Test-retest reliability of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale

Test-retest reliabilities of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale over 1- and 5-wk. intervals were examined for two samples of students, 73 boys and 88 girls in regular sixth, seventh and eighth grade classrooms (11 yr. to 14 yr.). For raw scores the test-retest Pearson r was .88 (1-wk.) and .77 (5-wk.), indicating good reliability. For both samples there was a small difference between test (12.2 for 1-wk. sample; 11.4 for 5-wk. sample) and retest (11.2 for 1-wk. sample; 9.8 for 5-wk. sample) mean raw scores. Implications for test use are discussed.     

Joint factor analysis of the Children's Depression Inventory and the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale.

Used a joint factor analysis with the Children's Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1980/81, 1992) and Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; C. R. Reynolds & Richmond, 1978, 1985) to identify items that uniquely measured depression and anxiety. Data from 750 youngsters in Grades 4 through 7 were analyzed using principal-axis factoring with an oblique rotation. Salient factors were identified using guidelines provide by Gorsuch (1997). Item overlap and the large negative affectivity component across instruments were evident. Items that overlapped or had nonsalient loadings were eliminated. The sample was randomly split into 2 groups of 375 and analyses were repeated. Results indicated that a unique 9-item depression factor composed largely of items representing a negative view of oneself existed. In addition, a unique 7-item anxiety factor emerged that consisted of items reflecting worry. The validity of these abbreviated scales was explored using a separate sample of 131 students in Grades 4 through 9. The abbreviated scales were correlated with scales of positive and negative affect consistent with predictions. Findings suggest exploring alternative scoring strategies for the CDI and RCMAS to eliminate problems associated with overlapping items.     

Factor structure of a Bulgarian translation of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale

The study examined the dimensionality of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale with a sample of 486 10- and 11-yr.-old Bulgarian children. Findings supported the established factor structure of this scale. Certain departures from the American version of the scale were also observed. Bulgarian girls scored significantly higher on the Anxiety scale than Bulgarian boys, and 10-yr.-old Bulgarian boys scored significantly lower than their American peers. Bulgarian children tended to score higher than the American children on the Lie scale. At present this Bulgarian version of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale could be employed as a rough screening test for anxiety.     

Reliability and validity of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale in a French-Canadian sample

The aim of this study was to examine the reliability and validity of a French version of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS). A sample of 2,666 school-age French-Canadian children completed the questionnaire. With regard to factor structure, the 5-factor model found in U.S. normative samples was confirmed. The internal consistency of the 5 scales and of the 2 global scales was good to excellent. Test-retest reliabilities after a 6-month period were also similar to those of the original version. Finally, the concurrent validity, assessed by a correlation with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children, was also found to be good. Results of the present study show that the French version of the RCMAS is a good instrument to assess anxiety in children.     

Factor structure and construct validity of "what I think and feel": The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale.

Responses to the Revised-CMAS of 329 children from grades 1 through 12 were factor analyzed. Consistent with current multidimensional theories of anxiety, three primary anxiety factors emerged, supporting the construct validity of the new scale. Implications for interpretation of the revised scale are discussed.     

Factor Structure of a Spanish Version of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale in Uruguay

The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) was translated into Spanish and administered to 1,423 pupils in Grades 1 thru 12 in Uruguay. An orthogonal varimax rotation was performed, which revealed three factors of anxiety. These factors are quite similar to those found through factor analyses in the RCMAS for American children. A discussion of the factor structure and possible use of this instrument in Latin American countries is presented.     

Factor structure of a Spanish version of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale in Uruguay

The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) was translated into Spanish and administered to 1,423 pupils in Grades 1 thru 12 in Uruguay. An orthogonal varimax rotation was performed, which revealed three factors of anxiety. These factors are quite similar to those found through factor analyses in the RCMAS for American children. A discussion of the factor structure and possible use of this instrument in Latin American countries is presented.     

Modifications in Junior-High-School Children's Verbal Behavior as a Function of Social Approval and Manifest Anxiety

Ability to take the perspective of another was studied among 97 5 to 6- and 7 to 9-year-old Anglo American and Mexican American boys and girls. These children were administered seven perceptual role-taking tasks and the Children's Embedded Figures Test of field-independence. Results indicated no significant cultural differences. Results were contrary to previous findings in three respects: (a) children were able to take the role of another younger than originally theorized by Piaget; (b) role-taking and field-independence were not significantly related when age is controlled; and (c) low and inconsistent correlations among the visual perspective role-taking tasks indicate that visual perspective role-taking is not an established unidimensional construct.     

The Aubert-Foerster phenomenon and its relation to Manifest Anxiety

Summary The narrowing of the visual field with an increase in distance between a person and a pre-set fixation point was investigated with 20 persons under stable background and with 10 persons under moving background conditions. Optical stimuli were introduced from the periphery and readings were taken at the limit of sharp perception of the figure by the subject. The Aubert-Foerster phenomenon, the easier recognition of small, near objects compared with larger, more distant objects subtending the same visual angle, was used as a starting point. The subjects were equally divided into high and low anxiety groups on the basis of Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale.The Aubert-Foerster phenomenon does exist in both experimental situations, under conditions of stable and moving background.Differences in visual angles and in amount of Aubert-Foerster phenomenon are found for the high and low anxiety groups under both experimental conditions.Under conditions of moving background with a centrally imposed task both experimental groups show greater narrowing of the visual angle than they did when exposed to stable background; on the contrary, the visual angle becomes increased when the centrally located task becomes simplified.

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Zusammenfassung Der Winkel zwischen der Blickrichtung und der Sehrichtung, bei welchem ein peripher dargebotener Gegenstand eben erkannt wird, nimmt bei gleichbleibender Größe des Netzhautbildes ab, wenn der Beobachtungsabstand vergrößert wird: Aubert-Foerster-Phänomen.Dieses Phänomen stellt den Ausgangspunkt vorliegender Arbeit dar, in der 30 Versuchspersonen herangezogen wurden, um die Frage nach der Gesichtsfeldeinengung mittels peripher vor unbewegtem und bewegtem Hintergrund einwandernder Figuren zu untersuchen. Die Versuchspersonen in den beiden Versuchsklassen wurden nach Taylors Manifest Anxiety Scale in Gruppen von hohem und niedrigem Anxiety-Wert zusammengefaßt.Das Aubert-Foerster-Phänomen tritt in beiden Versuchssituationen auf, d.h. beim Fixieren der Figuren vor dem bewegten als auch dem unbewegten Hintergrund.Für die hohen und niedrigen Anxiety-Gruppen bestehen in beiden Versuchsklassen Unterschiede hinsichtlich der nach dem Aubert-Foerster-Phänomen zu erwartenden Winkelgröße.Bei den Versuchen vor bewegtem Hintergrund wird der experimentell bestimmte Winkel größer als der theoretisch erwartete, wenn die Anzahl der Reize vermindert, d. h. die Aufgabe vereinfacht wird. Es besteht offenbar eine direkte Beziehung zwischen der geforderten Aufmerksamkeit an der Stelle deutlichsten Sehens und der peripheren Sehleistung.

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Dr. Mangans help in the collection of the data and his advice were greatly appreciated.     

I'll Know What You're Like When I See How You Feel: How and When Affective Displays Influence Behavior-Based Impressions

ABSTRACT— Accumulating evidence suggests that targets' displays of emotion shape perceivers' impression of those targets. Prior research has highlighted generalization effects, such as an angry display prompting an impression of hostility. In two studies, we went beyond generalization to examine the interaction of displays and behaviors, finding new evidence of augmenting effects (behavior-correspondent inferences are stronger when behavior is accompanied by positive affect) and discounting effects (such inferences are weaker when behavior is accompanied by negative affect). Thus, the same display can have different effects on impressions depending on the behavior it accompanies. We found evidence that these effects are mediated by ascribed intentions and that they have a boundary: When behaviors and affective displays are repeated, the augmenting and discounting power of displays appears to wane.     

I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons

The widely touted discovery of mirror neurons has generated intense scientific interest in the neurobiology of intersubjectivity. Social neuroscientists have claimed that mirror neurons, located in brain regions associated with motor action, facial recognition, and somatosensory processing, allow us to automatically grasp other people's intentions and emotions. Despite controversies, mirror neuron research is animating materialist, affective, and embodied accounts of intersubjectivity. My view is that mirror neurons raise issues that are directly relevant to feminism and cultural studies, but interventions are needed for the work to be compatible with nonreductionist critical thought. In this article I critique the dominant neuroscientific account of mirror neurons, called embodied simulation theory. I draw from feminist epistemologies as well as alternative interpretations of mirror neurons in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to consider mirroring as situated, embodied perception.     

What You Feel Influences What You See: The Role of Affective Feelings in Resolving Binocular Rivalry

It seems obvious that what you see influences what you feel, but what if the opposite were also true? What if how you feel can shape your visual experience? In this experiment, we demonstrate that the affective state of a perceiver influences the contents of visual awareness. Participants received positive, negative, and neutral affect inductions and then completed a series of binocular rivalry trials in which a face (smiling, scowling, or neutral) was presented to one eye and a house to the other. The percepts “competed” for dominance in visual consciousness. We found, as predicted, that all faces (smiling, scowling, and neutral) were dominant for longer when perceivers experienced unpleasant affect compared to when they were in a neutral state (a social vigilance effect), although scowling faces increased their dominance when perceivers felt unpleasant (a relative negative congruence effect). Relatively speaking, smiling faces increased their dominance more when perceivers were experiencing pleasant affect (a positive congruence effect). These findings illustrate that the affective state of a perceiver serves as a context that influences the contents of consciousness.