How do you feel?

Does your heart pound because you feel afraid, or do you feel afraid because your heart is racing? This question is the crux of a century-old controversy, stemming from a proposal by William James. A recent neuroimaging study addresses this issue and suggests that the functional connectivity of the insula could provide the key to resolving the debate.     

How do people know?

To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.     

Logic and Reasoning: do the facts matter?

Modern logic is undergoing a cognitive turn, side-stepping Frege’s ‘antipsychologism’. Collaborations between logicians and colleagues in more empirical fields are growing, especially in research on reasoning and information update by intelligent agents. We place this border-crossing research in the context of long-standing contacts between logic and empirical facts, since pure normativity has never been a plausible stance. We also discuss what the fall of Frege’s Wall means for a new agenda of logic as a theory of rational agency, and what might then be a viable understanding of ‘psychologism’ as a friend rather than an enemy of logical theory. Edited by Hannes Leitgeb     

Why do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?

Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom‐Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against a possible objection. 1     

How do people order stimuli?

People may find it easier to construct an order after first representing stimuli on a scale or categorizing them, particularly when the number of stimuli to be ordered is large or when some of them must be remembered. Five experiments tested this hypothesis. In two of these experiments (1 and 3), we asked participants to rank line lengths or to rank photographs by artistic value. The participants provided evidence of how they performed these tasks, and this evidence indicated that they often made use of some preliminary representation—either a metric or a categorization. Two further experiments (2 and 4) indicated that people rarely produced rankings when given a choice of assessment measures for either the length of lines or the artistic value of photographs. In Experiment 5, when the number of lines was larger or lines were only visible one at a time, participants were faster at estimating line lengths as a percentage of the card covered than at rank ordering the lengths. Overall, the results indicate that ordering stimuli is not an easy or natural process when the number of stimuli is large or when the stimuli are not all perceptible at once. An implication is that the psychological measures available to individuals are not likely to be purely ordinal when many of the elements being measured must be recalled.     

How Much do Chinese Applicants Fake?

More and more organizations have applicants who come from different cultural backgrounds, and according to new research, these cultural backgrounds matter for applicants' self‐presentational behavior (i.e., faking). If applicants come from China, can organizations assume that they will present themselves modestly, as suggested by Chinese norms? Or should organizations assume that there will be much self‐presentational behavior due to the high unemployment rate, at least among Chinese graduates? To answer this question, we obtained data from 307 Chinese applicants on their self‐presentational behavior, using the randomized response technique to ensure anonymity. We compared these data with similar data sets from the United States, Switzerland, and China. Contrary to the proposed modesty hypothesis in Chinese samples, perhaps due to high unemployment, self‐presentation was as prevalent in Chinese samples as in American samples.     

How do infants recognize joint attention?

The emergence of joint attention is still a matter of vigorous debate. It involves diverse hypotheses ranging from innate modules dedicated to intention reading to more neuro-constructivist approaches. The aim of this study was to assess whether 12-month-old infants are able to recognize a “joint attention” situation when observing such a social interaction. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm, we habituated infants to a “joint attention” video and then compared their looking time durations between “divergent attention” videos and “joint attention” ones using a 2 (familiar or novel perceptual component) × 2 (familiar or novel conceptual component) factorial design. These results were enriched with measures of pupil dilation, which are considered to be reliable measures of cognitive load. Infants looked longer at test events that involved novel speaker and divergent attention but no changes in infants’ pupil dilation were observed in any conditions. Although looking time data suggest that infants may appreciate discrepancies from expectations related to joint attention behavior, in the absence of clear evidence from pupillometry, the results show no demonstration of understanding of joint attention, even at a tacit level. Our results suggest that infants may be sensitive to relevant perceptual variables in joint attention situations, which would help scaffold social cognitive development. This study supports a gradual, learning interpretation of how infants come to recognize, understand, and participate in joint attention.     

How do we understand empathy systemically?

