Four meanings of “categorization”: A conceptual analysis of research on person perception

It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people. However, the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different underlying definitions in the person perception literature. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle four existing definitions: (a) categorization as representing, (b) categorization as dichotomizing, (c) categorization as organizing, and (d) categorization as grouping. Subsequently, we show that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping stone for more differentiated models of person perception.     

Can Shneidman's “Ten Commonalities of Suicide” Accommodate Rational Suicide?

Shneidman's (1985 ) commonly reproduced “Ten Commonalities of Suicide” cannot accommodate rational suicide, as the concept has been defined in recent literature, and therefore are not “commonalities” of all suicides. Quotes from Shneidman describing the “commonalities” are provided and selected items are briefly examined in light of one set of criteria for rational suicide. It is suggested that Shneidman's list, which is inherently biased against allowing for the possibility of rational suicide, be renamed so that its contents will not continue to be inappropriately used as evidence that suicide cannot be rational.     

Learning about Spirituality Together with “Seekers”

The present era, often referred to as post‐secular, has in many places seen a resurgence in spirituality. Nevertheless, the contemporary quest for spirituality is unique in the sense that many people do not expect to have their spiritual needs fulfilled within the structures of organized religion, starting on a journey of their own explorations instead. Sociologists of religion, therefore, tend to employ the “dwellers” and “seekers” paradigm to account for this phenomenon. This paper will explore this phenomenon in the context of the Czech Republic, whose citizens are frequently characterized as distrustful toward institutional religiosity, through the lens of the recent World Council of Churches' affirmation on mission and evangelism, Together towards Life: Mission and Evangelism in Changing Landscapes (TTL). For our purpose, the statement's emphasis on both “transformative spirituality” and “mission from the margins” will be of central importance. Using the notion of transformative spirituality as the energy engendered by the Spirit for the transformation of life and creation, it will be suggested that “seekers” can be agents in God's mission of liberation, reconciliation, and transformation, despite their inability or unwillingness to identify themselves with the church as institution. Keeping in mind ethical considerations, the paper will not seek to make a case for a forced “christening” of the seekers. Rather, it will argue that they can become partners in missio Dei, thus giving the notion of “mission from the margins” a new, contextually relevant dimension.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

“Baba Has Come to Civilize Us”: Developmental Idealism and Framing the Strict Demands of the Brahma Kumaris

This article extends and complicates the theory that “strict churches are strong” based on the strict demands that were followed and not followed by the Brahma Kumaris in Nepal. To be successful, strict religious groups must not only be strict, but also frame their strictness in ways that resonate with the everyday experiences and commonly held beliefs of their members. Nepali women involved with the Brahma Kumaris tend to accept and follow the group's demands when those demands have been framed as modern, and that framing is resonant with the prevailing definitions of modernity offered by Western development agencies. When the modern framing is not resonant, as with the case of framing celibacy as “spiritual birth control,” the strict demand is not followed, and the frame itself is rejected in favor of the practice being defined in different terms.     

Derrida's Worldly Responsibility: The Opening between “Faith” and the “Sacred”

This article will theorize how Derrida's deconstruction signifies a fundamental ontological alterity. We will examine the use of both the tropes of “sacred” and “faith” as tropes to express this possibility. We will articulate how deconstruction, as a development of phenomenology, provides a theoretical nexus where the alterity of things and persons may be thought. We will arrive at the paradoxical formulation of “ontological alterity” as a key moment in deconstructive thinking. Essentially we will argue that deconstruction offers the resources to think the relation between other person and things in the world as motivated by a firm radicalization of Heideggerean worldliness and Levinasian alterity.     

The american “colonization” of northwest European social psychology after World WAR II

The term colonization as used in this article does not refer to the suppression of one culture by another, but to a voluntary intellectual submission, eventually resulting in a “neo-colonial” relationship in which, in spite of a “decolonization” movement, much of the dominant culture has been retained. Contrary to the traditional view, Europe had a rich social psychological literature before the Second World War, and much of this early work still is of interest for contemporary social psychology. The Netherlands is used as an example of the “colonization” of Northwest European social psychology after 1945. It is shown that there has been an effort on the part of the older generation to integrate the European heritage and the newer American social psychology. The younger generation, however, according to an analysis of citations, adopted American social psychology, as a guiding model soon after the Second World War. The colonization metaphor draws attention to the power aspects of knowledge transfer. The author concludes that later “de-colonization” does not imply a turning away from everything American, but a cross-fertilization of perspectives, leading to a truly international approach. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

