The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism

Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare‐prior and excellence‐prior eudaimonism, and I make some preliminary remarks on behalf of welfare‐prior eudaimonism.     

Wolterstorff on Love and Justice

In Justice in Love, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for a unique ethical orientation called “care‐agapism.” He offers it as an alternative to theories of benevolence‐agapism found in Christian ethics on the one hand and to the philosophical orientations of egoism, utilitarianism, and eudaimonism on the other. The purported uniqueness and superiority of his theory lies in its ability to account for the conceptual compatibility of love and justice while also positively incorporating self‐love. Yet in attempting to articulate a “bestowed worth” account of human dignity—in which dignity is given by divine love and respected in acts of justice—Wolterstorff leans on an unstable characterization of how love and the good are conceptually interwoven. As a result, his reader cannot be sure about the theoretical superiority of care‐agapism. Moreover, Wolterstorff's attempt to value self‐love and at the same time reject eudaimonism depends on a dubious interpretation of Augustine carried over from Justice: Rights and Wrongs, which itself further depends on a mischaracterization of the possible varieties of eudaimonism. This mistake is unfortunate because, on a closer reading of Augustine, one finds an agapistic account of eudaimonism that could have significantly helped Wolterstorff's overall account of the complementary relation of love and justice.     

Kant’s Quasi‐Eudaimonism

In contrast to eudaimonism, Kant argues that moral reasoning and prudential reasoning are two distinct uses of practical reason, each with its own standard for good action. Despite Kant’s commitment to the ineradicable potential for fundamental conflict between these types of practical reasoning, I argue that once we shift to consideration of a developmental narrative of these faculties, we see that virtuous moral reasoning is able to substantively influence prudential reasoning, while prudential reason should be responsive to such influence. Further, Kant indicates the integration of virtue as a commitment concerning practical priorities, and so too what should and should not agree with the agent, is beneficial for prudential reasoning by prudential reasoning’s own standards. Although Kant’s ethical system breaks from eudaimonism in significant ways, it retains the eudaimonist claim that virtuously‐informed pursuits of happiness are not only better for virtue, but also better for happiness.     

Christianity and Eudaimonia,Luck and Eudaimonism

I argue that Christians have at least two reasons to reject eudaimonism, interpreted as the view that attaining eudaimonia—or happiness—is what fulfills the moral life. First, I contend Christian conceptions of eudaimonia should encompass more than realized moral excellence and its requirements. Second, I claim Christians should construe the love at the heart of their moral life as fully realizable even if it is not evidently reciprocated. Both affirmations contradict eudaimonism by implying that eudaimonia depends on more than fulfilling the moral life—the former by rendering eudaimonia more subject to luck than eudaimonists can allow, the latter by depicting the moral life as less subject to luck than eudaimonists can accept. These affirmations also enable Christians to regard God’s love integral to eudaimonia apart from its role in realizing moral excellence and to deny all inability to attain eudaimonia manifests moral failure.     

Parenting empathy: Associations with dimensions of parent and child psychopathology

Background. Parenting empathy, the understanding by parents, and the sharing in their child's perspective, represents an important element of competent parenting. The present study tested the hypotheses that maternal empathy might be lower where mothers or their children display symptoms of psychopathology. Method. Mothers (N = 268) of school‐aged children completed questionnaires on child‐directed empathy and egoistic personal distress and their own and their child's symptoms of psychopathology across a number of broadly defined domains. Results. Child conduct problems were associated with decreased child‐directed empathy and increased maternal egoistic distress. Maternal aggressive characteristics and maternal ADHD symptoms were each associated with increased egoistic personal distress. Conclusion. The findings indicate that symptoms of psychopathology in children and adults are associated with deficits in empathy and increased maternal egoistic personal distress. The implications of the findings for responsive parenting and child social behaviour are discussed.     

