Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance

Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be.     

Nihilism,Relativism, and Engelhardt

This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt's attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or content-full bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either nihilism or relativism. The first is the view that there is not even one true or valid moral code, and the second is the view that there is a plurality of true or valid moral codes. However, Engelhardt rejects both nihilism and relativism, at least in unrestricted form. Strictly speaking, he himself is a universalist, someone who believes that there is a single true moral code. Two argumentative strategies are employed by him to fend off unconstrained nihilism and relativism. The first argues that although all attempts to establish a content-full morality on the basis of secular reason fail, secular reason can still establish a content-less, purely procedural morality. Although not content-full and incapable of providing positive direction in life, much less a meaning of life, such a morality does limit the range of relativism and nihilism. The second argues that there is a single true, content-full morality. Grace and revelation, however, are needed to make it available to us; secular reason alone is not up to the task. This second line of argument is not pursued in The Foundations at any length, but it does crop up at times, and if it is sound, nihilism and relativism can be much more thoroughly routed than the first line of argument has it.Engelhardt's position and argumentative strategies are exposed at length and accorded a detailed critical examination. In the end, it is concluded that neither strategy will do, and that Engelhardt is probably committed to some form of relativism.     

文艺的信念:反抗道德虚假与道德虚无

在人类生活中,审美艺术创造发挥着重要的作用,它激发着人们的想象,显现着生命的形象力量。从价值论意义上说,人类生命活动的审美反恩,就是要探索生命的自由伦理,反抗道德虚假与道德虚无。道德虚假的盛行,是公正价值不畅的必然结果;道德虚无的兴起,是怀疑主义思潮作用的后果。现代文艺伦理学必须重建新型价值伦理,通过生命自由形象的创造,表达我们时代的内在呼声。     

走出价值相对主义

价值相对主义的理论失误和实践危害,使大多数价值哲学论者都力图克服之。新康德主义的形式先验主义的思路,舍勒的实质先验主义的思路,布伦坦诺的经验直觉主义的思路,培里的现代经验主义的思路,都是克服价值相对主义的不同尝试,都有其合理因素。但由于它们各自理论的缺陷,使之难以真正克服价值相对主义。我们认为,以实践为基点去理解价值的本质,应用唯物辩证的方法去说明价值的相对性与绝对性,才能走出价值相对主义。     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

如何认识普世伦理——论道德的普遍性与特殊性之关系

普世伦理就是道德的普遍性,它存在于特殊性之中。离开特殊性的普遍性是不存在的。     

The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism

The most popular argument against moral realism is the argument from disagreement: if there are mind‐independent moral facts, then we would not expect to find as much moral disagreement as we in fact do; therefore, moral realism is false. In this paper, I develop the flipside of this argument. According to this argument from agreement, we would expect to find lots of moral disagreement if there were mind‐independent moral facts. But we do not, in fact, find much moral disagreement; therefore, moral realism is false. I defend the argument, explain the empirical evidence that supports it, and show what makes this challenge novel and powerful.     

Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism

Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an “assertive” version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti‐realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse.     

道德本能与道德判断

Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. Translated by Yu Xin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (12): 72–78     

当代中国医德建设与相对主义医学伦理学

当代西方相对主义医学伦理学有许多建树,但也有其致命性的缺陷,这就是否定医学道德的客观绝对性和普遍性医学伦理准则。在引进、介绍了这种学说之后,需要下功夫同它进行对话,即以医德绝对性与相对性辩证统一的原理,对这种学说进行追问,从中借鉴有益的经验和教训,以顺利全面地推进我国当代的医学道德建设。     

Moral objectivism across the lifespan

We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found important interactions between attributions of objectivity and other factors, such as how strong participants’ moral opinions were and how much disagreement about the issue they perceived to exist within society. We believe our results have significant implications for debates about the nature of folk morality and about the nature of morality in general.     

Pragmatism and Feminism as Qualified Relativism

This article explores pragmatism's associationwith relativism, not to rescue it fromrelativism but rather to highlight how aspectsof the classic pragmatists' positions supportqualified relativism. I do so in an effort tohelp restore ``relativism' as a meaningfulconcept that is nuanced and complex, ratherthan naive and vulgar, as it is regularlyportrayed by more traditional philosophers. This nuanced relativism I call qualifiedrelativism. Qualified relativists insist thatall inquiry are affected by philosophicalassumptions which are culturally bound, andthat all inquirers are situated knowers who areculturally bound as well. However, we cancompensate for our cultural embeddedness byopening our horizons and including others inour conversations. I connect the classicpragmatist points to current feministepistemological work and show that qualifiedrelativists (pragmatists, feminists, andpostmodernists) can claim roots to theirpositions in Peirce, James, and Dewey, some ofthe very scholars others turn to for theirpragmatic realism and their nonvulgar absolutism.     

Relativism and Assertion

Relativism entails that sentences like ‘Liquorice is tasty’ are used to assert relativistic propositions—that is, propositions whose truth-value is relative to a taste standard. I will defend this view against two objections. According to the first objection, relativism is incompatible with a Stalnakerian account of assertion. I will show that this objection fails because Stalnakerian assertions are proposals rather than attempts to update the common ground. According to the second objection, relativism problematically predicts that we can correctly assess beliefs as false but faultless. I will show that it doesn't. Such assessments come out as incorrect because correct relativistic assertion requires the absence of a presupposition of non-commonality.     