“In‐Group Love” and “Out‐Group Hate” in Repeated Interaction Between Groups

Costly individual participation in intergroup conflict can be motivated by “in‐group love”—a cooperative motivation to help the in‐group, by “out‐group hate”—an aggressive or competitive motivation to hurt the out‐group, or both. This study employed a recently developed game paradigm (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008) designed specifically to distinguish between these two motives. The game was played repeatedly between two groups with three players in each group. In addition, we manipulated the payoff structure of the interaction that preceded the game such that half of the groups experienced peaceful coexistence and the other half experienced heightened conflict prior to the game. Enabling group members to express in‐group love independently of out‐group hate significantly reduced intergroup conflict. Group members strongly preferred to cooperate within their group, rather than to compete against the out‐group for relative standing, even in the condition in which the repeated game was preceded by conflict. Although both “in‐group love” and “out‐group hate” somewhat diminished as the game continued (as players became more selfish), choices indicative of the former motivation were significantly more frequent than choices indicative of the latter throughout the interaction. We discuss the implications of these findings for conflict resolution. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exposing information sharing as strategic behavior: power as responsibility and “Trust” buttons

Online platforms' success depends on individual's information sharing (IS). However, previous research showed that “knowledge is power” is a default‐perception in organizations and that individuals share relatively unimportant information while keeping the important private information for themselves. Trust has also been identified as important enabler of IS. We examined the role of power construed as responsibility for others' outcomes and of a “Trust” button, a theory‐inspired technological feature, using a 2(Power construals: opportunity vs. responsibility) × 2(Buttons: “Like” vs. “Like‐or‐Trust”) × 2(Information sharedness as within‐subjects factor; public, private) design. Findings showed that construing power as responsibility and “Trust” button's presence increased the sharing of private information; clicking behavior yielded insights into the underlying mechanisms. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

UNIVERSITY WITH CONDITIONS: A DECONSTRUCTIVE READING OF DERRIDA'S “THE UNIVERSITY WITHOUT CONDITION”

The possibility of a Derridian theory of the university lies not in the discussion of the “as if” in “The University without Condition” but, rather, in a theoretical crack that Derrida's book promised to elucidate—between the “as if” and the “perhaps,” the performative and the event, transcendence and immanence. Moreover, we see a kind of rupture between this book and numerous texts from the 1970s and 80s, which are collected and published under the title of Right to Philosophy. Here lies a real philosophical stake. We see between the early Derrida and the later Derrida not only an ethico‐political turn but also, so to speak, a radical transition from the problematic of institution or case law (jurisprudence) to the axiomatic of law (loi) by aggravation of the transcendental.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

Luck,Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence

There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”     

INVESTIGATING THE “SCIENCE” IN “EASTERN RELIGIONS”: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

This article explores some of the understandings of “science” that are often employed in the literature on “science and Eastern religions.” These understandings crucially shape the raging debates between the avid proponents and the keen detractors of the thesis that Eastern forms of spirituality are uniquely able to subsume the sciences into their metaphysical–axiological horizons. More specifically, the author discusses some of the proposed relations between “science” and “Eastern religions” by highlighting three themes: (a) the relation between science and metaphysics, (b) the relation between science and experience, and (c) the European origins of science. The analysis of these relations requires a methodological inquiry into some of the culturally freighted valences of “science,” “metaphysics,” and “experience.”     

Measuring Political Thinking: Development and Validation of a Scale for “Deliberation Within”

Compared to the concept of interpersonal deliberation, little is known about the underlying and preceding cognitive processes of citizens' deliberative discussions. The aim of this article is to develop a psychometric measurement for these processes, which—following an idea advanced by Goodin ( 2000, 2003 )—may be called “deliberation within.” The measurement is constructed based on theoretical definitions of the concept and further normative criteria of citizen deliberation. In three empirical studies using independent samples, the psychometric properties of the measurement are assessed, and evidence for its reliability as well as structural and criterion validity is offered. The resulting scale may serve as a useful instrument not only for deliberation research, but also for further communication research related to political processes.     

Derrida's “Antigonanette”: On the Quasi‐Transcendental

In this article, I rely both on Derrida's 1974 work Glas, as well as Derrida's 1971–72 lecture course, “La famille de Hegel,” to argue that the concept of the quasi‐transcendental is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel and to trace its implications beyond the Hegelian system. I follow Derrida's analysis of the role of Antigone—or, as the lecture course has it, “Antigonanette”—in Hegel's thought to argue that the quasi‐transcendental indicates a re(con)striction of empirical difference into the transcendental, which is thereby only ever provisionally transcendental. I then argue that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is neither a general economy, nor is it in each case singular, but rather it ambivalently oscillates between these two. Finally, I treat the temporality of the quasi‐transcendental, arguing that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is not prior to the re(con)striction of empirical difference, but is paradoxically produced by it by being retroactively constituted. I take up this analysis for the sake of describing what I contend is the quasi‐transcendental structure of constitutive exclusion, a way of understanding the conceptual structure of political bodies, and the political structure of concepts.