Pragmatism and revisionism: James's conception of truth

Abstract

The paper argues that James's conception of truth is non‐revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation‐alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russell's and Moore's, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummett's, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against James's pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non‐revisionism distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti‐metaphysical stance.     

Aristotle on God as Principle of Genesis

Aristotle holds that there must be multiple forms of human being and those forms constitute a genos, this paper argues. Aristotle advances his claim by arguing that the strength of a polis rests on the existence of a spectrum of useful essential differences among its citizens. The paper rejects the notion that eîdos is a homonym, and argues that it signifies `form,' not `species.' Its theses are based on analysis of passages in the Ethics, Metaphysics, Politics and other works. The argument of the paper is compatible with `individual' or `particular' forms. The paper also proposes a solution to the issue of `natural slavery.'     

Perceptual systems and realism

Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from the environment correctly represents features of mind independent objects. With regard to the first condition, I have argued elsewhere that a part of visual processing, which I call “perception,” is theory-neutral and nonconceptual. In this paper, facing the second demand, I argue that a part of the nonconceptual content of perception presents properties that are the properties of mind independent objects. I claim first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis of the issue at the level of beliefs about the world. Then I claim that a subset of the nonconceptual content presents features of objects in the environment as they really are. This paper was mostly written when I was a fellow at the Center of Philosophy of Science in the University of Pittsburgh during the Spring Semester of 2005–2006. A draft of this paper was presented both at the Center’s colloquium and at one of the informal discussion meetings of the fellows. I have very much benefited from the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper and so I would like to thank Gabriele de Anna, Carla Fehr, Malcolm Forster, Lilly Gurova, Nikolay Milkov, and Wang Wei. I am especially indebted to the director of the Center Professor John Norton whose astute comments made me think hard about the issues discussed in the paper. Several of my arguments in Sect. 4 are the result of John’s concerns with the earlier draft of the paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for helping me clarify several points in the paper. Thanks to them (especially the second one) the paper is considerably better than it would have been without them.     

Emergence: Core ideas and issues

This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent explanation of how “downward” causation, a central component of emergentism, is able to avoid the problem of overdetermination.Kim (2004). This paper is largely based on my “Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), 3–36, and “On Being Realistic about Emergence”. The latter was presented at the Emergence/Reduction Workshop at the Institut Jean Nicod in the fall of 2003; as this paper has been promised for another publication, the present paper was expressly composed in order to provide a critical target for the commentaries by Marras and Wong.     

Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits

This paper propounds a new reading of Berkeley's account of the activity of finite spirits. Against existing interpretations, the paper argues that Berkeley does not hold that we causally contribute to the movement of our bodies. In contrast, our volitions to move our bodies are but occasions for God to cause their movement. In answer to the question of wherein then consists our activity, the paper proposes that our activity consists in the dual powers to produce (1) our volitions – the acts of willing – and (2) our ideas of imagination.     

What's left is closer to right : A response to keating

The present paper attempts to respond to criticisms made by Keating (1988, Developmental Review, 8, 376–384) regarding the present author's earlier paper which described a recasted model of formal operations ( Byrnes, 1988, Developmental Review, 8, 66–87). This earlier paper made a distinction between conceptual and procedural knowledge at the level of formal operations, and presented evidence supporting this recasted model. Keating (1988) argues that the recasted model fails to capture what Piaget originally intended, that it fails to incorporate a procedural knowledge component, and that there is some question as to what would constitute empirical support for the model. The present paper discusses each of these criticisms and others in turn, and clarifies earlier arguments.     

Two in one or one in two? Pushing off from Jung with Wolfgang Giegerich

This paper responds to a recent paper by Wolfgang Giegerich entitled ‘Two Jungs: apropos a paper by Mark Saban’. Giegerich disputes my assertion that the ‘rigorous notion’ at the heart of his psychology ‘finds no source in Jung's psychology, implicit or explicit’. In order to do this he posits the existence of two Jungs, an exoteric Jung and an esoteric Jung. The implications of Giegerich's binary scission of Jung are explored in this paper, and show that the tendency to exalt one Jung while disparaging the other betrays a comprehensive blindness toward the contradictory complexity of Jung's psychology as a whole. It is suggested that this blindness is the consequence of Giegerich's systematic prioritization of a neo‐Hegelian agenda that is in profound conflict with the telos of Jung's psychology.     