Metaphilosophy and Relativism

I am concerned with the metaphilosophical questions of how we are to proceed when doing philosophy, and whether there is more than one way of achieving our aim. These questions are tackled initially by an examination of the answers given by Richard Double in his book Metaphilosophy and Freewill . It is argued that the considerations he rehearses in favour of metaphilosophical relativism are inconclusive, and that, in any case, it is a position that contains serious internal difficulties. An analogy is made with the problems encountered by Hume's sceptical theory of the self, and it is suggested that Double, like Hume, is implicitly presupposing the conclusion he is seeking to deny. He does so by relying upon certain critical procedures in the course of his argument. Next, I consider how Double might respond to this criticism, and it is concluded that such a rejoinder fails. Finally, I return to the questions which served as the starting point of this discussion, and I apply the conclusions I have reached to their possible resolution. It is claimed that a form of rationalism has been vindicated.     

The Problem of Confucian Moral Cultivation and Its Solution: Using Ritual Propriety to Support Rule by Law

Thinking about the decline of morality in post-reform China,the author analyzes the development of virtuous governance based on moral education,and concludes that the reason why ancient rulers were so infatuated with it was the inhibitive function of public evaluation on moral transgressions in familiar neighborhoods.However,as China transforms into a dynamic and commercial society,and its people move from familiar neighborhoods to alienated communities in the cities,public evaluation is losing its power over moral transgressors.To prevent the collapse of the moral system,it is necessary to use rule by law to foster people's sense of justice and rule-consciousness-not to simply hope for the appearance of more altruists.This is possible because law is the embodiment of moral principle,and because legal restraints and penalties can be internalized as habits.After a sense of justice and rule-consciousness has been established in people,we can again take up Confucian virtue education to nurture people's sense of shame and dignity,and their humane and righteous mind.However,to stop the current chaos and corruption,it is urgent that we adopt rule by law and supplement it with moral education.     

Rethinking Human Rights A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other Matters

In reviewing five edited collections and one monograph from the 1990s, the article summarizes the present status of the human rights revolution that was signaled by the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . It goes on to elaborate and evaluate some of the attempts contained in these books to deal with theoretical and practical controversies surrounding the subject of human rights, particularly the discussion of what to make of cultural relativism as far as human rights are concerned. Finally, the article summarizes some recent thinking and research on a neglected area, namely compliance with human rights standards protecting freedom of religion or belief.     

Moral variables before and after a court‐mandated psychological treatment of men convicted of violence against their partners: Evolution and relationship with sexist attitudes

Assuming that some moral variables can play a role in explaining intimate partner violence (IPV) and its treatment, this study explores the evolution of the relationship between some moral variables, which have recently been connected to IPV, and sexist attitudes in 160 men convicted of violence against the partner. The general hypothesis is that the moral variables can change during psychological treatments, and therefore be intervention targets, because they are related to more traditional variables in the field of IPV, such as sexist attitudes. To test this idea, we took pretreatment and posttreatment measures on moral variables (moral absolutism and moral foundations) and sexist attitudes (benevolent and hostile sexism) and analyzed their relationships and their changes after the completion of a prescribed psychological treatment. The results showed that (a) the moral variables were significantly correlated with the sexist attitudes before and after the treatment; (b) the men convicted of violence against the partner held with less certainty their general beliefs about morality and their particular beliefs about the binding moral foundations (in‐group, authority, and purity) after the unspecific psychological treatment; and (c) their moral absolutism before the treatment predicted the remaining sexist attitudes after the treatment. Practical implications can be drawn to better understand this kind of prevalent violence and eventually to improve the psychological treatments.     

道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响

本文通过两个研究探讨道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响。研究一中,被试随机分为三组,分别抄写“正性特质词语”“负性特质词语”或“中性词语”,并回忆自己所经历的与关键词有关的事情。启动完成后,考察其捐助行为。结果发现,正性特质启动组被试愿意捐助的数目显著高于负性特质和中性词语启动组。研究二用同样的方法改变被试的道德自我知觉,然后对被试的作弊行为进行了考察。结果发现,正性特质启动组的作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组,负性特质启动组的作弊发生率和作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组。本研究表明,道德自我调节过程不一定遵循负反馈机制：虽然“道德净化效应”在本研究中得到了部分验证,但是我们的实验结果不符合“道德许可效应”的预期。     

Emotional Reactions and Moral Judgment: The Effects of Morally Challenging Interactions in Military Operations

This study explores the association between different types of morally challenging interactions during military deployment and response strategies (e.g., moral justification), as well as the mediating role of moral emotions. Interviews with Dutch servicemen who participated in military operations (e.g., in Afghanistan, Angola; N = 45) were content coded. We found a relationship between local-cultural and team-related interactions and moral justification; these effects were mediated by other-condemning emotions. Similarly, other-condemning emotions mediated the relationship between local-cultural interactions and relativism. This study points at the importance of other-condemning emotions in shaping military reactions to frequently occurring morally challenging interactions.