Binary choice under instructions to select versus reject

Two experiments examine differences in binary choice under select versus reject instructions. Three aspects of the choice process are examined: commitment to the chosen alternative, absolute magnitude of attribute evaluations, and information distortion during the choice process. Although the findings support previously hypothesized causes (Study 1), these results are reversed when the decision alternatives are uniformly negative (Study 2a). Accompanying verbal protocols (Study 2b) provide additional insights into the underlying decision process. The results consistently support a compatibility effect. Whenever there is a match between the valences of the alternatives and of the decision strategy, namely selecting a positive alternative or rejecting a negative one, there is greater accentuation of attribute differences, higher certainty in the final choice, and more information distortion. Metaphorically, the choice process seems to flow more smoothly in the compatible conditions.     

Maximization and Search for Alternatives in Decision Situations With and Without Loss of Options

Maximizing tendency has been associated with greater accumulation of choice alternatives prior to selection of a preference. It is not known whether this search behavior extends to situations in which accumulation of new choice alternatives comes with the potential loss of existing ones. In Study 1, we replicate the original finding of greater accumulation of choice alternatives, using a computer‐based laboratory task. We then provide evidence, in Studies 2 and 3, that when potential loss of existing options is incorporated into the task, maximization is associated with less rather than more search for additional options. Maximization components of decision difficulty and alternative search, but not high standards or satisficing, explain this behavior. Other task measures are also collected, but few maximization‐related differences are observed. The findings support an interpretation of maximizers as decision makers who are as concerned with the potential loss of existing options as with the loss of undiscovered future ones. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Decision Strategy on Deciding to Defer Choice

Recent research has examined consumer decision making when the option of not choosing any of the alternatives is also provided. The findings from this research suggest that the decision to defer choice is sensitive to the uncertainty of choosing the most preferred option from the set of alternatives provided. Building on this research, the author tests whether the decision to defer choice is also influenced by task variables that influence decision uncertainty. In the first experiment, this proposition is tested for choice problems in which information on three relatively equally attractive alternatives is presented either sequentially or simultaneously. As predicted, the preference for the defer-choice option was greater when the three alternatives were presented simultaneously. A second study forced subjects into using one of four decision strategies in order to choose between two non-dominated alternatives. The preference for the no-choice option was found to be higher when the rule required explicit attribute tradeoffs and lower when it simplified choice. These results suggest that choice uncertainty is influenced by the decision strategy used to determine the preference among alternatives. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results for marketers' communication strategies.     

Dual-task interference as a function of cognitive processing load

Sixteen subjects from the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory participated in a dual-task study designed to measure processing requirements of a choice reaction time (RT) task. Two levels of choice RT stimulus-response (S-R)compatibility were tested with each of two tracking tasks to provide different levels of dual-task loading. In one tracking task, the target's temporal-spatial pattern was fixed; in the other, the target's path was a function of the subject's performance. In the choice RT task, compatibility was treated as a between-subjects factor, while the number of alternatives (set size) within a sequence was a within-subjects variable. Choice RT results indicated that compatibility and set size interacted; the increase in response latency as a function of set size was much greater when compatibility was low. An increase in choice RT response latency occurred when the secondary tracking task was added. Within a given compatibility level, this dual-task decrement was constant for all levels of set size; however, the magnitude of the dual-task decrement varied as a function of S-R compatibility, being greater when compatibility was low than when it was high. For these data, a model like Sternberg's (1969) stages model is seen to have more explanatory value than a pooled processing capacity model (e.g., Norman and Bobrow 1975).     

