Sexuality,Angelification, and Divine Indwelling: A Contemporary Ethic of Early Christian Asceticism

The monastic movement originated among laity who recognized within themselves the potential to embody the Christian gospel. That a practice so central to early Christians and their Scriptural understanding would undergo such a decline contemporarily gives pause for reconsideration. This article posits that the kind of asceticism at the core of Christian monasticism maintains relevance as a transformative Christian practice in the contemporary world, as well. The argument draws on a tripartite model of spirituality in accord with Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of epektasis. This suggests asceticism’s contemporary appropriation as an ethic of Christian spiritual development oriented toward perpetual ascent. Asceticism will be analyzed as a form of spiritual struggle; that is, physical, emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual exertion aiming to progress in knowledge, similitude, and intimacy with Jesus Christ, for God and for others. The three stages of this ethic of Christian spiritual growth – 1) detachment from fleshly passions, 2) strengthening of the soul, and 3) union with God – find parallels in the three themes at the core of asceticism: sexuality, angelification, and divine indwelling. Situating asceticism within a framework of spiritual struggle creates an opportunity to recover and re-envision a well-established Christian practice in a contemporary context.     

The ‘Connection’ Health Care Providers Make with Dying Patients

SUMMARY

The literature confirms illness and hospitalisation can become spiritual encounters for patients and their families. Further, it has been established that both patients and their families are better equipped to deal with loss and change if they have a healthily developed spiritual sense of self. The aim of the study sought to determine the benefit or otherwise of a previous model of spiritual care. It asked ‘from the perspective of the nurse and other health care providers, what constitutes spiritual care giving?’ An ethnography was undertaken where data consisted of field notes, interviews, records, and diary entries. This paper reports on interview data, from which themes were derived. The major theme titled their space is expressed via a new model of spiritual care. It was shown that when caring for patients and their relatives, nurses and other health care professionals enter the world of the other to determine the other's needs. In so doing they typify agapé (altruistic love), where the individual cares for a complete stranger as if that stranger were family. This connection with the patient and their family is the foundation for spiritual care.     

Mystical union and spiritual desire in late-Reformation devotion: The case of Martin Moller's The Great Mystery (1595)

This article examines the complex relationship between early-modern Protestantism and medieval mysticism. It does so through a case study of a late-Reformation work of devotion, The Great Mystery (1595), which has received very little scholarly attention. The author of this treatise, Martin Moller, an experienced Lutheran pastor, was familiar with mystical literature and drew on it directly in his numerous works of devotion. Especially evident in The Great Mystery, which presents the relationship between Christ and the Christian as a spiritual marriage, is a theme which rarely appeared in the Lutheran devotional literature of the sixteenth century: spiritual desire for God. Moller developed an evangelical theology and spirituality of desire, which marked a crucial development in early-modern Lutheran devotion. The presence of this theme also provides a potential clue for the ‘mystical turn’ in the late Reformation and why this period may have experienced a ‘crisis of piety’.     

Jung and Lévy-Bruhl

Abstract: For his knowledge of ‘primitive’ peoples, C. G. Jung relied on the work of Lucien Lévy‐Bruhl (1857–1939), a French philosopher who in mid‐career became an armchair anthropologist. In a series of books from 1910 on, Lévy‐Bruhl asserted that ‘primitive’ peoples had been misunderstood by modern Westerners. Rather than thinking like moderns, just less rigorously, ‘primitives’ harbour a mentality of their own. ‘Primitive’ thinking is both ‘mystical’ and ‘prelogical’. By ‘mystical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ peoples experience the world as identical with themselves. Their relationship to the world, including to fellow human beings, is that of participation mystique. By ‘prelogical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ thinking is indifferent to contradictions. ‘Primitive’ peoples deem all things identical with one another yet somehow still distinct. A human is at once a tree and still a human being. Jung accepted unquestioningly Lévy‐Bruhl's depiction of the ‘primitive’ mind, even when Jung, unlike Lévy‐Bruhl, journeyed to the field to see ‘primitive’ peoples firsthand. But Jung altered Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ mentality in three key ways. First, he psychologized it. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is to be explained sociologically, for Jung it is to be explained psychologically: ‘primitive’ peoples think as they do because they live in a state of unconsciousness. Second, Jung universalized ‘primitive’ mentality. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is ever more being replaced by modern thinking, for Jung ‘primitive’ thinking is the initial psychological state of all human beings. Third, Jung appreciated ‘primitive’ thinking. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is false, for Jung it is true—once it is recognized as an expression not of how the world but of how the unconscious works. I consider, along with the criticisms of Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ thinking by his fellow anthropologists and philosophers, whether Jung in fact grasped all that Lévy‐Bruhl meant by ‘primitive’ thinking.     

