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T. L. S. Sprigge 《Synthese》1994,98(1):73-93
Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general.I must express my warm thanks to Alastair Hannay and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and to the organisers of the conference in Oslo who arranged to celebrate their sixtieth birthdays, for having been invited to participate. As I was a graduate student with Alastair Hannay at University College, London, when A. J. Ayer was the head of the department, and am his almost exact contemporary, I have taken the opportunity for some reflections on the way philosophy of mind has gone over the intervening years. This article retains some of the informality of style which was appropriate for such an occasion. 相似文献
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In Consciousness Explained, Dennett systematically deconstructs the notion of consciousness, emptying it of its central and essential features. He fails to recognize the self‐intimating nature of experience, in effect reducing experiences to reports or judgments that so‐and‐so is the case. His information‐processing model of meaning is unable to account for semantics, the way in which speakers and hearers relate strings of symbols to the world. This ability derives ultimately from our animal nature as experiencers, though culturally supplemented in various ways. But Dennett, while successful in rebutting Cartesianism about the mind, fails to take into account our natural history. He claims descent from Wittgenstein in his philosophy of mind, but he shows awareness only of Wittgensteinian's demolition of the private object of experience and overlooks the equally Wittgensteinian theme of humans as products of nature. 相似文献
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Maxine Haire 《Sophia》2007,46(3):305-311
Robert Preece’s The Psychology of Buddhist Tantra and Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche’s Everyday Consciousness and Primordial Awareness are reviewed. Both books address Tibetan Buddhism, and their common threads underscore this discussion. Even when separated
from their original contexts, the Tibetan Buddhist teachings offer understandings about a common human nature and a method
of transforming consciousness through awareness.
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Maxine HaireEmail: |
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Human Studies - In this article, I propose four considerations that might frame a history of economic consciousness from the pre-modern oikonomia to the modern economy. (1) Before the economy... 相似文献
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David Woodruff Smith 《Synthese》1992,90(1):119-143
A phenomenology of action is outlined, analyzing the structure of volition, kinesthesis, and perception in the experience of action, and, finally, the experience of embodiment in action. The intentionality of action is contrasted with that of thought and perception in regard to the role of the body, and the relations between an action, the experience of acting, and the context of the action are specified.An early version of this essay was read at the XVIIIth World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton, England, on 25 August 1988. I thank discussants on that occasion, including co-symposiasts Robert Gordon, Helen Lauer, and Jonathon Suzman; I thank Steve DeWitt, Ronald McIntyre, Martin Schwab, Peter Simons, and Peter Woodruff for discussions since; and I thank an anonymous referee for many detailed comments on the penultimate draft. The present edition is much longer than, and quite different from, what was read at Brighton. 相似文献
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Arthur Falk 《Erkenntnis》1995,43(2):151-180
Reflection on the self's way of being in consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based inany wayat all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires evensolitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I describe my kinetic model of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, aspeaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness.A version of this essay was read at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta (February 1985), University of North Bengal (March 1985) and Jadavpur University (March 1985). My thanks to S. Basu and S. Chakraborty at Rabindra Bharati, and to M. Ghosh and S. K. Sen at North Bengal, and to Ch. Gupta and P. K. Sen of Jadavpur University. Jadavpur's Prof. Sen's extensive comments in support of the cognitive model of reference led me to revise the essay thoroughly. North Bengal University may have published a version of this essay. I also thank Kent Baldner and the referees of this journal for insightful comments forcing further revisions. 相似文献
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In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing
is always a component of one’s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle’s view to establish that there are actions
in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps
us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes. 相似文献
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DAVID BRAUN 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,69(2):484-491
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Chien-hsing Ho 《亚洲哲学》2007,17(3):213-230
In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an approach of interpretive and comparative analysis, I also clarify significant differences between the theory and the correspondent Cartesian views in order to reveal the theory's contemporary relevancy. 相似文献
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L. Weiskrantz 《International journal of psychology》1998,33(3):227-233
There are several neuropsychological syndromes in which good residual function is retained in the absence of acknowledged awareness, among them blindsight, amnesia, and unilateral neglect. All of them point to the need in studying conscious awareness not only for an “on-line” demonstration of the relevant capacity, but for an independent commentary or classificatory response by the subject, whether human or animal. The parametric limits of blindsight (visual discrimination without awareness) can be measured using a “commentary key” psychophysical paradigm, and the results may possibly allow an approach to identifying neural structures involved in visual awareness. 相似文献
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