Is speech perception modular or interactive?

Norris et al. recently reported experimental evidence that listeners learn phoneme categories in response to lexical feedback. To reconcile these findings with their modular account of speech perception, the authors argue that top-down feedback can be used to support phoneme learning, but not to influence on-line phonemic processing. We suggest that these findings have broader implications than the authors assume, and we discuss potential challenges for integrating a modular theory with top-down learning.     

Is retrieval-induced forgetting an inhibitory process?

Three experiments investigated memory performance in the retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995). This paradigm produces a retrieval-induced forgetting effect, wherein practicing some members of a studied category decreases the recall of other members of that category relative to a baseline. Our findings indicate that the retrieval-induced forgetting effect is replicable but that previous findings supporting an inhibitory account of this phenomenon may not be.     

Is creativity a Darwinian process?

In 1960, the psychologist Donald Campbell advanced a Darwinian model of how new knowledge comes into being. This would later come to be known as “evolutionary epistemology”;. For some psychologists and historians of science interested in creativity in science and technology, the Darwinian perspective was irresistible. Thus, in 1988, the psychologist Dean Keith Simonton proposed a Darwinian model of the psychology of scientific discovery by refining Campbell's model. Recently, in 1999, Simonton has devoted an entire book to “Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity.”; In this article, I challenge the Darwinian perspective by examining three episodes taken from the histories of natural science, technology and art, respectively.     

Does visual speech information affect word segmentation?

We present an experiment in which we explored the extent to which visual speech information affects learners’ ability to segment words from a fluent speech stream. Learners were presented with a set of sentences consisting of novel words, in which the only cues to the location of word boundaries were the transitional probabilities between syllables. They were exposed to this language through the auditory modality only, through the visual modality only (where the learners saw the speaker producing the sentences but did not hear anything), or through both the auditory and visual modalities. The learners were successful at segmenting words from the speech stream under all three training conditions. These data suggest that visual speech information has a positive effect on word segmentation performance, at least under some circumstances.     

Is stimulus competition an acquisition deficit or a performance deficit?

Traditionally, blocking (X-outcome, followed by XY-outcome, resulting in attenuated conditioned responding to Y, relative to XY-outcome alone) has been explained in terms of the X-outcome association’s preventing the acquisition of the Y-outcome association. This view is challenged by models that view stimulus competition as a deficit in the expression of the acquired Y-outcome association. Here, we provide evidence that blocking is a performance deficit in which the Y-outcome association, the to-be-blocked stimulus, can affect behavioral control by the blocking stimulus (i.e., attenuate responding to X). The results are discussed in terms of acquisition and performance models of stimulus competition.     

Selecting a patient or initiating a psychoanalytic process?

The defences provoked in the analyst by the anxieties associated with the difficult tasks of ‘assessment’ and ‘selection’ for psychoanalysis can result in a tendency to think in terms of ‘hurdles to be cleared’ by potential psychoanalytic patients, rather than ‘opening the gates’. This can result in a diminution of the analyst's capacity to enlist and sustain a psychoanalytic stance. Only within a psychoanalytic frame can a meaningful psychoanalytic process unfold, at all stages of a potential patient's movement from their first contact through to, possibly, entering into an analysis. The author illustrates the value of this thinking by describing the work of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis where there has been a shift of emphasis in psychoanalytic consultation towards working with individuals on their potential to initiate a psychoanalytic process, and away from the sole aim of ‘selection of a suitable patient’. In this paper, the author notes that when institutional culture and practice supports psychoanalytic identity, this makes it more possible to recognize and articulate the anxieties provoked by the ‘emotional storm’ inevitable in psychoanalytic consultation, and the draw towards unhelpful enactment that may otherwise obscure the initiation of a psychoanalytic process that may or may not result in analytic treatment. Illustrative case material from the Clinic is presented.     

Calculate or wait: Is man an eager or a lazy intuitive statistician?

Research on people's ability to act as intuitive statisticians has mainly focused on the accuracy of estimates of central tendency and variability. In this paper, we investigate two hypothesised cognitive processes by which people make judgements of distribution shape. The first claims that people spontaneously induce abstract representations of distribution properties from experience, including about distribution shape. The second process claims that people construct beliefs about distribution properties post hoc by retrieval from long-term memory of small samples from the distribution, implying format dependence with accuracy that differs depending on judgement format. Results from two experiments confirm the predicted format dependence, suggesting that people are often constrained by the post hoc assessment of distribution properties by sampling from long-term memory. The results, however, also suggest that, although post hoc sampling from memory seems to be the default process, under certain predictable circumstances people do induce abstract representations of distribution shape.     

Is the brain an effective Turing machine or a finite-state machine?

Summary A theorem presented by Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White (1989) suggested the possibility that connectionist networks could be effectively Turing machines. Levelt (1990) argued that the theorem of Hornik et al. only implies that networks are finite-state machines and are therefore not capable of generating the very unlimited productivity of symbol systems. Yet it can be argued that all real machines, including the brain, are finite-state machines. If so, no real machine actually possesses the very unlimited productivity of symbol systems. So any model of actual behaviour should capture the limitations on productivity inherent in the situation. Thus connectionist networks can be valuable models in psychology, precisely because they are finite-state machines.     

Is dyslexia a visual perceptive disorder? New empirical data

Several studies have shown that a phonological deficit is the origin of developmental dyslexia, because dyslexics have important difficulties in mapping orthographic to phonological codes. However, visual criteria are still used for the diagnosis of dyslexia and to develop methods of intervention. This study attempts to determine whether there are visual problems in dyslexic children. To this aim, dyslexic children and children without reading difficulties, matched by chronological age, participated in two experiments. One study was based on the Reversal test and the other was a visual decision task in which participants had to decide whether two letters were the same or different. There were 40 pairs of letters, to measure reaction times and mistakes. The results showed that dyslexics had similar performance to controls in the detection of different visual stimuli. Developmental dyslexics do not appear to have visual perceptual problems, but a particular difficulty to retrieve the phonological code of graphemes.     

Is apparent instability a guiding feature in visual search?

ABSTRACT

Humans are quick to notice if an object is unstable. Does that assessment require attention or can instability serve as a preattentive feature that can guide the deployment of attention? This paper describes a series of visual search experiments, designed to address this question. Experiment 1 shows that less stable images among more stable images are found more efficiently than more stable among less stable; a search asymmetry that supports guidance by instability. Experiment 2 shows efficient search but no search asymmetry when the orientation of the objects is removed as a confound. Experiment 3 independently varies the orientation cues and perceived stability and finds a clear main effect of apparent stability. Experiment 4 shows converging evidence for a role of stability using different stimuli that lack an orientation cue. However, here both search for stable and unstable targets is inefficient. Experiment 5 is a control for Experiment 4, showing that the stability effect in Experiment 4 is not simple side-effects of the geometry of the stimuli. On balance, the data support a role for instability in the guidance of attention in visual search. (184 words)     

Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

Is There Really a Beauty Premium or an Ugliness Penalty on Earnings?

Purpose

Economists have widely documented the “beauty premium” and “ugliness penalty” on earnings. Explanations based on employer and client discrimination would predict a monotonic association between physical attractiveness and earnings; explanations based on occupational self-selection would explain the beauty premium as a function of workers’ occupations; and explanations based on individual differences would predict that the beauty premium would disappear once appropriate individual differences are controlled. In this paper, we empirically tested the three competing hypotheses about the “beauty premium”.

Design/Methodology/Approach

We analyzed a nationally representative and prospectively longitudinal sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health).

Findings

The results contradicted the discrimination and self-selection explanations and strongly supported the individual differences explanation. Very unattractive respondents always earned significantly more than unattractive respondents, sometimes more than average-looking or attractive respondents. Multiple regression analyses showed that there was very weak evidence for the beauty premium, and it disappeared completely once individual differences, such as health, intelligence, and Big Five personality factors, were statistically controlled.

Implications

Past findings of beauty premium and ugliness penalty may possibly be due to the fact that: 1) “very unattractive” and “unattractive” categories are usually collapsed into “below average” category; and 2) health, intelligence (as opposed to education) and Big Five personality factors are not controlled. It appears that more beautiful workers earn more, not because they are beautiful, but because they are healthier, more intelligent, and have better (more Conscientious and Extraverted, and less Neurotic) personality.

Originality/Value

This is the first study to show that: 1) very unattractive workers have extremely high earnings and earn more than physically more attractive workers, suggesting evidence for the potential ugliness premium; and 2) the apparent beauty premium and ugliness penalty may be a function of unmeasured traits correlated with physical attractiveness, such as health, intelligence, and personality.

     

Is it a bird? Is it a plane? Ultra-rapid visual categorisation of natural and artifactual objects

Visual processing is known to be very fast in ultra-rapid categorisation tasks where the subject has to decide whether a briefly flashed image belongs to a target category or not. Human subjects can respond in under 400 ms, and event-related-potential studies have shown that the underlying processing can be done in less than 150 ms. Monkeys trained to perform the same task have proved even faster. However, most of these experiments have only been done with biologically relevant target categories such as animals or food. Here we performed the same study on human subjects, alternating between a task in which the target category was 'animal', and a task in which the target category was 'means of transport'. These natural images of clearly artificial objects contained targets as varied as cars, trucks, trains, boats, aircraft, and hot-air balloons. However, the subjects performed almost identically in both tasks, with reaction times not significantly longer in the 'means of transport' task. These reaction times were much shorter than in any previous study on natural-image processing. We conclude that, at least for these two superordinate categories, the speed of ultra-rapid visual categorisation of natural scenes does not depend on the target category, and that this processing could rely primarily on feed-forward, automatic mechanisms.     

Is an ant larger than a lion?

In order to examine the influence exerted by an irrelevant semantic variable in a comparative judgment task, we employed a Stroop-like paradigm. The stimuli were pairs of animal names that were different in their physical and semantic sizes (e.g., ant lion). Participants were asked to judge which of the two words was larger either in physical or in semantic size. Size congruity effect (i.e., faster reaction times with congruent than with incongruent stimuli) appeared in both semantic and physical judgments. The semantic distance effect (i.e., large semantic distances are processed faster than smaller ones), appeared only when the semantic dimension was relevant to the task. The findings indicate that when a word (animal name) is presented, its meaning is accessed automatically. Part of this meaning (at least with our stimuli) relates to the size of the animal in real life. Processing of meaning of the size of the words is carried out in parallel with the extraction of the physical features of the presented stimuli.     

Is a multiple self healthy or pathological?

In a sample of 144 undergraduate students, scores on Sackeim and Gur's measure of self-deception were associated with neuroticism scores (r = .50) on the Big Five Inventory, while scores on Altrocchi's measure of having a plural self were associated with neuroticism and openness scores (rs = .35 and .18, respectively). A multiple self, therefore, appears to have positive and negative features.     

Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.