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1.
A. D. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):197-212
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
相似文献
A. D. SmithEmail: |
2.
Michael D. Barber 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):79-97
John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is
ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish
empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts
to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing
McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis
of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even
more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility
and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content
(rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects
are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential
possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell
focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements
his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual
content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.
相似文献
Michael D. BarberEmail: |
3.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):65-77
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction
requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience.
I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the
association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates
considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought
and judgment.
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Hannah GinsborgEmail: |
4.
Jordi Fernandez 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):333-356
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether
memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest
that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the
past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view,
when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that
caused the very memory experience that she is having.
相似文献
Jordi FernandezEmail: |
5.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
6.
Josefa Toribio 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):351-361
It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations.
On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that
holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems
consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject
to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such
content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the
way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported.
Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it
would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content
demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all.
相似文献
Josefa ToribioEmail: |
7.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
相似文献
Robert HannaEmail: |
8.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of possibility, and not merely that of actuality, for an inquiry into the bodily constitution of experience. The paper will study how the possibilities of action that may
(or may not) be available to the subject help to shape the meaning attributed to perceived objects and to the situation occupied
by the subject within her environment. This view will be supported by reference to empirical evidence provided by recent and
current research on the perceptual estimation of distances and the effects brought about by the use of a tool on the organisation
of our perceived immediate space.
相似文献
Olivier GapenneEmail: |
9.
John Dilworth 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):369-387
Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, but a double content (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies
to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The
results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues
with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with
an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases.
相似文献
John DilworthEmail: |
10.
Jenny Slatman 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):321-342
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while
referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these
two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite
their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition,
however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition
involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result
of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”.
The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
相似文献
Jenny SlatmanEmail: |
11.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):87-89
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble.
I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
相似文献
Jens JohanssonEmail: |
12.
13.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
相似文献
Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
14.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
15.
Mark Siderits 《Sophia》2008,47(1):29-42
Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about
the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements
are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction
between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion
of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other
concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.
相似文献
Mark SideritsEmail: |
16.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
17.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(2):195-216
This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal
recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally
agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience
consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of
experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological
concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’
can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience.
相似文献
Matthew RatcliffeEmail: |
18.
Greg Janzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):355-366
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's
intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called
change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it
should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist
strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores
an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can
vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
相似文献
Greg JanzenEmail: |
19.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):79-95
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we
should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of
intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is
not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
相似文献
Uriah KriegelEmail: |
20.
Mark Heller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):83-101
The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim
that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism
has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once
we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore
encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the Donkey Problem’s conventionalism and deflate the debate between 3Dists
and 4Dists.
相似文献
Mark HellerEmail: |