Memory for Brand-Product Information in Pictorial Advertising

In two experiments, we investigated whether the type of picture that accompanies a brand-product pair has an effect on memory in an advertising context. Subjects were students in introductory psychology classes who received course credit for participation. We formed 24 fictitious brand-product pairs and illustrated them using pictorial presentation and letter accentuation in both interactive and noninter-active relationships. In Experiment 1, subjects in the interactive pictorial presentation group recalled more brands in a paired-associate task than did the interactive letter accentuation group or the control group. In a paired-associate task in Experiment 2, we examined relative effectiveness of interactive and noninteractive presentation relationships and revealed two main effects: (a) Interactive was superior to noninteractive, and (b) pictorial presentation was superior to letter accentuation in aiding recall. Results are discussed in terms of implications for advertising.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Postdecision evaluation of choice alternatives as a function of valence of alternatives,choice, and expected delay of choice consequences

The effects of valence of alternatives, choice, and expected delay of choice consequences on postdecision evaluations of choice alternatives were studied by either giving subjects a choice between two experimental tasks (both either pleasant or unpleasant) or assigning subjects their initially preferred task. Crosscutting valence and choice, subjects expected either no delay, 10-min delay, or 30-min delay before engaging in the task. All subjects evaluated both tasks immediately after the delay instructions but before experiencing the actual delay. Results confirmed the expected dissonance effect; that is, an upward evaluation of the chosen alternative and a downward evaluation of the rejected alternative, relative to no-choice conditions. Moreover, the relative upward evaluation of the chosen alternative increased as the expected delay decreased. Valence was not found to interact with other variables. The results are discussed in terms of differential salience of choice alternatives.     

Can fruits and vegetables and activities substitute for snack foods?

This study investigated the choice of snack foods versus fruits and vegetables and enjoyable sedentary behaviors using a computerized behavioral choice task. Thirty-nine participants were provided the choice of earning points for snack foods or fruits and vegetables (Condition 1) or snack foods or enjoyable sedentary behaviors (Condition 2). The behavioral cost to gain access to snacks increased across trials, whereas the behavioral costs to obtain alternatives to snack foods remained constant across trials. Results showed that when costs for snack foods and alternatives were equal, participants chose snack foods, but as the behavioral costs increased, participants shifted choice to the alternatives. The switch point for both alternatives was equal. Results suggest that fruits and vegetables and sedentary activities can substitute for snack foods when the behavioral cost for snack foods is increased.     

Effects of choice task on attribute memory

Winnowing process models of multiattribute choice in which alternatives are successively eliminated in stages based on partial information predict differential memory for minor attributes as a function of an alternative's relative desirability. This prediction, which differs from the results of judgment studies finding little or no relationship between evaluation and memory, was tested in two experiments in which the choice task (Choose 1 vs Choose 3) and the density of the option set were varied. Better memory for minor attributes of relatively desirable alternatives was observed for those conditions requiring the more difficult decisions, namely the Choose 1 task with a dense set of good alternatives. A third experiment replicated these results and demonstrated that the minor attributes did influence choice. The results of all three experiments are generally consistent with winnowing models. However, detailed analysis of the memory data revealed that only attributes of the chosen alternative were remembered better; this is not entirely consistent with those models. Implications of these results for models of memory and choice are discussed.     

Limits to decision-making ability in direct multiattribute alternative evaluation

In recent years there has been considerable interest in how decision strategies in choice problems depend on such characteristics as the number of available criteria and the number of available alternatives. Along with multicriteria choice problems, classification tasks are treated where alternatives are classified into several decision (evaluative) classes. We believe that in classification problems one's ability in information processing is limited and depends on task complexity. In this paper we describe two experiments involving categorization of a large number of multiattribute alternatives into two or four evaluative classes. The results demonstrate that the subjects use different decision strategies and that there is a limit in human ability to implement these two tasks.     

Individual differences in the use of simplification strategies in a complex decision-making task

Decision time results were used to assess the strategies that 90 college undergraduates used in a complex decision-making task. Trend analyses revealed that the functions relating choice time to the number of choice alternatives in a set and the number of attributes comprising those alternatives contained linear (increasing) components. In addition, for a portion of the subjects, there was a quadratic effect of the number of attributes available to the decision maker on choice time, suggesting that these subjects adopted simplification strategies at high levels of task complexity. Reliable individual differences in these trend components were observed, consistent with individual differences in motivation and/or processing capacities. These individual differences were included in an information-processing model of decision behavior that captured the choice time data observed in this study. Subjects' ratings of apartments were used as a basis to assess the extent to which the use of simplification strategies resulted in preference reversals. Contrary to expectation, subjects whose choice times contained quadratic components demonstrated fewer preference reversals at high levels of information load.     

