Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

The aim of this paper is to explore Merleau‐Ponty’s ambivalent relationship with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I begin by looking at several points of convergence between Kant and Merleau‐Ponty, focusing on the affinities between Kant’s account of transcendental realism and Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of objective thought. I then show how Merleau‐Ponty’s analysis of Kant’s paradox of asymmetrical objects points to a parallel in Kant’s thought to Merleau‐Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception. In the second part of the paper, I show why Merleau‐Ponty believes that, despite the promise of Kant’s thought, he fails to adequately escape from objective thought. After presenting the central claims of the transcendental deduction, I piece together Merleau‐Ponty’s criticism of it by answering three questions: For Merleau‐Ponty, how do we encounter the world prior to reflection? How is experience constituted? And what leads Kant to mischaracterise experience in his own transcendental philosophy?     

Let’s talk about race, Baby! When Whites’ and Blacks’ interracial contact experiences diverge

The present study investigated whether the conditions that make interracial contact anxiety-provoking for Whites differ from those that make it anxiety-provoking for Blacks. Specifically, the present work examined interracial anxiety as a function of discussant race (i.e., White or Black) and discussion topic (i.e., race-related or race-neutral). To that end, we examined the nonverbal behavior of White and Black participants during brief interpersonal interactions. Consistent with previous research, White participants behaved more anxiously during interracial than same-race interactions. Additionally, White participants of interracial interaction behaved more anxiously than their Black interaction partners. Furthermore, whereas White participants of interracial interactions found race-related discussions no more stressful than race-neutral discussions, Black participants of interracial interactions found race-related discussions less stressful than race-neutral discussions. The implications of these racial and contextual differences in interracial anxiety for improving interracial contact and race relations, more broadly, are discussed.     

Editor’s Introduction

The theme of the 2018 Spindel Conference was “Decolonizing Philosophy.” In this introduction, I will elaborate on this theme as a way to set the stage for the essays in this volume. Beginning with the question of what it means to consider philosophy “colonized” in the first place, I will focus on the subfield of the history of philosophy as a way to draw out my account. After elaborating what I take the claim that philosophy is colonized/colonizing to mean, I will turn to ways one might approach its decolonization. Again, my principle focus will be on the history of philosophy, though I take my analysis to extend beyond this subfield. Finally, I will elaborate four key tasks that I take to be essential to the decolonization of philosophy.     

Broca’s aphasia, verbs and the mental lexicon

Verb production is notoriously difficult for individuals with Broca’s aphasia, both at the word and at the sentence level. An intriguing question is at which level in the speech production these problems arise. The aim of the present study is to identify the functional locus of the impairment that results in verb production deficits in Broca’s aphasia. Levelt’s (1989) model is used as a theoretical framework for this study. Two experiments have been conducted, one on verb movement and one on verbs with alternating transitivity. The results suggest that the functional impairment in Broca’s aphasia should be located in Levelt’s “grammatical encoder.”     

Philosophy’s Diversity Problem

This paper explores the underrepresentation of women and minorities in academic philosophy. Specifically, it focuses on why, given the relatively even male/female ratio at undergraduate level, women are underrepresented at every level above this. It addresses some of the misconceptions and myths surrounding women in philosophy, including those surrounding the discussion of the different‐intuition hypothesis. It also explores the ways in which feminist research in philosophy is subject to marginalisation as a result of systematic exclusionary practices typical of the dominant culture of justification within traditional philosophy. It argues for the necessity of an intersectional approach, and the importance of taking seriously the psychological and sociological analysis of underrepresentation, in order to improve both the experience and the representation of women and other minorities at all levels of professional philosophy, as well as of the discipline as a whole.