This paper considers what a systemic understanding of empathy might be in the context of recent developments in systemic approaches. Clinical work is the basis for an exploration of which systemic ideas might be useful in thinking about 'systemic empathy'. The question of whether empathy is inherent in the systemic approach is considered.     

How do we track invisible objects?

We previously demonstrated that observers in multiple object tracking experiments can successfully track targets when all the objects simultaneously vanish for periods lasting several hundred milliseconds (Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, Dimase, &; Wolfe, 2005). How do observers do this? Since observers can track objects that move behind occluders (e.g., Scholl &; Pylyshyn, 1999), they may treat a temporal gap as a case of complete occlusion. If so, performance should improve if occlusion cues (deletion and accretion) are provided and items disappear and reappear one by one (asynchronously), rather than simultaneously. However, we found better performance with simultaneous than with asynchronous disappearance (Experiment 1), whereas occlusion cues were detrimental (Experiment 2). We propose that observers tolerate a gap in tracking by storing the current task state when objects vanish and resuming tracking on the basis of that memory when the objects reappear (a task-switching account).     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.     

How do counsellors make client assessments?

This paper reports on a consultation exercise undertaken with 18 experienced counsellors on how they make client assessments. These practitioners expressed a high degree of consensus on the purposes of assessment making (to reach a shared understanding with the client about their willingness and ability to undertake a shared therapeutic journey) but the way in which they approached the task varied according to the theoretical orientation they acquired during training. Although most had developed their counselling skills and techniques considerably since initial training, not all had integrated the assessment implications of later experience into their formulation making. The implications of combining single model assessment with eclectic practice are discussed, particularly in relation to making a decision to continue working with a client or to refer a client to a colleague. The authors call for further debate on how counsellors find meaning in what their clients say, why they ask the questions they do at the assessment stage, and how they achieve coherence in relation to ideas and skills accrued through ongoing training and practice. The implications of such a debate for training and supervision are discussed.     

How do people apprehend large numerosities?

People discriminate remarkably well among large numerosities. These discriminations, however, need not entail numerical representation of the quantities being compared. This research evaluated the role of both non-numerical and numerical information in adult judgments of relative numerosity for large-numerosity spatial arrays. Results of Experiment 1 indicated that judgments of relative numerosity were affected by the amount of open space in the arrays being compared. Further, the accuracy of verbal estimates of the numerosities of the arrays made upon completion of the comparison task bore little relation to performance on that task. Experiment 2, however, showed that numerical estimates for individually presented arrays were affected in much the same way by open space within or around the edges of the array as were the comparative judgments examined in Experiment 1. The findings suggest that adults heuristically utilize non-numerical cues as well as numerical information in apprehending large numerosities.     

How do somersaulters land on their feet?

Body movements of trampolinists landing upright from forward somersaults, with eyes open and closed, were analyzed to test a theory of how braking and timing of actions are conjointly controlled. In regulating landing, rotation has to be slowed by extending the body so that it reaches the upright just as the feet hit the trampoline. Extending a theory of visual control of linear braking, it was hypothesized that upright landing is achieved by perceptually regulating body extension so as to keep the ratio angle of body to upright: rate of change of angle (the tau function of the angle) proportional to time-to-landing. The data support the hypothesis, indicate that vision improves precision of control, and argue further for the value of the tau function in the perceptual regulation of action.     

How do children climb out of cribs?

48 children between the ages of 16 and 32 mo. were observed climbing out of a crib. Each child was observed four times climbing out of the crib. All the children were able to walk independently and were less than 35 in. tall. Two different climbing patterns were identified and associated with a location of the climbing event within the crib environment. Most children (90%) climb from a crib by first moving to a corner of the crib and then start climbing from the crib. The remaining 10% of the children used a side-climbing pattern in at least one of the four observations. Crib safety standards have eliminated the most common catch-point, the cornerpost extension from cribs. Since at least 10% of the children climbed over the side of the crib rather than at the corner, any potential catch-points should be eliminated from the complete perimeter of the crib.