The effects of a concurrent task on human optimization and self control

Memory deficits have been shown to hamper decision making in a number of populations. In two experiments, participants were required to select one of three alternatives that varied in reinforcer amount and delay, and the effect of a concurrent task on a behavioral choice task that involved making either an impulsive, self-controlled, or optimal response was studied. The studies aimed to see whether or not individuals were capable of optimizing when confronted with a three-alternative choice paradigm, and if a concurrent task could induce over-selectivity toward a self-controlled, or impulsive, choice, rather than an optimal choice. Various factors which could possibly influence optimization were also explored. The results suggest that some, but not all, individuals are capable of optimizing in a three-alternative choice paradigm, especially when there is a great differential between reinforcement rates of optimal versus non-optimal behaviors. Participants with a concurrent task (continuously subtracting seven from a large number) displayed over-selectivity, evidenced by the high proportion of self-controlled responses.     

Preference gives more consistent judgments than oddity only if the task can be modeled as forced choice

Earlier data showed that subjects presented with two samples of distilled water and one of tap water were significantly more consistent in choosing the tap water as preferred than in identifying it as the odd sample in the set. The results were sometimes interpreted as demonstrating greater sensitivity for hedonic judgments than for oddity judgments. They are now shown to be explained by the statistical properties of the decision rules followed in different judgment tasks. In a new expriment, oddity and preference judgments were obtained in a replication of the original task with extra conditions. In two of the new conditions, the decision structure of a preference task was the same as that for the oddity task; in these conditions, performance was no better than with explicit oddity responses. The Thurstone-Ura model of triangle judgments proposed by Frijters predicts the results as an outcome of the greater statistical power of three-alternative forced choice tests compared with triangular tests. An excellent fit to all the data is given by a model wherein all subjects have the samed′ for the difference between the water types but 25% of them prefer distilled water to tap water.     

Multidimensional vector model of stimulus-response compatibility

The present study proposes and examines the multidimensional vector (MDV) model framework as a modeling schema for choice response times. MDV extends the Thurstonian model, as well as signal detection theory, to classification tasks by taking into account the influence of response properties on stimulus discrimination. It is capable of accounting for stimulus-response compatibility, which is known to be an influential task variable determining choice-reaction performance but has not been considered in previous mathematical modeling efforts. Specific MDV models were developed for 5 experiments using the Simon task, for which stimulus location is task irrelevant, to examine the validity of model assumptions and illustrate characteristic behaviors of model parameters. The MDV models accounted for the experimental data to a remarkable degree, demonstrating the adequacy of the framework as a general schema for modeling the latency of choice performance. Some modeling issues involved in the MDV model framework are discussed.     

The Monty Hall dilemma in pigeons: Effect of investment in initial choice

In the Monty Hall dilemma, humans are initially given a choice among three alternatives, one of which has a hidden prize. After choosing, but before it is revealed whether they have won the prize, they are shown that one of the remaining alternatives does not have the prize. They are then asked whether they want to stay with their original choice or switch to the remaining alternative. Although switching results in obtaining the prize two thirds of the time, humans consistently fail to adopt the optimal strategy of switching even after considerable training. Interestingly, there is evidence that pigeons show more optimal switching performance with this task than humans. Because humans often view even random choices already made as being more valuable than choices not made, we reasoned that if pigeons made a greater investment, it might produce an endowment or ownership effect resulting in more human-like suboptimal performance. On the other hand, the greater investment in the initial choice by the pigeons might facilitate switching behavior by helping them to better discriminate their staying versus switching behavior. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of requiring pigeons to make a greater investment in their initial choice (20 pecks rather than the usual 1 peck). We found that the increased response requirement facilitated acquisition of the switching response. In Experiment 2, we showed that facilitation of switching due to the increased response requirement did not result from extinction of responding to the initially chosen location.     