Breathing New Life Into the World‐Soul? Revisiting an Old Doctrine Through the Lens of Current Debates on Special Divine Action

Nicholas Saunders’ 2002 book Divine Action and Modern Science remains among the most significant and widely‐cited recent contributions to the literature on special divine action (SDA). One of the tasks he takes up in that work is to critique a wide assortment of models of SDA, including that of Grace Jantzen. Her account employs the panentheistic notion that the physical universe is related to God in a manner closely analogous to the way in which a human body is related to the human mind—that is, the cosmos is God’s body. And just as we humans can exercise basic actions on and with our bodies without violating the laws of nature, God can exercise basic action on parts of the cosmos without such violations, thereby providing a workable non‐interventionist model of SDA. Saunders critiques this model on both philosophical and theological grounds, and moves on to consider another: the idea that God never acts directly on the cosmos, but instead interacts with the world by influencing human minds, which influence needn’t involve the violation of laws. This model too comes in for heavy criticism. In this essay I suggest a way of retaining important aspects of both of these accounts while sidestepping the criticisms levelled by Saunders. This can be done by reviving an idea sympathetically entertained by such notables as Plato, several early Church fathers (including Augustine), and Isaac Newton: that of a World‐Soul distinct from God.     

The role of attachment to God and spiritual self-awareness in predicting evangelical Christians’ appraisals of suffering

The present study examined how attachment to God and spiritual self-awareness are related to evangelical Christians’ appraisals of suffering. Specifically, we were interested in whether attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance with God were related to the appraised meaning of stressful life experiences as transformational and whether spiritual self-awareness mediated this relationship. A national sample (N?=?988) of students from Christian institutions completed an online survey. The results indicated that individuals with high levels of attachment anxiety or attachment avoidance with God were less likely to view suffering as a means of spiritual growth and connection with God. Mediation analyses also showed that higher levels of avoidant attachment to God were related to lower levels of spiritual self-awareness, which in turn were related to reduced ability to appraise suffering as transformational. Clinical implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

The rhetoric of transformation in the healing of alcoholism: The twelve steps of alcoholics anonymous

Close attention to spirituality and change are necessary for a fuller understanding of how Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) works. This paper draws upon the conceptual tools of the anthropology of religious healing to interpret AA's program for recovery, the Twelve Steps. The Twelve Steps are described as a fundamental component of AA discourse, and as a rhetoric of transformation. The Twelve Steps outline a rhetorical process which moves the alcoholic from drinking to sobriety by means of a rhetoric of predisposition, of empowerment, and of transformation. AA discourse is spiritual, in that members are persuaded to interpret the world, their lives, and their affliction in sacred terms. Healing is not cure, but a new way of attending to the world and engaging with others, including God, or a ‘Power greater than ourselves’.

There is a God, and it's not me.     

Malebranche and the General Will of God

Central to Nicolas Malebranche’s theodicy is the distinction between general volitions and particular volitions. One of the fundamental claims of his theodicy is that although God created a world with suffering and evil, God does not will these things by particular volitions, but only by general volitions. Commentators disagree about how to interpret Malebranche’s distinction. According to the ‘general content’ interpretation, the difference between general volitions and particular volitions is a difference in content. General volitions have general laws as their content and particular volitions have particular contents. The ‘particular content’ interpretation holds that all of God’s volitions have particular contents. The difference between general and particular volitions is whether the content of the volition is in accordance with the laws that God has established. A proper interpretation of this distinction is essential to understanding Malebranche’s theodicy, as well as his account of occasionalism and God’s causal activity in the world. In this paper, I defend the ‘particular content’ interpretation of the distinction.     

Evil in the Fine‐Tuned World

If the world has been fine‐tuned for human life, why does that life encompass such calamity and suffering? It seems that in so far as we are impressed by the fine‐tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil gains in urgency. I propose that observing the world from the anthropic point of view is the source of theists’ challenge which arises from this tension. Dealing with this challenge I suggest perhaps the world is fine‐tuned for God’s telos, which may be His manifestation of love through sentient beings’ pains and emotions.     

Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God: Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas,Buber, and Rosenzweig

This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God.

     

The Livingness of God; or,the Place of Substance and Dynamism in a Theology of the Divine Perfections

Theological reflection on the divine character is serviceable to the extent that it prevents the livingness of the triune God – and so the subject matter of theology – from disappearing behind rigorous consideration of the perfections themselves. The topic of God's livingness, in other words, informs the locus de Deo as a whole. The present article begins with a biblical‐dogmatic proposal for the form and content of this livingness: God's life in and for the world, it is proposed, is at every point rooted in the life which God has from himself as Father, Son and Spirit. Two clarifications are subsequently offered. An appeal to the livingness of God should be distinguished both from an abstract rejection of ‘substance’ language and from a conceptualization of reality under a general theory of the forward advancement of the world process.     

Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading

Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz probes Gregory of Nyssa on divine simplicity, a topic that Radde‐Gallwitz treated earlier in a book‐length monograph and takes further here in response to critics. As he notes, the Cappadocians and their opponents shared belief in divine simplicity. But for Gregory, simplicity functions as part of affirming the co‐equal divinity of the Father and Son, against his opponents. Radde‐Gallwitz lists six negative claims that Gregory’s understanding of divine simplicity supports: (1) God is immaterial; (2) God is without parts; (3) God does not possess any perfection “by acquisition”; (4) God does not possess any perfection “by participation”; (5) in God, there is no mixture or conflux of qualities, especially opposite qualities; (6) in God, there are no degrees of more or less. Yet with regard to positive statements about God’s perfections—for example the relation of God’s goodness to God’s wisdom—things are more difficult, as Radde‐Gallwitz shows. Interpreters of Gregory have differed sharply on this issue, in part because Gregory does not make his position crystal clear. Radde‐Gallwitz himself earlier held that Gregory considers God to have real but non‐definitive perfections distinct from the divine essence. Indebted to Richard Cross, however, Radde‐Gallwitz here adjusts his view, distinguishing more firmly between the divine essence itself and our limited concepts. He draws upon the Platonic distinction between natural and conventional naming, which differ in their accounts of what makes words meaningful. Arguing that Gregory is a “naturalist,” he reads Gregory’s texts on divine simplicity in this light.     

Solitude among contemplative cloistered nuns and monks: conceptualisation,coping and benefits of spiritually motivated solitude

There are rising perceptions and concerns about social isolation and the prevalence of loneliness in Western societies and their negative impact on people’s psychological well-being. We report on an ethnographic study conducted in two Catholic contemplative monasteries in Spain, focusing on the nuns’ and monks' voluntary search for solitude. Through in-depth interviews we aimed to explore their conceptualisation and experiences of solitude, the motivations behind their spiritual quest for it, and the benefits and challenges that this choice entailed. An extraordinary human template of searching for solitude emerged: although they lived communally (they were not alone), they actively avoided intimacy and closeness with other members of the community (they strove to feel alone out of their own volition). Human solitude was seen as the necessary condition for achieving perfect closeness with God and was interpreted not as leading to isolation but as a channel to communicate more intimately with God.     

Divine Unsurpassability

One historically significant model of God holds that God is a perfect being. Analytic philosophers of religion have typically understood this to mean that God is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. Recently, however, several philosophers have argued that this is inconsistent with another common theistic position: the view that for any world that God can create, there is a better world that God could have created instead. The argument runs (roughly) as follows: if, no matter which world God creates, there’s a better creatable one, then God’s action in creating a world is necessarily surpassable. And if God’s action in creating a world is necessarily surpassable, then God is necessarily surpassable. If this argument is sound, it reveals a serious flaw in an important model of God. In what follows, I set out this argument, and I then distinguish and evaluate four replies. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Empowering Muslim children’s spirituality in Malay Archipelago: integration between National Philosophical Foundations and Tawakkul (trust in God)

Multiple studies indicated that children raised to be spiritual were found to be happier, have more resilience and positive outlook towards life events. This paper attempts to explore and integrate the value of spirituality and religious practices. It is approached through the understanding and application of the tawakkul (trust in God) concept, as perceived from an Islamic viewpoint. This aspect is explored through the consolidation of the ‘believing in God’ component, as highlighted in the National Philosophical Foundations in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia to tawakkul. It will further seek to find the prospect of empowering Muslim children’s spirituality through such integration. This theoretical paper is based on the Islamic foundations and characteristics; its implementation and implications. The outcome illustrates indication of ‘divine involvement’ as the main essence of tawakkul; resulting sustainable religious, spiritual and moral enhancement. Moreover, an internalised and implicit form of tawakkul should be encouraged to promote self-understanding.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

The Problem of Criteria and the Necessity of Natural Theology

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ‐centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self‐disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post‐liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old‐fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self‐evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life‐world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach.     

“Why me?” – women’s use of spiritual causal attributions in making sense of breast cancer

Objective: This study addressed the role of positive (event is due to God’s Love or to God’s Will) and negative (event is due to God’s Anger) spiritual causal attributions in women’s adjustment to breast cancer.

Design: Ninety-three women diagnosed with breast cancer were assessed at six times from pre-diagnosis through two years post-surgery.

Main outcome measures: Women completed positive and negative measures of spiritual causal attributions (e.g. God’s Love), cognitive appraisals (e.g. threat), coping behaviour (e.g. avoidance) and well-being (e.g. distress).

Results: Positive spiritual attributions were consistently related to positive aspects of adjustment (e.g. positive appraisal, acceptance coping, and/or emotional well-being) while negative spiritual attribution was related to negative factors (e.g. appraisals of loss and uncontrollability, avoidance coping, and/or emotional distress). Path analyses revealed that the effects of positive and negative spiritual attributions on well-being were mediated by general cognitive appraisal and coping behaviour. Cross-lagged correlational analysis revealed a ‘downward spiral’ effect wherein the negative attribution of God’s Anger at pre-diagnosis predicted greater distress at 1 week pre-surgery which in turn predicted an increase in the negative attribution and so on across time.

Conclusion: Although positive spiritual attributions may help women maintain an attitude of hope and acceptance in the face of cancer, results indicate that the effects of negative spiritual attribution can play a significant role in undermining their well-being.