Against classical dialetheism

Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is, however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special perspective, this paper contends that classical dialetheism has no natural and plausible way to assign truth values to various truth-ineliminable sentences, i.e., sentences whose truth-conditions essentially involve the property of being true. Several examples of such truth-ineliminable sentences are given in the paper, and two classical dialetheist strategies for assigning them truth values are inspected. This paper argues that none of these strategies is successful.     

The Dao of Kongzi

This paper introduces the Analects of Kongzi (better known to English-speakers as 'Confucius') to non-specialist readers, and discusses two major lines of interpretation. According to one group of interpretations, the key to understanding the Analects is passage 4.15, in which a disciple says that 'loyalty' and 'reciprocity' together make up the 'one thread' of the Master's teachings. More recently, some interpreters have emphasised passage 13.3, which discusses 'correcting names': bringing words and things into proper alignment. This paper argues that both approaches are mistaken, based on interpolated and unrepresentative passages. The paper closes with a brief suggestion that the Analects reveals a thinker who emphasises cultivating virtues that allow for the appreciation of complex individual contexts, rather than one who seeks systematic generalisations. An afterword to the paper suggests that we should avoid both 'methodological dualism' (which posits a radical incommensurability between Western and Eastern philosophies) and 'the perennial philosophy' (which ignores differences in favour of similarities).     

The Public Schools: America's Achilles Heel

In a 1973 paper in The American Psychologist, a case was made for why it would take many decades for Blacks to improve their performance on school achievement and other cognitive tests. The paper was in opposition to Jensen's conclusion which emphasized genetics. One important part of the argument was deliberately omitted in that paper. The present paper deals with that omission which concerns the fact that our schools violate what is known about context for productive learning, a fact by no means peculiar to city schools. The near total failure of the educational reform movement has had and will continue to have consequences beyond the educational arena, one of these being Black anti-Semitism. Our cities are social time bombs. When they will ignite and explode is unpredictable. If classrooms become context for productive learning, the predicted positive outcomes require changes outside the schools, that is, the work arena.     

Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content

Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states. This paper has grown out of comments I made on Fodor’s paper “Revenge of the Given,” delivered at The Steven Humphrey Excellence in Philosophy Conference: “Content and Concepts: A Conference on the Philosophy of Mind” at the University of California, Santa Barbara, February 14, 2004. Thanks to Jerry Fodor for useful feedback, and to Barry Loewer for discussing with me the ideas that went into this paper.     

Religion and Self: Notions from a Cultural Psychological Perspective

After a brief introduction of a cultural psychological perspective, this paper turns to the concept of self. The paper proposes to conceive of that reality to which the concepts of self refer as a narrative, employing especially autobiographies and other ego-documents in empirical exploration. After discussing some psychological theories about “self,” the paper points out that they may well be applied in research on personal religiosity.     

The Philosophy of Joel Feinberg*

This paper is offered as a tribute to Joel Feinberg. The first section of the paper applies Feinberg’s analysis of freedom of expression to a contemporary case of academic freedom. The second section engages Feinberg’s work on rights and punishment. The paper ends with numerous quotations from Feinberg’s vast array of writings, words that express his ideas on a number of important problems that occupied his mind throughout his fruitful and influential career.     

Transient convergence and relational sensibility: Beyond the modern constitution of nature

The paper builds on the critique of what Latour (1993) terms the ‘modern constitution’ and its configuration of nature as an independent and external entity to human culture and politics. The paper suggests that, firstly, moving beyond the modern constitution to a world of amodern or postnature (Braun, 2004, Hayles, 1999) marks a shift from ontological stability to ontological instability, where ‘nature’ is now constituted by merging and emerging ontologies. In this unstable new world order, the paper argues that postnature should be understood as a transient convergence in a context of flow, union, and divergence. This perspective emphasises the role that emotions play in this relationship, arguing that they are both part and product of the transient convergence of postnature. ‘Humans’ are now constituted in and with the temporary coincidences that form ‘nature’, and the relational sensibility that is produced through this convergence is vital to fully understand the post-natural world. The paper concludes by suggesting that this postnature can provide new premises for protecting the world of which we are a part.     

Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness

When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for example in cases of absent-minded perception. If unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, then sensory quality is an insufficient condition for consciousness. The second part of the paper argues that there are even better reasons to think that sensory quality is an unnecessary condition for consciousness. The idea is that mental states can be conscious even when they lack sensory quality, for example, in the case of certain conscious propositional attitudes. In the third part of the paper, an alternative to the rejected supposition, drawn from the phenomenological tradition, is offered: that consciousness is a matter of implicit self-awareness, rather than of sensory quality. According to this alternative, a mental state is conscious when, and only when, it involves implicit self-awareness.     

MOTILITY,AGGRESSION, AND THE BODILY I: AN INTERPRETATION OF WINNICOTT

Among the central ideas associated with the name of Winnicott, scant mention is made of motility. This is largely attributable to Winnicott himself, who never thematized motility and never wrote a paper specifically devoted to the topic. This paper suggests both that the idea of motility is nonetheless of central significance in Winnicott's thought, and that motility is of central importance in the development and constitution of the bodily I. In elaborating both these suggestions, the paper gives particular attention to the connections between motility, continuity, aggression, and creativity in Winnicott's work.     

Solidarity and Community Engagement in Global Health Research

Abstract

Community engagement (CE) is gaining prominence in global health research. A number of ethical goals–spanning the instrumental, intrinsic, and transformative–have been ascribed to CE in global health research. This paper draws attention to an additional transformative value that CE is not typically linked to but that seems very relevant: solidarity. Both are concerned with building relationships and connecting parties that are distant from one another. This paper first argues that furthering solidarity should be recognized as another ethical goal for CE in global health research. It contends that, over time, CE can build the bases of solidaristic relationships—moral imagination, recognition, understanding, empathy—between researchers and community members. Applying concepts from existing accounts of solidarity, the paper develops preliminary ideas about who should be engaged and how to advance solidarity. The proposed approach is compared to current CE practice in global health research. Finally, the paper briefly considers how solidaristic CE could affect how global health research is performed.     

Diakonia Trinitatis Dei as/and Transformational Development

The paper acknowledges that different agencies acting against poverty and participating in poverty alleviation use different languages, for example, diakonia versus development and transformational development, while dealing with the same issues. Against the background of poverty in South Africa as well as development policies from South Africa, this paper discusses the importance of diakonia as founded in the trinitarian God, Father, Son, and Spirit. Using a missional paradigm, the paper discusses the missio Dei as it unites with the covenant, forgiveness, empowerment, and to make God known. The paper concludes that although diakonia has a more holistic and comprehensive approach, it is important to use language which is generally understood and accepted. It therefore suggests using the term “transformational development” to educate society about the concept of diakonia.     

Ethical Theory,Completeness &; Consistency

This paper argues that many leading ethical theories are incomplete, in that they fail to account for both right and wrong. It also argues that some leading ethical theories are inconsistent, in that they allow that an act can be both right and wrong. The paper also considers responses on behalf of the target theories.     

The Politics of Women's Studies and Men's Studies

This paper is a response to the problematic relation between men's studies and women's studies; it is also a particular response to Harry Brod's discussion of the theoretical need for men's studies programs in his article “The New Men's Studies: From Feminist Theory to Gender Scholarship.” The paper argues that a male feminist would be more effective in a women's studies program, that the latter already includes research about the experiences of both males and females. Although future research on both genders is needed, the paper argues that there does not currently exist a gap in theory or in practice in women's studies programs, as Brod claims. The paper argues in favor of both men and women working together to strengthen and broaden women's studies programs in existence and encourages the creation of more programs and more study of gender issues.