Agency,Patiency, and The Good Life: the Passivities Objection to Eudaimonism

Many contemporary eudaimonists emphasize the role of agency in the good life. Mark LeBar, for example, characterizes his own eudaimonist view this way: “It is agentist, not patientist, because it emphasizes that our lives go well in virtue of what we do, rather than what happens, to us or otherwise”. Nicholas Wolterstorff, however, has argued that this prioritizing of agency over patiency is a fatal flaw in eudaimonist accounts of well-being. Eudaimonism must be rejected, Wolterstorff argues, because many life-goods are “passivities” that are out of a person’s hands, including how she is treated by others. In this paper, I defend eudaimonism against this passivities objection. I argue that eudaimonism can maintain its agentist character while also capturing the element of truth in the passivities objection—namely, that human well-being is vulnerable and social. I also argue that eudaimonists should avail themselves of the notion of receptivity to capture important aspects of the good life.     

The Merits of Eudaimonism

This paper starts with Immanuel Kant’s definition of “eudaimonism” (a term he created) as a single‐source account of motivation, and explains why he thinks the eudaimonist is unacceptably self‐regarding. In order to modify and improve Kant’s account, the paper then revisits the Christian scholastics. Scotus is distinguished from Aquinas on the grounds that Scotus has a more robust conception of the will that encompasses the ranking of the affection for advantage (for the agent’s happiness and perfection) and the affection for justice (for what is good in itself, independent of this relation to the agent). This is a double‐source account of motivation. With these conceptual resources in hand, the paper goes on to examine Jean Porter’s defense of eudaimonism, urging that she begs the question against the Scotist view. Finally, the paper makes a conciliating suggestion that preserves most, but not all, of what the eudaimonist wants.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.     

SPINOZA'S SUMMUM BONUM

Abstract: As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this know‐ledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thing to the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods that we seek for their own sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia.     

Intentional (Nation‐)States: A Group‐Agency Problem for the State’s Right to Exclude

Most philosophical defences of the state’s right to exclude immigrants derive their strength from the normative importance of self‐determination. If nation‐states are taken to be the political institutions of a people, then the state’s right to exclude is the people’s right to exclude – and a denial of this right constitutes an abridgement of self‐determination. In this article, I argue that this view of self‐determination does not cohere with a group‐agency view of nation‐states. On the group‐agency view that I defend, a nation‐state is the kind of group‐agent that does not supervene on the intentionality of member/citizens. If we think that a nation‐state is an intentional group‐agent in its own right, then we should think that self‐determination resides with the institutions of the state rather than with the citizens. If nation‐states do not supervene on the intentionality of citizens, then it is unclear why citizens might have the right to control membership in the state as a feature of self‐determination.     

Testing Error Management Theory: Exploring the Commitment Skepticism Bias and the Sexual Overperception Bias

Research on error management theory indicates that men tend to overestimate women's sexual interest and women underestimate men's interest in committed relationships ( Haselton & Buss, 2000 ). We test the assumptions of the theory in face‐to‐face, stranger interactions with 111 man‐woman dyads. Support for the theory emerges, but potential boundary conditions are observed. In addition, we find that women's perceptions of men's desire for commitment is related to the women's own self‐reported sexual interest but that the reverse does not hold for men. Finally, we find evidence consistent with the proposition that people project their own level of interest in sex or in a committed relationship onto their interaction partners.     

Beyond the Boundaries of Current Human Nature: Some Theological and Ethical Reflections on Transhumanism

Following a brief overview of the emerging transhumanist vision, Childs turns to a theological and ethical assessment. He recommends that there take place a community‐wide conversation over the prospects of a post‐human future that includes both nerds and theologians along with all stakeholders in a healthy human future. Christians should be guided by the eschatological values that inform love's commitment to the common good. How does the common commitment to justice take concrete shape in public policies governing the mounting advances in science and technology? How does the commitment to life and healing speak to the ethical distinction between the uses of biomedical technology for therapy versus for enhancement?     

Nietzsche's Critique of Pure Altruism—Developing an Argument from Human,All Too Human

Abstract

Nietzsche often appears, especially in his writings from the middle period, to endorse psychological egoism, namely the claim that all actions are motivated by, and are for the sake of, the agent’s own self-interest. I argue that Nietzsche’s position in Human, All Too Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) should not be so understood. Rather, he is claiming, more weakly and more plausibly, that no action is entirely unegoistic, entirely free of egoistic motivations. Thus some actions might be motivated both by egoistic and unegoistic motives, on his view. Nietzsche’s argument may, in other words, be understood to be directed specifically against Schopenhauer’s portrayal of moral motivation, as pure, entirely unalloyed altruism, to show that this sort of action is impossible, not to rule out the possibility of any altruistic motive whatsoever. In light of Schopenahuer’s moral psychology, to which Nietzsche to some extent adhered at that time, I develop a concept of motivation and reconstruct Nietzsche’s argument.     