What you see is what you get--reloaded: can jackdaws (Corvus monedula) find hidden food through exclusion?

Choice by exclusion, that is, the ability to base the choice of a target on the rejection of potential alternatives, is becoming increasingly interesting for comparative cognition research. Recently, ravens have been shown to solve an exclusion task and it had been suggested that this ability might benefit ravens in a food-caching context. To investigate this possibility, the raven study was replicated with a closely related, but noncaching, species, the jackdaw (Corvus monedula). In the first test, the birds had to find food hidden in one of two differently shaped tubes. The results suggest that the jackdaws found the food through intensive search behavior, with little evidence for exclusion abilities. In a follow-up experiment, the tubes were replaced by cups, and before the birds made a choice, one of the cups was lifted to inform them about its content. In a final task, this procedure was modified to control for the influence of local enhancement. In both experiments, the jackdaws were successful only if they had seen the food before. These findings are in contrast to the previous results on ravens and support the idea that exclusion abilities may have evolved as specific adaptations to food caching.     

Second choices in a visual span of apprehension task

Four Ss were run in a visual span of apprehension experiment to determine whether second choices made following incorrect first responses are at the chance level, as implied by various high threshold models proposed for this situation. The relationships between response biases on first and second choices, and between first choice biases on trials with two or three possible responses, were also examined in terms of Luce’s (1959) choice theory. The results were: (a) second choice performance in this task appears to be determined by response bias alone, i.e., second choices were at the chance level; (b)first and second choice response biases were not related according to Luce’s choice axiom; and (c) the choice axiom predicted with reasonable accuracy the relationships between first choice response biases corresponding to trials with different numbers of possible response alternatives.     

An evaluation of the value of choice with preschool children

The current study examined the reinforcing effects of choosing among alternatives in a four-part evaluation. In the first study, initial-link responses in a concurrent-chains arrangement resulted in access to terminal links in which the completion of an academic task resulted in (a) the choice of a reinforcer (choice), (b) the delivery of an identical reinforcer (no choice), or (c) no material reinforcer (control). Three patterns of responding emerged: persistent preference for choice (3 participants); initial preference for choice, which did not persist (2 participants); and preference for no choice (1 participant). Additional evaluations determined if preference for choice could be enhanced (Study 2) or established (Study 3) by including more stimuli from which to choose. Choice-link selections systematically increased for all participants when more items were available from which to choose. Study 4 identified the precise value of the opportunity to choose by progressively increasing the response requirement during the choice terminal links for 3 children and determining the point at which these children stopped selecting the choice link. All children continued to select the choice link even when the work required in the choice link was much greater than that arranged in the no-choice link.     

How are cognitive and physical difficulty compared?

Tasks that require less physical effort are generally preferred over more physically demanding alternatives. Similarly, tasks that require less mental effort are generally preferred over more mentally demanding alternatives. But what happens when one must choose between tasks that entail different kinds of effort, one mainly physical (e.g., carrying buckets) and the other mainly mental (e.g., counting)? We asked participants to choose between a bucket-carrying task and a counting task. Our participants were less likely to choose the bucket task when it required a long reach rather than a short reach, and our participants were also less likely to choose the bucket task the smaller the final count value. We tested the hypothesis that subjective task durations provided a common currency for comparing the difficulties of the two kinds of tasks. We found that this hypothesis provided a better account of the task choice data than did an account that relied on objective task durations. Our study opens the door to a new problem in the study of attention, perception, and psychophysics—judging the difficulty of different kinds of tasks. The approach we took to this problem, which relies on two-alternative forced choice along with modeling the basis for the choice, may prove useful in future investigations.