Nothing Matters in Survival

Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an “extreme” view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor Jim Rachels, whose final days exemplified his own unselfish morality as well as the “neutralist” ideal we espouse. As an appendix, we include the last original work to be published by James Rachels, in which he criticizes Sidgwick’s most famous defense of egoism.     

Conceivability,Imagination and Modal Knowledge*

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology.     

Reliability and the Value of Knowledge*

Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably‐produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably‐produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably‐held belief is non‐accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.     

Extending Everything with Nothing

Philosophia - In this paper we offer a new solution to the old paradox of nothingness. This new solution develops in two steps. The first step consists in showing how to resolve the contradiction...     

Nothing but the Truth

A curious feature of Belnap’s “useful four-valued logic”, also known as first-degree entailment (FDE), is that the overdetermined value B (both true and false) is treated as a designated value. Although there are good theoretical reasons for this, it seems prima facie more plausible to have only one of the four values designated, namely T (exactly true). This paper follows this route and investigates the resulting logic, which we call Exactly True Logic.     

Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing about Nothingness

Often a source of concern to commentators about the adequacy of Barth's theology is his treatment of evil, in particular Church Dogmatics III/3 §50 with its depiction of evil as das Nichtige (the nothingness). Against the impression that Barth has little time in his systematic theology for doing justice to evil it is worth attempting a reading that indicates the importance of this section and what it seems that Barth is doing with it. Das Nichtige belongs to a conflictual and dramatic account, and talk of its, for Barth, 'absurd'existence' belongs there. The dramatic flavour of this discussion further impresses that there is more to be said about 'Barth on evil' than any focus on the paradoxical and negative language used to depict it could express – this 'more' should come specifically through ethics.     

水怪不怪

2001年4月底以来,"科学家再探尼斯湖英大巫师念咒语保护水怪"这样的新闻出来以后,一时在中国媒体上炒得沸沸扬扬.     

When Suicide Is at Stake: Some Thoughts on the Therapeutic Space between Therapists and Adolescents

Looking at adolescence as a period of turmoil as well as abrupt physical and mental changes, it is not surprising that in western countries suicide is the primary cause of death in adolescents and young adults ages 15–24. Most therapists treating adolescents encounter patients who frequently engage in suicidal behavior. This significantly challenges the therapeutic bond and influences the therapeutic space in a unique way. In this article, we address the challenges specific to the therapeutic alliance in treating adolescents presenting suicidal behaviors. While literature on the nature of the therapeutic bond with adult suicide attempters is available, literature on the distinguishing characteristics of the therapeutic bond with adolescent attempters is lacking. Two vignettes are presented to illustrate this distinctive alliance.     

Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head

Mental internalists hold that an individual's mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individual's head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from 'Pulse World'. These creatures' environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to what's in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative—a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism.