claims about demonstration in natural philosophy, mathematics, and morality. Careful attention to these detailed discussions motivates a reevaluation of Locke's views on demonstrative knowledge of morality. Specifically, while Locke did believe that some demonstrative moral knowledge might be in‐principle available to us he also believed that facts about the difficulty of demonstration meant that this knowledge would in‐practice be largely unattainable.     

Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell,Carnap, Wittgenstein,and Husserl

Philosophical intuition has become one of the most debated problems in recent years, largely due to the rise of the movement called experimental philosophy which challenged the conviction that philosophers have some special insight into abstract ideas such as being, knowledge, good and evil, intentional action, etc. In response to the challenge, some authors claim that there is a special cognitive faculty called philosophical intuition which delivers justification to philosophical theses, while some others deny it based on experimental results. A relatively smaller group of researchers aim at clarifying what the alleged intuition is. I follow the latter path. In this paper I argue that philosophical intuition is in the first place the capacity enabling one to what I refer to as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. The latter means becoming aware of the seemingly trivial “fact” that the way in which the world manifests itself depends on the cognitive apparatus one has, thereby propelling one to draw a distinction between appearances and reality. The recognition at stake is a very specific capacity to approach the world solely as it is experienced. This capacity, I argue, is the core and the defining feature of philosophical intuition. As part of my argumentation I also distinguish between the intuition in question and its different manifestations; and then introduce a novel notion of erotetic intuition. My argument is called “old-fashion” to emphasize the fact that I draw mostly on four figures who were pivotal in the twentieth- century philosophy and whose influence on the current debate concerning philosophical intuition should be, I believe, stronger than it is; I mean Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.

     

Rethinking Transcendence: Heidegger,Plessner and the Problem of Anthropology

Abstract

In times of the Anthropocene, we are in need of philosophical anthropology, revisiting the question concerning the human condition. I suggest rethinking what one may call ‘human transcendence’ in terms of a responsivist paradigm. Drawing on Heidegger and Plessner, the idea is that we should think of the eccentric or ecstatic position of the human in terms of something we undergo, instead of it being a human capability or something we do. It is a gift, emplacing us to the time-space of responsive embodied existence. The paper will follow this agenda in five steps. Having introduced what I take to be the challenge for a timely ontology, I will unfold the problem entailed in the very idea of philosophical anthropology according to Heidegger. I then focus on Heidegger’s (hidden) rapprochement to Helmuth Plessner’s anthropology, recalling Plessner’s analysis of laughter as a bodily expression displaying the ‘eccentric positionality’ of the human. I suggest rephrasing this kind of transcendence in a responsivist paradigm: Humans are responsive beings.     

The Philosophical Personality Argument

Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one??s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, we present the Philosophical Personality Argument (PPA). We explain how it supports the growing body of evidence challenging some of the uses of intuitions in philosophy, and we defend it from some criticisms of empirically based worries about intuitions in philosophy. We conclude that the current evidence indicates that the PPA is sound, and thus many traditional philosophical projects that use intuitions must become substantially more empirically oriented.