如何认识普世伦理——论道德的普遍性与特殊性之关系

普世伦理就是道德的普遍性,它存在于特殊性之中。离开特殊性的普遍性是不存在的。     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么,道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的,是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在;实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响;实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现:(1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下,个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断,说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下,个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断,说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此,道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

Is ontological revisionism uncharitable?

Some philosophers (‘nihilists’) deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers (‘universalists’) hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.     

文艺的信念:反抗道德虚假与道德虚无

在人类生活中,审美艺术创造发挥着重要的作用,它激发着人们的想象,显现着生命的形象力量。从价值论意义上说,人类生命活动的审美反恩,就是要探索生命的自由伦理,反抗道德虚假与道德虚无。道德虚假的盛行,是公正价值不畅的必然结果;道德虚无的兴起,是怀疑主义思潮作用的后果。现代文艺伦理学必须重建新型价值伦理,通过生命自由形象的创造,表达我们时代的内在呼声。     

Nihilism,Relativism, and Engelhardt

This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt's attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or content-full bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either nihilism or relativism. The first is the view that there is not even one true or valid moral code, and the second is the view that there is a plurality of true or valid moral codes. However, Engelhardt rejects both nihilism and relativism, at least in unrestricted form. Strictly speaking, he himself is a universalist, someone who believes that there is a single true moral code. Two argumentative strategies are employed by him to fend off unconstrained nihilism and relativism. The first argues that although all attempts to establish a content-full morality on the basis of secular reason fail, secular reason can still establish a content-less, purely procedural morality. Although not content-full and incapable of providing positive direction in life, much less a meaning of life, such a morality does limit the range of relativism and nihilism. The second argues that there is a single true, content-full morality. Grace and revelation, however, are needed to make it available to us; secular reason alone is not up to the task. This second line of argument is not pursued in The Foundations at any length, but it does crop up at times, and if it is sound, nihilism and relativism can be much more thoroughly routed than the first line of argument has it.Engelhardt's position and argumentative strategies are exposed at length and accorded a detailed critical examination. In the end, it is concluded that neither strategy will do, and that Engelhardt is probably committed to some form of relativism.     

颜色词与颜色认知的关系——基于民族心理学的研究视角

颜色词与颜色认知的关系是语言影响认知的重要领域.不同民族之间存在着语言和文化的差异.对于颜色词与颜色认知的关系,一直就存在着普遍进化理论和语言相对论的争论.既往研究通过哲学思辨、命名和计算、颜色分类、颜色记忆和颜色搜索等多种范式对颜色词与颜色认知的关系进行了卓有成效的探讨,使该领域的研究呈现出蓬勃发展的局面.     

走出价值相对主义

价值相对主义的理论失误和实践危害,使大多数价值哲学论者都力图克服之。新康德主义的形式先验主义的思路,舍勒的实质先验主义的思路,布伦坦诺的经验直觉主义的思路,培里的现代经验主义的思路,都是克服价值相对主义的不同尝试,都有其合理因素。但由于它们各自理论的缺陷,使之难以真正克服价值相对主义。我们认为,以实践为基点去理解价值的本质,应用唯物辩证的方法去说明价值的相对性与绝对性,才能走出价值相对主义。     

Preconditions for Normative Argumentation in a Pluralist World

A problem arises, both for philosophy and for argumentation theory, in a pluralist world where people hold widely different beliefs about what to do. Some responses to this problem, including relativism, might settle but do not provide any criteria for resolving such differences. Alternative responses seek a means of resolution in universalist, culture-neutral criteria which must be invoked in assessing all human action. A philosophically adequate account of universalism would contribute to an ideal of critical rationality, as well as to the ideas of field-invariance and of convincing, as opposed to persuasive, argumentation. The account's adequacy would require universality both in form and in content. Universality in form is secured by seeking universal preconditions for practical reasoning in general, rather than specifically for morality. Universality in content is harder, and candidates such as freedom, autonomy and health are problematic. An alternative content is provided by the proposition that the satisfaction of material preconditions is necessary for the performance of any action whatever. Neglect of these preconditions may constitute a fallacy in the extended sense found in argumentation theory, and assumptions about them should form part of the point of departure for any practical deliberation.     

Ethics: universal or global? The trends in studies of ethics in the context of globalization

The article discusses how theory and practice in global ethics affect each other. First, the author explores how the study of ethics has changed in the era of globalization and ponders what the role of the field of study of global ethics is in this context. Second, she wants to show how the logical fallacies in widening study field of ethics produce false polarizations between facts and value judgements in social ethics made in various cultural contexts. She further elaborates how these false polarizations prevent constructive cross-cultural and transnational discussions on ethical guidelines and principles that are needed to produce joint action (plans) to deal with serious ethical issues globally and nationally. Finally, the paper argues that in order to find a way to solve our shared complex ethical problems in global context, we need to get back to basics by focusing on the method of ethics, that is, self-critical and logical analysis of sound argumentation and justification of our values and moral principles.     

The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory

The traditional requirements upon the waging of a just war are ostensibly independent, but in actual practice each tenet is subject ultimately to the interpretation of a legitimate authority, whose declaration becomes the necessary and sufficient condition. While just war theory presupposes that some acts are absolutely wrong, it also implies that the killing of innocents can be rendered permissible through human decree. Nations are conventionally delimited, and leaders are conventionally appointed. Any group of people could band together to form a nation, and any person could, in principle, be appointed the leader of any nation. Because the just war approach assumes absolutism while implying relativism, the stance is paradoxical and hence rationally untenable.     

道德本能与道德判断

Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. Translated by Yu Xin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (12): 72–78     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.