On Not Giving Up the World – Davidson and the Grounds of Belief

Abstract

What is the relation between our beliefs, or thoughts in general, and the perceptual experience of the world that gives rise to those beliefs? Donald Davidson is usually taken to have a well‐known answer to this question that runs as follows: while our beliefs are, at least in part, caused by our experience, such experience does not thereby count as providing a rational ground for those beliefs; our beliefs are thus evidentially grounded in other beliefs, but not in the experience that gives rise to them. John McDowell, among others, has challenged this Davidsonian picture on the grounds that it actually severs the connection between beliefs and their proper evidential grounds. Against such a view, this paper argues the Davidsonian position grounds belief in the specificity of our own locatedness in the world, and in the more general and prior embeddedness of belief in the world that is a part of the very concept of belief.     

GOD IN THE CAVE

When Finite and Infinite Goods was published in 1999, it took its place as one of the few major statements of a broadly Augustinian ethical philosophy of the past century. By “broadly Augustinian” I refer to the disposition to combine a Platonic emphasis on a transcendent source of value with a traditionally theistic emphasis on the value‐creating capacities of absolute will. In the form that this disposition takes with Robert Merrihew Adams, it is the resemblance between divine and a finite excellence that makes the finite excellence objectively of value, and it is the correspondence of an obligation to a divine command that makes the obligation objectively obligatory. I look closely at the complexity of this ethical division of labor—between the good and the right—mainly as it appears in the context of Finite and Infinite Goods, but also with attention to the broader corpus of Adams's writings, particularly his work on Leibniz and the essays of his that have been gathered together in The Virtue of Faith. I argue that there is a creative tension in his work between his desire to secure an objective basis for ethics and his affirmation of the value of grace, a love that is not proportioned to the excellence of its object. This tension, I further argue, ought to be resolved in the direction of grace.     

Green consumerism: The influence of product attributes and values on purchasing intentions

Generally, a majority of consumers support the idea of purchasing green products. However, this is often not translated into actual behaviour. We argue that there is a trade‐off between the influence of product attributes on purchasing decisions, whereby it is assumed that consumers tend to focus on egoistic product attributes first, followed by green product attributes. In two experimental studies (N = 100 and N = 107), we find support for this reasoning: If product attributes fulfil self‐serving motives (low price, familiar or well‐known brand), green product attributes (cruelty free and low environmental impact) influence purchasing intentions more than when self‐serving motives are not fulfilled (high price, unfamiliar or unknown brand). Further, we investigated if and how values weaken or strengthen the influence of product attributes on purchasing intentions. We conclude that biospheric values steer how product attributes influence purchasing intentions stronger than egoistic values. In line with our expectations, we find that if biospheric values are weak, egoistic product attributes are more influential, whereas if biopheric values are strong, green product attributes are more influential. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

To trust or not to trust: How self‐construal affects consumer responses to interpersonal influence

Although people generally prefer persuasive messages that align with their self‐construal, the present research explores a seemingly paradoxical situation wherein mismatched message that does not align with people's self‐construal is positively received. Given sufficient cognitive capacity to trigger persuasion knowledge—the knowledge of persuasion tactics that are encountered in the marketplace, the use of an individually focused persuasion attempt on consumers with an interdependent self‐construal results in greater levels of trust in the sales agent. In contrast, consumers with an independent self‐construal respond similarly to different types of persuasion attempts. Persuasion knowledge is a mechanism for variations in trust. The findings replicate those of prior work, and the robustness of the effects is confirmed via small‐scale meta‐analysis.     

“WHY BE MORAL?” The Cheng Brothers' Neo‐Confucian Answer

In this article, I present a neo‐Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo‐Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self‐interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self‐interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self‐interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self‐interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa.