What some effects might not be: The time to verify membership in 'well-defined' categories

Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1983) reported shorter categorization times for members of well-defined categories judged more typical. They concluded that these effects could not originate in a graded, similarity-based category representation and consequently that the typicality effects obtained with natural categories might not be indicative of such a structure either. In this article, we re-examine this conclusion, focusing first on the performance obtained with well-defined categories of different sizes. Only the larger categories used showed variations in typicality ratings and produced typicality effects on categorization times. However,multiple regression analyses showed the effects on categorization times to be better explained by a measure of associative strength, called category dominance. The range of various predictor variables was equated in a follow-up experiment involving large, natural, and well-defined categories. Results obtained with well-defined categories showed pronounced dominance effects when typicality was controlled, but no reliable typicality effect when category dominance and instance familiarity were controlled. Results were opposite for natural categories. By showing that well-defined categories fail to produce unbiased typicality effects, our results bring added support to the hypothesis that the effects obtained with natural categories originate in a graded, similarity-based category structure.     

范畴变量对虚假记忆的影响

以中文词为材料,考察范畴样例重复,样例熟悉性、典型性和范畴大小对虚假再认的影响。实验1表明,随着范畴样例增加,虚假再认也增加。实验2表明,对高熟悉的样例虚假再认多。实验3表明,对高典型样例更易虚假再认。实验4表明,和大范畴样例比,对小范畴样例有更多的虚假再认。整个结果可以用激活扩散理论统一地加以解释     

Strategies of semantic categorization in the cerebral hemispheres

Strategies of semantic categorization in intact cerebral hemispheres were studied in two experiments by presenting names of typical and atypical category instances to the left visual field (LVF) (right hemisphere) or to the right visual field (RVF) (left hemisphere). The results revealed that the typicality of instances had a large effect on categorization times in the LVF in both experiments, suggesting that the right hemisphere relies strongly on a holistic, similarity-based comparison strategy. In Experiment 1, the typicality effect was weaker in the RVF than in the LVF. In Experiment 2, a typicality effect in the RVF was observed for the "four-footed animal" category but not for the "bird" category. The hypothesis that the left hemisphere employs a strategy based on defining or necessary features is not supported by the observed typicality effect in the "four-footed animal" category. Instead, it is suggested that the left hemisphere may be able to categorize on the basis of prestored instance-category knowledge. When such knowledge is not available (e.g., as for four-footed animals), a similarity-based comparison strategy is employed by the left hemisphere.     

The role of familiarity in determining typicality

Ashcraft (1978b) found that people tend to know more properties of instances they rate as typical of a category than of instances they rate as atypical. This suggests that variations in typicality result from variations in familiarity. Three experiments are presented that challenge or qualify this suggestion. Experiment 1 showed that subjects sometimes produce more properties for items they rate as low in typicality. Experiment 2 showed that in a large, random sample of items, there was a tendency to produce fewer properties for atypical items, but Experiment 3 indicated that part of the reason for this result was a response bias to assign low typicality ratings to unfamiliar words, rather than a reflection of low perceived typicality of the referents themselves. These results suggest that variations in typicality can exist independent of variations in familiarity, although familiarity may also play a role.     

Effects of classification context on categorization in natural categories

The patterns of classification of borderline instances of eight common taxonomic categories were examined under three different instructional conditions to test two predictions: first, that lack of a specified context contributes to vagueness in categorization, and second, that altering the purpose of classification can lead to greater or lesser dependence on similarity in classification. The instructional conditions contrasted purely pragmatic with more technical/quasi-legal contexts as purposes for classification, and these were compared with a no-context control. The measures of category vagueness were between-subjects disagreement and within-subjects consistency, and the measures of similarity-based categorization were category breadth and the correlation of instance categorization probability with mean rated typicality, independently measured in a neutral context. Contrary to predictions, none of the measures of vagueness, reliability, category breadth, or correlation with typicality were generally affected by the instructional setting as a function of pragmatic versus technical purposes. Only one subcondition, in which a situational context was implied in addition to a purposive context, produced a significant change in categorization. Further experiments demonstrated that the effect of context was not increased when participants talked their way through the task, and that a technical context did not elicit more all-or-none categorization than did a pragmatic context. These findings place an important boundary condition on the effects of instructional context on conceptual categorization.     

Implicit access to semantic information

Three experiments investigating the patient M.S.'s semantic memory are reported. Experiments 1 and 2 involved a category-membership decision task, in which M.S. was asked to determine whether a noun was a member of a specified semantic category. His performance in Experiment 1 was impaired for nouns from living categories in comparison with nouns from nonliving categories, and this impairment was especially marked for nouns of low typicality. Experiment 2 demonstrated an equivalent pattern of very poor performance to nouns of low familiarity from living categories. In Experiment 3 the effect of a category label on lexical decision was examined, using category labels as primes preceding nouns or pronounceable nonwords. Facilitation from related category label primes was found for typical and untypical members of living and nonliving semantic categories. These findings demonstrate that M.S. has impaired knowledge of the structure of living semantic categories when explicit access to this information is required (Experiments 1 and 2), but that some form of preserved category structure can be demonstrated in tasks which assess this implicitly (Experiment 3).     

Comparison and contrast in perceptual categorization

People categorized pairs of perceptual stimuli that varied in both category membership and pairwise similarity. Experiments 1 and 2 showed categorization of 1 color of a pair to be reliably contrasted from that of the other. This similarity-based contrast effect occurred only when the context stimulus was relevant for the categorization of the target (Experiment 3). The effect was not simply owing to perceptual color contrast (Experiment 4), and it extended to pictures from common semantic categories (Experiment 5). Results were consistent with a sign-and-magnitude version of N. Stewart and G. D. A. Brown's (2005) similarity-dissimilarity generalized context model, in which categorization is affected by both similarity to and difference from target categories. The data are also modeled with criterion setting theory (M. Treisman & T. C. Williams, 1984), in which the decision criterion is systematically shifted toward the mean of the current stimuli.     

A rule-based categorization deficit in Alzheimer's disease?

This study examined the categorization processes that Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients use during assessments of semantic memory. Rule-based categorization involves the careful, analytic processing of strict criteria to determine category membership, particularly for items from graded categories with ambiguous category membership; similarity-based categorization requires an overall comparison of a test stimulus with a prototype or remembered exemplar of the category and is relatively effective for the rapid categorization of items with unambiguous category membership. To assess these processes in AD, patients were asked to decide the category membership of test stimuli for categories with poorly defined or fuzzy boundaries (e.g., VEGETABLE) and for categories with well-defined boundaries (e.g., FEMALE) and then to judge the representativeness of the test stimulus for its chosen category. A subgroup of AD patients demonstrated a typical pattern of impaired semantic memory compared to healthy control subjects; that is, difficulty deciding the category membership of test items from fuzzy categories. Among these patients, we found no deficit in category membership decisions about items taken from well-defined categories. We also found that AD patients and healthy controls do not differ in their representativeness judgments of items within a correctly judged category. These findings are most consistent with the hypothesis that rule-based categorization difficulty limits semantic memory in AD.     

Metamorphosis: Essence, appearance, and behavior in the categorization of natural kinds

The transformation paradigm (Rips, 1989) was used to contrast causal homeostasis and strict essentialist beliefs about biological kinds. Participants read scenarios describing animals that changed their appearance and behavior through either accidental mutation or developmental maturation and then rated the animals on the basis of similarity, typicality, and category membership both before and after the change. Experiment 1 in the present study replicated the dissociation of typicality and categorization reported by Rips (1989) but also revealed systematic individual differences in categorization. With typicality and membership ratings collected between participants, however, Experiment 2 found no evidence for the dissociation and few essentialist responders. In Experiment 3, excluding information about offspring led most participants to categorize on the basis of appearance and behavior alone. However, with offspring information included and with questioning focused on the change of kind, essentialist categorization was still surprisingly rare. We conclude that strict essentialist categorization in the transformation task is relatively rare and highly task dependent, and that categorization is more commonly based on causal homeostasis.     

Prototypicality in sentence production

Three cued-recall experiments examined the effect of category typicality on the ordering of words in sentence production. Past research has found that typical items tend to be mentioned before atypical items in a phrase—a pattern usually associated with lexical variables (like word frequency), and yet typicality is a conceptual variable. Experiment 1 revealed that an appropriate conceptual framework was necessary to yield the typicality effect. Experiment 2 tested ad hoc categories that do not have prior representations in long-term memory and yielded no typicality effect. Experiment 3 used carefully matched sentences in which two category members appeared in the same or in different phrases. Typicality affected word order only when the two words appeared in the same phrase. These results are consistent with an account in which typicality has its origin in conceptual structure, which leads to differences in lexical accessibility in appropriate contexts.     

Distinguishing prototype-based and exemplar-based processes in dot-pattern category learning

The authors contrast exemplar-based and prototype-based processes in dot-pattern categorization. In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants provided similarity ratings of dot-distortion pairs that were distortions of the same originating prototype. The results show that comparisons to training exemplars surrounding the prototype create flat typicality gradients within a category and small prototype-enhancement effects, whereas comparisons to a prototype center create steep typicality gradients within a category and large prototype-enhancement effects. Thus, prototype and exemplar theories make different predictions regarding common versions of the dot-distortion task. Experiment 2 tested these different predictions by having participants learn dot-pattern categories. The steep typicality gradients, the large prototype effects, and the superior fit of prototype models suggest that participants refer to-be-categorized items to a representation near the category's center (the prototype), and not to the training exemplars that surround the prototype.     

Domain differences in the structure of artifactual and natural categories

In three experiments, different methodologies, measures, and items were employed to address the question of whether, and to what extent, membership in a semantic category is all or none (i.e., absolute) or a matter of degree (i.e., graded). Resemblance theory claims that categorization is based on similarity, and because similarity is graded, category membership may also be graded. Psychological essentialism asserts that categorization is based on the presumption of the category essence. Because artifactual (e.g., FURNITURE) and natural (e.g., FRUIT) categories have different sorts of essences, artifacts and natural kinds may be categorized in qualitatively different manners. The results converged onthe finding of a robust domain difference in category structure: Artifactual categories were more graded than natural categories. Furthermore, typicality reliably predicted absolute category membership, but failed to predict graded category membership. These results suggest that resemblance theory and psychological essentialism may provide a concerted account of representation and categorization across domains.     

Journey to the center of the category: the dissociation in amnesia between categorization and recognition

The authors' theoretical analysis of the dissociation in amnesia between categorization and recognition suggests these conclusions: (a) Comparing to-be-categorized items to a category center or prototype produces strong prototype advantages and steep typicality gradients, whereas comparing to-be-categorized items to the training exemplars that surround the prototype produces weak prototype advantages and flat typicality gradients; (b) participants often show the former pattern, suggesting their use of prototypes; (c) exemplar models account poorly for these categorization data, but prototype models account well for them; and (d) the recognition data suggest that controls use a single-comparison exemplar-memorization process more powerfully than amnesics. By pairing categorization based in prototypes with recognition based in exemplar memorization, the authors support and extend other recent accounts of cognitive performance that intermix prototypes and exemplars, and the authors reinforce traditional interpretations of the categorization-recognition dissociation in amnesia.     

The role of graded category structure in imaginative thought

Participants generated lists of exemplars from the categories of animals, tools, and fruit, and their lists were used to determine the relative accessibility of individual exemplars. Measures of accessibility included output dominance (the number of participants who listed an exemplar), rank (how early instances were listed), and two scores that reflect their combination-output precedence and dominance/rank. Other participants drew and described novel exemplars of those categories that might exist on an imaginary planet and reported on the factors that influenced their creations. References to Earth animals, tools, or fruit were used to determine imagination frequency (the number of participants who mentioned relying on particular Earth exemplars). Items high in accessibility were also high in imagination frequency, implying that those items that come to mind most readily are the ones most likely to serve as starting points for the development of novel ideas. This result held even when task constraints weighed against the use of such items (Experiment 2) and when participants were encouraged to be as creative as possible (Experiment 4), suggesting that it is difficult to avoid the influence of highly accessible category exemplars. Other measures of category structure, including the rated typicality, familiarity, and frequency of exemplars, did not predict imagination frequency as well. The results are discussed in terms of expanding concept boundaries and the inadvertent application of knowledge that is readily accessible.     

The relationship between category typicality and concept familiarity: Evidence from Spanish- and English-speaking monolinguals

We examined the relationship between an item’s familiarity and its category typicality, employing ratings obtained from Spanish- and English-speaking monolinguals living in southern Florida. In the first experiment, Spanish- and English-speaking monolinguals were asked to rate the prototypicality of instances of 12 common language categories. The correlations between the Spanish and English speakers’ rated item typicality indicated that the prototypicality gradients of the Spanish and English monolinguals were fairly discrepant for a number of categories. In the second experiment, we examined the degree to which these differences in cultural typicality could be accounted for by differences in rated cultural familiarity. It was predicted that, if familiarity plays a role in determining cultural differences in prototypicality, statistically controlling for the effects of cultural familiarity should result in higher interlingual typicality correlations. This should be true particularly for those categories for which there is a wide discrepancy in the typicality gradients for the two language groups. These predictions were confirmed. Consequently, we conclude that item familiarity is at least one variable influencing cultural differences in category typicality gradients.     

The role of exemplar typicality and encoding strategies in category retrieval-induced forgetting

Selective retrieval practice of category exemplars often impairs the recall of related items, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). In Experiment 1 the role of item typicality (high, low) and presentation format of category exemplars (random, grouped) were analysed, while in Experiment 2 two encoding strategies (inter and intracategory) to modulate RIF were tested. Exemplar typicality was the critical factor underlying RIF. Competition during retrieval practice rendered RIF in the typical exemplars, but RIF did not appear when the exemplars were low typicality. The greater impairment of strong exemplars is in line with the inhibitory account of RIF and the notion of interference dependence. Inhibition appeared with random and grouped presentations suggesting that presentation format of the exemplars is not a critical factor in modulating RIF in a category-cued recall task. Distinctive processing instructions using sentences that connected items from different categories (intercategory strategy) and integration instructions by using size to organise the exemplars within categories (intracategory strategy) easily avoided competition and the need of inhibition processes in recall.     

Prototype abstraction by monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

The authors analyze the shape categorization of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and the role of prototype- and exemplar-based comparison processes in monkeys' category learning. Prototype and exemplar theories make contrasting predictions regarding performance on the Posner-Homa dot-distortion categorization task. Prototype theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to a representation near the category's center (the prototype)--predicts steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. Exemplar theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to memorized training exemplars-predicts flat typicality gradients and small prototype-enhancement effects. Across many categorization tasks that, for the first time, assayed monkeys' dot-distortion categorization, monkeys showed steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. These results suggest that monkeys--like humans--refer to-be-categorized items to a prototype-like representation near the category's center rather than to a set of memorized training exemplars.     

The opposite of republican: polarization and political categorization

Two experiments examined the typicality structure of contrasting political categories. In Experiment 1, two separate groups of participants rated the typicality of 15 individuals, including political figures and media personalities, with respect to the categories Democrat or Republican. The relation between the two sets of ratings was negative, linear, and extremely strong, r = ?.9957. Essentially, one category was treated as a mirror image of the other. Experiment 2 replicated this result, showing some boundary conditions, and extending the result to liberal and conservative categories. The same method was applied to two other pairs of contrasting categories, healthy and junk foods, and male and female jobs. For those categories, the relation between contrasting pairs was weaker and there was less of a direct trade‐off between typicality in one category versus typicality in its opposite. The results are discussed in terms of implications for political decision making and reasoning, and conceptual representation.     

The subjective experience of retrieval-induced forgetting

The objective was to examine whether the lower accessibility of studied items (Rp?) that follows retrieval practice with studied items from the same category (Rp+; retrieval-induced forgetting) is correctly monitored by our cognitive system. If monitored, lower confidence for Rp? items would be expected which, in turn, would allow the control of the retrieval-induced forgetting through the report option. In Experiment 1 the standard retrieval-practice paradigm with categorised word lists was followed by a recognition test with confidence rating and the option to report or withhold the answer. Accuracy showed retrieval-induced forgetting, but there were no differences in confidence. The report option did not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. The confidence–accuracy dissociation could be due to a correct monitoring of the retrieval-induced forgetting joined with a factor that incorrectly increases confidence for Rp? items. Familiarity with the practised category was proposed as this factor and tested in Experiment 2. Despite presenting the categories more times during the retrieval-practice phase to increase their familiarity, confidence ratings were unaffected. In conclusion, this research suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting was not monitored, giving rise to a confidence–accuracy dissociation.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.